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I.

INTRODUCTION

Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and
events that prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse
because the progression of the political or institutional consequence
involves entrenched behavior, anteceding determinations, and an
elevated cost of altering course. 1 Path dependent methodology has been
applied to diverse topics, such as economic behavior, party system
dynamics, the incorporation of labor movements, and implementation of
legislative agendas. 2 This article considers how the two primal riskaverse post-9/11 assumptions-that there was a global al-Qaeda
network intent on perpetrating numerous catastrophic terror attacks and
that severe psychological interrogation methods were essential for
3
prying details of plots from suspected terrorists to prevent those attacks
-initiated a path dependent process that resulted in a rampant violation
of human rights on suspected terrorists, combatants, and innocent
4
people, both in and out of war zones. Residing between the two causal
premises and the result was the intervening variable of advisory memos
that rationalized illicit interrogation practices5 with loopholes to make
1. RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DA YID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL
JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-29
(2002); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251-53 (2000).
2. Pierson, supra note 1, at 251-54.
3. Robert Bejesky, A Rational Choice Reflection on the Balance Among Individual
Rights, Collective Security, and Threat Portrayals Between 9/11 and the Invasion of Iraq,
18 BARRY L. REV. 31, 34-43 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection];
Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from Historical
Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 330-32 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Utilitarian
Rational Choice].
4. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-91; Robert Bejesky,
Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58
LOY. L. REV. 821, 823-28 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Pruning]; Robert Bejesky, Closing
Gitmo: The Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus During the Military Commissions
Circus, 7-10, 20-25 (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Epiphany Approach];
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, A National Security Agenda, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829, 835
(2010) (speaking of the Bush Administration's interrogation techniques and noting that
"[ c]hoices made by earlier administrations are difficult to reverse abruptly, if at all, and as a
result new approaches evolve slowly.").
5. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogations, 66
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legal restraints inapplicable. 6
Yet if one discards the premises, signified by the reality that the
first terrorist attack since 9/11 occurred at the 2013 Boston Marathon
when two bombs exploded and killed three Americans and injured
dozens more, 7 there has been virtually no credible evidence of sleeper
cells, realistic plots, or preparation for an attack, 8 and that wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not persuasively related to imminent threats
inside American borders; legal advisory memoranda endowed
government interrogation orders with a facade of legitimacy even as

OHIO ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 5127, 5132 (2010) [hereinafter O'Connell, Responses] (stating that "the
memo on the Geneva Conventions and other torture memos are replete with errors,
erroneous reasoning, omissions, and illogic," and the sole plausible "explanation for the
shockingly poor quality of the memos ... is that the authors intended to reach conclusions
the law did not support."); see also Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to
Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 855-61 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 348 (2004); Neal K. Katya} & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002);
Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002).
6. Linda M. Keller, ls Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 521, 551 (2005)
(opining that the advice was tantamount to "the power to commit genocide, to sanction
slavery, to promote apartheid, to license summary execution."); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,

War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age
of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 682 (2004) (noting that "lawyers for the Bush
administration went from the legitimate conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot
easily be applied to many modem conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed conclusion that
there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. interrogation practices.").
7. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, But We Can Be, 28 YALE L.
& PoL'Y REv. 419, 419 (2010) (noting that there were no attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11);
Palash R. Ghosh, Boston Marathon Bombing: A Timeline Of Terrorist Attacks on US
Targets Since 9/11, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.ibtimes.com/boston-marathon-bombing-timeline-terrorist-attacks-us-targets911-l l 93485?ft=k82h2 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
8. Ian S. Lustick, Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror and the Emperor's New
Clothes, 16 MrNN. J. INT'L L. 335, 338 (2007); The Editorial Board, Indisputable Torture,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/ 17/opinion/indisputable-torture-ofprisoners.html?ref=extraordinaryrendition&_r=O (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that a
recent "independent, nonpartisan panel's examination of the interrogation and detention
programs" implemented by the Bush Administration found violations of international law
and stated that there was "no firm or persuasive evidence that they produced valuable
information that could not have been obtained by other means"); David Cole & Jules Lobel,
Are We Safer?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007), available at http://www.latimes.com/la-opcolel8novl8,0,6931314.story (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (noting that the Justice
Department claimed that there were 261 "terrorism and terrorism-related" convictions, but
only two cases "actually involve[ed] attempted terrorist activity.").
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U.S. integrity was undermined with widespread deprivation of human
rights. 9 However, it is also possible that the memoranda were not a
consequential intervening cause that modified Bush Administration
decision-making, but instead human rights abuses may have been the
foreseeable proximate cause of White House assumptions and
solicitations for advice. 1 Consider the following causal flow:

°

FOR INTERROGATION T
ILITY DIFFUSION
R
1 · RESPONSIB
CHA

--

Bus Administration:
Preexisting Intent to
Interrogate in Violation
oflnternarional Law

Advice

1.
Responsibility Diffusion
Re

Classify
Under National

Security and Take
Action

Part JI Constitutional
•(

l. Impotent Judiciary
1.
2. Nonbinding International Law

3. Unrestricted Commander in Chief

2:
Responsibility Diffusion
Part III Circumstantial

1. Nonbinding International Law
Based on Facts
2. Failed State
3. Conflict is International inScope

4. Necessity and Self-Defense 4. Denying

) 5. Classifying Combatants
Unacceptable

6. Classifying Torture

Acceptable Wirh One Fully Compdling Posicion
An Aggregation of Specious, Ambiguous, Or Confusing Positions May Prevail

Chart 1 starts with an administration decision and request and
the outcome is torture with immunity. Newsweek referenced an
effective "call for papers" when it reported that President Bush
petitioned White House lawyers to "find a way to exercise the full
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the
Constitution: If that meant pushing the boundaries of the law, so be
9. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 875-76; David Abraham, The Bush
Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 249 (2008) (stating that "the Bush regime is known primarily for
the international mess it has created as the world's only superpower, and for the way is has
sacrificed long-accepted legal norms - military and civilian, international and domestic - in
the name of its so-called War on Terror," which led to "domestic repression" and "the
brutality and denial of legal obligations toward enemy non-Americans.").
10. Judith Resnick, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay
in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REY. 579, 612 (2010) (stating that "[t]he
Torture Memos sanctions actions that, as hundreds of pages of reports from an array of
sources now document, took place.").
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it." 11 Similarly finding specious that objective legal advice instigated
interrogation operations, Human Rights Watch emphasized that "there
is now substantial evidence that civilian leaders requested that
politically appointed government lawyers create legal justifications to
support abusive interrogation techniques, in the face of opposition from
career legal officers." 12 In December 2008, the Senate Armed Service
Committee Report explained that the solicitation "on how to use
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of
their legality, and authorized their use against detainees." 13 Professor
Jack Goldsmith, who was later appointed to head the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that was writing legal
memoranda, stated that the Bush Administration wanted to "act
aggressively and preemptively," but because officials feared
prosecution, the solution required having lawyers "find some way to
make what [Bush] did legal." 14
Of the thousands of attorneys in the Department of Justice and
American government, the White House repeatedly summoned the same
demimonde of lawyers 15 who referred to themselves as the "War
Council"-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, White House legal
counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General Counsel
William J. Haynes, and OLC Deputy Attorney General John Yoo. 16
11. Evan Thomas, Full Speed Ahead: After 9/ 11, Bush and Cheney Pressed for More
Power-and Got It. Now, Predictably, the Questions Begin. Behind the NSA Spying Furor,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
8,
2006,
7:00
PM),
available
at
http ://www.thedai lybeast.com/newsweek/2006/01 /08/full-speed-ahead.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2013).
12.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATM ENT OF DETAINEES 2 (July 2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us071 l webwcover_ 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013).
13. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
D ETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xii (2008), available at http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/Publications/EXEC%20S UMMAR Y CONCLUSIONS_For%20Release_ 12%20December%202008.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013).
14. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney 's Lawyer 's Efforts to
Expand Executive Power, WASH. POST (Sept.
5,
2007),
available at
http: //www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007 /09/04/AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
15. Robert C. Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 39, 89-90 (2009).
16. Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 389,
392 (2010) (noting that advisory opinions on war-detention, and interrogation were
"hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four highly placed government lawyers."); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 396 (2006) (stating that Bush Administration legal advisors
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The "War Council" produced legal opinions containing highly
unpopular advice and the President classified the memos under national
security so that other government lawyers could not critique the
17
consultation prior to the predetermined action being taken.
Department of Defense
experiences,
From witness
investigations, congressional hearings, correspondence among top
officials, and court records, 18 it is clear that military personnel,
interrogators, and private contractors committed acts amounting to
19
torture or inhuman treatment on detainees for several years with the
20
While top
full cognizance of Bush Administration officials.
21
the
advice,
legal
the
of
some
discarded
policymakers reportedly
damage still resulted in abuses that were condemned by Republicans,
Democrats, 22 the global community, 23 and the Justice Department's
Office of Professional Responsibility. 24
"undermined the ethics of the legal profession and violated the U.S. Constitution and the
laws of the U.S., which they were sworn to uphold.").
17. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 68,
77 (Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005) (mentioning that an ACLU
FOIA lawsuit uncovered classified legal memoranda indicating that the government
implemented a common plan to execute abhorrent interrogation practices, covered up and
lied about that scheme, isolated the plan from the law and courts, and rationalized how it
was legal) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY]; See Robert Bejesky, National
Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter's Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
399, 420-26 (2012) (discussing leaked documentation that revealed controversies); See e.g.
Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the
Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 85 (2009) (noting that the Bush
Administration supposedly changed its opinion to treat al-Qaeda and Taliban members with
some Geneva Convention protections, but this was declassified in January 2005); Michael P.
Scharf, Accountability for the Torture Memo: International Law and the Torture Memos, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 342 (2009).
18. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 104, 107-09, 112-14, 193.
19. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of
Justice, 32 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2013)[hereinafter "Bejesky, Abu Ghraib
Convictions"]; Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 852.
20. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Op-Ed, There is No Justification for Torture, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 28, 2004, at Al I ("It is . . . clear that U.S. officials knew the law was being violated
[during interrogations] and for months, possibly years, did virtually nothing about it.");
Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (stating that the Bush
Administration "condoned torture.").
21. 153 CONG. REC. S27303 (Oct. 16, 2007) (reporting that Jack Goldsmith revoked
legal memos, including those pertaining to warrantless surveillance and the Bybee torture
memo); See infra notes 239, 244, 291 and accompanying text for additional ostensible
retractions.
22. U.S. Senate Democrats, Senate Republican Have Been Outspoken Against
Torture-Will Their Votes Match Their Rhetoric?, Feb. 13, 2008, available at
http://democrats.senate.gov/2008/02/13/senate-republicans-have-been-o utspoken-against-
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Principal advisors issued opinions for the White House and
secretary of defense that inverted the law in a broad range of areas,25
ignored legal precedent, misrepresented laws to achieve a preordained
result, 26 craftily carved loopholes on what was meant by torture, opined
torture-will-their-votes-match-their-rhetoric/#.UxoZrT9dWa8 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014);
Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation Limits, WASH. POST,
Oct.
6,
2005,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/05/AR2005100502062.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014)
("Forty-six Republicans joined 43 Democrats and one independent in voting to define and
limit interrogation techniques that U.S. troops may use against terrorism suspects, the latest
sign that alarm over treatment of prisoners in the Middle East and at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, is widespread in both parties.").
23. Michael J. Kelly, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 5059,
5060 (2009) ("Because of Gitmo, torture at Abu Ghraib prison, the illegal invasion of Iraq,
and other errors in judgment committed by the Bush administration, America is no longer
regarded as a leader in human rights and an adherent to the rule of law."); UN Demands
Prosecution of Bush-Era CIA Crimes, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2013, available at
http://rt.com/usa/un-crime-cia-bush-804/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting that "[a]
United Nations investigator has demanded that the U.S. publish classified documents
regarding the CIA's human rights violations under former President George W. Bush, with
hopes that the documents will lead to the prosecution of public officials."); John H.
Cushman Jr., UN. Condemns Harsh Methods in Campaign Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.
28,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/28/politics/28nations.html?_r=O (last visited Mar. 21,
2014) ("The United Nations official charged with monitoring compliance with international
prohibitions against torture has sharply criticized several practices adopted by the Bush
administration in its campaign against terrorism").
24.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT:
INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES
RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 132, 260-61 (2009), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFina1Report090729.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2013); Philippe Sands, Poodles and Bulldogs: The United States, Britain, and the
International Rule of Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1357, 1365 (2009) (criticizing the poor quality of the
memos).
25. Several authors discussed the inversion of the rule of law. JORDAN J. PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON
TERROR 86-100 (2007) (stating that top Bush Administration officials knew they were
engaging in habitual lawbreaking, but they used lawyers to exonerate actions); see generally
STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); see
also SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB
(2004); see generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND
THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEW AR ON TERRORISM (2003).
26. Scharf, supra note 16, at 389; Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive
Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and
Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 345, 393 (2007) (stating that
"Yoo and several others in the administration endorsed the theory ... of necessity to violate
international law."). Over one hundred lawyers, five former members of Congress and
twelve former judges, contended that the legal advisors transgressed professional
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that extraordinary defensive measures were imperative for gathering
information from detainees, and contended that the series of four
27
Geneva Conventions that define war crimes and prohibit torture were
28
inapplicable or unavailing. Other scholars went further and called the
29
opm1ons "embarrassing," "utterly unjustifiable" legal analyses,
teeming with blatant errors, "not an attempt in good faith to assess the
law," 30 "flout[ing] constitutional principle by establishing law-free
zones and constitutional black holes," and offering "duplicitous parsing
of legal obligations. " 31
With the Bush Administration's request for legal memos,
predetermined preference, receipt of opinions from select lawyers, and
classification of advice, perhaps the result of torture can be expected.
The ultimate repercussion of the memoranda was a dissipation of
responsibility that diminished the likelihood that policymakers would
confront punishment for torture even though inconsequential
intervening events do not sunder the chain of causation between an act
and harm to a victim in tort or criminal law. In short, given the
consistent bias on pivotal issues when there were alternative
interpretations of the law, it is not clear that the attorney-advisors were
obligations because the "memoranda ... ignore and misinterpret the U.S. Constitution and
laws, international treaties and rules of international law." Lawyers' Statement on Bush
Administration's Torture Memos addressed to President George W. Bush, Vice President
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John
at
available
2004),
(Aug.
Congress
of
Members
and
Ashcroft,
http://uclaprofs.com/petitions/040800torturememos.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
27. Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter "Geneva I"];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Geneva Protocol Additional"].
28. See generally infra Part III.
29. Keller, supra note 6, at 551; Power, supra note 15, at 100 ("As I absorbed the
opinions, I concluded that some were deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf of the President.").
30. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5134.
31. Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, The Abuses of AntiTerrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1142
(2007); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1096-98 (2008) (stating that Bush
Administration assertions contended there was a right to defy Congressional will, laws, and
treaties via expansive interpretation of the Commander in Chief clause); Ralph Wilde, Legal
"Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 772-76 (2005) (remarking that commentators
called these areas, such as Guantanamo Bay, a place where law does not apply).
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relevant when policymakers ostensibly had the intention to do whatever
they wanted. The article assesses the far from fluky exonerating legal
positions by dividing the advice into core constitutional arguments (Part
II), factual extrapolations for Afghanistan (Part Ill), and the use of
national security secrecy to circumvent more serious condemnation for
several years (Part IV).
II.

DENYING RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Legal advisors opined that there are minimal constitutional
restrictions on executive war powers authority, by espousing a
capacious and unreviewable political question doctrine, abjuring
applicability of substantive international law, assuming carte blanche
for the Commander in Chief authority, and premising that exigency
obviated the need for reasonable adherence to human rights law. If
these foundational constitutional assertions had been convincing,
advisors would have had no rationale for generating fact-specific
opinions, which will be addressed in Parts III and IV. However, there
were prima facie weaknesses in the constitutional advice.
First, the Bush Administration assumed that courts should not
be involved in restricting government actions during the "war on
terror," which invariably would abnegate detainees from attaining
remedial relief for torture or receiving a review for the justification for
imprisonment via habeas corpus challenges. 32 Pursuant to Marbury v.
Madison, the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional
interpretation, but will refrain from "questions, in their nature
political."33 Courts are not prohibited from hearing cases with relations
to foreign affairs. 34Additionally, a judiciary that too broadly sidesteps

32. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 841-52; Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant
to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the "Zone of Twilight," 44 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1, 86-87 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, War Powers"] (Yoo contending that the judiciary
does not have a role in war powers cases despite much contrary evidence). Other denials
were aimed at foreign petitioners. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v.
Dow Chem., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16, 43-44, 48, 81-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (court dismissing
Agent Orange case brought by Vietnamese plaintiffs against U.S. corporations because it
would open the federal courthouse to "all of the Nation's past and future enemies," and the
Bush Administration argued that herbicides were not banned, hearing the case would judge
Executive war operations, and the Executive position prevailed over potential customary
international law restrictions).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 177 (1803); Edwin B. Firmage, The War
Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 Cow. L. REV. 65, 68 (1977) (noting that
because there is no political question doctrine in the Constitution, it is a common law
development).
34. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Political Question Doctrine and Corporate Complicity in
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questions with tangential political overtones may forsake constitutional
responsibilities 35 and not serve justice, prevent executive wrongdoing,
uphold the integrity of the American judicial system, fulfill reciprocal
obligations to other states, or support the democratically-derived public
choice of American citizens who heighten human rights. Indeed, the
Supreme Court disagreed with legal advisors on habeas corpus
challenges at Guantanamo Bay in a succession of cases-Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v.
Bush. 36
Second, legal advisors attenuated the binding nature of U.S.
obligations owed to other states under treaties and customary
international law. 37 Obscuring what were personal inclinations of
appointed agents as institutional dissension, John Yoo stated: "The State
Department and OLC often disagreed about international law. State
believed that international law had a binding effect on the President,
38
indeed on the United States, both internationally and domestically."
Regarding the interpretation of treaties, Attorney General John
Ashcroft, the Bush Administration's first attorney general, wrote that
the President's "determination against treaty applicability would
provide the highest assurance" that courts would not entertain charges
against American agents for violating "Geneva Convention rules
relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of
detainees. " 39
Extraordinary Rendition, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 311, 332 (2007). But see Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 ( 1997) (holding that Congress persons can lack standing
without a cognizable injury from the President's acts).
35. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 535-37 (1966).
36. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 88.
37. Tel-Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 287 (6th ed. 1963)) (stating that the law of nations has been
defined as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states
and in their relations with one another").
38. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 33 (Atl. Monthly Press) (2006); David Scheffer, Tenth Annual Grotius Lecture
Series: For Love of Country and International Criminal Law, Further Reflections, 24 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 665, 667-68 (2009) (stating that none of the principal legal advisors had a
distinguished background in international law); Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the
Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006) (critiquing
Posner and Goldsmith and their realist book) ("[N]ormative claims, if valid, would lend
support to the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a purely
instrumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do not have a moral
obligation to try to prevent their government from doing so.")
39. Document - USA: Torture, War Crimes, Accountability: Visit to Switzerland of
Former US President George W. Bush and Swiss Obligations Under International Law:
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Ashcroft's point does not clearly jibe with Supreme Court
precedent that affirms the President's war powers are circumscribed by
Congress, jurisprudence that affirms the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter
of the Constitution, 40 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention which makes
treaties binding on states and required to "be performed by them in
good faith," 41 or the U.S. Supremacy Clause which states that "all
Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land. " 42 An executive act, legislation, or court
judgment can prevail over an inconsistent international law provision
due to the last-in-time rule, 43 but transgressing treaty obligations may
still be an international law violation vis-a-vis other countries. 44 There
is also no evidence that Congress sanctioned the Bush Administration
for violating the Geneva Conventions or authorizing interrogation
techniques amounting to torture pursuant to the Joint Resolution for the
Use of Force, the Patriot Act, 45 or other executive war powers
authority. 46
A constitutional basis for discretionarily abrogating
international law obligations is sorely lacking when government action
eventuates into probable violations of }us cogens norms, universal
jurisdiction crimes, and federal statutes prohibiting torture. 47 From this
Amnesty International 's Memorandum to the Swiss Authorities, AMNESTY INT'L, available
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/009/201 l/en/e82562ec-75c9-4092-9a3aat
d2d51484e67d/amr51009201 len.html (citing position of Ashcroft on Feb. 1, 2002) (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
40. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 10, 64, 86-87.
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI,§ 2.
43. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(4) (1987); Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
45. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 134 (2004).
46. Robert Bejesky, Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions As the
Achilles' Heel of War Powers, 32 Miss. C. L. REV. 9, 19 (2013) (noting that Congress
defines the scope of the president's war powers).
47. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."); O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5128 (noting that "[n]o
government official has 'authority' to violate international law - no government official
should wish to do so."); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
175, 186 (2006) (noting that the advisor's contention that the President's decision
"concerning the detention of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners constitutes a 'controlling
Executive act' that is completely at odds with relevant Supreme Court precedents."); Id. at
179 (espousing that the legal advisors "twisted, in small and large ways, international
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48
vista and the fact that the U.S. law absolutely criminalizes torture, one
should not need to rehash the obvious, but Congress did pass a ban on
torture in December 2005 by a vote of 90-to-9. However a few days
later, Bush inserted a signing statement indicating that he would
interpret the law "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
49
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch."
Signing such statements are potentially unconstitutional and the use of
"unitary" in this context is a solecism, 50 but the practical impact was
that the President was evidently still endeavoring to unilaterally define
the fact-intensive conditions for detention and interrogation and thereby
returning to the tantamount supposition that the Executive was not
subject to constitutional constraints.
OLC advisors also denied the applicability of customary
international law when it wrote "customary international law, as a
matter of domestic law, does not bind the President, or restrict the
actions of the U.S. military, because it does not constitute either federal
law made in pursuance of the Constitution or a treaty recognized under

law.").
48. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 5 CAT/C/28/Add.5, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Feb. 9, 2000),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2013) ("No official of the government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is
authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official
condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a
justification for torture."); Harold Hongju Koh, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb./Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.koh.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013) (Harold Hongju Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights,
and labor, testifying to a U.N. committee in 2000) ("In every instance, torture is a criminal
offense. No official of the government ... is authorized to commit or instruct anyone else
to commit torture.").
49. George W. Bush, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and the Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013); ALFRED M. McCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 217 (2006); Eric
Schmitt, Editorial, House Delays Vote on U. S. Treatment of Terrorism Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A25 (reporting that the White House and the CIA lobbied to exempt
the CIA from the restrictions).
50. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 90-92; Jennifer Van Bergen, The Unitary
Executive: Is the Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State?
at
available
2006),
9,
(Jan.
FINDLAW
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109_bergen.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2013) (noting that Bush issued 435 signing statements in his first term and used the term
"unitary" in the statements 95 times, but signing statements could be unconstitutional under
Chadha and Bowsher).
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the Supremacy Clause."51 Alternatively, the Restatement (Third) of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law states "Customary law that has developed
since the United States became a state is incorporated into United States
law as of the time it matures into international law."52 Scholars concur
that torture is universally proscribed and that every state is bound to
ensure that no one is subjected to torture as a }us cogens norm and
customary international law. 53
Third, legal advisors expressed that the President, as
Commander in Chief, is not bound by law prohibiting torture when
acting to provide national security and that "any effort by Congress to
regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the
Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the
President. " 54 If this position is accurate, international law that forbids

51. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzalez, Gen. Counsel to
the President & William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Memorandum Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 2
(Jan. 22, 2002), available at www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013). Courts decide cases based on "the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States [but do] not ... conform the law of the land to norms of
customary international law." United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Yoo wrote that no one previously thought to argue that the President has disregarded
customary international law. However, there is actually a substantial literature delving into
the issue. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226-30 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 844-46 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, The President ls Bound by International Law,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 930 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: ls Violation of
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321
(1985).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at chap. 2, Introductory Note; Louis B. Sohn, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 17, 26 (1967)
(noting that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which has been called "a part of
the common law of the world community," together with the Charter of the United Nations,
has achieved the character of the world law superior to all other international instruments
and to domestic laws.").
53. See Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-35; Paust, supra note 26, at 418 (stating
that "[t]he claim that the President has authority to violate international laws of war, human
rights law, and domestic legislation is patently unconstitutional and unacceptable.");
Alvarez, supra note 47, at 186 (calling the torture memoranda "shoddy and incomplete" on
the question of treaties and a "cavalier" and "reckless" treatment of custom).
54. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 34-35, 39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) ("In
light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war ... the prohibition
against torture ... must be construed as not applying to interrogation undertaken pursuant to
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torture may be facially or upon application unconstitutional any time the
President issues authorizations to conduct alleged terrorism- or
55
combatant-related interrogations that eventuate into detainee abuse.
Moreover, the Justice Department could not prosecute interrogators for
violating the law if interrogators perpetrated torture pursuant to
directives issued under the Commander-in-Chief authority. 56 This
advice is peculiar when official government investigations revealed, and
media reports frequently surfaced with interrogators and military
personnel being accused of significant harm and Bush affirmed that he

his Commander in Chief authority."). Similarly, in a March 2003 memo, Pentagon General
Counsel William Haynes concurred and claimed that "in order to respect the President's
inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign," the prohibition against
torture "must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his
Commander-in-Chief authority." Ingrid Arnesen, Detainees Not Covered by Geneva
at
available
2004),
9,
(June
CNN
Concluded,
Report
Conventions,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/09/detention.report/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2013); see
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009)
(critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist-oriented book and stating that "[a] policy-maker
reading the book might well conclude that compliance with international law, such as the
1949 Geneva Conventions or the Convention against torture, is optional.").
55. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31 ("Even if an interrogation method arguably were to
violate Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached
on the President's constitutional power to conduct a military campaign."); Dana Priest & R.
Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7 .html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2013) (noting that the legal advisors asserted that "international laws
against torture 'may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations' conducted in President
Bush's war on terrorism.").
56. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xviii, xxi-xxii (stating that
CIA and military officials were concerned about the legality of the methods, but Yoo
advised that subordinates could not be prosecuted); Bybee, supra note 54, at 35, 31-39
(contending that U.S. officials carrying out orders could not be held responsible because
they "would be aiding the President in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities.").
Yoo contended that "Congress doesn't have the power to 'tie the President's hands in regard
to torture as an interrogation technique'. . . It's the core of the Commander-in-Chief
They can't prevent the President from ordering torture." Jane Mayer,
function.
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 114; IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at
89-90 (stating that Haynes's memo asserted that the President could authorize any physical
and psychological techniques to obtain "intelligence" to protect Americans, and that a
presidential directive pursuant to wartime powers could be used by interrogators who torture
suspects to avoid liability); Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to
Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the
Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 , 623 (2005)
(stating that the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum apply an eccentric "theory of ratification"
that contends that the President has implied constitutional powers to issue orders to make
actions of his subordinates inherently legal).
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"never ordered torture" 57 and mandated that interrogators "stay within
U.S. law." 58
If the advice contending that war crime prohibitions did not
restrict either the Commander-in-Chief authority or derivative acts
committed by subordinates had been sound, the President would not
need to refute anything, or direct subordinates to remain within U.S.
law, because Presidential directives and subsequent subordinate acts
were above criminal laws restricting torture. Additionally, it is puzzling
that states contemplated, negotiated, and ratified treaties applicable to
war and armed combat with provisions that explicitly prohibited
interrogation and accepted conventions proscribing torture under all
circumstances, but these obligations were now inapplicable to the U.S.
President59 when acting as "Commander in Chief," which is activated
by Congress and foremost germane to directing U.S. troops into armed
combat.
Fourth, one of Bybee' s memoranda to Gonzales and Haynes
also maintained that the Commander in Chief authority prevails over
international and domestic law because self-defense and necessity can
permit suspending legal obligations (such as the Geneva
Conventions),60 allow harsh interrogations, and absolve interrogators
from criminal liability. 61 If the reasonableness of necessity and selfdefense are systematized as philosophical lenses of the world, such as
with realist views of Thomas Hobbes who emphasized self-preservation
at one pole and liberalist views of Immanuel Kant who emphasized the
importance of human dignity at the other pole, Bush nestled closely to

57. Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A60719-2004Jun22.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
58. President Bush Holds Press Conference Following the G8 Summit, WHITE HOUSE
(June
10,
2004),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-36.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2013).
59. See generally STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1999) (stating that "[s]tronger
states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the one that best suits their
instrumental objectives," which may only require rationalizations to justify the action
predominantly for the domestic audience).
60. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-15, 27-29; Paust, supra note 26, at 356 (quoting John
Yoo: "It seems to me that if something is necessary for self-defense, it's permissible to
deviate from the principles of Geneva [including the prohibition of torture].").
61. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31-40; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 84 (2005) (stating that if such
notions are relayed down the chain of command, loose talk regarding necessity and selfdefense might persuade interrogators to conceive that their operations were justified).
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Hobbesian notions of self-preservation62 and therein impaired the
opposing Kantian position as those of critics who were "soft on
terrorism" and who unreasonably desired to limit presidential
authority. 63 There are several weaknesses in this position.
First, as the opening chart imparted, the driving perception of
peril cast by the government into societal discourse may not be a
rational and sober portrayal. Second, even with a gap between
perception and reality, the President's core preclusive constitutional
authority to suspend certain laws and take preemptive action refers to
responding to an exigent and substantiated jeopardy that imperils the
nation. 64 The Bush Administration issued annual and ongoing public
emergency inside the U.S. for several years, 65 which was ostensibly
specious when the country continued to function as usual. The post9/ 11 world is not the American Civil War, 66 which enveloped two
62. Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan: The
False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L. REv.
899, 905, 907-08, 911-12 (2010); Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L.
REV. 29, 44-47 (2011) (discussing the division between risk-averse realist and cooperative
liberalist positions). Rumsfeld justified severe interrogation techniques by calling them
"hardened criminals willing to kill themselves and others for their cause," and Cheney
called captives "the worst of a very bad lot. They are very dangerous." PETER IRONS, WAR
POWERS 248 (2005).
63. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM 213 (2008).
64. President Thomas Jefferson stated that the "law of necessity, of selfpreservation, ... [involves] saving our country when in danger." DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S
CONSTITUTION 193 (2003) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept.
20, 1810), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1231, 1231 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
Secretary of State Daniel Webster explained that to use military force requires "a necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choices of means, and no moment for
deliberation." R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(1938) (expressing that "acts of self-defense must occur only during the last feasible
window of opportunity in the face of an attack that is almost certainly going to occur").
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
at
available
1998),
17,
(July
A/CO NF .183/9
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) ("A personal
shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct ... [t]he person
acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person," or engaged in an act of
military necessity required for survival that is proportionate to the danger).
65. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 330-32, 340-41; Bejesky,
Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 6-14, 21; Av. Secretary of State (No. 1) [2005]
2 A.C. [96]-[97] (British high court deciding that post-9/11 laws to respond to terrorism did
not meet the definition of a public emergency under the ECHR because "[t]he real threat to
the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws
and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.").
66. Eric K. Yamamoto, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the
Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: White (House)
Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

24

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

Path Dependent Result of Torture

2013]

17

halves of a country seeking domination. Accepting similar conceptions
of danger might permit any country to suggest national peril during
criminal crackdowns and to engage in torture, suspend habeas corpus,
and exonerate the crimes of government officials.
Third, the Bush Administration engaged in a bait-and-switch by
stating that interrogation was necessary to thwart terrorism, but
extended notions of self-defense and necessity inside and outside of war
zones even though international agreements and customary international
law expressly prohibit torture outside war zones, and the Geneva
Conventions additionally prohibit interrogations inside war zones. 67
Fourth, issuing orders for interrogations that approximate torture and
violatejus cogens norms are prohibited under all circumstances. 68
III. APPL YING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO AFGHANISTAN

A. Gainsaying International Law by Factual Application
As depicted in the last part, the claim that the President, under
the Commander in Chief authority or other constitutional powers, can
order subordinates to execute actions that constitute human rights
violations is unpersuasive. 69 Had the constitutional arguments been
compelling, the legal advisors would not technically have needed to
offer fact-specific exemptions for Afghanistan that sought the same
outcome via legal contextualization. However, advisors did offer factintensive positions, including that Afghanistan was a failed state under
Taliban control, combat in Afghanistan was "international in scope" but
that the Geneva Conventions were not binding, the characteristics of
National Security Abuses, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 (2005) (contending that
"claims of urgent need" are false and are raised to "justify aggressive actions" and
individual threat misrepresentations are only "the tip of proverbial iceberg" of a larger
pattern of misrepresentations.)
67. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 2(2), opened for signature Dec. 10. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT] ("No exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture."). In October 2004, Theo van Boven, UN Special Rappoteur on torture,
responded to the Bush Administration's legal arguments involving "necessity" and "selfdefense" as justifications to attain information, and stated: "The condoning of torture is, per
se, a violation of the prohibition of torture." Many Countries Still Appear Willing to Use
Torture, Warns UN Human Rights Official, UN DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/27102004.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
69. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-35; Harold Hongju Koh, Friedmann Award
Essay: A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 642, 648-49 {2005).
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combatants made them unprotected under the Geneva Conventions,
approved interrogation techniques were not torture, and extraterritorial
jurisdiction did not requisition elevated human right protections. If
claims are sufficiently compelling, or are at least effectively immune
from discredit, the likelihood of imposing liability for human rights
abuses is reduced.

B. Failed State
In January 2002, legal advisors wrote that the Geneva
Convention and the U.S. War Crimes Act did not apply to al-Qaeda or
Taliban captives in Afghanistan because Afghanistan was a "failed
71
state."70 The White House rapidly endorsed the opinion, but the
underlying consultation is bothersome for several reasons.
First, under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, to qualify as a
state there must be a defined territory, a permanent population, and a
72
government in control that can enter into international relations. The
73
question of political recognition is separate from state recognition and
even if a state effectively collapses and the government does not
discharge basic sovereign functions, the international community does
not typically revoke recognition, 74 but recognition can be employed by
stronger states as a political instrument. 75 Likewise, foreign powers
70. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2; Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020125.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013)
(stating that international conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because the Taliban "did
not exercise full control over the territory or over the people" of Afghanistan, "was not
recognized by the international community," "could not fulfill international obligations,"
and was a militant group rather than a government, which made the Geneva Conventions
"obsolete" and inapplicable in this new type of war); see also S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1378 (2001) (condemning the Taliban's governance over Afghanistan); Lawrence
Azubuike, Status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J.
INT'L. L. 127, 134 (2003); David Akerson & Natalie Knowlton, President Obama and the
International Criminal Law of Successor Liability, 37 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 615, 633
(2009).
71. Paust, supra note 5, at 831.
72. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
73. Id. art. 3 (stating that the "political existence of the state is independent of
recognition by other states").
74. Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense
Post-9/11, 105 A.J.I.L. 244, 249 (2011).
75. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 15 (noting that weaker states have typically argued that
recognition should be automatic, whereas stronger states have selectively use recognition as
a political instrument); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Movement: Changes in the Legal Theory of
Statehood, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 209, 234-35 (2011) (noting that whether dominant
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cannot violate another state's sovereign rights even if a state lacks
recognition 76 because there are different types of sovereignty that do not
covary; a state can have one form of sovereignty but not another, such
as by retaining international law and W estphalian rights even when it
does not exhibit convincing domestic sovereignty or cogent control. 77 If
the level of violence is an effective indicator, perhaps the Taliban was
the legitimate government in control and did instill meaningful authority
prior to the invasion, whereas Afghanistan slid more into a failed state
status under U.S. occupation because the insurgency and fighting
became more intense over the past eleven-year occupation. 78
Second, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 79 some U.S. allies,
and other countries officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate
government in power, 80 which means that some states did regard the

and regional countries grant statehood is telling).
76. Sterio, supra note 75, at 217-18 (stating that as long as a territory has state
sovereignty it has a sovereignty shield that a non-state does not necessarily possess); Milena
Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans, " Secession, and the Great
Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 148-49 (2010) (noting that there are some
anomalies where a territory could be treated as a state when it does not possesses the four
elements or a territory not being treated as a state when the four elements exist).
77. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 3-4, 12 ("A state with very limited effective domestic
control could still have complete international legal sovereignty" and be recognized as a
"juridical equal by other states.").
78. Stuart Hendin, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights: The Differing
Decisions of Canadian and UK Courts, 28 WINDSOR REV. L. & Soc. ISSUES 57, 68 (2010)
(pointing out that from 2005 to 2008, Foreign Policy published a list of "failed states" since
2005 and Afghanistan has been on the list); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan's
Insurgency, 32 INT'L SEC. 7, 7-8 (2008) (noting that from 2002 to 2006, insurgent-initiated
attacks increased by 400%, and insurgent-initiated attacks increased another 27% in 2007);
Deb Riechmann, Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Increase, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 27,
2012), available at http://www.newsday.com/news/world/insurgent-attacks-in-afghanistanincrease-1.3865838 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (insurgent attacks spiked in 2010 and
exceeded that violence in 2012). Increased violence followed the invasion and occupation.
As an example of similarly loose treatment in which no attributes of official sovereignty
existed, in mid-December 2012, the U.S. recognized a purported coalition of rebel groups as
the representative of the Syrian people. Jessica Golloher, Russia Slams US over its Syria
Stance, VOA NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.voanews.com/content/russiacriticizes-us-for-recognizing-syrian-opposition/1563252.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
The Assad family has ruled the country for decades. Erin McClam, Who are the Assads?
Inside the family that has ruled Syria for decades, NBC NEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2013)
available at http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/29/20247267-who-are-theassads-inside-the-family-that-has-ruled-syria-for-decades?lite (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
79. Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from the
Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619, 628 (2005).
80. Joshua S. Clover, Comment, "Remember, We 're The Good Guys": The
Classification and Trial of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 359
(2004).
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Taliban as the de Jure government. 81 Afghanistan also remained a
member of international institutions during the 1990s. 82 Denying
recognition to Afghanistan also seems affected and inconsistent with the
facts because both the Clinton and Bush Administrations held
diplomatic relations with the Taliban as they discussed a potential
contract with multinational energy companies for constructing a transConsequently, even without being legallycountry pipeline. 83
recognized or holding membership in organizations, the Taliban was at
least the de facto government of Afghanistan. 84
Third, Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions, 85
which binds the territory and successive regimes after ratification.
Legal advisers recognized that Afghanistan had been a party to the
Geneva Conventions prior to the Taliban coming to power. 86 The
87
Geneva Conventions apply during all conflicts and to all combatants
and humanitarian law is designed to protect human rights of everyone
during combat and wars, 88 which obviates the logic that inhabitants of a
81. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 539 n.19, 543-44 (2002). Former State Department
legal advisor William Taft IV wrote, "before, during, and after the emergence of the
Taliban ... Afghanistan constituted a state." Mayer, supra note 56, at 112.
82. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 116 (3d ed. 2010).
83. Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market
Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 265-71 (2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Geopolitics"];
Azubuike, supra note 70, at 133 (stating that the U.S., through the CIA, reportedly helped
bring the Taliban to power).
84. Annyssa Bella), Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and
Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT' L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 25 (Mar. 2011),
available at www .icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-maslen.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013) (stating that "the Taliban before and in 2001 ... surely fulfilled the criterion
of de facto authority over a population"); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black
Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 7 (2004) ("Before the armed conflict started, the Taliban
government had been in effective control of Afghanistan."). Examples of de facto states
include Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Northern Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Southern Ossetia
and Taiwan. Sterio, supra note 75, at 226.
85. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Signatories to Protocol Additional to the Geneva
at
available
1949,
August
12
of
Conventions
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Nov. 11, 2013)
(Afghanistan signed in 1949 and became a party in 1956).
86. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-11, 14-20.
87. Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos addressed to
President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Members of Congress, supra note 26 ( over
one hundred legal professionals signing).
88. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283, OEA/Ser.LN/11.106,
doc.6 rev., at 1291 (1999), available athttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/us 109-99 .html
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territory cannot derive rights when present in a "failed state."89
Moreover, it is not clear that Geneva requires Afghanistan to be a party
for the rules to be binding because Geneva law is non-derogative and is
not premised on reciprocal compliance, but on obligations owed by and
to all humankind. 90 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
mandates that all detainees "shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely," which is an assurance that is not subject to the Executive
discretion of a participant country. 91
Fourth, as a practical argument, Bush's legal advisers
maintained that a blanket non-suspension approach would be unwise
because "international law would leave an injured party effectively
remediless if its adversaries committed material breaches of the Geneva
Conventions."92 Ergo, irrespective of whether obligations are driven by
universality, American soldiers could not be guaranteed to receive
protected treatment from a foe that is not bound to the Geneva
Conventions when hospitable treatment is normally based on
reciprocity. 93 It is unfortunate that wartime humanitarian abuses can

(last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (Geneva rights should be viewed broadly because "individual
rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity"); Mayer, supra note 56, at 114 (A
former State Department lawyer remarking: "There is no such thing as a non-covered person
under the Geneva Conventions."); Robert A. Peal, Combatant Status Review Tribunals and
the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634 (2005) (noting
distinctions between a war and armed conflict, such as the intensity of the violence, and
capability of the parties to endure sustained fighting).
89. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013) (responding to Yoo's draft and noting that carte blanche denial of POW
status to the Taliban, assuming Afghanistan ceased to be a party to Geneva, that the
president can suspend Geneva's applicability in Afghanistan, and that customary
international law does not bind the U.S., are all wrong).
90. Paust, supra note 5, at 815, 830 (calling the January 9, 2002 memo another
"attempted avoidance of international and domestic criminal responsibility for interrogation
tactics."); Scharf, supra note 17, at 94-95 (former JCS General Richard Myers explaining:
"We train our people to obey the Geneva Conventions, it's not even a matter of whether it is
reciprocated-it's a matter of who we are.").
91. Paust, supra note 26, at 407; Steyn, supra note 84, at 5 (noting that "[w]hatever
their status, such prisoners are entitled to humane treatment"); 3 COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 35-37 (Jean S.
Picteted., 1960) (stating that Common Article 3 is "applicable automatically, without any
condition in regard to reciprocity"); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2005)
(referencing that the ICRC also interprets Article 3 expansively and reasoned that "nobody
in enemy hands can be outside the law"); Id. at 2795-96 (holding that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions applies to all expansive combat between countries and non-state
actors).
92. Bybee, supra note 51, at 24-25.
93. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 43 (reciprocity requirement to provide names of
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occur, and that both sides of a conflict typically commit human rights
abuses to varying degrees, 94 but given that advisory opinions and Bush
Administration statements were issued so early after invasion and
captured detainees were quickly being removed from Afghanistan, one
might even view that the Bush Administration provided the initial
predominant signal to combatants in Afghanistan that the U.S. was not
95
This is a costly
obligated to treat detainees with full protections.
signal for American troops because the Geneva Conventions are the
most reliable framework that would protect Americans if they were
captured in a foreign country,96 and compelling arguments can be made
that the reputational effect for not providing humane treatment is grave.

C. International in Scope
Legal advisors concurred that the bulk of the Geneva
Convention did not apply to protect al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan because Common Article 2 applies to "armed conflict
individuals detained); id., art. 132 ( obligation to exchange prisoners to the other side when
hostilities end). Perhaps somewhat baffling with such consternation over reciprocity, is that
the legal advisors initially contended (and the Bush Administration agreed) that the Geneva
Conventions were inapplicable to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which insinuates that the foe
must also not be bound, but Gonzales opined that customary laws of war could still be
utilized to bring war crimes charges against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for combat in
Afghanistan. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2-3, 25 ("Taliban troops ... torture. any American
prisoners ... [t]he U.S. military thus could prosecute Taliban militiamen for war crimes for
engaging in such conduct.").
94. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL 115-19 (2004).
95. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 711, 758 (2008)
(contending that when the Bush Administration violated International Humanitarian Law, it
"provided an added incentive for non-state actors to take the position that IHL does not
apply to them.").
96. Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel
at
available
2002),
26,
(Jan.
1
President
the
to
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (stating the Geneva Conventions should apply to those captured in Afghanistan and
failure to do so would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the
Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in
this specific conflict and in general"); Joby Warrick, Administration says Particulars may
Trump Geneva Protections, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2008), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-27 /politics/36898081 _ 1_interrogationbenczkowski-letters (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). Senator Graham, who opposed the
administration's detainee policies, remarked that the Geneva Convention "rules we set up
speak more about us than it does the enemy." Kate Zernike, G.O.P. Senator Resisting Bush
at
available
2006),
18,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Detainees,
over
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07 /18/washington/18graham.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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'between two or more of the High Contracting Parties"' and Article 3
did not apply. 97 Common Article 2 refers to conflict with two or more
opposing states engaged in international armed conflict; 98 and Common
Article 3 applies to non-international armed conflict,99 which by process
of elimination, applies to any type of conflict not involving two rival
states, such as combat between government forces and insurgents or
non-governmental forces.
Common Article 3 is consistent with
ensuring that all persons involved in conflict have human rights and are
protected. 100
97. Bybee, supra note 51, at 9 ("[A] non-governmental organization cannot be parties
to any of the international agreements here governing the laws of war. .. al-Qaeda is not a
High Contracting Party. As a result, the U.S. military's treatment of al-Qaeda members is
not governed by the bulk of the Geneva Conventions, specifically those provisions
concerning POWs."); see also id. at 9-10 (al-Qaeda is a "non-governmental terrorist
organization" and al-Qaeda and the Taliban were criminal organizations, which meant there
were no available protections under the Third Geneva Convention.). Gonzales, Haynes, and
Yoo concurred. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ I 0/24/international/worldspecial2/24gitmo.html ?pagewanted
=all&position= (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (Gonzales called the opinion "definitive.").
Haynes and Yoo contended that "neither the Third nor Fourth Geneva Conventions
protected al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan," and Bybee contended
that "neither the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions would apply to the
detention of al-Qaeda prisoners." Bybee, supra note 51, at 37; Jeremy Waldron, Torture
and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691
(2005) (noting that Yoo contended that the Geneva Conventions "apply to some captives or
detainees but not to others, and that they do not apply to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees in
the war on terror."). On April 4, 2003, Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker concurred
that the Taliban was not afforded protection under the Geneva Convention because they are
"unlawful combatants" and that it does not apply to al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not a
contracting party. Paust, supra note 5, at 841-42.
98. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
[hereinafter "Geneva II"]. An "armed conflict," whether of an international or noninternational character is "a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
70 (Int') Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
99. Article Three applies in "cases of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." Geneva I, supra note 27,
art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 98, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter "Geneva Ill"].
100. See Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13 YALE H.R.
& DEV. L.J . 185, 208 (2010) (noting that an egalitarian understanding of the law mandates
that all human beings be regarded with equal worth); see O'Connell, Responses, supra note
5, at 5132 (noting that "all persons caught up in armed conflict have the protections of the
Geneva Conventions - all persons"); see also Jordan Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and
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Citing legal memoranda, Bush announced that he had "the
authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the
United States and Afghanistan," but would not presently do so; that he
accepted legal advice contending that "Article 3 of Geneva does not
apply to either al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other
reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common
Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an international
character;"' and that he would still apply provisions of Geneva "to our
present conflict with the Taliban." 101
There is substantial precedent to support the position that
battling terrorism is an international armed conflict requiring Geneva
protections, 102 but it might have even been logical to announce that
American operations in Afghanistan did not involve armed conflict of
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment,
Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1335, 1351 (2004) (stating that Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions guarantee
minimum protections, including the right to be free from torture, humiliation, and cruel and
unusual treatment, and to be treated humanely, and Article 3 applies to all detainees,
including POWs and unprivileged belligerents).
101. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Dick Cheney, et
al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2013); Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, WHITE HOUSE, available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13 .html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate
Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva] Convention, and the President
has determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention.").
102. Comm 'n of Inquiry on Lebanon, Rep. Pursuant to Human Rights Council
55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2, (Nov. 23, 2006) (finding the fighting
Resolution S-2/1,
between Israel and Hezbollah an international armed conflict, substantially because
Hezbollah was called a "militia belonging to a Party to the conflict."); HCJ 769/02 Public
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, at 43 [2006], available at
that
(holding
http://elyonI.court.gov .il/Files_ ENG/02/690/007 I A34/02007690.a34.pdf
military operations against terrorism involved an "armed conflict of an international
character," requiring application of the Geneva Conventions); contra Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006) (calling conflict with al-Qaeda a non-international armed
conflict); see also Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT'L
at
available
(2007),
377-78
373,
CROSS
RED
REV.
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_ 866_ milanovic.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013). Also, if there is a sufficiently substantial connection between a state and a nongovernmental group, then the fighting should be called an international conflict. Sylvain
Vite, Typology ofArmed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and
Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED. CROSS 69, 71 (2009), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A Judgment on Appeal,, 92-93 , (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tadaj990715e.pdf (holding that there is an international armed conflict when a non-state group
is in conflict with another state when the non-state group "belongs to" another state).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

32

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Path Dependent Result of Torture

25

an international character, perhaps due to the "failed state" allegation, as
long as one finds that operations involve conflict not of an international
character, 103 which implicitly still means that basal Geneva Convention
rights apply. Ultimately, with Bush offering the indecisive comment of
having authority to "suspend the Geneva Convention" 104 and that
minimal standards of Article 3 did not apply, an impression is
seemingly implanted that nothing is truly binding and that any
protection from that origin of zilch appears gratuitous. Ironically
enough, Bush did not eagerly apply Geneva provisions, 105 but instead
stated several years later that Article 3 applied. 106
The other problem stems from the use of heuristics-the
targeted foe evolved and there was selective use of the phrase "war on
terrorism" to empower the president on the one hand and reduce
international law restrictions on the other. Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in September 2001 to
permit the U.S. military to capture Osama bin Laden and those
associated with 9/11, which was then expanded to suspected al-Qaeda
members in Afghanistan, to the Taliban, and to segments of the Afghani
population that opposed the occupation after the U.S. installed a
president and established military bases. 107 The United Nations called
the attack on Afghanistan a "war" between two states, and Bush said the
attack on Afghanistan was part of a "war on terror" apparently harbored
those connected to 9/11. 108 Thus, for purposes of unleashing unbridled
l 03. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, 64-65, ,, 114-16 (June 27) (holding that the Contras' battle against the
legitimate government of Nicaragua was a non-international armed conflict, but the U.S.
involvement in training, equipping, and financing the Contras did not result in effective
control over the Contras); David Glazier, Playing By the Rules, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV.
957, 994 (2009) (discussing the battle with al-Qaeda and expressing that "[i]f the choice is
between the rules governing 'international' and 'noninternational' conflict, then the former
is clearly the better alternative.").
104. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 101 (Bush remarking: "Although we never recognized
the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva]
Convention, and the President has determined that the Taliban are covered by the
Convention.").
105. William H. Taft, The Geneva Conventions and the Rules of War in the Post-9/11
and Iraq World, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 149, 154-55 (2005) (noting that Bush did not
implement the provisions).
106. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007) ("Common Article
3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency.")
107. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 83, at 273.
108. Bush Gives Update on War Against Terrorism, CNN (Oct. 11, 2001), available at
http://articles.cnn.com/200 l-10-11 /us/gen.bush.transcript_ 1 terror-islamic-nationswar?_ s=PM: US ("[W]ar against all those who seek to export terror and a war against those
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moral and legal authority or power and deploying sophisticated
weaponry and aircraft and the U.S. military under the Commander-in109
which
Chief authority to combat a formidable army, it is a war,
suggests there is an international armed conflict and Article Two should
have applied inside Afghanistan.
The inconsistency arises when al-Qaeda as the enemy is
emphasized to call it a "global" war, but under international law, a state
cannot be at war with belligerents, insurgents, or non-state actors, such
as Osama bin Laden. Only Congress can declare war and it technically
never authorized any broadly construed "war on terror," 110 but Bush
interpreted the AUMF to assume expansive Commander-in-Chief
111
authority for war against "every terrorist group of global reach."
However, because war is a conflict involving at least two opposing
states, 112 perhaps commentators are correct that "the war on terror" was

governments that support or shelter them."); Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 79, at 629-30;
Johannes van Aggelen, The Bush Administration 's War on Terror: The Consequences of
Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Victims, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 30 (2009) ("Neither of the Security Council resolutions nor NATO's
September 12, 2001 statement attempted to establish a link between terrorist acts and a
particular state.") NATO members deployed troops. Kenneth Anderson, United Nations

Collective Security and the United States Security Guarantee in an Age of Rising
Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L.
55, 68 (2009) ("[NATO] went along to support an ally in a general sense, [but] not because
they believed this mission was actually core to the NA TO mutual security pact.").
109. Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New
Paradigm" of International Law? 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 88-89 (2005).
110. Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking al-Qaeda and Iraq, 56 How.
L.J. 1, 8-11 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, CFP"]; Paust, supra note 26, at 346; see contra
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2056-57 (2005) (disagreeing with those contending
that "powers being granted to the President are limited or truncated in some fashion because
Congress has not declared war" and that "the powers granted to the President in the AUMF
are limited or truncated in some fashion because conflict with terrorists is not a 'real war."').
111. Marks, supra note 109, at 75; Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies
to Combat Al-Qa'eda, the Taliban, and the Associated Forces - The First Year, 30 PACE L.
REv. 340, 344-45 (2010) (stating that the "War on Terror" is "not accurate in what it
purported to describe" and does not list an enemy); Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming
Necessity, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 230 (2008) ("By invoking a so-called 'war on terrorism,'
government officials seek the availability of exceptional powers to act.").
112. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN
OF INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 21-22 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. Inc. 1983) (1762) ("War is not therefore a relationship between one man and
another, but relationship between one state and another. In war private individuals are
enemies only incidentally: not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers."); YoRAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 5 (4th ed. 2005) ("In all definitions it is
clearly affirmed that war is a contest between states.").
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only a metaphor 113 that called for improved police work. 114 Whatever
the invasion of Afghanistan should have been called, and whether it was
international or non-international conflict, international law does not
permit denying Geneva Convention protections or grant a right to
engage in interrogation tactics that may be torture. 115 Nonetheless, the
bifurcation of the enemy and select use of rhetoric may also have led to
esoteric assumptions about U.S. military operations in foreign lands and
another legal loophole that rejected occupation and human rights law,
which ordinarily guarantee generally-applicable rights even when the
Geneva Conventions are inapplicable.

D. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) affirms: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." 116 The
Bush Administration reduced the ICCPR's jurisdictional applicability
by omitting the "subject to its jurisdiction" portion of the provision and
contended that U.S. human rights obligations were only available in the
"territory of the United States." 117 Alternatively, Germany, the U.K.,
Australia, and Belgium all executed documents with the UN that
recognized that they accepted jurisdiction over actions of their forces
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq; 118 U.S. military doctrine requires
human rights treaties to be followed in foreign stability operations; 119
113. Brooks, supra note 6, at 716-17; George Anastaplo, September 11th, A Citizen's
Responses (Continued), 4 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 135, 157 (noting that 9/11 was "a vicious
assault by a gang of international criminals"); Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, "Global War on
Terror" is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-25/politics/36918330_ 1_congressionaltestimony-obama-administration-memo (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
114. Anastaplo, supra note 113, at 154.
115. CAT, supra note 68.
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
117. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: United States of America,, 130, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005).
118. Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 256 n.124 (2010).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3.07: STABILITY OPERATIONS 1-7 (Oct. 6,
2008), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOTNT PUBLICATION 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, at 11-2 (Jan. 10, 1995), available at
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/cgi-
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and the Bush Administration's position was inconsistent with existing
120
the Interprecedent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
121
UN Human Rights
American Committee on Human Rights,
Committee, 122 and the UN General Assembly, 123 which have affirmed
that human rights treaties apply beyond a state's territory.
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) precedent is not
binding on the U.S., but interpretations provide insight and persuasive
bin/virtcdlib/index.cgi/4240529/FID6/pdfdocs/jel/new_pubs/jp 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) ( "[Military officials and troops] respect human rights. We observe the Geneva
Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience.").
120. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136,, 109 (July 9) (holding that the jurisdiction of
states "may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory," particularly when there
is a "constant practice" of exercising control over that territory); Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 39
(June 21) ("[T]he fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory
does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law"). The
Wall advisory opinion states that the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights,
the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, all
apply extra-territorially when a state exercises effective control over a foreign territory.
Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective
Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by
Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 113, 130 (2010); Cleveland, supra note 118, at 259-60 (noting that the ICJ has held that
either territorial control or "effective control" implicates international legal obligations).
121. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba), Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532, 533-34
(2002). (determining that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were held under the "authority
and control" of the U.S. military, making human rights treaties applicable); Alejandre v.
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Com'n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L.N/Il.106, doc. 3
rev. P 25 (1999).
122. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th Sess., May 26,
2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, at,, 2, 9-10 (March 29, 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/478b26ae2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (ICCPR
jurisdiction applies, based on reciprocal obligations, to states for "all persons who may be
within their territory" and "to all persons subject to their jurisdiction" when the party has
"effective control" over the territory); Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No.
12.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (holding that "it would be
52/1979, at 88,
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant [ICCPR] as
to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another
State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory."); ICCPR, supra note
116, art. 2(1) (stating that the agreement applies "to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction").
123. Patrick Walsh, Fighting for Human Rights: The Applicability of Human Rights
Treaties to United States' Military Operations, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 45, 53-54 (2009);
Heidi Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights In the JCRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 268 (2006).
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precedent to the jurisdictional applicability of human rights via
"effective control." 124 Article 1 of the ECHR employs language
guaranteeing that all persons shall have secure rights and freedoms
"within [the] jurisdiction" of the parties. 125 Consequently, the ECHR
grants protection "to everyone within their jurisdiction," 126 which
includes extending obligations on a member state when there is
effective control outside national territory, including for what follows
after lawful or unlawful military action. 127
The ECHR addressed case specific facts involving the
occupation of Iraq and extended ECHR obligations to member states
due to effective control. 128 With respect to the U.S., the Security
Council authorized occupation, 129 which inherently affirms effective
control, including after a new Iraqi government was installed, because
"territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army." 130 Scholars may disagree over the point
at which "war" in Afghanistan turned to occupation.

124. Cleveland, supra note 118, at 261-66 (emphasizing that effective jurisdiction is
consistent with other ECJ cases and that "effective control" is not limited to a state's
sovereign territory).
125. Convention for the Protection Of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
I, Sept. 3 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
126. Id.
127. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-Xll Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 354-55 (holding that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is particularly appropriate when acts of state "produced effects or
were performed outside their own territory, where as a consequence of military action
(lawful or unlawful) the state exercised effective control of an area outside its national
territory, whether it was exercised directly, through the respondent state's armed forces, or
through a subordinate local administration"); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 2122, 24-25 (ser. A) ( 1995) (holding that that Turkey was in effective control over Cyprus
because it possessed authority to implement and enforce policies with a military presence of
30,000 troops, and was liable for upholding human rights in Northern Cyprus).
128. AI-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [153]
(case involving British soldiers apparently killing six Iraqi citizens in Iraq (one was
reportedly in a British detention facility)); Dan E. Stigall, Counterinsurgency and Trends in
the Law of International Armed Conflict, 30 PA. J. INT'L L. 1367, 1373-75 (2009)
(describing how the Al-Skeini case history depicts some unwillingness within British
institutions to accept jurisdiction over British acts in Iraq); Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [64], [66], available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1598.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013)
(holding that U.S. detentions of noncitizens, who are "subject to indefinite detention in
territory over which the U.S. has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of his detention before any court of tribunal," were arbitrary and "in apparent
contravention of fundamental principles").
129. S.C. RES. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003)(recognizing obligations
of the legal status of occupation).
130. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct.
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Despite all the precedent relating to jurisdictional applicability
of the ICCPR, it may still be reasonable to interpret from the negotiating
history and objections that the ICCPR was not always intended to apply
beyond a state's sovereign territory for military operations, but this is
because international humanitarian law is required to be followed
during combat. 131 The problem is rather obvious because the last part
addressed how the Bush Administration used fuzzy reasoning with
Article 2 and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to deny full
132
Another method of
applicability of international humanitarian law.
denying international law restrictions is to focus on the characteristics
of the enemy, which could also deny POW status and advance a policy
of removing detainees from Afghanistan and transporting them across
the Atlantic Ocean to Guantanamo; a location with an "ambiguous legal
status" 133 and that may have been partially relevant to the removal of
detainees from Iraq 134 and to abductions and Extraordinary Rendition of
135
suspected terrorists in other parts of the world.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306, 1 Bevans 631.
131. Walsh, supra note 123, at 51-52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIST OF ISSUES TO BE
CONSIDERED DURTNG THE EXAMTNATION OF THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 32 (Apr. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013) (John Bellinger, State Department legal advisor, remarking that "neither the text of
the Convention [Against Torture], its negotiating history, nor the U.S . record of ratification
supports a view that Article 3 of the CAT applies to persons outside the territory of the
United States"). The CAT requires parties to undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in Article 1. CAT, supra note 68, at art. 2( 1).
132. See Human Rights Council, U.N. Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to
Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, ,, 99, 101 U.N. Doc.
http://daccess-ddsat
available
2010),
19,
(Feb.
A/HRC/13/42
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/99/PDF/G l 013499.pdf?OpenElement (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013) (stating that the Bush Administration decided that human rights law would
not apply in Afghanistan or in detention centers at Guantanamo Bay and other places around
the world).
133. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional law:
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 306 (2006); Rasul v. Bush,
124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-99 (2004) (holding that overseas detainees could attain relief in U.S.
courts for habeas corpus violations, and attain civil damages for international law
It is surprising that the Bush Administration utilized this ambiguous
violations).
jurisdictional status because when the U.S. criminalized torture in 1994 for acts perpetrated
by U.S. citizens outside the U.S., it was understood that the statute did not apply because
Guantanamo Bay was "within the definition of the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations 7-8 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/040403 .pdf. (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
134. Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith to William H. Taft, IV, et al. (Mar. 19, 2004),
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E. Classifying Combatants
1. Legal Advice
Based on advice from appointed lawyers, the Bush
Administration announced that Taliban and al-Qaeda members were not
entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions because of their
combatant characteristics, but that they should be treated in a way that is
consistent with the Geneva. 136 Any combatant can be detained to
prevent them "from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms
once again," 137 but whether detainees are classified as POWs, civilian
internees, or "other detainees," can set justifications for long-term
detention, standards of treatment, and the right to prosecute. 138 There is
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/doj_memo03 l 904.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that
"protected persons," who may or may not be illegal aliens, could be removed from Iraq
"pursuant to local immigration law" for a brief but not indefinite period, so long as
adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them"). Alternatively, if a person is
innocent, this could be a form of kidnapping, and if an individual is a combatant and one
acknowledges that detainees are "protected" under the Geneva Conventions, they cannot be
interrogated. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 5-16 (noting the legal
ambiguities that developed over treaty applicability in Iraq).
135. Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, THEW ASH. POST (Jan.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5 l 7262005Jan5.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (Gonzales affirmed the legal authorization for
the U.S. to abduct terror suspects throughout the world without regard to foreign
sovereignty). This can also be viewed as inconsistent with international law. Robert
Bejesky, Sensibly Construing the "More Likely Than Not" Threshold for Extraordinary
Rendition 6-7, 10-12 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Sensibly
Construing].
136. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
(Jan.
19,
2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc l.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that al-Qaeda and the Taliban "are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949," but that soldiers should "treat them humanely, and to
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, [and] in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949"); Bush, supra note 101, at ,, 2-3 ("[The U.S.
military] shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva,
[but] the Taliban (and al-Qaeda] detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not
qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.").
137. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
138. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1265 (2005) (noting that these
classifications are also consistent with military doctrine); Int'l Comm. Red Cross,
Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, at art. 46
(1960) (affording protection to civilians and emphasizing that "protected persons" include
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disagreement over whether the correct designations under international
139
meaning that
law should be civilians and privileged combatants,
140
anyone other than a combatant designee is by default a civilian.
Instead, the Bush Administration invented a new category called
"unlawful enemy combatant" to avoid Geneva Convention protections
that prohibit interrogations 141 and criminal prosecutions of captured
combatants. 142
OLC opinions even contended that torture should be narrowly
construed and that prohibitions on interrogation did not apply to "enemy
combatants." 143 Unlawful detentions, prosecutions, or abuse during
144
interrogations mandates liability under the Geneva Convention.
"enemy nationals within the national territory of each of the Parties to the conflict and ...
the whole population of occupied territories").
139. Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law
When the World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 91, 104 (2009); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E.
Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War:" The Law and Politics of Labels, 36
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 68-70 (2003) (noting that only legitimate combatants are entitled to
POW status).
140. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 50(1 ); Int'l Comm. Red Cross,
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of I 977 to the Geneva Convention of I 949, 611 1
1917 (1987); CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME
OF WAR. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY-ART. 4. PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS,
available at http: //www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600007?0penDocument (last visited Mar.
21, 2014) ("Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he
is either a prisoner of war . .. covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the
Fourth Convention, or ... a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands
can be outside the law.").
141. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 87, 123; JEFFREY T. RICHELSON,
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 307 (2012) (stating that "cheating" is the reason for
Geneva rules that prohibit interrogations because POWs were a prime source of intelligence
about adversaries in wars preceding the Geneva Conventions); George C. Harris, The Rule

of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch
Lawyers in the Wake of 9/1 I, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 409, 432-33 (2005) (noting
that the OLC did not cite precedent for failing to apply any of the Geneva Convention
categories).
142. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 118 (POW s must be repatriated to their respective
countries after hostilities end); Tug Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a

Time: A Non Criminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay
Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 149, 171 (2005). Soldiers are generally not held
liable for following orders, but there can be prosecutions for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary of the
Third Geneva Convention, 419-22 (1994).
143. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb - Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV .
689, 707 (2008).
144. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 131 (no state "shall be allowed to absolve itself or
any other ... of any liability incurred by itself or by another" for serious breaches of the
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Legal opinions written by Yoo, Delahunty and Gonzales focused much
attention on the possibility of prosecution under the War Crimes Act,
but "[t]heir refutation of its applicability rests solely on the argument
that the Third Geneva Convention does not protect members of the
Taliban or al-Qaeda." 145

2. Distinguishing Combatants
There were two approaches for denying POW status for actions
in Afghanistan based on the characteristics of the enemy. The first
approach included applying Geneva Convention designation elements
and the second approach involved pointedly determining that those
deemed to be members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban were not protected.
First, advisory opinions assume that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
were "unlawful enemy combatants" because they hid among
civilians, 146 which can deny POW status under Article 4(A) of the Third
Geneva Convention because combatants ( 1) are not commanded by
leaders, (2) do not wear recognizable combat insignia, (3) do not openly
carry arms, and (4) do not obey laws of war. 147 The test is intended to
Geneva Convention).
145. Wallach, supra note 56, at 619; Gonzales, supra note 70, at 1-2 (noting that if the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to the Taliban, there was also a reduced likelihood of
criminal prosecution of U.S. soldiers and officials under the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C.
2441 )); Benjamin G. Davis, Rejluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution in
U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 503, 57677 (2008).
146. 151 CONG. REC. 88811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
("They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They
cheat."); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 28-29 (2004) (stating that combatants who hide among
civilians can lose the privileged status, and a civilian can become a combatant and vice
versa).
147. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(l); see Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of
1899, ch. I, art. I, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of
1907, ch. I, art. I, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Bush, supra note 101, at 2; Bybee, supra
note 51, at 9-10 (stating that al-Qaeda members "have attacked purely civilians targets of no
military value; they refused to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead
hijacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; and they themselves do not object
the laws of war"). The problem with this position is that it discusses broad acts of al-Qaeda
outside of Afghanistan and assumes culpability based on a perceived nexus that should have
ultimately been dependent on determinations in military commissions at Guantanamo Bay.
As of February 2013, "there have been six convictions of Guantanamo detainees by military
commissions, four of which were procured by plea agreements." Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong.
Research Serv., R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in
Federal
Criminal
Court
IO
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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prevent rewarding combatants for hiding among civilians, which can
place the civilians in harms way and provide an unfair military
advantage if the opponent is conscientious in not placing civilians in
danger. 148
On the one hand, the Taliban must have had some degree of
structure and unity in command because it was engaged in fighting with
the Northern Alliance for several years, but members would generally
However, there are alternative
not meet the four elements. 149
interpretations of the Geneva Convention requirements that make
denying POW status controversial.
Article 44 of the Protocol
Additional (adopted in 1977) provides that anyone "who falls in the
power of an adverse party shall be a prisoner of war." 150 The U.S. is not
a party to Protocol I, but 173 countries are members to make Protocol I
an additional source to the Geneva Conventions, 151 which might make
Protocol I's POW principle customary international law. 152
148. Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1025, 1026 (2004); Derek Jinks, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal
Regime After September 11 ?: Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1493, 1495 (2004) (noting that "the question is how best to encourage fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population").
149. United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002); David E.
Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 61, 69 (2005). Some commentators did contend that the Taliban was the armed
forces of Afghanistan, but legal advisers called the Taliban a "loose confederation of militia
groups." Graham, supra at 68. The Taliban lacked an "organized command structure," and
"wore the same clothes they wore to perform other daily functions." Memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/taliban.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013); 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham) ("We find ourselves in a war with a group of people who are not part of a state or a
nation. They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They
cheat."); Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Remarks at
the Chatham House on the Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaeda Detainees (Feb.
20, 2002), available at h ttp://2001-2009 .state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/rm/2002/8491.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (identifying the elements for the test in the Geneva Conventions and
agreeing that the Taliban do not meet the test to be granted POW status, but noting that they
do "have the right to be treated humanely"); See contra Glazier, supra note 103, at 1013
(stating that some al-Qaeda units might have qualified as POWs because they did wear the
same camouflage uniforms and openly carried weapons).
150. Int') Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 85.
151. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
membership,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates= XPages NORMStatesParti
es&xp treatySelected=4 70 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014 ).
152. GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LA w: CASES AND MATERIALS, app. c, at
585-87 (2005).
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During the negotiations over Protocol I, countries discussed
terms to address liberation movements and to eliminate colonial powers
from their countries and developing countries prevailed in eliminating
the insignia requirement 153 so that hostilities could be conducted from
within civilian populations and belligerents would still have POW
status. 154 Protocol I adds that "armed forces of a Party" comprise "all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates." 155 If the
Taliban could be granted POW status and there is a sufficient
relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 156 then both groups
could have arguably received POW status.
Article 44(3) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention states that a combatant is not required to wear a uniform
when "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot
so distinguish himself." 157 The invasion of Afghanistan occurred due to
the acts of 19 hijackers, reportedly because of a plan devised by Osama
bin Laden, who was apparently in Afghanistan. The Taliban did not
direct those who were involved in 9/11 158 and perhaps those wielding
weapons against invading forces acted m self-defense when

153. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3); see also Geneva I, supra
note 27, art. 4(A)( l ),(2) (POW status is applicable to "members of the armed forces of a
Party" and "organized resistance movements").
154. Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving
Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683, 724-26 (2009).
155. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 43(1); INTL. COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, supra note 140, 1663, at 508 (non-state entities "may in certain circumstances
become Parties to the conflict").
156. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 108 (2011) (stating that it
"appears now that either the Taliban could not control al-Qaeda, or that al-Qaeda simply
dictated to the Taliban"); Stephen R. Shalom, Far From Infinite Justice: Just War Theory
and Operation Enduring Freedom, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 623, at 644 (emphasizing
that CIA Director George Tenet considered al-Qaeda and the Taliban inseparable). Not all
agree that there was this tight relationship. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Unlikely Bedfellows:
Feminist Theory and the War on Terror, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. l (2009)
(reporting that "[l]inks between the Taliban and al-Qaeda go beyond the mere territorial, but
nonetheless are a far cry from the threshold of complete dependence or effective control
applied in the Nicaragua Judgment," which assessed the relationship between the Contras
and the Reagan Administration's covert action team); Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits,
Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and
Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 840 (2005) (noting that the
Taliban did not seem to have any greater connection to al-Qaeda than providing logistical
support).
157. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3).
158. Reinold, supra note 74, at 245 (noting that "the Afghan Taliban ... neither
directed nor controlled the perpetrators of 9/11 ").
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confronted. 159 There may also be some hypocrisy in not granting POW
status 160 and Afghanistan's poverty may have made procuring uniforms
cost prohibitive. 161
The second general approach for denying POW protections was
to assume that if individuals could be labeled members of the Taliban
162
and or al-Qaeda, they would be designated an "enemy combatant."
"Membership" is the determining variable for an "enemy combatant"
designation, rather than the act perpetrated that preceded capture. Many
authorities disagreed with the use of the "unlawful enemy combatant"
163
label to deny Geneva Convention protections in Afghanistan,
159. Shalom, supra note 156, at 672, 674-75 (mingling with civilians does not absolve
the U.S. of responsibility to avoid harming non-combatants, but early NGO estimates placed
Afghani civilian casualties at several thousand).
160. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(4) (stating that even if a
combatant does not meet POW requirements or carry arms openly, the individual will
"nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners
of war"); Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force I Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 878
(2010) (noting that some American government officials disclosed that private military
contractors for some types of operations were advantageous because they do not wear
uniforms). Given that CIA operations are often covert, CIA agents and assets also do not
wear uniforms and may commingle with civilian populations.
161. WORLD BANK, INT'L DEV. Ass'N, OPERATIONAL PoL'Y & COUNTRY SERV. & RES.
MOBILIZATION DEP'T, OPERATIONAL APPROACHES AND FINANCING IN FRAGILE STATES 2
(June 2007) (depicting Afghanistan as the eighth poorest country in the world and the
poorest outside of Africa).
162. Guantanamo Detainee Process, DEP'T OF DEF., at 2 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2013)
(stating that for purposes of detention at Guantanamo, an "enemy combatant" is "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This
includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities
in aid of enemy armed forces."); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of
the Dep't of Def., to Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.cfr.org/international-law/enemy-combatants/p5312 (last visited Sept. 24, 2013)
(defining an "enemy combatant" as "an individual who, under the laws and customs of war,
may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict. In the current conflict with al Qaida
and the Taliban, the term includes a member, agent, or associate of al-Qaida or the
Taliban."); see also Memorandum from LTC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to
Commander, Joint Task Force 170, at Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies, para. 2 (Oct. 11, 2002), reproduced in THE TORTURE PAPER: THE ROAD TO ABU
GHRAIB 229 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) ("Since the detainees are
not [Enemy Prisoners of War] EPWs, the Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily
would govern captured enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel
conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO."); Ensign Scott L. Glabe, Conflict
Classification and Detainee Treatment in the War Against al Qaeda, 2010 ARMY L. 112,
113-15 (noting that there was difficulty in classifying operations against al-Qaeda under the
Geneva Convention).
163. Paust, supra note 5, at 829 (pointing out that the Bush White House's use of the
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extenuate precedent, confuse the categories, 164 and to use Geneva
Convention definitions not to classify the enemy, but to use
characteristics of the enemy to construct a new category.
"Enemy combatant" was not a commonly-used term prior to
9/11, and there is no reason to believe it was legitimate in this case. 165
In Ex parte Quirin ( 1942), the Supreme Court called six German
saboteurs caught on U.S. shores during World War II unlawful enemy
combatants. 166 The Court pointed out that they were not qualified to be
POWs because they, "during time of war, pass surreptitiously from
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for
the commission of hostile acts ... " 167 If the intent with using the term
was to assume that those individuals who entered U.S. territory during a
world war with an intention to commit terrorism should be extrapolated
to anyone inside a foreign country that the U.S. invaded, the factual
.
.
.
comparison 1s spurious.
After much debate over the classification of those detained in
Afghanistan, in January 2005, the Bush Administration finally
declassified the legal memo that stated that there was an intention to
treat members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a manner consistent with
the Geneva Conventions. 168 It is unclear why compliance with
international law should be a classified national secret and it is unclear
whether this intention was in fact fulfilled in the previous years. The
term "unlawful combatant" "demonstrate[d] remarkable ignorance of the nature and reach
of treaties and customary international law ... [because] any member of al-Qaeda who is a
national of a state that has ratified the relevant treaties is protected by them."); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 549 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (disagreeing with classifying the
Taliban as unlawful enemy combatants). The Canadian military commented on treatment of
detainees in Afghanistan: "All the individuals ... captured or detained will be afforded
humane treatment, according to the standards that are applicable to POWs, and that's
according to international law." Hendin, supra note 78, at 61.
164. David Wippman, Comment on Richard Arneson 's Just Warfare Theory and
Noncombatant Immunity, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 702 (2006) (noting that the proper
term should have been "unprivileged belligerent").
165. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside Guantanamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 94 (2010).
166. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (noting that they were individuals
associated with a country at war with the U.S. and who would engage in acts that would
support the enemy).
167. Id. at 31, 35 (holding that an unlawful enemy combatant can be a "spy who
secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in a time of war,
seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy ... ").
168. Scharf, International Law in Crisis, supra note 17, at 85; Laura A. Dickinson,
Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law
Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2010) (stating that a new U.S. Army Field Manual
was adopted in 2006 and eliminated classifications between Prisoners of War and enemy
combatants and provided that the Geneva Conventions apply to all detainees).
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definitional maneuvers in Afghanistan were astonishingly parallel to
what transpired in Iraq.
The Bush Administration acknowledged that the Geneva
Conventions clearly applied in Iraq, 169 but for some reason Iraqi
detainees were subjected to the same incarceration and interrogation
policies and many were also called "unlawful combatants." 170 Security
Council Resolution 1483 pertained to the occupation of Iraq and cited
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 as
applicable during the occupation. 171 The Supreme Court regards the
Hague Conventions, which have been ratified by over 180 countries, as
the paramount authority for assessing proper conduct for the law of
war, 172 and Geneva Convention protections should also apply as a
matter of customary international law. 173 The Bush Administration
simply rejected the Conventions and Security Council Resolution
restrictions in the case of Iraqi detainees. Rumsfeld directed intensive
interrogation procedures to obtain "actionable intelligence" from Iraqi
169. See, e.g., Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media
Availability
En
route
to
Baghdad
(May
13,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3010 (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (Rumsfeld stating that "from the beginning" it has been the U.S. government's
position "with respect to Iraq that the Geneva Conventions apply" and "anyone who is
running around saying that Geneva Convention did not apply in Iraq is either terribly
uninformed or mischievous."). In congressional hearings, Senator Levin stated that
Rumsfeld publicly announced about Iraq on several occasions "that the Geneva Conventions
apply not precisely, that prisoners are treated 'consistent with, but not pursuant to' [the
Geneva Conventions]." Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation
Operations, Hearing on S. 108-868 Before the Comm. on Armed Serv., 108th Cong. (2004),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-l 08shrg96600/html/CHRG108shrg96600.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter "Comm. on Armed Serv."].
170. Comm. on Armed Serv., supra note 169 (Colonel Warren stating that some
detainees at Abu Ghraib were being called "unlawful combatants" and that interrogation
procedures "are not, in and of themselves, in isolation, violations of the Geneva
Conventions," specifically for "security detainees" under the Fourth Convention). Senator
Levin itemized interrogation methods approved by Rumsfeld for "unlawful combatants" in
December 2002, and methods included "nudity, exploiting detainees' fears ... and stress
positions." Id. Additional interrogation methods were authorized on April 16, 2003. Id.
General Miller provided interrogation orders when visiting Iraq; "Policy No. I-Battlefield
Interrogation Team and Facility (BIT/F) Policy" dated 15 July 2003 was produced for Iraq,
and queried General Fay who admitted that these authorizations "contribute[d] to the use at
Abu Ghraib of aggressive interrogation techniques ... " Id.
171. S.C. Res. 1483, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
172. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603-04; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
173. Glabe, supra note 162, at 116. Germany did not ratify the 1907 Hague
Convention, but violations were applied as customary international law. International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. I, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947).
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prisoners 174 and originally justified issuing the interrogation directives
as necessary methods to fight the "war on terror" 175 even though
Hussein's regime did not have ties to al-Qaeda. 176
F. Using Interrogators and Classifying Torture

1. International Law Prohibits Interrogation
With legal advice postulating that international law did not
restrict the Bush Administration's directives under the Commander-inChief authority, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply because
Afghanistan was a failed state, that the conflict was international but the
Conventions were not binding and Article 3 was inapplicable, and that
those categorized as "unlawful enemy combatants" could be denied
POW protection, it certainly does appear that appointed legal advisers
strove to meet an ultimate goal of detaining and interrogating prisoners
without legal ramification. These contentions molded the groundwork
for what was explicated more directly by White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales. The existence of "novel factual circumstances" does not

174. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 121; Scott Higham & Joe
Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at AOl
(recalling the abuse at Abu Ghraib, stating that interrogations were being used to obtain
intelligence to "thwart the insurgency in Iraq" and "find Saddam Hussein or locate weapons
of mass destruction," and that military intelligence officers were using "MPs to help 'set the
conditions' for interrogation"); R. Jeffrey Smith, Knowledge of Abusive Tactics May Go
Higher, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at AOl (stating that there was "heightened pressures in
Washington for more robust intelligence-gathering, because of proliferating attacks on U.S.
forces and the dwindling intelligence on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass
destruction").
175. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 94, 122, 126-27; JAMES R.
SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DETENTION
OPERATIONS
63-64
(2004),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (stating that interrogation was being used to gather intelligence and that the "failure to
adapt rapidly to the new requirements of the Global War on Terror resulted in inadequate
resourcing, inexperienced and untrained personnel, and a backlog of detainees destined for
interrogation."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB I (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
(stating that "the Bush administration ... required that the United States circumvent
international law . . . " and administration lawyers counseled that "the new war against
terrorism rendered 'obsolete' long-standing legal restrictions on the treatment and
interrogation of detainees.").
176. See generally Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110; Robert Bejesky, Intelligence
Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 811, 858-59, 877
(2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Intelligence Information"].
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177
but
mean that government officials can dismiss existing law,
paradigm"
Gonzales opined that the war on terrorism required a "new
that rendered "obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of
enemy prisoners" because of the need to "quickly obtain information
from captured terrorists and their sponsors. " 178 As a categorical
prohibition without exceptions 179 and with similar restrictions existing
in U.S. military law for 150 years, 180 Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention provides:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound
to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army,
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent
information ...No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant
181
or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

The Geneva Convention mandates that prisoners of war be
humanely treated at all times and requires states to prohibit actions that
cause death, seriously endanger the health of prisoners, or subject
detainees to acts of violence, reprisals, intimidation, or "any other form

177. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
178. Gonzales, supra note 70, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 175, at 1.
179. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 395.
180. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION,
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34at
available
(1992),
1-8
at
52.pdf#search=%22FM%2034-52%20Field%20Manua1%22 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that "[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the
source's free will ... Torture is defined as the infliction of intense pain to body or mind to
extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure," and "US policy expressly
prohibits acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats,
insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation."); U.S.
WAR DEP'T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
at
available
(1863),
16
ART.
I,
SECTION
FIELD,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/286696dfc21 d967 ec 12563cd00514a91 ?OpenDocument (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States (Lieber Code) stated that "[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of crueltythat is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions"); see also David Luban,
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (2005); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (8th ed. 2004) (defining torture as "the infliction of intense pain to
the body or mind to punish, or to extract a confession ... or to obtain sadistic pleasure").
181. Geneva I, supra note 27, at art. 17; Aaron E. Garfield, Note: Bridging a Gap in
Human Rights Law: Prisoner of War Abuse as "War Tort, " 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 725, 748-49
(2006).
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of coercion" to attain information, 182 but these conditions were
systematically violated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. 183
Geneva Convention provisions require prisoners to be given adequate
food and water to maintain good health, sufficient clothing and
footwear, sanitary facilities, and medical attention, 184 but the Bush
Administration overtly violated convention provisions by issuing
directives that upset detainees' psychological and physical conditions,
stripped them naked, and tasked health care professionals to facilitate
interrogations. 185
2. Distinguishing Between Torture and Cruel and Inhuman
Treatment
As for the degree of abuse, trends and policy intentions indicate
that there should be no sharp distinction between torture and cruel and
unusual punishment, 186 but legal advisors issued memos that sustained
the use of harsh interrogations by obfuscating distinctions between
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. 187 These
prohibitions on interrogation are applicable during a period of armed

182. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 13, 17.
183. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64; Bejesky,
Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11, 20-25.
184. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 26-30.
185. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 35-36.
186. Koh, supra note 69, at 642 ("Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
are both illegal and totally abhorrent to our values and constitutional traditions. And no
constitutional authority licenses the President to authorize the torture and cruel treatment of
prisoners, even when he acts as Commander-in-Chief."); ABA Torture Resolution 10-B, at
l
(adopted
Aug.
9,
2004),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/torture/torturepolic
y2004_10B.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (condemning "any use of torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon persons within the
custody or under the physical control of the United States government ... and any
endorsement or authorization of such measures by government lawyers."). International law
can be interpreted to absolutely prohibit interrogation and all forms of abuse. Geneva I,
supra note 27, at art. 17 (stating that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion" can be employed); Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
187. See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and
Abroad, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 154 (Sanford Levinson, ed., 2004); Waldron, supra
note 97, at 1727 (the administration was obfuscating "cruel, inhuman and degrading
methods" from "torture for the purpose of paying lip service to prohibitions"); US Experts
Unconvinced by Bush Assurance on Torture, REUTERS (June 25, 2004), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0625-07.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(Republican representative Frank Wolf wrote a letter to the Justice Department noting: "I
am deeply concerned that this memorandum provides legal justification for the US
government to commit cruel, inhumane and degrading acts, including torture.").
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combat, occupation, 188 and as general restrictions that prohibit any
189
substantial level abuse by government agents in other locations.
With several bodies of law applicable in different contexts and
locations to prohibit interrogation that would be torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment, another of the Bush Administration's
approaches was to discount the applicability of generally restrictive
sources by referencing exceptions in one source. For example,
specifically to imprison and interrogate detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
the Administration contended that Articles 1-27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) did not bind U.S.
actions because the ICCPR was not self-executing as domestic law,
could not be enforced in American courts, and that the President could
dismiss restrictions based on exigency. 190
The ICCPR distinguishes between torture and lesser forms of
harm and absolutely prohibits torture, but "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" could be permitted if there is a sufficient

188. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 3 (grave breaches of the laws of war include
"murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; ... outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; [and] the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment."); Paust, supra note 5, at 835
(noting that during an occupation, the Geneva Convention and human rights law prohibit
torture, "'violence,' threat of violence, 'cruel' treatment, 'physical and moral coercion ... to
obtain information,' 'physical suffering,' 'inhuman' treatment, 'degrading' treatment,
'humiliating' treatment, and 'intimidation' during interrogation").
189. CAT, supra note 68, art. 1 (prohibiting "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" for reasons of
inflicting severe physical or mental pain or punishment, intimidating, inflicting punishment,
or extracting information); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 6, G.A.
Res. 43/173, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9,
1988) (providing that "no person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); European
Convention, supra note 125, art. 3 (defining torture as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him ... , or intimidating or coercing him"); Michael John Garcia, The UN. Convention
Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens
at
available
2004,
11,
Mar.
CONGRESS,
FOR
REPORT
CRS
1,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31351.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting
that "torture is defined as an extreme form of cruel and unusual punishment committed
under the color of law" and that the U.S. enacted statutes to enforce Article 3).
190. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 45 n.10
http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2011-12at
available
(2011),
16amr51103201 lenguantanamodecadeofdamage.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
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exigency. 191 The ICCPR is not automatically suspended during a period
of armed combat, such that combat would be deemed an exigency, 192
and Article 9 only permits temporary derogations "to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation" and only when member
Moreover, the ICCPR
states officially request exemptions. 193
Committee defined torture broadly, such as by noting that sleep
deprivation, 194 forcing captives into stress positions, hooding, and
threatening detainees were forms of torture. 195
The Administration was indeed correct when it reminded that at
the time of congressional ratification, the ICCPR was not intended to be
self-executing. 196 However, the Senate made a reservation to the
ICCPR based on prohibiting torture as standards equivalent to cruel,

191. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights, The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 REC. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. 235, 240 (1987) (explaining that "most of the obligations imposed by the
Convention apply only to acts of torture, as defined in Article 1"); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 190, at 45 n.10 (stating that the advisory memo "entirely
ignored the fact that under the ICCPR, even 'in time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation', there can be no derogation from the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Articles 4 and 7)").
192. van Aggelen, supra note I 08, at 56.
193. ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 9; Human Rights Comm., CCPR General
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, 72nd Sess., Aug. 31,
2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.11,
2 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fdlf.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (affirming that
"[ m ]easures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and
temporary nature").
194. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm. Against
Torture, Annual Rep., Sept. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/44; GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No.
44, 1257 (Sept. l 0, 1997).
195. Human Rights Comm., 31st Sess., Oct. 26-Nov. 13, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/43/40,
2.2,
4,
10
(Oct.
27,
1987),
available
at
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/l 987. l 0.27 _Magri_de_Cariboni_v_ Uruguay
.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (being kept incommunicado for 42 days, "blindfolded with
towelling material," deprived of sleep, beaten, and threatened with torture, was torture);
Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., July 29, 1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 8.5
(July 29, 1997), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/114_colombia053.php (last
visited Oct. 1, 2013) (stating that "being blindfolded and dunked in a canal" and being
threatened with deadly force were torture).
196. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992) (specifying that "the
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not
self-executing"); Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 31 I.L.M. 645, 652, 657
(1992) (stating that "[t]he Administration proposed a declaration stating that Articles l
through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not self executing" and that "[t]he intent is to clarify that the
[ICCPR] will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts").
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unusual, and inhumane treatment as specified in the Fifth, Eight, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, 197 which means that U.S.
jurisprudence and law enforcement practices in the U.S. are applicable
to defining torture and that "the Convention bans conduct that is already
unconstitutional." 198 The White House and Secretary of Defense
directed the use of psychological interrogation tactics that American
officials could not engage in inside the U.S. without violating the Eighth
Amendment and those same standards would be prohibited outside the
United States when the ICCPR or CAT are applicable to American
government actions. 199
3. Endorsing Specific Methods
With respect to the interrogation tactics that the Bush
Administration approved, in October 2002, Joint Task Force 170
furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SOUTHCOM with proposals that
were substantially similar to interrogation methodology that the CIA

197. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36, 192 (1990) (the U.S. is bound to prevent '"cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' only insofar as the term ... means the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States"); U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF.,
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
6
(Apr.
4,
2003),
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2013) (stating that U.S. obligations "under the Torture Convention apply to the interrogation
of unlawful combatant detainees," but only to the extent that "cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment and punishment" was restricted under the U.S. Constitution; ICCPR, supra note
116, art. 7 ("cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" restriction as equated to
cruel and unusual treatment in the Bill of Rights); Garcia, supra note 189, at 2, 4 (stating
that police brutality would not be torture under the CAT, but distinguishing from the lesser
forms of "cruel and unusual punishment" and affirming that both standards are prohibited);
Id. at 6 (stating that there the Senate restricted "mental torture" to mean "severe physical
pain and suffering"); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (3d
ed. 1993) ("The reasons why the United States has maintained its distance from the
international human rights agreements are not obvious ... [T]here is resistance to accepting
international standards, and international scrutiny, on matters that have been for the United
States to decide.").
198. EVIL, LAW AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER AND VIOLENCE 9
(John T. Parry ed., 2006).
199. Garcia, supra note 189, at 13 (CAT and/or § 2340A restricts torture outside the
U.S. borders). Congress ensured that this was clear with the McCain Amendment which
affirms that the President must "take action to ensure" that "[ n ]o individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment and
punishment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(d), 2000dd-0(3)
(2008).
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researched and incorporated into its Kubark Interrogation Manual in
1963. 200 The Task Force proposed three categories of techniques with
progressing intensity. Category I authorized interrogators to stimulate
an uncomfortable environment by yelling and employing deception to
create stress. 201 Category II permitted interrogators to use stress
positions, produce falsified documents, quarantine captives in solitary
confinement for up to thirty days, restrict breathing, induce sensory
deprivation, and invoke phobias. 202
Category III authorized
interrogators to threaten to kill members of a captive's family, expose
inmates to harshly cold temperatures and water, engage in daylong
interrogations, and induce perceptions of drowning or suffocation. 203 In
December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved Category I and
II, and some methods in Category III. 204
After some officials contended that detainees frequently resisted
approved interrogation methods, in early March 2003, a Defense
Working Group proposed more approaches and Rumsfeld authorized
another dozen interrogation techniques, including implementing
"environmental manipulation," altering sleep rhythms from night to
day, leaving detainees naked in dark isolation for up to thirty days,
applying harsh heat and cold, withholding food, hooding for several
days straight, and forcing detainees into "stress positions" that would
"subject detainees to rising levels of pain." 205 Directives progressed
down the chain of command and interrogators commonly used the
procedures on detainees at all American detention facilities. 206

200. Wallach, supra note 56, at 581.
201. See generally Memorandum from General Counsel of the Department of Defense
William J. Haynes II for Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/additional_detainee_documents/
07-F-2406%20doc%201.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); Memorandum from Joint Task
Force 170 for Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013)
[hereinafter Task Force 170].
202. Task Force 170, supra note 201, at 1-2.
203. id. at 2-3.
204. Wallach, supra note 56, at 583, 593-94; Paust, supra note 5, at 840. In November
2002, the Bush Administration approved the use of sensory deprivation, stress positions,
phobias and dogs, psychological trickery, and threat scenarios against the detainee and/or
his family. Haynes, supra note 201.
205. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at 2, 63-65, 70.
206. LTG Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and
205th Military intelligence Brigade, FINDLAW.COM 10, 15-16, 25-26 (August 23, 2004),
available at http:/!fl 1. findlaw .com/news. findlaw .corn/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt. pdf (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that on September 14, 2003, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez,
authorized the use of twenty-nine interrogation methods in Iraq, including isolation, stress
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There was emphatic criticism of these methods, which led to
disagreements with international authorities. The Bush Administration
offered retorts with a failure to recognize the degree of abuse. For
example, expressing concerns over the isolation of prisoners, the United
Nations Human Rights Council stated that the "weight of accumulated
evidence to date points to the serious and adverse health effects of
solitary confinement" and that it was a potential breach of the ICC PR. 207
The Bush Administration denied that "prolonged isolation and
indefinite detention ... per se constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment." 208 Yet with the ICCPR's usual applicability
to domestic criminal law standards, there is a general distinction
between placing an already-convicted inmate in solitary confinement
perhaps for a week as a punishment for misbehaving in a penal facility,
and capturing a suspected insurgent or terrorist, blindfolding him, taking
him to an unknown location, and subjecting him to other forms of
sensory deprivation and isolation for weeks or months without being
certain about the detainee' s guilt.
The ECHR deemed methods such as "wall-standing, hooding,
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and
drink," inhuman treatment that caused "at least intense physical and
mental suffering."209 The methods were explicitly prohibited under the
ECHR, but they were not deemed torture. 210 Legal advisor Jay Bybee
issued a memo that used the ECHR' s case to develop definitions and
approved of methods such as sleep deprivation, white noise, stress
positions, denying food and water, and hooding. 211 However, the
postttons, threats with dogs, and sleep and sensory deprivation, only to revoke the
authorization several weeks later); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites:
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT' L L. 309, 340
(2006) (stating that an approach implemented at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib was to
use attack dogs to intimidate inmates); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1263-65 (Rumsfeld
approved of using attack dogs and other means of generating fears and individual phobias in
November 2002); Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64
(discussing abuse at Abu Ghraib); Bejesky, Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11 , 2025 (discussing abuse at Gitmo).
207. U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1177-85, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008).
208. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 131, at 107.
209. Paust, supra note 26, at 408-09.
210. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1706; See also International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11 , Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
211. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1705-06; Jackson Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy,
Torturing the Rule of Law: USA and the Post 9-11 Legal World, 21 ST. JOHN ' S J.L. COMM.
689, 721 (2007); Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture Lite," "Full Bodied" Torture, and the
Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT' L SECURITY L. & POL 'y 187, 192 (2005) (noting
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ECHR case involved British interrogators holding Irish detainees for a
few days and subjecting them to psychological interrogation methods, 212
while the Bush Administration's orders routinely subjected hundreds of
detainees to more intense interrogation techniques for many months.
Nonetheless, shades in the degree of abuse may not have been
consequential if the most criticized position of all had been taken
seriously.

4. Nullifying the Relevance ofAuthorized Interrogation Standards
with the Bybee Memo
Perhaps the most condemned memo, 213 approved by Bybee but
reportedly written by John Yoo in August 2002, 214 imparted a legal
defense for government actors carrying out interrogation directives.
The Bybee memo stated that for an interrogator to be held criminally
responsible for abuse, the interrogator must intend that the victim
"experience intense pain and suffering of the kind that is equivalent to
the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of
significant bodily function will likely result. " 215 Alternatively, federal

that another advisory position, provided by Judge Advocate L TC Beaver, acknowledged
that the U.S . was restricted from using methods that would be torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, but maintained that approved interrogation techniques did not violate
those restrictions; methods such as sleep deprivation, threatening with dogs, inducing
"misperceptions of asphyxiation," and "mind noninjurious contact" did not violate
international or domestic law); Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of
Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, 1382
(2004) (interrogators "have used a 110-volt power supply to shock detainees" and
"performed 'numerous' simulated asphyxiations to obtain information").
212. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11.
213. Koh, supra note 69, at 647 ("[I]n my professional opinion, the Bybee Opinion is
perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read."); Waldron, supra note
97, at 1704, 1708 (stating that "[t]he quality of Bybee's legal work here is a disgrace ....
[T]hese are obvious errors, and the Department of Justice - as the executive department
charged with special responsibility for the integrity of the legal system.").
214. Rachael Ward Saltzman, Executive Power and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28
YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 439, 440 (2010) (stating that it was later reported that Yoo wrote this
memo and Bybee approved it); Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on
WASH.
POST
(June
25,
2007),
available
at
Presidential
Power,
http:/!blog. washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_the_envelope_on_presi/
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (explaining that Yoo kept getting "summoned" to the White House to
tell CIA officers "what the legal limits of interrogation are" and that administration officials
"attributed authorship [of the Bybee memo] to Yoo").
215. Bybee, supra note 54, at 1, 3 (stating that "[w]e conclude by examining possible
defenses that would negate any claim that certain interrogations methods violate the statute"
and enumerating the high-threshold elements to convict).
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jurisdiction was established over torture crimes and Section 18 U.S.C. §
2340A absolutely prohibits physical and psychological torture outside
the U.S. 216 The Torture Statute defines torture as "[a]n act committed
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 217
The Bybee memo's position that such a malicious mens rea is
required for a high-level abuse is particularly surprising when federal
courts have interpreted that specific intent for torture can also exist
when there is an intentional act that leads to "prolonged mental pain or
218
suffering" that is a foreseeable consequence of the deliberate act.
Moreover, the Torture Statute is a generally-applicable law that does not
mention interrogation, but interrogation itself involves a govemmentsanctioned level of dominance by the interrogator over the captive and
the relationship is specifically anticipated to employ specific acts to
inflict harm and make the subject obliging.
With the Bybee memo's excessively high standard for
culpability, a government's logical retort to criticism could be that chain
of command directives could not have authorized illegal orders because
authorized psychological interrogation tactics were limited and
interrogators were not convicted of crimes. 219 After all, the legal advice
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, 2340(1) (2012). There are emerging trends in transnational
plaintiff litigation. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347 (1991); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 2002 FOR.
AFFAIRS 102 (2000).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) ("[S]evere mental pain or suffering" defined as
"prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from . . . the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; the administration or application,
or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent death;
or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain
or suffering, or the administration or application or mind-altering substances ... ").
218. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004); Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003); see Garcia, supra note 189, at 2 ("[A]n act that results in
unanticipated and unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of the
Convention.").
219. Daniel Levin, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, U.S.
at
available
2004),
30,
(Dec.
JUSTICE
OF
DEP'T
http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Memo
withdrawing the legal advice on liability and noting that discussion on liability was
unnecessary because "[ c]onsideration of the bounds of any such authority would be
inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not
engage in torture."); John T. Parry, "Just for Fun": Understanding Torture and
Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 253, 267 (2005) ("If the
Torture Convention is the controlling document, then a state that wishes to justify its
violence need only assert that, whatever it may have done, it has not tortured. At this point
the discussion gets bogged down in definitions."); Senate Judiciary Committee Grills
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states that to be illegal, torture must "inflict pain that is difficult to
endure," such as pain similar to "death or organ failure," as
distinguished from cruel and inhuman acts. 220 Most significant to the
approved interrogation methods is that "[ m ]ental torture" must cause
"significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years," 221 which would surely be arduous for a detaineeplaintiff or prosecutor to prove.
With a substantial gap between definitions prohibiting torture
under U.S. and international law and the punishment standards
contained in the Bybee memo, interrogators may have believed that
their own acts would not be criminally culpable irrespective of the
Administration's authorized techniques. 222 The high threshold criterion
might also have been further promoted because the Bybee memo
reiterated that even if there were violations of the U.S. Code, the
Commander in Chief could still use "flexible" means of interrogation to
attain information that would prevent terrorist attacks, pursuant to
"necessity" and "self-defense" justifications. 223
Approved interrogation methods and the President's direction
for interrogation to remain within U.S. law do not explain how so many
captives kept emerging with indications that they were severely beaten
or how as many as two hundred detainees died, with at least 34
confirmed homicides while in U.S. custody between August 2002 and
2006. 224 In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military doctors signed many
Ashcroft on Justice Dept.
Memo,
PBS (June 8, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/govemment_programs/jan-june04/torture_ 6-8.html
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (In responding to the scandal following the Abu Ghraib atrocities,
Rumsfeld remarked: "Let me completely reject the notion that anything that this President
has done or the Justice Department has done has directly resulted in the kind of atrocity
which were cited ... There is no Presidential order immunizing torture.").
220. Bybee, supra note 54, at I.
221. Id. at 7.
222. For example, the Bush Administration's interrogation standards did not approve
of organ failure and death as pressure tactics to gain information, but the same agency of
government - the Justice Department - is the same agency that is empowered to decide
whether to criminally prosecute. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, NY TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007I I 0/04/washington/04interrogate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
223. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31, 39-45.
224. Command's Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan,
HUM.
RTS.
FIRST
(Feb.
l,
2006),
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/up loads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web. pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 390, 398-99, 406 (placing the
death toll caused by interrogation practices at 200 detainees through 2006); Stephen N.
Xenakis, More on: "Doctors Must Be Healers", 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 703, 706 (2007) (at
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detainee death certificates with causes that were tantamount to
226
even though
torture, 225 but interrogators were not being prosecuted
torture and acts of cruel and unusual punishment require punishment
under international law. 227 Is it possible that legal advice regarding the
mens rea of interrogators undermined the reasonable application of
approved interrogation standards and that the legal advice was
incompatible with the definition of a criminally punishable act under
international and domestic law?
Given the definition in U.S. federal law, many scholars and
government and military lawyers expressed that the memo mangled the
228
provided a
definitions of torture and culpability for torture,
"breathtakingly expansive view of presidential powers," was
230
inconsistent withjus cogens norms, 229 and endorsed criminal conduct.

least 98 detainees died in U.S. custody, and Physicians for Human Rights tallied 105 deaths
in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005); James W. Smith III, A Few Good
Scapegoats: The Abu Ghrabi Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System,
27 WHITTIER L. REv. 671, 675 (2006) (noting that the British also engaged in torture of
detainees that resulted in deaths); Report: 108 Die in U.S. Custody, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16,
2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/ l 6/terror/main680658 .shtml
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that based on information supplied by the Army, Navy
and other government agencies, at least 108 detainees died in U.S. custody).
225. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 402-03, 406.
226. Khan, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that despite this evidence of deaths during
interrogation, "not one single CIA personnel has been prosecuted"). By comparison, in the
rare case of prosecution during the Vietnam War, the military court held that "whether
Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the United States Army in Vietnam or the
most intelligent, he must be presumed to know that he could not kill the people involved
here." U.S. v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 544 (C.M .A. 1973).
227. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
228. Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on
Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1418 (2008).
229. David A. Wallace, Torture v. The Basic Principles of the U.S. Military, J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. (May 2008), available at http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/content/6/2/309.full.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Federal Courts, The Indefinite Detention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing Due Process
and National Security in the Context of the War on Terror, RECORD (2004), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/1C_WL06!.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting the "almost
unlimited expansion of executive power" specifically because "the domestic war on terror"
was treated as the same as "'total war' circumstances of World War II and the Civil War");
IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 105 (former Nixon Counsel John Dean
stating that the Bybee "Torture Memo" is "damning evidence suggesting a common plan [or
conspiracy] on the part of the Administration to violate the laws of war"); Jordan J. Paust,
Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2009)
("[M]emoranda ... facilitated the common, unifying plan devised by an inner circle to use
torture."). If Dean is correct, the memo could implicate top officials as conspirators in
deaths and abuse that resulted after the order's issuance date. Id.; United States v. Laster, 42
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Explaining precisely what transpired, Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell
explains that the authors of the memo ignored "the negotiating history
of the treaty" and "went to a completely unrelated document, a health
care statute, found a provision that they liked, and from this statute they
constructed a definition of torture that limited torture to actions
inflicting the pain of 'organ failure or death. "' 231
Even John Yoo conceded that the memorandum does not
represent "majority views among international law academics,"232 but a
former White House lawyer believed the memo's perspective was more
strained than a minority opinion and estimated that "if you line up 1,000
law professors, only six or seven would sign up to [the torture memo's
viewpoint]." 233 In a June 2004 press conference, Gonzales contended
that there were "unnecessary, over-broad discussions in some of these
memos that address abstract legal theories, or discussions subject to
misinterpretation, but [those opinions were] not relied upon by decisionmakers are under review, and may be replaced, if appropriate, with
more concrete guidance." 234 If this is true and the torture memo was a

M.J. 538, 540 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that under military law, circumstantial
evidence can provide the basis to infer that there was an agreement to commit a crime
between two parties).
230. Wallace, supra note 229, at 313 (calling the string of memos "overly legalistic
and patently erroneous attempts to redefine torture"); Peter Brooks, The Plain Meaning of
Torture?,
SLATE
(Feb.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/02/the_plain_ meaning
_of_torture.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (calling the opinion "the work of some bizarre
literary deconstructionist"); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July
15, 2004), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17230 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that the memo is equivalent to "the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how
to skirt the law and stay out of prison").
231. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5136.
232. R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memorandums, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2004, at A4 (quoting John Yoo).
233. John Hagan, Gabrielle Ferrales & Guillermina Jasso, How Law Rules: Torture,
Terror, and the Normative Judgments of Iraqi Judges, 42 LAW & Soc'y REV. 605, 610
(2008); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture: Prophecy and
Casuistry: Abortion, Torture and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REV. 499, 530 (2006)
(noting that a percentage of Catholics repudiated Bush for using specious reasons to wage
war against Iraq and that revelations of torture and memos justifying torture called into
question Bush's commitment to human dignity).
234. Press Briefing by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, et al., WHITE HOUSE
(Sept.
25,
2004),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2013); Edward Alden, Top Lawyers Call Legal OK for Torture 'Preposterous', FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://archive.truthout.org/article/top-lawyers-call-legal-oktorture-preposterous (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (stating that Yoo referred to the opinion as
"an abstract analysis of the meaning of a treaty and a statute.").
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response to a policymaker request, it makes one wonder how many of
the other advisory memos were intended to be planks of initial
cogitation.
Perhaps it was partially the glut of warnings of abuse 235 and
appalling victim accounts that puzzled Senators when Gonzales testified
before the Senate in January 2005 and when he explained emphatically
that the Bybee memo had been withdrawn and that he and Bush had
both repudiated torture. 236 Senator Kennedy retorted by remarking that
"for a two-year period when it was in effect, you didn't object to it." 237
In fact, it took until June 2005 for the U.S. government to even admit
that prisoners had been subjected to abuse amounting to torture in
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan. 238 By this point, the Bush
Administration had already renamed the interrogation approaches and
tweaked the standards.
5. Modifying the Bybee Memo and Using "Enhanced
Interrogation "
In December 2004, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin,
wrote a memo that withdrew the language of the Bybee memo, written
over two years earlier, that required pain equivalent to "organ failure,
impairment of bodily functions, or even death." 239 The new memo
stated that to meet the definition of punishable torture, physical harm
must be severe in "intensity and duration or persistence" and more than
"mild and transitory pain," and that "mental harm must be of some
lasting duration," but the harm need not last for "months or years." 240
235. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 19-22 (explaining that the
Bush Administration had been warned about illegalities in American prison facilities long
before the memo was reportedly rejected).
236. Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2005),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01 /06/politics/06TEXTGONZALES.html?_r=O&pagewanted=all&position= (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Gonzales
stating, after being questioned over whether he agreed with the interpretation of the standard
for torture in the Bybee memo, "I do not [agree with that interpretation]. That does not
represent the position of the executive branch.").
237. Id.
238. US Acknowledges Torture at Guantanamo; in Iraq, Afghanistan
UN, AFX
NEWS
LIMITED
(Sept.
25,
2005),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20060207165 83 6/http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/afx/2005/0
6/24/afx2110388.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (UN Committee member stating: "They are
no longer trying to duck this and have respected their obligation to inform the UN.").
239. Levin, supra note 219.
240. Id. ( calling the torture memo "abhorrent both to American law and values and to
international norms" and that there may be questions of whether an interrogator
"specifically intended" to engage in an act of torture "in light of the President's directive
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Citing a Supreme Court case to address interrogator culpability, the
revised OLC memo stated that if an interrogator "acted in good faith,
and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct
would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, it appears
unlikely that he would have the specific intent necessary of violate
sections 2340-2340A." 241
Professor Jack Goldsmith replaced Bybee as head of the OLC in
2003 and rescinded many of the opinions 242 and called Yoo' s work from
200 I to 2003 "deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf
of the President. " 243 Goldsmith was "anointed as a hero by the media"
for repealing the memos, 244 but Goldsmith had also been known to
represent an ideological position that preferred to treat international law
as discretionary norms, 245 and his 2004 OLC memo added a footnote
stating that "all the interrogation methods that earlier opinions had
found legal were still legal." 246 The footnote arguably nullified the
relevance of the new memo and John Yoo apparently believed that
Goldsmith's withdrawal of the opinion was merely "'for appearances'
sake to divert public criticism in the immediate aftermath of the Abu
Ghraib controversy. 'In the real world of interrogation policy nothing
had changed. "'247

that the United States not engage in torture").
241. Id.
242. Saltzman, supra note 214, at 446.
243. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney Lawyer's Efforts to Expand
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
5,
2007),
available
at
Executive
Power,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/04/ AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMfNISTRATION 146-50 (W.W. Norton & Company 2007); Yamamoto, supra note 66, at
318-19 (citing lists of other legal authorities).
244. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349.
245. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006) (critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist
ideological book and stating that "[t]he book cannot be viewed as separate from the authors'
broader normative project - a project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in U.S.
institutions and to limit the application of the international law," and noting Goldsmith's
realist ideological affinity with other advisors).
246. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183); GOLDSMITH,
supra note 243, at 155-56; Power, supra note 15, at 97-98 (stating that Goldsmith was
entirely supportive of the Bush Administration, but partially cleaned the mess left by
anteceding memos).
247. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183).
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It does appear that nothing had changed. In February 2005,
shortly after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General and about one
month after Levin's memo was produced, Gonzales endorsed methods
that were reportedly "the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by
the Central Intelligence Agency. " 248 Other than waterboarding, the new
methods that authorized degrees of physical touching could probably
already be presumed to be occurring and many methods were the same
as or substantially similar to the techniques approved in 2002, but they
249
Only the
were now labeled "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques."
25
For
label was changed on methods that were already called torture.
example, JAG attorneys, the international community, and U.S. courts
have called waterboarding torture, 251 but CIA Director Porter Goss

°

248. Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 222; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen,
Gonzales Helped Set the Course for Detainees, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48446-2005Jan4.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2013) (noting that Gonzales had intricate involvement because he chaired meetings with
top government officials that detailed "how much pain and suffering a US intelligence
officer could inflict on a prisoner without violating" U.S. criminal law and that approved
methods included "'waterboarding,' a tactic intended to make detainees feel as if they are
drowning" and the "threat of live burial").
249. These "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" included grabbing and slapping
prisoners, shaking them to get their attention, imposing long-time standing, placing
detainees in "cold cells," and using "waterboarding." Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA 's
Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/lnvestigation/story?id=1322866 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013);
See supra Parts IIl(F)(3)(4).
250. Resnick, supra note 10, at 614 ( explaining that "[t]he labels 'enhanced
interrogation,' 'harsh' techniques, and 'coercion' have been offered up in lieu of the words
torture, and the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" to define detainment conditions);
Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 393 (calling the memos "permissible interrogation techniques"
was just "a euphemism for torture"); Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The
Obama Administration and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2011) (noting that the memos were ostensibly
endeavoring to further justify the system of extraordinary rendition flights and secret CIA
detention facilities).
251. Scott Horton, The JAGs Set the Record Straight, HARPER'S (Nov. 4, 2007),
available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001588 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(noting that JAG attorneys "unanimously and unambiguously agreed that [waterboarding is]
inhumane and illegal and would constitute a violation of international law, to include
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions."); Martin Hodgson, US Censored for
at
available
2008),
6,
(Feb.
GUARDIAN
THE
Waterboarding,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/07/humanrights.usa (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak remarking, "I'm not willing any more
to discuss these questions with the U.S. government, when they say [waterboarding] is
allowed. It's not allowed."). After World War II, the U.S. prosecuted Japanese officials for
using waterboarding and U.S. courts have customarily classified waterboarding as a form of
torture. Power, supra note 15, at 85; Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History
of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 472-99 (2007); Jordan J.
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explained that waterboarding is "an area of what I call professional
interrogation techniques. " 252 Against the order of Congress, the CIA
destroyed the interrogation tapes of detainees who were subject to
waterboarding. 253
Even after all of the criticism and challenges to the standards,
methods approved, and culpability level for interrogation, the President
continued to pronounce discretion under the Commander in Chief
power254 and contended that the CIA had authority to choose
interrogation methods. 255 In summer 2007, the Justice Department
issued "letters," instead of "advisory memos," and noted that the Bush
Administration was retaining flexibility in permitting the CIA' s
"harsher interrogation techniques. " 256 Instead of addressing torture and
Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43
VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1553 (2009) (water-boarding "manifestly and unavoidably
constitute[s] torture").
252. Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the CIA subjected Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu
Zubaydah to waterboarding for a combined total of 266 sessions); Dan Eggen, Justice
Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations: Severe, Lasting Pain is Torture, He Says,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at A3 (reporting that OLC advisor Steven G. Bradbury
explained to a House subcommittee that "if it doesn't involve severe physical pain, and it
doesn't last very long, it may not constitute severe physical suffering" and noting that
waterboarding is not torture). Republican candidate Rudy Giuliani stated that whether
waterboarding is legal "depends on how it's done. It depends on the circumstances. It
depends on who does it." Michael Cooper, In His Words: Giuliani on Torture, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007110/25/in-his-ownwords-giuliani-on-torture/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
253. Scott Shane, Prosecutor to Review Official Handling of C.J.A . Tapes, N. Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.corn/2008/02/10/us/1 Otapes.html?_r=O
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
254. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 4,
available
at
2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01 /04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_b
an/?page=full (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that after Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act (OTA) to prohibit torture of detainees, Bush included a "signing statement,"
asserting that he had the prerogative to bypass the law as commander in chief). The signing
statement should have no legal effect because Congress defines the expanse of the
Commander in Chief authority. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 28-33, 89-93.
available
at
255.
Exec.
Order
No.
13440
(July
20,
2007),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-l 3440.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reaffirming
that the Geneva Convention did not apply to "al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces"
and that the CIA was authorized to engage in "certain detention and interrogations" that are
not torture or cruel and inhumane treatment, with the "conditions of confinement and
interrogation practices" determined by the CIA).
256. Mark Mazzetti, Letters Give C.I.A. Tactics a Legal Rationale, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/washington/27intel.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013).
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cruel and inhumane treatment, the "letter" distracted attention onto a
new and lesser category of offense by noting that there would be no
violation of the Geneva Convention's prohibitions of "outrages upon
personal dignity" as long as interrogation procedures did not intend to
humiliate, there was a need to defend the U.S., or if the act of
humiliation was not "so deplorable that the reasonable observer would
257
recognize it as something that should be universally condemned. "
In a peculiar interpretation of what transpired, Goldsmith wrote
in his book that the Bush Administration experienced a failed attempt at
presidential expansionism, was "strangled by law," and did not
sufficiently rely on "soft power" persuasion to attain consent for its
policies. 258 The Bush Administration did not appear to be "strangled by
law" to implement interrogation initiatives because as new human rights
abuses were reported, new standards were devised, time passed, and
more loopholes opened based on discretionary circumstances and
actions hidden in national security secrecy.
With respect to laws that prohibit wars of aggression and the use
of rhetoric to persuade, Bush readily issued unsubstantiated terror threat
259
announcements to the American public to drive fear rhetoric and top
Bush Administration officials made at least 935 patently false
statements and hundreds of other misleading statements on 532 different
occasions about weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda to
persuade Americans that Iraq was a security threat and needed to be
invaded. 260 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard Professor Linda
Bilmes estimated that the war in Iraq cost the American public upwards
of $3 trillion when including indirect expenditures, and Bush departed
from office with the lowest recorded American Presidential approval
ratings in history at 22%, which was due to the Iraq war and poor
economic conditions. 261 Not being restrained by law and implementing
persuasive tactics without consequence were substantially due to misuse
of the secrecy prerogatives of the national security apparatus.

257. Id.
258. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 69, 205-16.
259. Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 37-48; Bejesky, CFP, supra
note 110, at 20-24.
260. Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 343, 348-49 (2012).
261. Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and War Powers for the 2012
Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 1-3 (2012).
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IV. A POLITICIZED ROLE WITH SECRECY

A. The Secrecy Pipeline
As public revelations of human rights abuses and public
excoriation periodically emerged, generally from whistleblower
accounts or investigations, the Bush Administration delayed thorough
investigations by unilaterally choosing to hide legal advice under
national security by designating legal advice, orders for interrogation,
and execution of directives as pieces of encompassing covert
operation; 262 diluted responsibility by timely declassifying memos to
defend that previously issued interrogation directives were legal; and
then modified standards and definitions so they could continue virtually
the same operations. The Geneva Conventions and criminal law
prohibitions against torture and interrogation were unilaterally
dismissed with classified legal advice263 and successions of wrongs
passed without accountability being imposed and with the Bush
Administration only experiencing minimal and temporary political
fallout.
It is true that the lawyers in the Attorney General's Office can
have multiple roles because they must enforce the law and defend the
U.S. government when there is a case or controversy, but the zealous

262. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL, 24 (News Press, 1st ed.
2006) (stating that the Justice Department memos and Presidential orders authorized
obscene powers to intelligence and military agents to detain and interrogation and that
memos were eventually declassified); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1273 (stating that
"Congress was largely absent from engagement in U.S. policies of detention and
interrogation from 2001 through much of 2005 ."); Transcript: Reps. Harman, Hoekstra on
Fox
NEWS
(Dec.
16,
2007),
available
at
'FNS ',
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007 I 12/ 16/transcript-reps-harman-hoekstra-on-fns/
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Congresswoman Jane Harman noting: "We have a system of checks
and balances and it's broken. We're in Constitutional crisis because of the arrogant view of
some in this administration that they can decide what the policy is, write the legal opinions
to justify that policy and be accountable to no one."). The use of Extraordinary Rendition
provides a good example. Kreimer, supra note 31, at 1189-90; Louis Henkin, A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992)
("abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and ...
the territorial integrity of another state"); Lila Rajiva, The CIA 's Rendition Flights to Secret
Prisons: The Torture-Go-Round, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/rajiva12052005.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (stating that
there was significant evidence supporting a "long line of renditions without cause/due
process of any kind" and that the Bush Administration was falsely representing that nothing
illegal was occurring).
263. John J. Gibbons, Commentary on the Terror on Trial Symposium, 28 REv. LITIG.
297, 300-01 (2008).

Published by SURFACE, 2013

65

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

58

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

advocate 1s not the proper role for legal advisors who provide
consultation for policy development. Recall that the White House
specifically requested advisors to provide ways to "exercise the full
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the
Constitution" and stated that he did not care if that meant "pushing the
boundaries of the law." 264 Advisors did push the boundaries of the law
and commentators have called the legal advice despicable,
professionally unethical, 265 in violation of non-derogative international
law, 266 and even criminal. 267 Condemnations followed after policies
were executed due to the use of the national security apparatus.

264. Thomas, supra note 11; Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethnical
Responsibilities of Federal Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6
CONN. Pub. INT. L. J. 23, 23-24 (2006) (stating that there is the possibility that legal advisors
could issue opinions to curry favor with bosses).
265. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1687 (emphasizing that it is unfortunate that "views
and proposals like these should be voiced by scholars who have devoted their lives to the
law, to the study of the rule of law, and to the education of future generations of lawyers is a
matter of dishonor for our profession"); Saltzman, supra note 214, at 440-41 (reporting that
after the change in Administration, the Justice Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility and other authorities recommended that the authors of the memos should be
referred to proper disciplinary authorities); Power, supra note 15, at 41 ("Law drove policy
decisions throughout the war, and not always in good or morally justifiable ways.").
266. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-92 (discussing how
advisory memos were inconsistent with prohibitions on torture); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured
Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 COLO. L.
REV. 1, 24 (2006) ("The acts endorsed by the torture memoranda violate a jus cogens norm
of international law by advocating and excusing acts of torture."); Waldron, supra note 97,
at 1681 (noting that the torture memoranda subvert the rule of law); Paust, supra note 5, at
861-62 ("As various memoranda, authorizations and actions noted above demonstrate, there
were plans to deny protections under the Geneva Conventions ... The plans to deny
protections ... violate the [Geneva] Conventions, and violations of the Conventions are war
crimes.").
267. Koh, supra note 69, at 654 ("if a client asks a lawyer how to break the law and
escape liability, a good lawyer should not say, 'here's how.' The lawyer's ethical duty is to
say no."); Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347,
349, 357, 362-63 (2007) ("lawyers are potentially complicit in war crimes when they
'materially contribute' to the commission of crimes like torture," including via the
International Criminal Court or under the Convention Against Torture); Scott Higham, Law
Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4 l l 89-2004Aug4.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2013) (quoting John J. Gibbons, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals) ("The position taken by the government lawyers [within the Bush Administration]
in these legal memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating
a law.").
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B. Using Secrecy to Hide Illegal Orders
One of the first of the later condemned directives was issued
shortly after 9/11 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who launched a
"special-access program" to assassinate or capture and interrogate "high
value targets. " 268 International law prohibits assassinations and an
executive order has long banned American government officials from
ordering assassinations, but Bush explained that he was not waiving the
executive order, but instead killing "enemy combatants." 269 The Bush
Administration tasked the CIA with abducting suspected terrorists and
conducting hundreds of covert flights across the world to deliver
prisoners to secret detention centers and other countries with
Extraordinary Rendition. 270 Secret prisons prima facie violate the
Geneva Conventions and International Committee of the Red Cross
inspection requirements, 271 but Bush did not officially acknowledge the
secret detention centers until September 2006. 272 International law
forbids abductions and rendering individuals to countries when it is

268. Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to
THE
NEW
YORKER
(May
24,
2004),
available
at
Abu
Ghraib,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/24/040524 fa_ fact?currentPage=all (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013); Seymour M. Hersh, Rumsfeld's Dirty War on Terror, GUARDIAN HOUSE
(Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6898.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing abductions and noting that they had been occurring
from 2001 to 2004). Secrecy was manifest because the only individuals privy to the
operations were a few top Bush Administration officials and about two hundred Navy
SEALs and Army Delta Force who were to execute operations in elite squads. Noted in
McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Adeno Addis, The "War on Terror" as an Autoimmunity
Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 323, 339 (2007); GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP 88 (Metro.
Books, 2006) (stating that there were reports of the U.S. aiding paramilitary groups
"accused of assassinations and torture" and that a former high-level intelligence agent
explained that locals were being recruited in the same way that the Reagan Administration
founded and financed "right-wing execution squads in El Salvador").
269. James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for al Qaeda; Bush
has Widened Authority of Cl.A. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.nytimes.corn/2002/ 12/ 15/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-al-qaeda-bush-haswidened-authori ty-cia-kil l.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Brian Whitaker & Oliver
Burkeman, Killing Probes the Frontiers of Robotics and Legality, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6,
2002), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/06/usa.alqaida (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that Anna Lindh, the Swedish foreign minister, called such
assassinations "a summary execution that violates human rights").
270. McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135,
at 1-3, 6-10.
271. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 75; Symposium, Left Out in the
Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U.
L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2008); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1450 (2008).
272. Khan, supra note 20, at 6-7.
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expected that the detainee will be tortured, and Congress must approve
of rendition programs. 273 Orders to engage in abusive interrogations
began secretly and from the beginning, it seemed that the assumption
274
was that lawmakers and the public had no right to know.
CIA Director Tenet reportedly went to the White House to attain
approval to permit minute details of interrogation to protect agents from
criminal prosecution275 and Bush purportedly exempted the CIA from
military rules on interrogation after 9/11 under the rationale that
"certain terrorists might have information that might save American
lives" and even noted that criminal law restrictions could be avoided in
specific circumstances. 276 The problem with the requests and assumed
legitimacy of exemptions is that the President does not have the
authority to grant another government agency the right to violate
criminal law or human rights law, particularly if methods approved rise
to the level of torture or a jus cogens violation, or the right to exempt an
277
agency from international laws that are binding inside a war zone,
which is also unrelated to protecting American civilians from terrorist
attacks.
After operations were executed, secrecy undermined criminal
justice processes in the two high-profile and rare prosecutions. In 2006,
CIA contract employee David A. Passaro was convicted of assault for
the death of Afghan detainee Abdul W ali in June 2003. 278 At the
beginning of the trial, Passaro sought to introduce classified memos and
emails and to subpoena CIA officials to prove that CIA superiors
directed and approved of abusive practices, but the judge denied his
273. Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135, at 10-12.
274. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 26 (testifying before a joint House and Senate
intelligence committee hearing, Cofer Black, the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism
Center, claimed that "operational flexibility" was needed in dealing with suspected terrorists
and stated: "This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know:
There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves come off.");
CIA Interrogation Techniques: What Did Congress Know, CNN, (Dec. 13, 2007), available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0712/13/ltm.02.html (last visited on Nov. 19,
2013) (stating that sometime in 2002, four Congresspersons on the SSCI were the first to be
informed that the CIA would be engaging in an operation involving harsh interrogation
methods to attain information from captives).
275. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 45
(2008).
276. Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 236.
277. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36; See supra Part II.
278. Gregory P. Bailey, Note, United States v. Passaro: Exercising Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Over Non-Defense Department Government Contractors Committing Crimes
Overseas Under the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 58
CATH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1157-59 (2009).
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request in a closed hearing on the basis of protecting state secrets. 279
Passaro claimed that the Bush Administration was classifying
everything, and that the judge did not know any better than to deny
requests to documents that the Bush Administration classified, which
included decisive evidence. 280 Likewise, Corporal Charles Graner was
convicted for his role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, and Graner appealed
on the basis that there was an order for a "suspension" of war crime
laws for the American military, 281 which does not seem illogical with
today's knowledge of the loophole legal opinions that were issued by
advisors. 282
The state secrets doctrine has questionable legitimacy, 283
particularly when government directives were implemented and there
are questions of fact over whether those orders led to detainee deaths
and severe abuse, but pertinent government documents are classified
and treated as "secret" information. The state secrets privilege is a
common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to "block
discovery in a lawsuit of any information that, if disclosed, would
adversely affect national security, " 284 but it should not routinely prevail
over a criminal defendant's assertion to obtain classified materials
unless the classified document's evidentiary value to the accused is
"clearly negligible." 285 Nonetheless, both Passaro and Granier defended
279. Ryan P. Logan, Note, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying U.S.
Values to Eliminate Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in
Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1605, 1635 (2006); Judge Denies Ex-CIA
Contractor Access to Classified Documents, WRAL.COM (Aug. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1091970/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
280. Logan, supra note 279, at 1633-34.
281. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Administration Asserted a Terror Exception on Search
and Seizure, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR2008040304 l 36.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
282. Scott Horton, A Nuremberg Lesson, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/20/opinion/oe-horton20 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(Gonzales stating that "the Geneva Convention was 'obsolete' when it came to the war on
terror."). Abu Ghraib was in Iraq, but the directives that were issued for Iraq also did not
effectively respect the Geneva Conventions. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note
19, at 22-31.
283. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1933 (2007) (contending that the state
secret' s doctrine weakens congressional and judicial oversight of the executive).
284. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Reynolds v. United
States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the
National Security or Immunity for the Executive, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982).
285. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (citing
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938)).
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by contending that they were acting on orders of superiors and both
claims were rejected, with Passaro' s claim being rejected specifically
because the memos he wanted to introduce as evidence were classified
and protected from disclosure under "national security. " 286 By April
2008, 22 out of 24 civil cases of alleged abuse by civilian employees
and contractors were dropped by the Justice Department, and they may
have been dropped substantially due to the defenses advanced by legal
advisors. 287 It appears that advisory memos were classified to protect
the administration and diffuse attention from scandal.
C. Using Secrecy to Hide Legal Advice
Over two years after the invasion of Afghanistan, classified
legal advisory memos periodically emerged. 288 The Justice Department
Office of Professional Responsibility later investigated and provided a
rather astounding explanation, which was that there were very few
recipients of the legal memoranda because of "the limited number of
security clearances granted to review the materials," that "[t]his denial
of clearances to individuals who routinely handle highly classified
materials has never been explained satisfactorily," and that the denial
"represented a departure from OLC's traditional practices of widely
circulating drafts of important opinions for comment. " 289 Professor
Jack Goldsmith, the new head of the OLC after Bybee, acknowledged
the secrecy and "limited readership" and stated that other departments,
such as the State Department, were expected to object to the opinions. 290
For example, when pressed about specific legal device,
Gonzales explained that he renounced advice imparted in one of the
memos and would review other opinions issued by the OLC (or "John
Yoo"), but also mentioned that the document in question was not
scheduled to be declassified until 2012. 291 Another memo written by

286. United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 220 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the trial
court "admitted some of the evidence in full, admitted some in redacted form, and excluded
some as irrelevant, cumulative, or corroborative," which was not an abuse of discretion).
287. Eggen & White, supra note 281, at A04.
288. Michael Isikoff, Double Standards?, NEWSWEEK (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard. php?az=view_ all&address= 103x5
2175 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
289. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 260.
290. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 167; Neil Kinkopf, Is it Better to be Loved or
Feared? Some Thoughts on Lessons Learned From the Presidency of George W. Bush, 4
DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. PoL'Y 45, 46 (2009) (stating that "Administration officials
deliberated only among themselves: not publicly and not with Congress").
291. Allen & Schmidt, supra note 57, at AO 1.
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Yoo and dated March 14, 2003 was eighty-one pages and not
declassified until March 31, 2008. 292 In July 2011, Human Rights
Watch noted that top officials should be investigated and prosecuted if
evidence warrants it, but pointed out that a main impediment to
gathering evidence is that much information, internal memoranda,
directives, and advisory memos remained classified. 293
With respect to the details of the authorized interrogation methods,
Gonzales contended in written responses for his confirmation hearings
for Attorney General that he could not reveal "exceptional" Top Secret
interrogation standards or practices because disclosure "would fairly
rapidly provide al-Qaeda with a road map concerning the interrogation
that captured terrorists can expect to face and would enable al-Qaeda to
improve its counter-interrogation training to match it."294 This was not
a very compelling explanation because the general methods of
interrogation had been known for decades and were denounced by the
international community. 295
Despite the fact that Bush and other top officials kept issuing
orders for interrogation consistent with the legal advice, 296 classifying
memoranda, and facing criticism by claiming that interrogators were
ordered to remain within U.S. law, Gonzales oddly explained: "I don't
believe the President had access to any legal opinions from the
292. See van Aggelen, supra note 108 (referencing Memorandum from John Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel
of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003).
293. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 2; Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane,
Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17 /us/politics/17detain.html?_r=O (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (announcing the release of four new "detailed memos describing
brutal interrogation techniques"). Recent investigations assessed the professional and ethical
conduct of the lawyers as licensed attorneys, but Yoo's attorneys responded that the State
Bar of Pennsylvania, his state of licensure, has a four-year statute of limitations for the
advice in question, which had already expired. Miguel A. Estrada of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility
Final
Report,
at
4
(July
29,
2009),
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20100220JUSTICE/20100220JUSTICEYooResponse.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
294. Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Says '02 Policy on Detainees Doesn't Bind CIA, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2005),
available
at
http://www.nytimes,com/2005/01 I 19/politics/ 19gonzales.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
295. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11 (explaining that the
details of the CIA's Kubark interrogation manual (1963) could have been downloaded from
the Internet, the methods were in findings and holdings of the ECHR case involving British
abuse of Irish detainees in Northern Ireland, and waterboarding had been known of and
condemned as war crimes since World War 11.); see supra Part III(F)(3)(5).
296. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 22-30.
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Department of Justice. " 297 How could Bush and appointees possibly
issue orders and publicly claim that those tasked with carrying out
directives were not violating law if he was not privy to the content of
the memos? 298 The directives that were issued were considered illegal
and unconstitutional to an overwhelming percentage of Americans, the
legal profession, and the rest of the world, 299 but the White House hid
behind the advice of four attorneys who kept issuing opinions to each
other, and top Bush Administration officials kept classifying the
memos. These top officials hid behind select legal memos in the same
manner that they hid behind "intelligence information" to make their
claims to invade Iraq. 300 The secrecy also caused chagrin for the U.S.
military.

D. Using Secrecy that Compromised Military Responsibilities
The legal advice from Bush Administration lawyers placed the
military in a precarious situation because military officials were also
implementing directives and managing detention facilities, but military
officials and attorneys were either substantially unaware of the legal
advice that sanctioned levels of abuse or their objections were
ignored. 301 The Schlesinger Report, which studied interrogation and
297. Adam Liptak, Author of '02 Memo on Torture: Gentle Soul for a Harsh Topic,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/world/reachwar-legal-advice-author-02-memo-torture-gentle-soul-for-harshtopic.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
298. Steven R. Weisman & Joel Brinkley, Rice Sees Iraq Training Progress But Offers
No Schedule for Exit: Senate Democrats Confront Nominee at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
at
available
2005),
19,
http:/!query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05EED B 133 8F93AA257 52COA9639C8
863 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained
that "the determination of whether interrogation techniques are consistent with our
international obligations and American law are made by the Justice Department").
299. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-29; see supra Part IV(A).
300. See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSC/ Investigation of the Iraq War: Part II:
Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013); Bejesky, Intelligence Information,
supra note 176, at 875-82.
301. Graham, supra note 149, at 77 (stating that "there was no extensive legal debate,
even within the Pentagon, concerning these interrogation methods," and that "[m]any, if not
most, attorneys within the building were completely unaware that these methods had been
approved"); Victor Hansen, A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,
50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 638 (2009) (a small circle of advisors shut JAGs out of the process).
Rear Admiral Don Guter, a former Navy JAG officer, explained that "[i]f we-we being the
uniformed lawyers-that is, the lawyers who are in the U.S. military-had been listened to
and what we said put into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred." Senator
Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Statement on Nomination of Alberto Gonzales
(Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2005/02/03/reid-statement-on-
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detention abuse, states that the Secretary of Defense should have used
"the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates and General
Counsels" and obtained "a wider range of legal opinions and a more
robust debate regarding detainee policy and operations." 302
Had the Bush Administration not hid legal advice as classified
national security secrets, military attorneys may have had more of a
reasonable opportunity to voice objections. However, a competing
position is that JAG attorneys and the military generally did not need to
be consulted and were not empowered to challenge the standards. 303
Professors Yoo and Sulmasy wrote an article that challenged the
contention that JAG attorneys should have provided legal counsel on
detention and interrogation methods because doing so would have
violated constitutional restrictions that ensure that there is civilian
control over the military, enter JAG attorneys into domains in which
they do not normally provide advice, and involve military lawyers in
legal consultation when the "war on terror" was different from previous
wars. 304
Yoo and Sulmasy's contention that JAG attorneys might cause a
separation of powers dilemma by "resisting civilian policy choices" is
theoretically reasonable,3° 5 but JAG attorneys are also mandated by
their professional obligations to impart advice on combat and related

nomination-of-alberto-gonzales/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). There was some high-level
military consideration because Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora expressed his concerns
three times to Haynes during December 2002 and January 2003 and believed that
interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay may be torture. SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xxi; SANDS, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting that there were
warnings). However, Haynes was one of the four prime legal advisers who issued opinions
that were condemned by scholars.
302. SCHLESINGER, supra note 175, at 36.
303.
In March 2003, a Department of Defense Working Group issued
recommendations for interrogation and opined what level of abuse would constitute torture
under international law. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197. The military was instructed to
accept the legal standards set by the Attorney General's Office of Legal Counsel. Detention
Policies and Military Justice: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Personnel of the S.
Comm. of Armed Services, 109th Cong. 15 (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at
24 (noting that "in wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to
best prevail against the enemy"). Orders consistent with OLC advice were applied in
Afghanistan and Iraq. FAY, supra note 206, at 24-25; MAJ. GEN. GEOFFREY MILLER,
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ 2 (2003).
304. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1818-23, 1842-43
(2007); Hansen, supra note 301, at 639 (disagreeing with Sulmasy and Yoo and noting that
the authors exhibit a lack of understanding over the U.S. Constitutional structure).
305. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1834.
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concerns to commanders on a regular basis 306 and avert military
personnel from violating criminal laws. 307 Foremost consternation
arose over whether to extend Geneva Convention Prisoner of War
protections to detainees, such as for alleged members of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda; 308 and whether crimes under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice were committed, such as murder, manslaughter, maltreatment,
battery, and assault. 309
In the capacity of legal advisor, there is no need to be overlyrestrictive310 and oppose the government's preference, assuming the
legal advisor offers reasonable advice. 311 Perhaps there is a threshold
306. Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2010) (article devoted to
discussions with JAG attorneys and depicting that they are consulted daily on numerous
legal issues relating to combat and operations); Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1835-36
(stating that there are elevated concerns for legal doctrine during combat).
307. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
LAWYERS, R. l.13(c) (1992), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_26.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("If a lawyer for the Army knows that an officer ... is engaged
in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is either
a violation of a legal obligation to the Army or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the Army the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
of the Army."); Kramer & Schmitt, supra note 228, at 1426.
308. Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at summary (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31 36701132005.pdf
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (stating that foreigners and human rights organizations have
been especially critical of the denial of POW status to all combatants and that "[t]he
publication of executive branch memoranda document[ ed] the internal debate about the
status of prisoners").
309. 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 918, 919, 928 (2010).
310. John Yoo, A Crucial Look at Torture Law, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2004), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/06/opinion/oe-yoo6 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("A
lawyer must not read the law to be more restrictive than it is just to satisfy his own moral
goals, to prevent diplomatic backlash or to advance the cause of international human rights
law."). With respect to reciprocal obligations among states, such as to fulfill human rights
standards that are binding on all governments, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that a treaty is to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1). It does not say "treaties should be interpreted in light of every
possible loophole, excuse, exception, and rationalization that can be conjured to avoid the
object and purpose of the treaty." The Convention further states that the ordinary meaning
of a treaty should be followed unless the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32. It does not say that "a
government should adopt manifestly absurd and unreasonable interpretations of human
rights treaties to make the ordinary meaning of the treaty ambiguous or obscure." Id.
311. Barron & Lederman, supra note 31, at 985-87, 998, 1006-07, 1015-17, 1031,
1037-38, 1042, 1044-45, 1055, 1059-60, 1067-68, 1075, 1078, 1083, 1091 (noting that the
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up to which advice should be assumed to be objective, but when
opinions exceed this threshold of reasonableness with loopholes and
technicalities that dismiss more orthodox interpretations of the law so to
promote preferences of the government client, it seems highly probable
that the advice could contort the view of the best interest of the ultimate
client-the American public.
V.

CONCLUSIONS ON PATH DEPENDENCE

This article maintains that human rights abuses might have been
virtually inevitable as a path dependent outcome based on the Bush
Administration's assumption of ubiquitous peril, open invitation to
justify its policy preferences when it requested legal memos, and control
over the national security apparatus. Several appointed legal advisers,
who were prone to appease, 312 produced advice with loopholes 313 that
contended the President has an all-puissant Commander in Chief
authority that permits ignoring binding treaties and customary
international law, that necessity and self-defense formed exigency to
nullify laws that would otherwise restrict interrogations, that
Afghanistan was a "failed state" without a lawful government, that
distinctively classifying combatants and torture meant that detainees
could be interrogated, and that the Taliban was more like a "militant,
terrorist group" than a formal military.
Effectively, the Bush
Administration "construct[ed] a judicially-endorsed practice of
permissible torture" 314 and hid the advice that contended how directives
would be legal. Ironically enough, the approach of hiding information
in the past, the Attorney General's office did impart diversity in opinions and did not always
aggrandized executive war power).
312. Legal memos were written by OLC lawyers with "clear Republican credentials
and affiliations," and those who reviewed the memoranda were "all Republican-appointed
or at least Republican-affiliated officials." David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119
YALE L.J. 548, 606 (2009); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (2007)
(calling the memos advocacy briefs rather than objective opinions).
313. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 355 (2007) (opining that
legal advisors intentionally produced "forward-leaning" memos to "see how far the CIA and
the military could go without breaking the law, and how far the law could be stretched to
move the line farther forward still"); Vanessa Blum, Culture of Yes: Signing Off on a
Strategy, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 1 ("Guided by a determination to prevent another
terrorist attack on U.S. soil, strong loyalty to the president, and in some cases an ideological
disdain for international law, government attorneys sought ways to justify White House
policies in the war on terror, much as a corporate lawyer might exploit loopholes in the tax
code.").
314. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the 'Ticking Bomb, ' in THE TORTURE
DEBATE in AMERICA 71 (Karen J. Greenberg, ed. 2006).
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in the national security apparatus, promoting a public agenda, and then
using the national security apparatus as a scapegoat, was frightfully
similar to the Bush Administration's false claims that led to the war in
Iraq. 315
The Bush Administration endowed American agents with a
to engage in the widespread use of interrogation methods that
right
legal
316
resulted in torture, kidnapping, unlawful detentions, and even deaths;
318
knew of the abuse; 317 promoted legal advisors when they could have

315. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 176, at 875-82. In one specific
piece of key information, the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence requested analysts to
write a "murky" paper to "lean far forward and do a speculative piece" and if you were to
"stretch to the maximum the evidence you had, what could you come up with?" SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE, REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S
PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, s. REP. No. 108-301, at 306-07 (2004)
(committee staff interview with CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence). The paper's scope
note affirmed that it was "purposely aggressive in seeking to draw connections" and written
for White House "senior policymaker interest in a comprehensive assessment of Iraqi links
to al-Qa'ida." Id. at 305-07. Congressman Peter Hoekstra places blame on the intelligence
hierarchy: "I think you've got a systemic problem here. I think the [intelligence]
community is incompetent. It is arrogant . . . [I]t's become political." Transcript: Reps.
Harman, Hoekstra on 'FNS', Fox NEWS (Dec. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,317011,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The
Bush Administration regarded the information, much of it rumors, as serious in making
threat claims to the American public. Robert Bejesky, The SSC! Investigation of the Iraq
War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2012); Bejesky, Intelligence
Information, supra note 176, at 859-63; Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110, at 22-29. The war
may have cost American taxpayers upwards of $3 trillion. See generally, JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE
IRAQ CONFLICT (W. W. Norton & Company ed., 2008).
316. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 18-24; McCOY, supra note 49, at 116; Bejesky,
Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-36 (citing scholars contending that it is rather probable that
the Bush Administration committed crimes).
317. Leila Nadya Sadat, International Legal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of
Iraqi Detainees by American Forces, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2004), available at
http://www.tjsl.edu/slomansonb/AbuGhraib.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (noting that
abuses were generally known by top officials who could have prevented the abuses).
318. McCOY, supra note 49, at 160 ("[The] Bush administration's torture advocates
strut across television screens and down the corridors of power," operate above the law, and
the chief architects and policy-makers of the memos that protect the torturers from criminal
prosecution have almost all been promoted by Bush.); Diane Marie Amann, Application of
the Constitution to Guantanamo Bay: Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2085, 2086 (2005)
("A few soldiers were prosecuted for detainee abuse, but generals implicated in government
reports were not, and high-ranking civilians won promotion."). Bush appointed, and the
Republican-controlled Congress confirmed Gonzales as attorney general after asking a few
questions about interrogation memos. Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 236. Bybee
was also rewarded for "torturing the law" by being appointed a federal judge. Alvarez,
supra note 47, at 197 n. 83.
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been conspirators in war crimes; 319 and even responded to detainee
attempts to attain legal redress as "lawfare" and international "judicial
processes" that are "strategies of the weak" that undermine "[ o]ur
Meanwhile, Yoo and Bybee
strength as a nation state. " 320
acknowledged that interrogators would be relying on their advice, 321 but
it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor would indict when there is a
Justice Department opinion that authorizes the practices, 322 which can
politicize the justice system. 323
IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 133-35 (citing Marjorie Cohn,
Indictment, MARJORIE COHN (Jan. 10, 2005), available at
http: //www.marjoriecohn.com/2005/01 /gonzales-indictment.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2013)); David M. Brahms et al., An Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, GLOBAL
SECURITY, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/senatejudiciary-committee-letter_03jan2005.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (a group of military
officials expressing their concern about Gonzales's nomination because of his influence on
supporting human rights violating interrogation and detention methods); van Aggelen, supra
note 108, at 22.
320. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
6
(2005),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy .pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2013). The term "lawfare" was offered as a means of describing reliance on legal means to
confront national security issues instead of by military force, and that the U.S. has
traditionally relied on defensive lawfare. Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare and U.S. National
Security, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 393, 394, 399, 401 (2010); DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR
AND LA w 116 (2006) ("Law now offers an institutional and doctrinal space for transforming
the boundaries of war into strategic assets, as well as a vernacular for legitimating and
denouncing what happens in war."). The fear is that an enemy could use the U.S.'s strong
legal system against us. Fred K. Ford, Keeping Boumediene off the Battlefield: Examining
Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of the United
States Military Operations, 30 PACE L. REV. 396, 401 (2010). Abused detainees could
allegedly wage "lawfare" against the United States. Michael J. Frank, U.S. Military Courts
and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 645, 65 l (2006) (noting that
"[u]nfortunately, the United States has not fully taken advantage of and enjoyed the fruits
that can be reaped from the prosecution of war criminals, particularly with respect to
terrorists operating in the Iraqi theatre of operations" which "is due in part to the effects of
the lawfare being waged against the United States with respect to the prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba").
321. THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel ed., 2005) (referencing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney Gen, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President (Aug. 1, 2002)).
322. Clarke, supra note 275, at 46; William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists,
Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1455-56 (2008) (noting that it
was "extraordinary" that Gonzales claimed "that the government has the legal authority to
prosecute journalists for publishing classified information," such as those related to torture
and other scandals).
323. In another example, in late 2006, individuals at the Department of Justice forced
out several prosecutors in an effort to "manipulate prosecutorial decisions in an effort to
entrench their political allies;" but "[t]he White House, of course, denied any involvement."
Eric Lane, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the
319.

The

Gonzales
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In April 2008, after legal memos were successively issued for
six years, the Justice Department finally decided to commence an
investigation into whether its officials were improperly advising Bush
and top White House officials on issues related to international law,
wartime authority, and laws governing torture. 324 One month later,
fifty-six members of Congress sent a letter to Attorney General Michael
Mukasey, Bush's new appointee, to choose a special counsel to
investigate whether top Bush Administration officials committed crimes
by authorizing harsh interrogation techniques. 325 It is difficult to
cogitate what is left to investigate after years of assiduous work by the
ACLU, numerous human rights groups, courageous dissenting officials,
a dozen military investigations, and the Bush Administration's own
admissions. 326 Even former President Jimmy Carter expressed whether
he believed that the Bush Administration issued policies that tortured
prisoners in violation of international treaties, and he stated: "I don't
think it. I know it." 327 With reference to the Bush Administration's
contention that the "Geneva Convention do not apply to those people in
Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo," Carter further explicated that the
assertion seems to assume that "we can torture prisoners and deprive
them of an accusation of a crime to which they are accused ... [Y]ou
can make your own definition of human rights and say we don't violate
them, and you can make your own definition of torture and say we don't
violate them." 328

President's Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 73 7,
770 (2010). Congressional investigations revealed that White House officials did play an
active role in the firings, and there was "politicization of the American criminal justice
system." Id. at 770 -71.
324. Lara Jakes Jordan, Justice Department Investigating 2003 Torture Memo,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.chron.com/news/nationworld/article/J ustice-Department-investigating-2003-torture-memo-164 7 622. php
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2013).
325. JOHN CONYERS, JR., REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 368 n.531 (2009)
(citing Letter from Jan Schakowsky, Rep., U.S. House of Rep., et al., to Michael Mukasey,
United States' Attorney General (June 6, 2008).
326. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 19-22, 64-75.
327. Carter Says US Tortures Prisoners, CNN (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/10/carter.torture/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
328. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars worldwide have clearly demonstrated the inability of the
Bretton Woods Institutions (the "BWis") to promote authentic
sustainable development. 1 Some have criticized the BWis for their
1. The Bretton Woods Institutions encompass the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. In July 1944, delegates from forty-four allied nations gathered at the
Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
CONFERENCE Vol. I at 5 (1948). They gathered to create institutions that would regulate the
international monetary system and reconstruct the international relations. Id. at 5-7. The
meeting resulted in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ("IBRD"), and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). See LEE E.
PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY
REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 132- 33 (2d. ed. 1997) (explaining that the IMF was
established to carry out exchange, reserve, and short-term loan functions normally
associated with "bank," while the IBRD is essentially a "Fund" for providing long- term
loans). The purpose of these institutions was to stabilize the global economy and fund
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
reconstruction of countries recovering from World War II.
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 12 (2003). See DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO., EVERYONE'S
UNITED NATIONS 364- 65 (9th ed. 1979) (explaining that the IBRD was established to assist
in the reconstruction and development of members' territories by facilitating the investment
of capital for productive purposes; to promote private foreign investment and to supplement
it by providing loans for productive purposes; and to promote growth of international trade
and maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international
investment for the development of the productive sources of the Bank's members). The
IMF was established with the purposes of facilitating international monetary cooperation;
promoting exchange rate stability; assisting in the establishment of multilateral payment
systems; eliminating foreign exchange restrictions; providing loans to nations experiencing
balance of payments issues; all for the purpose of creating conditions for strong economic
growth. Id. at 55. The IMF created an orderly basis for international currency exchange,
and established both stabilization and adjustment mechanisms. See LEE E. PRESTON &
DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2d. ed. 1997); see also EDWARDS. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER,
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21, 22 (1973). The IBRD provided loans to
support reconstruction in war-damaged countries, and later promoted economic growth and
development in nations with low per-capita income. See LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE
WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2d. ed. 1997); see also EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER,
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21, 22 (1973). The World Bank actually refers
to two banks: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
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inability to rehabilitate, evolve, and reform their respective policies. 2
Some scholars argue that the core of this problem is the voting
structures of the BWis. 3 Additional critiques address the lack of
transparency and limited participation by developing countries in
formulation of BWis' policies; both deficiencies have resulted in fewer
developing countries benefiting from these policies. 4

International Development Association.
See WORLD BANK, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). The World Bank Group
refers to the two banks and three other agencies: the International Finance Corporation, the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes. See id.
2. See What Are the Main Concerns and Criticisms about the World Bank and IMF?,
BRETTON
WOODS
PROJECT,
available
at
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320869 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013)
("Criticism of the World Bank and the IMF encompasses a whole range of issues but they
generally centre around concern about the approaches adopted by the World Bank and the
IMF in formulating their policies, and the way they are governed. This includes the social
and economic impact these policies have on the population of countries who avail
themselves of financial assistance from these two institutions, and accountability for these
impacts.").
3 . ARIEL BUIRA, CHALLENGES TO THE WORLD BANK AND IMF: DEVELOPING COUNTRY
PERSPECTIVES l (2003); see also JOHN E. CHEN, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
IN GLOBALIZATION: THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 81 (2003); M. PANIC, GLOBALIZATION AND
NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE 228 (2003); WILLIAM K. TABB, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 184, 373 (2004); V. SPIKE PETERSON, A CRITICAL REWRITING
OF GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTEGRATED, REPRODUCTIVE AND VIRTUAL ECONOMIES 3,
8 (2003); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE ANTI- GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT, THE GLOBALIZATION
AND DEVELOPMENT READER: PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 356
(2007); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALISM'S DISCONTENTS, THE GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT READER: PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 295 (2007);
Messner et al., Governance Reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the U.N.
Development System 6 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Dialogue on Globalization, Occasion Paper
No. 18, 2005). The IMF and the World Bank have a weighted system of voting. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa12.htm#5 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter Articles of IMF] (explaining subsection a); WORLD BANK, Voting Powers,
http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUClO (last visited Dec. 3, 2013)
available at,
[hereinafter Voting Powers] (explaining that the IMF' s voting bylaws state that each
member is guaranteed 250 votes, plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equal to
100,000 special drawing rights. Within the World Bank, a new member country is allotted
250 votes plus one additional vote for each share it holds in the World Bank's capital stock);
see
also
ICSID
Basic
Documents,
ICSID,
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Ru
lesMain (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (discussing how the ICSID allocates its voting within its
Administrative Council; all decisions are taken by a majority of the votes cast, and each
member must vote in person).
4. See Ngaire Woods, Governance in International Organizations: The Case for
Reform in the Bretton Woods Institutions, INT'L AND FIN. MONETARY ISSUES (2008),
available
at
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-
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Acknowledging these critiques, this article will argue that current
BWI policies must be fundamentally redesigned, since many are archaic
and others are counter-productive to integral sustainable development in
the current global economy. Further, the article will argue that the
dominant nations in the BWI have forced their political agendas on the
rest of the world while hiding behind the veil of these multilateral
funding institutions. 5
In making these arguments, the article will begin with a review of
the origin, purpose, and structures of the BWis and offer a brief critique
of their voting structures. Next, this article will analyze and critique the
neoliberal revival of the classical laissez-faire liberal ideology now on a
global scale, and show how it has played out in the Asian financial
crisis, the current world financial crisis, and the on-going debt crisis.
Two case studies will then be provided and discussed: one on
Argentina; and a second on Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper will then
analyze other institutions' alternative solutions to the ongoing problems
with the BWI, specifically the Monterey Consensus, developed by the
United Nations Financing for Development process, the "Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries," created by the World Bank, and the G-20 6 , a
policy-advising group of 20 countries claiming to represent the most
"systemically significant" world's economies. Finally, a conclusion
will summarize this article's critique of the BWis and suggest
alternative lines of strategy.
Part II first reviews the events and global instability that led to the
Bretton Woods Conference creating the early BWis, and then explains
content/uploads/Governance%20and%20Decision-Making.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2013)
("While pressure for good governance has been magnified by the policy role of the [IMF
and World Bank, also known as the] Bretton Woods twins, neither institution has adequately
reformed [the] core aspects of accountability and participation."); see also Madeline Baer,
Water Privatization and Civil Society in Bolivia, Addressing the Democratic Deficit of
International Organizations, Annual Meeting of International Studies Association (2006),
at
available
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_ mla_ apa_research_citation/I /0/0/4/0/pages 100408/p
100408-1.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (providing another critique which charges that
recent BWis' globalization policies favoring privatization- allowing private lenders to
come in and charge higher rates-are further aggravating the problem for developing
countries).
5. See, e.g., Nico Kirsch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power
and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 382 (2005).
"Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development of international
law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and
improve their position." Id.
6. See About the G20, G20.0RG, available at http://www.g20.org/about_G20 (last
visited Dec. 4, 2013); see infra Part IV.C.
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the Bretton Woods Conference itself and the global response to the
creation of the BWis. 7 Part II then concludes with a critical analysis of
the IMF and World Bank voting structures. 8
Part III begins by showing how neoliberal agendas influence the
policies of the BWis through vote and governance. 9 A historical
analysis of the rise of the contemporary neoliberal ideology is then
provided. 10 At the heart of this has been the University of Chicago
School of Economics, led by the late Professor Milton Friedman, and
the Austrian School of Economics. Both were highly influential in
developing a new and problematic model of so-called global
'development' for the BWis. Part III then examines loan conditionality;
the mechanism by which the BWis pressure other countries into
accepting neoliberal ideas. 11 Part III concludes by providing a critical
analysis of the neoliberal ideology in its application to the Asian
Financial Crisis, 12 along with case studies showing its impact on
Argentina and Sub-Saharan Africa. 13
Part IV analyzes alternative solutions, which have been put forth
by various global endeavors. It begins with an examination of the
Monterrey Consensus, the product of an international conference held in
Monterrey, Mexico. 14 Part IV then examines The Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries, a program created by the World Bank and the IMF,
which currently classifies forty developing countries with high levels of
poverty and debt which are eligible for special assistance. 15 Finally, the
G-20 is a group of twenty countries that hold periodic meetings to
review and promote discussions pertaining to the promotion of
international financial stability and the governance of the world
economy. 16
7. See infra Parts II.A-C.
8. See infra Parts II.D-E.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.D.3.
13. See infra Part III.D.1-2.
14. See Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development: Response Sought.from Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 219
(2004); see infra Part IV.A. (stating the conference in Monterrey, Mexico comprised of over
fifty Heads of State, two hundred Ministers of Finance, and the Heads of the United
Nations, IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization).
15. See Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 191, 191 - 94 (2000); infra Part IV.B.
16.
See
What
is
the
G20,
G20.0RG,
available
at
http://www.g20.org/about_g20/g20_members (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (providing that the
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Finally, Part V concludes that the BWis, due to their lending
policies and governing structures, have restrained true global
development. The BWis have served as impediments to authentic
development and these institutions are in need of fundamental reform
including overhauls to their policies, voting systems, and governance
Part V proposes alternative strategies for authentic
structures.
sustainable development through other multilateral global institutions.
II. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
A. Worldwide Economic Instability After World War I
A world trading system was practically nonexistent during the
Great Depression because there were no major multilateral trading
agreements or international agencies at the time to regulate or promote
trade relations between countries. 17 Developed countries pursued
nationalistic policies of closing their borders to imports in an effort to
protect their domestic productions and shift unemployment to the
nations from which they formerly imported. 18 At the mercy of their
"European Masters," 19 developing countries suffered from these
isolationist policies, as they were cut off from their trading partners and
20
no longer had external purchasers for their nationally produced goods.
group consists of both developed and developing countries, heads of state and government,
finance ministers and central bank governors); see infra Part IV.C.
17. KENT ALBERT JONES, WHO'S AFRAID OF THE WTO? 68 (2004) (discussing how the
world trading system after World War I collapsed during the Great Depression partly
because most countries established bilateral trade agreements, thus precluding any sort of
broad multilateral trade agreement).
18. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 15, 107 (2003)
(explaining that these policies became known as "beggar- thy- neighbor" policies). Beggarthy- neighbor policies are a government's protectionist course of action taken to discourage
imports by raising tariffs and instituting nontariff barriers, usually to reduce domestic
unemployment and increase domestic output. Id. This term is sometimes applied to
competitive currency devaluation. Id. at 107.
19. Id. at 11 - 13 (asserting that contrary to its original policies, the IMF lends funds
only if countries "engage in policies like cutting deficits, raising taxes, or raising interest
rates that lead to a contraction of the economy.").
20. CHARLES P. KlNDLEBERGER, THE WORLD in DEPRESSION: 1929- 1939, 26-28 (1973)
(discussing how beggar- thy- neighbor tactics put countries in a worse-off position since
they led to retaliation among countries). National economic interests trumped international
cooperation. Id. In addition to the British government's micromanagement of the
agricultural industry, the 1932 Import Duties Act imposed an ad valorem tariff on almost all
goods, with only minimal exceptions. Id. Further, the Ottawa Agreements Act granted a
duty exemption for all British Commonwealth Countries; this led to the economic
discrimination against Great Britain's neighboring countries. Id. at 85- 86 (explaining
further that the duty exemption granted reciprocity on duty- free imports and exports to all

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

84

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Failure to Achieve Integral Development

77

B. The Bretton Woods Conference
In July 1944, delegates from forty-four allied nations 21 gathered at
the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with
the objective of creating institutions that, through a unified system of
purpose, policies, and rules, would regulate the international monetary
system while simultaneously reconstructing the international relations
which had begun to foster before World War II. 22 Although all of the
British Commonwealth Countries). Germany responded to the international financial crisis
by establishing its own beggar- thy- neighbor policies in the form of exchange controls in
1931, and by 1933, several state import boards were granted the power to regulate trade
through import quotas and tariffs. Id.; B. N. GHOSH, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
REFORMS: CASES AND CAVEATS 379 (2001) (explaining how Germany and France increased
border protection and domestic market regulations). Parallel to the United Kingdom and
Germany, most developed countries introduced exchange- control systems. DEREK How ARD
ALDCROFT, EUROPE'S THIRD WORLD: THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 61
(2006) (listing countries that established exchange controls during the l 930's as: Bulgaria
1931, Estonia 1931, Greece 1931, Hungary 1931, Latvia 1931, Lithuania 1935, Poland
1936, Romania 1932, Spain 1931, Turkey 1930, and Yugoslavia 1931 ). Those that did not
introduce exchange systems became members of trade blocs similar to that of the British
Commonwealth; these blocs were characterized by preferential trading agreements that
benefited bloc members and discriminated against nonmembers.
EUROPE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 1500 TO 2000 156 (Derek Howard Aldcroft & Anthony Sutcliffe
eds., 1999) (explaining how exchange control systems were also an issue in the
development of South American and African countries). Thirteen of the fourteen countries
using these systems in the IMF were Latin American countries. See id.; ELIZABETH
HENNESSEY, A DOMESTIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: 1930- 1960 85 (1992) ( explaining how
African countries fared differently under the exchange control systems depending upon their
relationship with the British Commonwealth).
21. The Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary
and Financial Conference Vol. I at 5 (1948) [hereinafter Bretton Woods Conference Vol. I].
The forty- four nations were comprised of: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
22. See id. at 5- 7; DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 365 (9th ed.
1979). The draft documents presented to delegates at the Bretton Woods conference were
presented in four different versions: the U.S . version, the U.K. version, new material, and
material taken from the Monetary Fund proposal. EDWARD s. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER,
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21 (1973). Least developed members, including
European countries damaged during World War II, held a greater interest in development of
the IBRD than the IMF. Id. Therefore, when the first week of the conference primarily
focused on development of the IMF, delegates feared the IBRD would not be established.
Id. Stable monetary conditions are the cornerstone to successful lending and a precondition
to the membership in the BWis. Id.; JACQUES J. POLAK, THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF: A
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP l (1994). An attempt to reconcile openness and trade expansion
with economic and employment stabilization, the agreement was "an unprecedented
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forty- four nations were present, the Bretton Woods agreement was
largely negotiated between Britain and the United States of America. 23
The meeting resulted in the creation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), and the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"). 24
Despite the peaceful northern New Hampshire setting for the
Bretton Woods conference, the meeting set the stage for future conflict
not only between the United States and Great Britain, but also between
historical differing economic policies. At the conference, Great
Britain's Lord John Maynard Keynes ("Keynes") sought to retain the
imperial preferential system and bilateral trading, while the United
States' Harry Dexter White ("White") preferred an open, nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system. 5 Fundamentally, Great
experiment in international economic constitution building." G. JOHN IKENBERRY, THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BRETTON WOODS, A PERSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
155 (1993).
23. The United States of America and Britain were the two major Western powers
from World War II. See IKENBERRY, supra note 22; see also ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND
THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS To THE 1990s 33 (1996)
("The Bretton Woods negotiations are often portrayed as a battle of wills between Keynes
and White."); M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599, 1852254,00.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2013).
24. LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSlNESS 132- 33 (2d. ed. 1997)
(explaining that the names of these two institutions are somewhat confusing, since the IMF
was established to carry out exchange, reserve, and short- term loan functions normally
associated with "bank," while the IBRD is essentially a "Fund" for providing long- term
loans). The IBRD was established on December 27, 1945 with the intent to:
"[A]ssist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes; to promote private
foreign investment and, when private investment is not readily available on
reasonable terms, to supplement it by providing loans for productive purposes out of
its own capital funds; and to promote the balanced growth of international trade and
the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging
international investment for the development of the productive sources of the Bank's
members."
DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO., EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 364-65 (9th ed. 1979). Membership
to the IBRD is open to all members of the IMF. Id. at 364. The IMF was established with
the purposes of facilitating international monetary cooperation; promoting exchange rate
stability; assisting in the establishment of multilateral payment systems; eliminating foreign
exchange restrictions; providing loans to nations experiencing balance of payments issues;
all for the purpose of creating conditions for strong economic growth. Id. at 55.
25. IKENBERRY, supra note 22, at 156. Britain's position was to secure employment
and economic stabilization within its borders for its citizens. See id. at 157. Formal
negotiations on international trade took place in Havana, Cuba three years later under the
formulation of the International Trade Organization. TYRONE FERGUSON, THIRD WORLD
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Britain recognized a need for some post-war regulation on the
international scene; it recognized that the potential exploitation by the
war's victors of the defeated Axis Powers, as a means of financing the
reconstruction of war-tom European nations, could lead to another
global disaster. 26 The United States' influence and power ultimately
won out, for the BWis were mostly modeled after White's proposals. 27
C. After the Bretton Woods Conference
Throughout the 1960s, the BWis faced three great obstacles:
decolonization, threats of decreasing international liquidity, and a
weakening gold standard. 28 In partial response, the World Bank created
the International Development Association ("IDA") 29 in 1960, which

AND DECISION MAKJNG IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25 (1988).
The
multilateral organization taking the place of the ITO was the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") in 194 7. See id. Analysts consider the Bretton Woods system's
"triadic structure" to include the GATT, IMF, and IBRD, encompassing trade, monetary,
and financial relations. Id. The GATT was intended to reverse protectionist and
discriminatory trade practices such as the imperialistic approach. See General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XV [hereinafter
GATT].
26. See JOHN D. CIORCIARI, The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World
Bank Credit Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of
Agreement, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J 361-69 (2000) (describing the negotiations leading up to
the creation of the BWis that took place prior to the end of WWII); World War II, U.S.
HISTORY, available at http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1661.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2013) (explaining that the Allies were determined not to repeat the mistakes of World War
I); Paul Wachtel, Understanding the Old and New Bretton Woods 6 (New York University,
Stern School of Business Working Paper No. 2451, 2007), available at
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Florence_paperjan4.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
Keynes proposed an international bank and a radical institutional system for management of
currencies, including creation of a common world- unit of currency. Id. He envisioned that
these institutions would manage international trade through regulation, and prove strong
incentives for countries to avoid substantial trade deficits while fostering economic growth.
Id. Meanwhile, White's proposal called for less regulation. Id. White proposed limited
government interference and gave more emphasis to market based solutions. Id.
27. Sabine Dammasch, The System of Bretton Woods: A Lesson from History, 5,
available at http://www.hiddenmysteries.org/money/policy/b-woods.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2013).
28. See Jong II You, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform and Change,
in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS 209, 210-12 (2000) (explaining
that SDR's were created in 1969 to respond to the shortage of .international liquidity);
Historical Gold Prices - 1833 to Present, NATIONAL MINfNG ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.nma.org/pdf/gold/his_gold_prices.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) (listing the
price of gold from 1833 to present day).
29. International Development Association, Articles of Agreement and Report of the
Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the
Articles of Agreement, Sept. 24, 1960, at 21 [hereinafter IDA Articles ofAgreement].
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was praised as "the most significant moment in institutional expansion
of the BWis toward a poverty-focused approach." 30 When Robert
McNamara arrived as World Bank President in 1968, the Bank's
fundraising efforts grew. 31 Envisioning a larger, more active, and more
efficient bank, McNamara established lending targets which, due to
acceleration of the Bank's growth, justified reorganization in 1973. 32
The IDA, 33 led by the United States, assisted the world's most
impoverished countries, which were ineligible for bank loans, by
offering concessional or soft loans. 34 Shifting its attention to newly
30. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: Third World Social
Movements and International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 529, 552 (2000) (explaining
how the IDA led to the further establishment of additional development institutions because
its framework, lending primarily to Third World countries, helped the World Bank become
a true international institution).
31. Id. at 140, 180; JOCHEN KRASKE, ET AL., BANKERS WITH A MISSION: THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE WORLD BANK, 1946- 1991 at 175 (1996); PHILIPPE LE PRESTRE, THE
WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 59 (1989). McNamara's stated
reorganization goal was to:
"[r]eplace the ... procedure in which unrelated project loans, considered in isolation
from another, filter up through the levels with a five year program based on systems
analysis and overall development strategy, taking account of relative priorities
among countries and within sectors of each country."
Id.; see also Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Symposium: Social Justice and

Development: Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods System: Income Distribution and
the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social
Development , 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. I, 18 (1996). Lending to alleviate
poverty in developing countries expanded considerably after Robert McNamara took over
the Bank's helm in the late 1960's; structural adjustment lending followed in the late
1970's. Carrasco & Kose, supra; see also KRASKE, supra, at 140 (discussing how during
McNamara's presidency, the World Bank staff tripled, growing from 1,600 to 5,700
people).
32. SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD'S BANKER 26-27 (2004) (discussing the
divergence of the World Bank from a conservative lender to an ambitious bank set on
offering loans to countries even if they could not afford to pay them back). The creation of
the IDA reflected a shifting mind- set of the World Bank's largest shareholders as they saw
the tide of independence sweeping Africa, combined with the height of the Cold War, as an
opportunity to aid others in the hopes that those governments aided through the IDA would
not become communist. Id.
33. See IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 29 (discussing how the United States
and a group of the Bank's member countries set up an agency that would lend to the poorest
countries with the most favorable terms possible).
34. See DEVESH KAPUR, JOHN P. LEWIS & BERNARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS
FIRST HALF CENTURY VOL. 2 PERSPECTIVES 204, 207 (1997) (explaining how the United
States encouraged the World Bank during the establishment of IDA to extend lending to
low- income countries, become involved in development problems such as agricultural
productivity, and take the lead in matters relating to industrial and trade liberation in India);
at
available
Loans,
Concessional
OECD,
e.g.,
see
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5901 (last visited Dec. I, 2013) (defining
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industrializing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the World
Bank expanded its reach into new sectors. 35 The IDA's funding was
derived from the contributions of wealthier nations, IBRD income, and
borrowers' credit repayments. 36 Due to the fact that funds were initially
insufficient to meet the IDA's commitments-because of the
unlikelihood of substantial replenishment due to the balance of payment
deficit experienced by wealthier states-there emerged a certain
skepticism about progress, which contributed to delays associated with
recuperating the funds. 37
As time passed, however, a significant and problematic shift
emerged in the IDA's operational philosophy. It moved away from the
World Bank's original theory of market-based lending, and instead
adopted a new theory favoring loans to the poorest countries. 38

concessional loans as "loans that are extended on terms substantially more generous than
market loans; the concessionality is achieved either through interest rates below those
available on the market or by grace periods, or a combination of these. Concessional loans
typically have long grace periods.").
35. See Martin A. Weiss, CRS Report/or Congress: The World Bank's International
Development Association
(!DA)
2,
6
(Apr.
1,
2008),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104719.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013)
(explaining how concerns of the World Bank loans being unaffordable to low- income
countries prompted the establishment of the IDA); see also International Development
Association;
What
is
!DA?,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida-15-mid-term-review.html (last visited Dec. I, 2013).
"The IDA- 15 replenishment raised funds for poor countries for the three-year period
between July 2008 and June 2011. These are critical years for countries trying to achieve
the U.N. Millennium Development Goals since it takes time for projects to be completed
and yield measurable results." Id. Forty- five donor countries made pledges toward this
replenishment. Id.
36. See generally KRASKE, supra note 31, at 142-43 (explaining that IDA
commitments dropped in 1968 from $400 million per year to $107 million). This became a
problem of mobilizing resources within the IDA. Id.
37. See generally id. This became a problem of mobilizing resources within the IDA.
Id. at 140; see id. at 180; EDITH KUIPER & DRUCILLA K. BARKER, FEMINIST ECONOMICS AND
THE WORLD BANK: HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY 17 (2006) ("A critical junction in the
Bank's history was the appointment as its president of Robert McNamara .... During his
tenure . . . the Bank shifted from an emphasis on infrastructure to agriculture and rural
development, in an attempt to address people's basic needs, particularly the rural poor.").
38. These loans were then furnished at cheaper rates, under the guise of giving "World
Bank credits as a useful tool for propping up sympathetic governments." See Carrasco &
Kose, supra note 31, at 3.
Income inequality came under scrutiny during preparatory meetings for the World
Summit for Social Development (Social Summit). Observers noted that although
living standards in developing countries have improved over the past two decades,
disparities within countries- the subject of this article- are likely to rise, with the
largest gaps occurring in South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
Id.; see also DIGUMARTI BHASKARA RAO, WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 198
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Originally, the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system had been
the United States' policy of buying and selling gold accordin¥ to an
official price set at the behest of foreign monetary authorities. 9 The
Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement, Article IV, defined the unit of
the international monetary system as either the U.S. dollar or gold of a
specified weight and fineness. 40 However, the vulnerability of the gold
standard began to show in the 1960s. Later, in August of 1971,
President Richard Nixon officially suspended the automatic conversion
of dollars into other currencies. 41 Although solutions to fixing the gold
standard for the international monetary system were proposed,
ultimately the Bretton Woods gold-standard system collapsed. This led
43
to the development of Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs") 42 in 1969.
(1998) (quoting former secretary general Boutros- Ghali); LE PRESTRE, supra note 31, for a
discussion on the BWis involvement in the development debate of the 1960's and 1970's.
39. MICHAEL D. BORDO & BARRY EICHENGREEN, Bretton Woods and the Great
Inflation 28 (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper No. w14532, 2008) (explaining how
first, there was an asymmetric adjustment between deficit and surplus countries, which led
to a deflationary bias); see FRITZ MACHLUP, REMAKING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM: THE RIO AGREEMENT AND BEYOND 7- 8 (1968) (explaining how the United
Kingdom and United States conflicted over the gold standard because the United States and
White wanted it, but the United Kingdom and Keynes saw the system as imposing
intolerable restraints on member countries). Gold supplies were inadequate to finance the
growth of world output, and to serve as gold cover to back national currencies. BORDO &
EICHENGREEN, supra. Shifts of currency holdings between London and New York risked a
confidence crisis in the weak sector, while a shift between the key currencies and gold
occurred when foreign holders of key currency balances staged runs on banks where reserve
centers' could not convert their outstanding liabilities into gold. Id.
40. BAHRAM GHAZI, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE QUESTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2005) (explaining how other IMF members also had to keep the value of
their currency within one percent of the par value). If a change of margin was needed, IMF
members had to undergo thorough discussions with other members and obtain their consent
before implementing the measure. Id.
41. See id; see also THE ECONOMIST, A Brief History of Funny Money, Jan. 6, 1990, at
21 (providing a brief account of why the Bretton Woods system ended and a larger debate as
to which exchange- rate system has worked best in the world economy).
42. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.HTM (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
SDRs] (discussing the makeup of the SDR). The SDR is a potential claim on the freely
usable currencies of IMF members where holders of SDRs can obtain currencies in
exchange for their SDRs through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges between IMF
members, or through an IMF designation of members with strong external positions to
purchase SD Rs from members with weak external positions. Id.; Held in Reserve: A Brief
Guide to the IMF's "Currency", THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/13447239 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (discussing the
redefinition of the SDR as a basket of currencies consisting of the value of a fixed amount
of the Japanese yen, U.S. dollar, pound sterling, and Euro).
43. Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (discussing how various sources of liquidity
became unreliable and inadequate toward financing the growth of output and trade). In the
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Essentially, SDRs are "[i]nternational reserve asset(s) [which]
supplement existing reserve assets."44
SDRs have been criticized as funny money, as nothing more than a
fancy term for allocated credits doled out by the IMF to member
countries that have no value, but can be exchanged for subsidized loans
to non-reserve currency countries. 45 Because SDRs are allocated in
proportion to countries' existing IMF quotas, when the 020 46 countries
authorized the IMF to issue $250 billion in new SDRs in 2009, up to
approximately $170 billion could still land in the reserves of wealthy

late I 950's the world's monetary gold stock became insufficient. Id. The supply of U.S.
dollars was dependent on the U.S. balance of payments, which hedged on the "vagaries of
government policy and the confidence problem." Id. The probability of all dollar holders
being able to convert their dollars into gold at the fixed price declined" and "outstanding
dollar liabilities held by the rest of the world monetary authorities increased relative to the
U.S. monetary gold stock." Id.; Joseph Gold, The "Sanctions" of the International
Monetary Fund, 66 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 737 (1972) (discussing the special drawing rights
amendment to the IMF Articles, with a focus on sanctions); William Bernhard, J. Lawrence
Broz & William Roberts Clark, The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions, 56 INT'L
ORG. 693, 700 (2002) (discussing the gold overhand and lax U.S. macroeconomic policies).
44. See Editorial, The G- 20 's Funny Money, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2009, at A22
(Originally, to participate in this system, a country needed official reserves, government or
central bank holdings of gold, and widely accepted foreign currencies that could be used to
purchase the domestic currency in foreign exchange markets. After the Bretton Woods
system collapsed, the major currencies shifted to a floating exchange-rate).
45. Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (discussing the April 2, 2009 authorization of $250
billion in fresh SDRs). Another example is China; its SDR reserves, already nearly $2
trillion, will go up $9.3 billion. Id.; see SDRs, supra note 42 (discussing how the IMF
allocates SDRs). Under the Articles of Agreement, the IMF may allocate SDRs to members
in proportion to their respective IMF quotas using two kinds of allocations: general and
special. SDRs, supra note 42. General allocations are based on a long- term global need to
supplement existing reserve assets, and have only been made three times, where special
allocations occur in the form of a one- time allocation of SD Rs enabling all members of the
IMF to participate in the SDR system on an equitable basis. Id. This corrects the inequity
for countries that joined the IMF after 1981, as they had never received an SDR allocation.
Id. The three general allocations were distributed in 1970 through 1972, 1979 through
1981, and on August 28, 2009; the special allocation was implemented on September 9,
2009. See id.
46. See Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (explaining that the United States needs
Congressional approval to part with its share). The last proposed SDR allocation in 1997
failed because only 75% of the votes accepted the proposal, and the IMF requirement is
85% of votes in order for the allocation to be ratified. Id. The United States, with nearly
seventeen percent of the votes in the IMF, never approved. Id.; see also G- 20 Funny
Money, supra note 44 (explaining how SDRs cost U.S. taxpayers $330 million per year).
Had the 1997 resolution been approved, U.S. exposure would have been about $12 billion
with a $750 million annual cost to taxpayers. Id. Although IMF financing does not show
up on the annual United States expenditure, the SDR credits make countries in turmoil, such
as Syria, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Venezuela, and Burma, eligible for substantial amounts of
money. Id.
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47
countries such as the United States, Japan, and Britain. Although the
IMF hopes the reserve-rich countries will lend their shares to those
countries in greater need, this is not a guarantee required by the current
system. 48

D. The Voting Structures
1. International Monetary Fund
The voting structure of the IMF was a debated topic at the outset
by the principal founding nations. 49 Despite the desire of many
countries to institute purely economic criteria in determining how votes
would be distributed, the votes were allocated based on the relative
50
economic importance of member-states to the international economy.
In order to appease smaller economic nations, the weighted voting
system was bifurcated to include the allocation of a certain number of
"basic" votes, which would be guaranteed to each member, thus giving
smaller countries a "sense of participation," and tempering the
51
Also,
overriding control that would be exercised by larger countries.
while majority-voting for decision-making was to be a requisite in the
IMF's Articles, the United States successfully advocated that certain
52
Despite the
decisions should require higher majorities for approval.
47. Held in Reserve, supra note 42; see also G- 20 Funny Money, supra note 44.
48. See Voting Powers, THE WORLD BANK (Jan. 10, 2010), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUClO (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Voting
Powers] (providing links to voting statuses of the IBRD, IFC, IDA, and MIGA listed by
country and executive director).
49. See J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945- 1965:
TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 59 (1969) ("It would be an
advantage if the proposed Union could be brought into existence by the United States and
the United Kingdom as joint founder- States ... [t]he management and the effective voting
powers might adhere permanently in the founder States."). Michael Tanzer, Globalizing the
Economy: the Influence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, MONTHLY
REV., Sept. 1, 1995 at 1 (discussing how the United States was ensured to be the dominant
voice, having thirty- six percent of the subscribed capital).
50. FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 60--61.
51. Tanzer, supra note 49; see FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 60-61 (explaining that
although this requirement effectively gave the United States a unilateral veto power, it was
added to the Fund ' s Articles albeit in a more limited version in which the high, special
majorities would be reserved for a few important decisions).
52. Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund. Art. V, s. 5- 7, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). Repurchase of
currency and dealings of special drawing rights are some examples of instances which
require super majority approval. See id. The voting structure provides that, when a vote is
needed to waive any conditions on loan eligibility or even to declare a member country
ineligible for IMF funds, the member's votes shall be increased by each 400,000 special
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attempt to evenly allocate a certain percentage of votes to smaller
countries, subsequent IMF practice, and the increase in the number of
smaller economies as members of the IMF, has led to a reduction in the
proportionality of basic votes as compared with total voting power. 53
To fully analyze the voting requirements and their effects on the
many nations, an analysis of the IMF's overall governance structure and
implementation is required. 54 The IMF is governed by a Board of
Governors that meets once each year and consists of one governor and
one alternate governor for each member country. 55 The day-to-day
business of the IMF is handled by a twenty-four member Executive
Board of Directors. 56 There are cases, such as in Africa, where dozens
of countries are represented by just one director. 57
The IMF has two ministerial committees: the International
Monetary and Financial Committee ("IMFC"), 58 and the Development

drawing rights of net sales and reduced for each 400,000 special drawing rights of net
purchases. Id. at Art. XII, s. 5.
53. Hector Torres, Reforming the International Monetary Fund- Why its Legitimacy is
at Stake, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 443, 446 (2007) (explaining Torres' experience within the
Fund and that the imbalance in voting power leads to the dilution of a true consensus voting
forum, thereby falsifying by effect the Fund's frequent statements that its decisions are
mostly taken by consensus); see e.g., IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF
of
Governors,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND
(July
11,
2011),
Board
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx. See FERGUSON, supra note 25
(emphasizing that votes are distributed according to quotas and quotas are meant to reflect
wealth. G7 countries alone have 41. 72% of votes and 28 countries hold over 61 % of the
voting power at both the Fund and the World Bank).
54. Alexander Mountford, Independent Evaluation Office Background Paper of the
International Monetary Fund, The Formal GovernanceStructure of the Monetary Fund
(March 2001 ), available at http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2013).
55. Id. See Factsheet: A Guide To Committees, Groups, and Clubs, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#IC (last visited Oct. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter IMF Factsheet] (providing a general discussion of the IMFC and explaining that
larger economies, mirroring the weighted-voting philosophy, are represented by individual
directors while smaller economies-developing countries- are grouped together and
represented by a single director). During meetings, the governors vote on various
amendments to the structure and operation of the IMF. Each governor, usually the minister
of finance or the head of the central bank within his or her country, is appointed by his or
her respective member country. Id.
56. See IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
57. IMF Factsheet, supra note 55.
58. See id. (discussing the Development Committee); See also William N. Gianaris,
Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 910, 914 (1990) (The IMFC discusses matters of concern affecting the global
economy.).
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Committee (jointly with the Bank). 59 The ministerial composition of
these two committees is basically identical to the composition of the
respective Executive Boards.
2. World Bank

The planning involved in creating the World Bank was
significantly less rigorous than that of the planning required for the
creation of the IMF. 60 White's initial plan for a postwar stabilization
fund and international bank included voting in proportion to stock
holding, 61 however, his ultimate plan proposed voting power by the
number of shares held by each government. 62 Ultimately, subscriptions
to the capital of the Bank determined voting power, and thus, the World
Bank's use of the weighted voting system is almost identical to that of
the IMF. 63 Despite a revision of the voting structure in 2010, the six
largest economies of the 187 member countries still maintain 38.61 % of
the total vote, with the United States having 15.85% alone. 64
Similar to the governing structure of the IMF, the World Bank's

59. See IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). The
Development Committee advises the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank
on issues related to economic development in emerging and developing countries.
Governance
Structure,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013);. The Boards
of Governors appoints or elects the Executive Board. IMF Executive Directors and Voting
Powers, supra. The Executive Board takes care of the daily business of the IMF. Id.
60. MASON & ASHER, supra note 1, at 14-16 (explaining how the Inter-American
Bank combined the functions of an ordinary commercial bank, intergovernmental bank, and
international stabilization fund).
61. Id. at 16- 17 (explaining that no government could hold more than twenty- five
percent of the total voting power).
62. Id. at 11.
63. Gianaris, supra note 58, at 917-18, 927- 28 (discussing further that although
membership in the World Bank is contingent upon membership in the IMF, the reverse is
not true).
Like the IMF, each member has 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each
share of capital equivalent to U.S. $100,000 subscribed . . . While most states
wanted a large quota in the IMF, giving them enhanced drawing rights, the less
developed countries preferred a lower quota in the World Bank because the amount
they could borrow was independent of their capital contribution. To resolve the
controversy, the United States agreed to accept a larger quota in the World Bank
than in the IMF.
Id.
64. Members,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). The
United States currently has 16.75% of the voting power. Id.
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powers are vested in its Board of Governors. 65 Another analogous
feature is that the Board of Executive Directors for the World Bank has
all of the day-to-day powers. The Articles of Agreement sets forth the
structure and powers of the Board of Governors and the Board of
Executive Directors; of the twenty-four Executive Directors, the five
largest shareholders, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. 66 Interestingly enough, each of the eleven Presidents
of the World Bank, also known as the Chairman of the Board of
Executive Directors, have been the appointed Executive Director of the
United States. 67

E. Critique of the Voting Structures
Both IMF member countries and critics of the IMF have attacked
the IMF' s voting structure, characterizing it as outdated. 68 In response
to such criticisms, the IMF issued proposals to change the voting
structure, such as a one-time boost in voting power to under-represented
countries and an increase in the developing nations' voting share
coupled with a respective decrease in the voting share of some of the
industrial nations, especially those in Europe. 69 Yet, these proposed
65. Board of Governors, IMF, Articles ofAgreement, art. XII, Section 2. See also THE
WORLD BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/IA6NF9XJ40 (last visited Oct. 24,
2013). (The World Bank's Board of Governors consist of one governor and one alternate
governor appointed by each member country.).
66.
About
the
World
Bank,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
http:!/web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:2014 74
66-menuPK:344189-pagePK:98400-piPK:98424-theSitePK:95474,00.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2013). (Each appoints an individual Executive Director while the remaining
nineteen Executive Directors represent the other 182 member countries.).
67. Id.
68. Jonathan Gregson, The World Bank: Trying Times, GLOBAL FIN., Oct. 2007, at 24
(discussing how emerging countries want a greater say within the World Bank's voting
structure). India and Brazil are examples of emerging economies which have criticized the
IMF's voting structures as being outdated and who believe that as a result of their respective
increased contributing to the global economy, they should henceforth be provided with
voting powers which correlate. Id.
69. Anthony Faiola, Nations Cast Plan for Expanded IMF: Role to Deepen in Global
Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2009, at A18 (explaining the preliminary plan that, by
January 2011, would give more voting power to emerging financial powers like Brazil and
China). Emerging economies would have more long- term say over the IMF's policies if
voting rights were redistributed, "giving a 50-50 split to the developing and developed
worlds." Id.; IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota and Related Governance Reforms
(Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06205 .htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2013) (explaining how on September 18, 2006, the IMF's Board of
Governors adopted a resolution that aimed to align the IMF's quota shares with members'
positions within the world economy). Mexico, China, Korea, and Turkey, which were
characterized as underrepresented countries, gained an increase in quota shares. Id. But see
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changes were not without their own sets of criticism. 70
The "basic vote" of the IMF was originally a compromise to give
developing countries a specified amount of votes on top the allocated
"quota-based" votes. 71 Since 1944, the IMF's quota has increased by a
factor of thirty-seven while its membership has quadrupled. 72
Originally, basic votes accounted 11.3 percent of all votes but that has
been reduced to merely 2.1 percent. This drastic decline in the power of
the basic vote "has substantially shifted the balance of power in favor of
large-quota countries .... Consequently, the voice of small countries in
discussions has been substantially weakened and their participation in
decision-making made negligible." 73 The result of the weighted voting
structure is that developed countries have 60.4 percent of the IMF's
voting power, while only accounting for twenty percent of the IMF's
membership and fifteen percent of the world's population. 74
Realizing a need for some sort of voting reform, the IMF is in the
process of instituting amendments to the overall voting structure after
the Board of Governors approved such reform on December 15, 2010. 75
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty- Four on International Monetary Affairs and
Development
Communique
(Oct.
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2008/101008.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013)
(explaining that an agreement was not reached on an increase in the voting power of
developing and transition countries). It was stressed that broader objectives were necessary
to achieve a realignment of voting shares because the current proposal at the time was a
piece- meal approach. Id.
70.
Christopher Swann, Critics Assail IMF Plan on Developing Nations' Voting
Share, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2008, at D03 (discussing a 2008 plan that intended to give
more voting authority to developing countries). The voting share of developing countries
was to rise to forty- two percent from about 40.5% while the voting share of advanced
economies would have fallen from 59.5% to 58%. Id. Former IMF officials, such as former
chief economist at the U.S. agency for International Development Colin Bradford and
former executive vice president with the Inter- American Development Bank Nancy Birdsall
signed a letter authored by former assistant Treasury secretary Edwin M. Truman expressing
their displeasure with the proposed reforms because they fell short in "addressing the
challenges facing the IMF and its evolution toward a truly global institution. Id.
71. FINANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE IMF 290 (James M. Boughton & Domenico
Lombardi eds., 2009) (stating that the compromise was to allocate 250 "basic votes" to each
member country).
72. DAVID WOODWARD, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, IMF VOTING REFORM: NEED, OPPORTUNITY AND OPTIONS l
(2007).
73. BUIRA, supra note 3, at 15.
74. WOODWARD, supra note 72, at 2.
75. See IMF Quota and Governance Publications, IMF, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). Even
more drastic then the 2008 reforms, the Board of Governors, on December 15, 2010, passed
a package of far-reaching reforms, completing the "14th General Review of Quotas." Id.
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In 2008, reforms passed increasing basic votes to 5.502 percent of total
votes, which results in 741 basic votes for each 187 member countries
of the IMF. 76 Additionally, the reform enabled Executive Directors
representing seven or more members to each appoint a second Alternate
Executive Director following the 2012 regular elections of Executive
Director. 77 Unfortunately, despite the much needed reform, developed
countries still maintain a large percentage of the IMF's voting power;
the seven G7 countries alone maintain 43.12 percent of all the votes
while the top ten quota-based countries, including the G7 countries,
have 52.13 percent of all the votes. 78
The World Bank has experienced the same sort of criticisms,
notwithstanding these criticisms developed and large emerging
economies are asserting pressure on the World Bank desiring more
influence on the institution. 79 Recently, the World Bank sought to
pursue a reform program where developing countries would get at least
forty-seven percent of the voting shares in the institution, although fifty

The 14th General Review of Quotas will: ( 1)double quotas from approximately SDR 238.4
billion to approximately SDR 476.8 billion, (about US$767 billion at current exchange
rates); (2) shift more than 6 percent of quota shares from over-represented to underrepresented member countries; (3) shift more than 6 percent of quota shares to dynamic
emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs); (4) significantly realign quota shares.
China will become the 3rd largest member country in the IMF, and there will be four
EMDCs (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund,
and preserve the quota and voting share of the poorest member countries. This group of
countries is defined as those eligible for the low-income Poverty Reduction and Growth
Trust (PRGT) and whose per capita income fell below US$1,135 in 2008 (the threshold set
by the International Development Association) or twice that amount for small countries. Id.
76.
Factsheet: IMF Quotas, IMF (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm (last visited Oct. 21 2013).
77. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Recommends Reforms
to
Overhaul
Quota
and
Voice
(Mar.
28,
2008),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0864.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 20 l 3)(stating
that the Executive Directors of African countries will receive additional Alternate
Directors).
78. See IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last vistited Oct. 21, 2013)
(stating that Canada, France, Germany, United States, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, China,
Russia, and Saudia Arabia have a combined 1,312,43 7 votes out of the 2,517 ,646 total
votes);
Group
of
Seven,
INFOPLEASE,
available
at
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A082 l 954.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing
the G7 countries as Canada, France, Germany, United States, Italy, Japan, United
Kingdom).
79. Press Release, The World Bank, The World Bank, World Bank Reforming to Meet
New
Challenges,
Zoellick
Says
(Oct.
6,
2009),
available
at
http://go.worldbank.org/5JYWTSK5UO (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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percent has been argued to be the optimal percentage. 80
That being pursued, the voting structure still results in unfair
situations. For example, the World Bank granted a loan on the
condition that a country's water and sanitation services are privatized. 81
The country then sells its water and sanitation industries to a private
consortium, which is financed by the IFC, a branch of the World
Bank. 82 When the people of the country start complaining about sharp
price increases due to privatization, the country is forced to tum to the
ICSID, a branch of the World Bank, to dispute the situation. 83 So the
weighted voting structure allows larger countries to impose their
policies through the World Bank, which in this scenario results in the
World Bank Group controlling the ( 1) conditions for which a country
may take a loan, (2) the financing for the privatization of certain
services, and (3) the dispute settlement. 84 This scenario happened at El
Alto (Bolivia) in 2004-05. 85
Although reforms to promote good governance were stressed as
early as 1996, 86 the IMF's governance did not begin a major reform
80. Id. (discussing a speech made by World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick
at the beginning of the 2009 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF in Istanbul,
Turkey). The World Bank's shareholders supported giving developing countries at least a
4 7 percent share of the voting shares, yet Zoellick called for developing countries to have a
50% share. Id.; see Robert B. Zoellick, President, The World Bank Group, Remarks at
Board of Governors of World Bank Group Annual Meeting: The World Bank Group
Beyond the Crisis (Oct. 6, 2009) (discussing the World Bank's pursuit of an ambitious
program of reform).
81. ERIC TOUSSAINT, THE WORLD BANK A CRITICAL PRIMER 3 (Sylvain Dropsy ed. ,
Elizabeth Anne trans., Pluto Press, 2008).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3-4.
84. See id.
85. Id.; see Maude Barlow, Securing the Right to Water in Bolivia, BLUE PLANET
at
available
2010)
23,
(Mar.
PROJECT
http://www. b lueplanetproj ect.net/?s=Securing+the+Right+to+Water+in+Bo livia&searchsub
mit= (last visited on Oct. 21, 2013). "[C]itizens in El Alto, Bolivia [struggled] to regain
control of their local water supply from multinational corporate giant, Suez .... As a
condition for a World Bank loan, the public water system in El Alto was privatized in 1997 .
Eight years later, despite promises of expanded water services, the private company Aguas
del Illimani (Suez is the major shareholder) had failed to deliver water to 200,000 people in
El Alto and had no plans to do so in the future .... In January 2005, after a general strike
and public protests demanding the immediate withdrawal of Suez from Bolivia and for the
government to investigate the company's actions, the Bolivian government decided to
cancel its contract with Aguas del Illimani .... Despite this initial victory, the Bolivian
government, under pressure from the Inter- American Development Bank, the World Bank
and German Corporation GTZ, announced its intention to create a supposed 'New Model' of
Public- Private Partnership where Suez would continue to hold 35% of the shares." Id.
86. See INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., THE WORLD BANK
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process until 2006. 87 A 2009 Committee on IMF' s Governance Reform
report described the drawbacks to the current governance framework as:
legitimacy and effectiveness; political voice; the executive board itself;
overlaps and gaps; and mandates. 88 To rectify the drawbacks, the
Committee recommended enhancement of clear leadership, enablement
of effective executive decision-making, and an increase in membership
accountability. 89 Emerging economies are not in favor of the reforms
sought by the IMF. 90
PARTICIPATION
SOURCEBOOK
(1996),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP /IB/1996/02/01 /000009265
3961214175537/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf(last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (showing reform
ideas proposed in 1996, which suggested that increased participation by developing
countries was necessary).
87.
Governance
Structure,
INT'L MONETRARY
FUND,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (explaining the
governance reform ideals between 2006 and 2008). A committee was appointed to assess
the adequacy of the IMF's current framework. Id. The committee on IMF Governance
Reform was appointed by Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn on September 4,
2008. Id.; see INT'L MONETARY FUND, COMMITTEE ON IMF GOVERNANCE REFORM FINAL
REPORT
(Mar.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter COMMITTEE ON IMF] (explaining the findings of the committee); Press Release,
Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss- Kahn Welcomes Experts'
Report
on
Fund
Decision
Making
(Mar.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0988.htm (last visited October 31, 2013)
(discussing the makeup of the eight- person committee).
88. COMMITTEE ON IMF, supra note 87, at 7- 10. Changes are reforms that are
implemented and take years to go into effect, and many nations are not following through
with their respective portions of the bargain. Id. at 7. "High- level political representation
on a decision- making body that provides strategic and policy direction, and discusses
macroeconomic and financial policy coordination, is needed." Id. at 9. The Executive
Board, while in actuality is a body of high professional and technical capacity, is treated by
its members as a position on international civil servitude, rather than a capacity of political
representation, therefore the members are often removed from the actual policy- making. Id.
at 9. Regarding the overlaps and gaps, in order for a governing body to be efficient there
needs to be clarity in the roles and responsibilities delineated to each area of the
governmental framework. Id. at 9. "Components of institutional decision-makingnamely, the legislative function, the executive function, and a means of measuring
performance and holding the executive accountable- are insufficiently delineated and
assigned. The IMFC lacks the mandate to take strategic decisions; the Board is too stretched
in day- to---day operational decisions to be able to set broad strategic directions; and there are
few explicit systems for measuring management and board performance and holding them
accountable." COMMITTEE ON IMF, supra note 87, at 9.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Lesley Wroughton, Emerging nations stand firm on IMF vote reform, REUTERS
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2009 (explaining that emerging economies want voting shares realigned
before governance reforms are tackled). Emerging powers want voting shares to reflect
their shares within the global economies before the governance is reformed because the
emerging economies fear that a decision- making ministerial council backed by the current
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The World Bank's governance, in its role as the premier
multilateral banking institution, has been inherently critiqued, as it is the
sole global institution of the sort. 91 As a result of weathering the heavy
criticism, the World Bank has evolved vastly since its inception and has
become a pioneer in terms of accountability. 92 The World Bank's
governance structure is in a constant state of review and reformation. 93
As such, the World Bank instituted an independent review by
experienced individuals, which the World Bank hopes will aid in
strengthening its aims of becoming more accountable, agile, effective,
inclusive, innovative, and financially sound. 94
That independent review, headed by former Mexican President
Ernesto Zedillo, emphasized the lack of accountability at the top-at the

IMF's powers would delay basic reforms emerging countries want. Id.
91. Ngaire Woods, The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World
Bank Themselves, World Development (May 2000) 17- 18 (discussing the critiques as the
greater influence in research direction and results by large shareholders, and the World
Bank's Anglo-Saxon approach to economics including the homogeneity in the World
Bank's staffing). An example of influence is that in the 1980's, the Reagan administration,
Germans, and British played a role in squelching research on debt issues. Id. The AngloSaxon approach consisted of the staffing of the agency being dominated by English
speaking United States' citizens. Id. Fluency in English advanced employees within the
organization. Id.
92. Id. at 6. In 1993, the World Bank became the first multilateral organization to
create an independent inspection panel for public accountability. By 1998, that panel had
received thirteen requests for inspection. Id.
93. Press Release, The World Bank, Outside Review Supports World Bank Group
available
at
Reform
(Oct.
21,
2009)
(on
file
with
author),
http://go.worldbank.org/2I98FYWNJO (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (explaining that the
reforms that are already underway deal with financial capacity, the strengthening of
management accountability, the leadership selection process, expanding voice, and the
restructure of the World Bank's governing bodies). Financial measures such as the injection
of paid- in capital were developed to reform financial capacity. Id. The World Bank is
doing an institutional review of independent evaluation entities to strengthen management
accountability. Id. The leadership selection process was reformed so selection of the World
Bank Group President is now merit- based, transparent, and open. Id. The World Bank's
voice has been expanded through a new chair for Sub- Saharan Africa, an increase in
developing countries' shares in IBRD, and a raise in developing and transition countries'
voting power. Id. The World Bank Group's governing bodies were restructured to improve
Board operations and client services. Id.
94. See Press Release, The World Bank, supra note 93 (explaining that World Bank
Group President Robert B. Zoellick created the High Level Commission on Modernization
of World Bank Group Governance in October 2008 which did an external review of the
World Bank Group's governance). Headed by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo,
the Commission made five recommendations: 1) restructure the World Bank Group's
governing bodies; 2) strengthen the World Bank Group's resource base; 3) strengthen
management accountability; 4) reform the leadership selection process; and 5) enhance
voice and participation Id.
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level of the Executive Board and Senior Management. 95
The
accountability problem is exasperated by the Executive Board having
three
counterproductive
functions:
political
representation,
96
The report calls for more division of
management, and oversight.
labor and responsibilities via a restructure of the current governance
structure. 97 It is suggested that the Board of Directors be elevated to a
"World Bank Board" with more responsibilities including making major
policy decisions, conducting general oversight of the institution, and
approving the World Bank Group's overall strategy and direction. 98
Furthermore, all responsibility for the approval of all World Bank
Group financing operations should be transferred to Management. 99
The separation of management responsibilities will provide a checks
and balances system where management will be accountable through
effective performance evaluation by the World Bank Board. 100
III. THE IMPOSITION OF NEOLIBERALISM ON A GLOBAL
SCALE
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the
economic principles which have controlled the actions of the BWis and
World Trade Organizations and how these principles have led to the
failure of these institutions. Subsection A suggests that specific
economic policies have played a fundamental role in the outcome of
implementing the ideals underlying the BWis. 101 Subsection "B"
presents the evolution of neoliberalism and how it has had dramatic
negative effects on the global economy throughout the last two
centuries. 102 Subsection "C" analyzes the IMF and the World Bank's
use of loan conditions, their chosen tool for imposing neoliberalism. 103
95. ZEDILLO COMM'N, REPOWERING THE WORLD BANK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL COMMISSION ON MODERNIZATION OF WORLD BANK GROUP
GOVERNANCE 30 (2009) [hereinafter ZEDILLO COMM'N REPORT], available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/WBGovemanceCOMMISSIONREPO
RT.pdf. (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
96. Id.; Governing Structure of the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/O,,contentMDK:20094705menuPK:220464-pagePK:220503-piPK:2204 76-theSitePK:228717 ,00.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2013).
97. See ZEDILLO COMM'N REPORT, supra note 95, at 30, 39.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id. at 40.
100. See id. at 43.
101. See infra Part III.A.
102. See infra Part III.B.
103. See infra Part III.C.
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Subsection "D" presents case studies on Argentina and Africa and how
the neoliberalist approach of the IMF and World Bank has impacted
those countries. 104

A. Influence through Vote and Governance
The British economist Keynes was a key participant at the Bretton
Woods. 105 Through the looking glass of the Great Depression, the IMF
and the World Bank's policies were based primarily on Keynes'
prescriptions to resolve global economic problems. 106 However, by the
mid 1980's, the controlling economic policy of these institutions shifted
to the neoclassical approach. 107 "The Keynesian orientation of the IMF,
which emphasized market failures and the role for government in job
creation, was replaced by the free market mantra of the 1980' s, as part
of a new "Washington Consensus"- a consensus between the IMF, the
World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury about the "right" policies for
developing countries-that signaled a radically different approach to
economic development and stabilization." 108 Rapid trade liberalization
corresponding to the free market ideology would ultimately lead to the
colonization of developing countries to the IMF. 109
The IMF brought in the World Bank initially planning to provide
billions of dollars in emergency support to Europe after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. 110 In the 1980's the Bank lost sight of this humanitarian
foundation and began lending structural adjustment loans burdened with
IMF imposed conditions to developing countries. 111
The BWis
collectively represented the aggregate desire of the capitalist market to
expand globally beyond the boundaries of the developed industrial
world with minimum state restrictions. 112 Within the IMF, capitalistic
104. See infra Part III.D.
105. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 11.
106. See id.
107. See ARIEL BUIRA, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK AT SIXTY, 8 (2005) ("The
growing breach between world economic and financial realities and the governance
structure of the BWis argues for reform to enhance the legitimacy and restore the
effectiveness of these institutions").
108. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 16.
109. Seeid.
110. See id. at 14.
111. See CARL JAY ARAJAH & WILLIAM H. BRANSON, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T,
STRUCTURAL & SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT: WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE, 1980-92 (1995)
(explaining an extensive study performed by the Operations Evaluation Department in 1995
regarding the World Bank's experience with adjustment lending in the 1980' s, including
conditionality).
112. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 8; Under Bretton Woods, structural balance of
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nations like the United States and England forcibly imposed neoliberal
ideologies on underdeveloped countries by swinging heavily weighted
voting power in favor of free markets. 113 President Reagan brought this
neoliberal ideal to the annual meeting of the World Bank in 1983 when
he stated:
The societies that achieved the most spectacular, broad based
economic progress in the shortest period of time have not been the
biggest in size, nor the richest in resources and certainly not the most
rigidly controlled. What has united them all was their belief in the
magic of the marketplace. Millions of individuals making their own
decisions in the marketplace will always allocate resources better than
. d government plaannmg
. process. 114
any centra11ze

The IMF was the perfect mechanism for the United States to
realistically pu
ursue an implementation of the free market concept on a
global scale. 15 Starting in the mid 1970's, the IMF and the World Bank
hired graduates from the Chicago School to implement capitalistic free
Underdeveloped
market irrespective of humanitarian rights. 116
countries which had sought refuge in the IMF and World Bank were
blindly subjected to the neoliberal ideas of the Chicago School and
became heavily indebted to the institutions. 117
The IMF issued structural adjustment programs to bail out
countries in financial crisis, which also helped to advance privatization
payments disequilibria were to be corrected by exchange rate movements. Id. The IMF
through its surveillance function is supposed to assess a country's economic health by
reviewing its monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, trade and other financial policies. Id.
However, under Milton Friedman's floating exchange rate approach, developed countries
would essentially absolve themselves from any form of IMF oversight. See MILTON
FRI EDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 65- 71 (2nd ed. 1982); John R. Kroger, Enron,
Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76. U. COLO. L. REV. 57,
60-65 (2005) (stating there is a complete lack of transparency and review of leading
international financial bodies promotes lack of discretion, illegality, and fraud within the
global economic community).
113. See STIGLITZ, supra note I, at 14- 15. The IMF and the World Bank were both
driven by the collective will of the G- 7, the governments of the most important advanced
industrial countries. Id. These countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada,
Italy, and France. Id. In year 2011 the G-8 was formed to include Russia. Id.
114. See RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND WTO 13
(2003) (recognizing that Friedman and the Austrian School of Economics had profound
implications on global fiscal policy).
115. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER
CAPITALISM 388-403 (2007).
116. Id. at 161-63 ( describing the policy makers of the IMF and their relation to the
Chicago School).
117. See generally id. at 388-403 (building a connection between lifting regulations on
interest rates and the colonization of Third World countries).
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and free trade. 118 Countries which adhered to the adjustment programs
took on massive floating interest rate loans. 119 Since interest rates were
not regulated under the IMF and World Bank, 120 eventually the cost of
borrowing money increased at a faster pace than countries could repay
debt. This morally bankrupt lending practice was the driving force
behind the colonization of the financially bankrupt counties to the IMF
and World Bank. 121
B. Evolution and Critique ofNeoliberalism

Prior to an examination on the impact of neoliberalism on the
policies of the IMF and World Bank, it is worth discussing the evolution
of political economics. During a time when government regulations
were desired Keynesian economics became the most popular. 122 From
the Great Depression until the end of World War II, Keynesian
economics had its primary influences on economic policies. 123 Keynes
presumed that in order to correct market imperfections, state
intervention had to be implemented. 124 One of the most important
118. Id. at 155- 56, 200-03, 216. The IMF was originally concerned with exchange
rates and balance of payment loans. Id. The IMF short term loans were at first used mainly
by the same circle of industrial economies that had dominated the institution ' s founding.
KLEIN, supra note 115, at 155-56, 200-03, 216 (2007). The IMF shifted in the mid 1970's
to a more intervention- type stance where loans were granted under conditions of greater
austerity to Third World countries. Loan conditionality was based on how countries achieve
This conception was formulated by right wing politicians and
economic growth.
bureaucrats operating mainly through the U.S. Treasury in the series of Republican
administrations. The result of neoliberal conditionality, together with policy moves, such as
capital account liberalization, has proven to be disastrous for working people in developing
countries. Id.
119. See generally KLEIN, supra note 115 at 156 (discussing the issues pertaining to
government debt inheritance).
120. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 72 (stating that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
had a policy to promote free market reform and opened the developing world to foreign
trade and investment).
121. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 41 (stating that the Fund's approach to developing
countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler); See generally KLEIN, supra note 115
(explaining that industrialized countries pillage Third World countries in the modem day
just as governments colonized the New World in the pre- industrialization era).
122. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ON ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS
OF 2008 100 (2009) (explaining how during the 1930s the United States fell into the Great
Depression and John Maynard Keynes attempted to explain the causes of the slump to the
general public).
123. See id. at 102 (expounding on the notion that Keynes was in favor of
macroeconomic intervention and this was viewed as acceptable by conservatives throughout
WWII).
124. See id. (making an assumption that Kenyes did not want to return to a free market
ideal even after the economy responded positively to government intervention).
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lessons which Keynes helped teach was that markets are not selfcorrecting and government intervention is required to ensure recovery
and a return to full employment. 125
Keynesian economics lost popularity in the mid 1970's due to
stagflation and associated ideological assaults launched by the Chicago
School. 126 Unlike Keynes' idealization of government regulations,
economists from the Chicago School such as Milton Friedman
perceived most government expenditures as excessive.
Hence,
government intervention was viewed as inefficient and not likely to
achieve projected goals. 127
With the help of Friedman, the Chicago School derived a three-part
formula for creating the perfect free market economy. 128 The formula
included government deregulation, privatization of government
enterprises, and cutbacks on government spending. 129 Under this
125. See JOSEPH E. STJGLITZ, THE STIGLITZ REPORT 20 (2010) (explaining how the
United States economy would not have recovered after Great Depression without
government intervention).
126. See BEN FINE, ECONOMICS IMPERIALISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS, HISTORY
OF ECONOMICS REVIEW 15 (2000). The cornerstone of Milton Friedman's economic theory
was that individuals make economic choices based upon self interests alone, and therefore,
rational expectations of individuals in the market cannot be predicted through quantitative
data. See id. Optimal levels of economic health were measured and predicted by
formulating the rational expectations of individuals. Id. Friedman's rational expectations
theory did not simulate a systematic macroeconomic policy requiring the gathering of data
to calculate economic agents. Id.
127. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the economic policies behind the
global financial crisis of 2008 and mentioning how doctrines that supported deregulation
were predicated on the assumption that sophisticated market participants were rational and
had rational expectations and unfettered markets would result in optimal economic
efficiency).
128. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65- 71 (2d ed. 1982).
Friedman promoted a floating exchange rate system because it is self-correcting and fully
automatic. Friedman believed the instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in
the underlying economic structure. Elimination of this symptom by administrative freezing
of exchange rates, a method of direct controls, only aggravates the underlying problem. One
way to correct this problem is for the U.S. to announce that it will not proclaim official
exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies, and in addition, it will not engage in
any speculative or other activities influencing exchange rates. Id. Exchange rates would
then be determined in free markets. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65-71
(2d ed. 1982). These measures would conflict with the U.S. obligation to the IMF, to
specify an official parity for the dollar. However, the IMF found it possible to reconcile
Canada's failure to specify a parity with its Articles and gave its approval to a floating rate
for Canada. The IMF should do the same for the U.S. Also, other nations will be able to
peg their currency to the U.S. by drawing on reserves, coordinating their internal policies
with U.S. policy, and by tightening or loosening direct controls on trade. Id.
129. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65- 71 (2d ed. 1982).
(speaking on the pitfalls of social welfare programs and government regulations; for
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doctrine, only self regulation was appropriate. 130 To increase overall
wealth, the government would have to not only sell all state capital
assets to private corporations, but also required dramatic cut backs on
entitlements, minimal taxes, and a deregulation of trade. 131
In the late twentieth century, the Chicago School began to have a
132
profound influence on South American Governments such as Chile.
At this time, Chile was under the power of a socialist group led by
Salvador Allende ("Allende"). 133 Allende came into power as a result
134
of an election in which he promised to promote a democratic society.
Conversantly, Allende proceeded to convert Chile into a fully fledged
communist state. 135 In tum, Allende's communist policies provoked the
military to overthrow him and set up a military regime led by General

example, mm1mum wage laws effectively increase the unemployment rate because
employers cannot afford to pay workers at the required rates). But see Frontline: The
Warning (PBS DVD release Jan. 5, 2010) (showing that Summers, the Obama's
administration financial advisor, is unopposed to government regulation).
130. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the doctrines which support free
markets).
131. See generally Kroger, supra note 112, at 57, 60 (exemplifying the consequences
of complete government deregulation; Enron was built upon deregulation).
132. See e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM & GLOBAL
ORDER 9 (2003); see also BUIRA, supra note 3, at 145 (During the 1990's, policymakers in
Chile sought to improve investor confidence and promote stable, sustainable economic and
export growth. Chile confronted issues resulting from the neoliberal hyperinflation with
Capital Management Techniques "CMTs". The CMT Chile set in place in the 1990's was
designed to insulate the economy from volatile international capital flows).
133. See e.g., id. Friedman had no qualms over the military overthrow of Chile's
democratically elected Allende government in 1973, because Allende was interfering with
business control of Chilean society. Id. After fifteen years of often brutal and savage
dictatorship-all in the name of the democratic free market- formal democracy was
restored in 1989 with a constitution that made it vastly more difficult, if not impossible, for
the citizenry to challenge the business- military domination of Chilean society. Id; see also
KLEIN, supra note 115, at 97(explaining how Segio de Castro was a prominent Chilean U.S.
trained economist). See generally KLEIN, supra note 115, at 18, 82. (defining the trinity of
free markets as privatization, deregulation, and cuts of social spending).
134. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 145 (explaining how Chile uses CMT's to protect
their economic infrastructures which were derailed during the 1970's and 1980's when the
Chicago School had profound influences on their financial stability). "The policy regime
sought to balance the challenges and opportunities of financial integration, lengthen the
maturity structure and stabilize capital inflows, mitigate the effect of large volumes of
inflow on the currency and exports, and protect the economy from the instability associated
with speculative excess and the sudden withdrawal of external finance." Id.
135. See id. at 146 (Ariel Buira and the G- 24 Research Program 2003) (explaining the
Chilean model, whereby, financial integration in Chile was regulated through a number of
complementary, dynamic measures; the authorities revalued the exchange rate mechanism
that was initially adopted in the early 1980's).
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Pinochet. 136
Pinochet and his military tried to increase the overall wealth the
Chilean economy. 137 However, inflation doubled in the first eight or
nine months of their regime. 138 When rates of inflation continued to
rise, Pinochet consulted with economists to stabilize the failed
economy. 139 These economists were called "Chicago Boys" because
they had studied at the University of Chicago and had received their
Ph.D. degrees at the University of Chicago. 140 At the time, the
"Chicago Boys" was the only group of economists in Chile not tainted
by a connection with the Allende socialists. 141 They were untainted
because the University of Chicago was one of the only institutions in
the United States where the economics department had a strong group
of free market economists. 142
The Chicago Boys assured Pinochet that if he withdrew
government involvement from all private sectors at once that the natural
laws of economics would push the domestic economic variables, such
as inflation and unemployment, back to equilibrium. 143 Pinochet
followed the Chicago School's recommendations; he privatized a
majority of state-owned companies including several banks, permitted
speculative financing of projects, opened boarders to foreign imports
exposing Chilean manufacturers to competition, and cut all government
136. See id. (explaining how regulations in Chile were central to the success of the
Chilean model; foreign loans faced a tax of 1.2% per year; foreign direct investment and
private investment faced a one year residence requirement).
137. See id. at 147 (showing how CMT's greatly reduced the likelihood that the
currency would appreciate and made it difficult for investors to leave, which would
ultimately jeopardize the Chilean currency).
138. See id. (showing that despite restraints on trade, investors committed funds to the
Chilean infrastructure because the regime offered attractive opportunities for development
within their growing market).
139. See ButRA, supra note 3, at 151(Ariel Buira and the G24 Research Program 2003)
(explaining how the CMTs employed in Chile in the 1990s not only reduced the risk of
financial crisis but was a major preventative defense against IMF involvement within their
policymaking).
140. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 71, 77- 81 (describing the Chicago Boys influence
on the Chilean government in the 1970's and 1980's).
141. See ButRA, supra note 3, at 150. "The general soundness of the Chilean banking
system in the 1990s and macroeconomic policy, the maintenance of price stability and the
high level of official reserves were important sources of investor confidence." Id.
"International support for the neoliberal aspects of Chile's economic reforms provided the
government with the political space to experiment with CMTs." Id.
142. See KLEIN, supra note 115 at 75 (explaining how the Chicago School influenced
the theory taught within the Chilean economic schools).
143. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (2d. ed. 1982) (explaining
how neoliberalism is the cure to economic inefficiencies).
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funding by ten percent. 144 In 1974, Pinochet's adaptations backfired
and inflation escalated above 700 percent. 145 Both Castro and scholars
of the Chicago School insisted that the inflation was attributable to
Pinochet's incorrect implementation of free market ideals. 146 Noam
Chomsky articled the concerns of Henry Kissinger regarding the
likelihood of a widespread negative implication of Pinochet's regime. 147
Chomsky described the implications of the Chilean economic practices
as a true threat to social change worldwide. 148
Within a year, Friedman convinced Pinochet to fire his economic
advisor and hire Sergio de Castro as the finance minister. 149 Castro
invited friends from the Chicago School to join him to work with him in
the Chilean government and appointed one of the Chicago School
economists to the central bank. 15 In 197 5, over 500 companies were
privatized, government spending was cut by twenty seven percent,
domestic manufacturers were absolved, and the Chilean economy fell
into a major recession. 151 Friedman's concept of shocking the economy
into equilibrium by lifting all government restraints on trade had failed
to cure Chile's domestic economic market problems. 152
Certain governments, such as Mexico, have begun to view Chile as
a model of a failed free market and realize the necessity to strengthen
their financial systems through regulations. 153 However, supporters of
144. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 75- 100 (stating that Pinochet was an admired
Chilean leader, and defining the trinity of free markets as privatization, deregulation, and
cuts of social spending).
145. Inflation Chile 1974, INFLATION.EU, available at http://www.inflation.eu/inflationrates/chile/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-chile-1974.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
146. See id. at 75- 80 (explaining how the Chicago Boys influenced Chilean economic
policy).
147. See CHOMSKY, supra note 132, at 21 - 22. Noam Chomsky is the leading
intellectual figure in the world today in the battle for democracy and against neoliberalism.
Id. at 11. In the 1960 's, Chomsky was a prominent U.S. critic of the Vietnam war, and,
more broadly, he became perhaps the most trenchant analyst of the ways U.S. foreign policy
undermines democracy, quashes human rights, and promotes the interests of the wealthy
few. Id. In the 1970 's, Chomsky, along with his co- author Edward S. Herman, began their
research on how the U.S news media serves elite interests and undermines the capacity of
the citizenry to actually rule their lives in a democratic fashion. Id. at 11.
148. See id. (describing the issues of Chile in light of neoliberal influence).
149. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 75.
150. See id. at 254-55 (explaining how the Chicago Boys sought to liberate central
banks in Africa).
151. See id. at 100
152. See id. at 75- 100 (denoting how the Chicago Boy theory of economic policy did
not have positive long lasting effects on the Chilean economy).
153. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31 - 34. ("If a national economy goes sour and
default looms, the IMF is the preferred creditor. It gets paid back first even if others, such
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free markets, such as the Washington Consensus, continue to argue
against any artificial barriers to trade. 154 The free market supporters
continue to believe that growth can be achieved throughsound budgets,
low inflation, deregulation of markets, and free trade. 1 5
Further magnifying the failure of Chile's economic policies was
the success of countries that have moved away from the policies set
forth by the "Washington Consensus." Brazil and Bolivia are two
examples of two South American economies that have challenged the
neoliberal model and moved to a more nationalistic approach. 156
Bolivia, like many other South American countries, was in the
midst of a debt crisis at the start of the 1980s. 157 Fueled by increased
public borrowing during the petrodollar boom of the 1970's and the
corruption of the military governments, Bolivia's GDP declined every
year between 1981-1986. 15 Pushed to the brink of insolvency resulting
from the falling price of tin elections were held a year early. 159 The
election of Victor Paz Estenssoro marked the beginning of

as foreign creditors, do not. They might get nothing. So a rational private sector financial
institution is going to insist on a risk premium- a higher interest rate to cover the higher
likelihood of not getting paid back."); See also STIGLITZ, supra note l, at 206.
154. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31- 34. Stiglitz, commenting on his experience
at the World Bank and their failed policy decision making:
At the World Bank, during the time I was there, there was an increasing conviction
that participation mattered, that policies and programs could to be imposed on
countries but to be successful had to be "owned" by them, that consensus building
was essential, that policies and development strategies had to be adapted to the
situation in the country, that there should be a shift from "conditionality" to
"selectivity", rewarding countries that had proved track records for using funds well
with more funds, trusting them to continue to make good use of their funds, and
providing them with strong incentives.
Id.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 49.
155. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31- 34.
156. Nathaneal Hamilton, The Brazilian Economy in Transition: Explaining President
Lula's Response to Neoliberal Reform (May 23, 2011) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, San
available
at
http://sdsuDiego
State
University),
dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/l 0211.10/1351 /Hamilton_Nathanael.pdf?sequence= 1
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
157. Lydia Chavez, Man in the News; Bolivian in an Encore: Victor Paz Estenssoro,
THE
N. Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
7,
1985),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1985/08/07/world/man-in-the-news-bo livian-in-an-encore-victorpaz-estenssoro .html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
158. Benjamin Kohl, Challenges to Neoliberal Homogenies in Bolivia, ANTIPODE 304,
available
at
3 10
(2006),
http://www.temple.edu/gus/kohl/documents/ChallengesNLHegAntipode .. pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
159. Id.
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neoliberalism in Bolivia. 160
Paz Estenssoro, through Presidential Decree 21060, initiated the
New Economic Policy (NEP), which called for the closing of state
mines, privatized state-owned enterprises, and increased foreign direct
investment, all leading to the end of protectionist policies that had been
in place. 161 While the plan initially succeeded in slowing inflation
within the first couple of weeks, over time it failed to address Bolivia's
fundamental economic problems. 162 In 1993, under the leadership of
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Bolivia instituted what is known as "El
Plan de Todos." 163 The Law of Capitalization implemented the partial
privatization of five major industries in Bolivia: oil and gas,
telecommunications, airlines, power generations, and railroads. 164
Bolivia, a 50% shareholder in the multinational corporations that took
control of these industries, planned on using the stock revenue to bail
out the failing national pension system; however, factors such as lost
revenues resulting from the Law of Capitalization as well as economic
forecasts not being met led to a major reduction of government
programs. 165 A populist backlash against neoliberal policies soon
followed, culminating in the Cochabamba Protests of 2000 and the
Bolivian gas conflict of 2003. 166 The current administration has
attempted to further implement state control over the national economy,
as evidenced by the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. 167
The result seems to be a success for Bolivia. In 2010, the
country's exports totaled $7.1 billion while imports totaled $5.3 billion,
resulting in a healthy trade surplus of $1.6 billion. 168 Bolivia is part of
several international trade partnerships, including the Andean
Community (the "CAN") and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
(the "ALBA"). 169 The country currently enjoys a BB- rating from the
rating agency, Standards and Poor. 170 Though the country still is
160. Chavez, supra note 157.
161. Kohl, supra note 158.
162. Id. at 310-11.
163. Benjamin Kohl, Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia: El Plan de Todos, 27.2
INT'L J. URB. & REG'L RES. 337, 340 (2003).
164. Id. "El Plan de Todos" was not a complete transfer over of the public sector to
private industry; rather, it was a sale of 50% of the state industries to multinational
corporations. The remaining shares were transferred back to the . Id.
165. Id.
166. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Background notes: Bolivia (Aug, 3, 2011).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Sovereign's Ratings List, STANDARD AND POOR'S RATINGS SERVS., available at
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heavily dependent on foreign assistance to help finance development
projects, 171 Bolivia has rebounded nicely following the reign of
neoliberalism in the country.
Brazil presents another successful example of a country flourishing
after moving away from neoliberal policies. Neoliberal reform was
brought to Brazil after the election of Fernando Collor de Mello in
1990. 172 The Collor de Mello administration implemented a number of
policies to help deal with the high inflation rates of the 1990' s,
including market deregulation, reduction of import tariffs, and an
investor-friendly tax system that helped pave the way to opening up
Brazil to the global market. 173 A second round of neoliberal policies
were followed up by the administration of Itamar Franco with the
"Plano Real". 174 These measures involved a mix of privatizing several
state-owned entities, including a global public offering of shares of the
oil and gas giant Petrobas, and the raising of interest rates. 175 The plan
drew a huge influx of foreign investors to Brazil. 176 Although the
"Plano Real" seemed to first be a success, it was not able to bring about
mass prosperity. 177
Former President Luiz Ignazio "Lula" Da Silva had to juggle
between not upsetting his left-leaning Workers Party base and
representing the interests of the conservative neoliberals. 178 Lula issued
a statement during the 2002 campaign stating that his government
would respect the IMF programme agreed upon by the Cardoso
administration and has maintained interest rates at levels set out by the
"Plano Real." 179 In stark contrast to these neoliberal measures, Lula
introduced "Bolsa Familia", a government program aimed to help
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratingslist/en/us/?subSectorCode=39&sectorld= 1221186707758&subSectorld= 1221187348494
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
171. U.S. State Dep't, supra note 166.
172. James Brooke, Man in the News; The Choice of Brazilians; Fernando Col/or,
THE
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
1989),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/world/man-in-the-news-the-choice-of-braziliansfemando-collor.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
173. Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo & Alfredo Saad- Filho, Neoliberal
Economic Policies in Brazil (1994- 2005): Cardoso, Lula and the Need for a Democratic
Alternative, 11 NEW POL. ECON. 99 (2006).
174. Id.
175. Hamilton, supra note 156.
176. Id.
177. Sovereign's Ratings List, supra note 170.
178. Gerardo Renique, Introduction: Latin America Today: The Revolt Against
Neoliberalism, 19 SOCIALISM AN o DEMOCRACY 1, 1- 11, 182 (2005).
179. Hamilton, supra note 156.
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reduce poverty by providing a government subsidy to families whose
children attend school. 180 The multidisciplinary approach used by
Brazil may be the reason for its economic success.
Amid an economic downturn throughout the global markets, Brazil
has managed to maintain strong economic activity. 181 The state-run
energy company, Petrobras, is among the international industrial leaders
in oil production. 182 A portion of government expenditures has been
directed at a number of high-tech industries, including aerospace,
information technology, and telecommunication. 183 Government's
willingness to invest in innovation has led to success in private
entrepreneurship, resulting in a growing middle class that now accounts
for more than half of the 190 million people in Brazil. 184 With a
nominal GDP of $2.09 trillion, the country enjoyed a GDP growth of
7.5% in 2010. 185 The country currently enjoys an A- rating from the
rating agency, Standards and Poor. 186 Brazil is an emerging market rich
with resources that is looking to benefit from added representation at the
negotiating tables of the BWis. 187
C. Loan Conditionality

The economic policies of those in charge of running the IMF and
World Bank have generally been imposed through conditions placed on
loans and other benefits of membership with the IMF and World Bank.
The IMF' s embracement of loan conditionality was declared the
"biggest divergence from the Bretton Woods objectives." 188 The
180. How to get children out of jobs and into school:The limits of Brazil's much
admired and emulated anti- poverty programme, ECONOMIST (Jul. 29, 2010) available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16690887 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
181. See Andrew Downie & Tim Padgett, The One Country That Might Avoid
Recession . . .,
TIME
(Mar.
05,
2009),
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1883301-1,00.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
182. See Lori Ioannou, Brazil's Start-up Generation, Time Online, Aug. 22, 2010,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,201007 6,00.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2013).
183. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Background notes: Brazil (Mar, 8, 2011).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Sovereign's Ratings List, supra note 170.
187. See Julia E. Sweig, A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Nov/Dec 2010), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66868/julia-esweig/a-new-global-player (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
188. Yilmaz Akyuz, The Rationale For Multilateral Lending; A Critical Assessment
20 (July 5, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.newrules.org/storage/documents/ffd/akyuz04.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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principle of conditionality was incorporated within the Articles of
Agreement in 1969, empowering the IMF to condition access to
financial assistance upon the borrowing country's assent to mandated
reforms targeting primary causes of their balance of payments issues. 189
The majority of conditions imposed on poor countries wanting loans
from the IMF and World Bank include privatization-related
conditions. 19 For example, when Bangledesh received a large credit
from the World Bank in 2005, of the fifty-three conditions added to the
loan, eighteen required that Bangladesh, where over 50% of the
population lives below the poverty line, privatize its banks, electricity,
and telecommunications sectors. 1 1 Despite the fact these conditions
have ultimately made matters worse within poorer countries, the
average amount of conditions imposed on low income countries rose
from forty-eight per loan to sixty-seven per loan between 2002 and
2005. 192
The World Bank has also been known to impose conditions
involving trade liberalization on poor countries. 19 Rwanda was

°

189. Article V, Section 3(a) of the Articles of Agreement provides:
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies
on stand- by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special
balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of
payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement
and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general
resources of the Fund.
Amended July 28,
1969, available at
IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT,
http: //www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). The nature of
the conditions have predominantly centered on restricting government spending and foreign
borrowing, regulating currency to limit inflation, and in strengthening banking supervision.
See id.; John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Finance Institutions: The Changing
Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 194, 214- 18 (2007- 2008) (discussing the legal aspects oflMF conditionality).
190. EURODAD, WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A DEVELOPMENT INJUSTICE
12
(2006),
available
at
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad_world_bank_and_imf_c
onditionality_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); see also Privatization and the World
THE
WHIRLED
BANK
GROUP,
available
at
Bank,
http://www.whirledbank.org/development/private.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013)
(questioning the effectiveness of privatization conditions imposed by the IMF and World
Bank, and providing examples of privatization conditions in Argentina, India, and Mexico).
191. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 12; Shahzad Uddin & Trevor Hopper, Accounting

for

Privatisation

in

Bangladesh:

Testing

World

Bank

Claims,

available

at

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21894315/Accounting-for-Privatisation-in-Bangladesh-TestingWorld-Bank-Claims (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
192. EURODAD,supra note 190, at 9.
193. Id. at 12; JUBILEE U.S.A., Are IMF and World Bank Economic Policy Conditions
Undermining
the
Impact
of Debt
Cancellation?
(2008),
available
at
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conditioned to join the East African Trade Agreement, practically
194
Bangladesh was
stripping its right to freely contract for its exports.
required to remove any quantitative restrictions it had imposed on sugar
imports. 195 Luckily, such trade conditions only constitute 3% of all
World Bank conditions to low income countries. 196
In essence, the purpose of the World Bank and IMF in giving loans
to poorer countries is to assist those countries in raising their economy
while helping to end the perpetuating cycle of poverty. However, the
World Bank has been known to impose "Micro-Management" type
conditions, which ultimately prevents much needed aid from reaching
those actually in need of help. 197 Uganda, where 37. 7% of the country
lives in poverty, was required to "review and approve its school sports
policy for tertiary schools," before it could access its World Bank
financing in 2005. 198 As a condition to receiving their financing, The
Republic of Mali, where 10% of children die as infants, was forced to
move its government offices to a new location. 199
The discord between loan conditionality and development
objectives is rooted in the IMF and World Bank's governance structure
permitting dominant shareholders to utilize conditionality as a means of
200
Actions
furthering their own global economic and political agendas.
by the IMF and World Bank give credence to the growing belief that the
http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Resources/Policy_ Archive/208briefnoteco
nditionality.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013)("Some of the most egregious policies force
countries applying for debt relief to adhere to strict IMF fiscal and monetary targets,
privatize key industries, liberalize their markets, and remove subsidies for sensitive
commodities like gasoline and cooking oil. '').
194. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 15.
195. Id.; Bangladesh: Trade Policy and Integration, THE WORLD BANK, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUT HASIAEXT/EXTSA
RREGTOPINTECOTRA/O,,contentMDK:20592516-menuPK:579454 -pagePK:34004173piPK:34003707-theSitePK:579448,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
196. EURODAD, supra note 190, at .15.
197. Id. at 11; KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL REPORT 871 (May 3, 2006)("The
impression that has been created is that . . . econ om[ ies] [are] being managed by the IMF
and the World Bank. The impression is that all these prices are as a result of micromanagement by the IMF and the World Bank.").
198. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 11.
199. Id.
200. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 19 (showing how sometimes conditionality was
even counterproductive, either because the policies were not well suited to the country or
because the way they were imposed engendered hostility to the reform process); Contra
STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 52 (stating that "sometimes money has gone to governments with
good policies in place- but not necessarily because the IMF recommended these policies.").
Stiglitz also continues the argument that loan conditionalities shifted the debate inside the
country in ways that led to better policies. Id.
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institutions "systematically act in the interest of creditors and of rich
elites. . . in preference to that of workers, peasants, and other poor
people." 201

D. Case Studies
1. Argentina
Argentina provides a context for exammmg the economic and
human impact of IMF lending over the course of nearly half a century.
Prior to World War I, Argentina was viewed by the public and investors
as a land of opportunity. 202 Argentina was a resource-rich nation and
therefore attracted both European and American investors. 203 The Great
Depression negatively affected Argentina due to its reliance on
exporting capital.
Argentina initially appealed to the IMF for assistance in 1958 with
the hope of receiving an infusion of capital to address its rampant
inflation and a resulting balance of payment crisis. 204 The early
successes associated with the loans were mitigated by an emerging
discontent within the labor force stemming from a decrease in real
wages, a rise in inflation, and a decline in the country's gross domestic
product. 205
Argentina's internal political problems led to a problematic
relation.ship with the IMF until, in 1965, President Arturo Illia
terminated Argentina's relationship with the IMF, rejecting all of the
201. GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO
GLOBAL FAITH 140-41 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that people in industrial countries began to
complain that Third World demands were being ignored, causing the underdevelopment of
the Global South). While transnational corporations were getting rich, countries of the
South were being exploited for their resources. Id.
202. See KRUGMAN,supra note 122, at 38-40.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 51 Argentina's lower profile rescue came via the World Bank, which
enabled a capital injection of $12 billion to support the nation's banks. Id. Subsequently,
the Fund conditionally provided capital in the amount of 75 million and a further 254
million dollars, which was derived from public and private U.S. agencies. Id.
205. Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.MF. and Economic and Social
Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 231 - 32 (1986)
(explaining that in 1959 real wages, decreased by twenty- six percent from the previous
year, inflation rose to 111 %, and GDP declined by eight percent). As the working class
became increasingly dissatisfied, Argentina had a record number of employee strikes. Id.
Even after the Fund negotiated similar stand- by arrangements for 1959 and 1960, the
atmosphere within Argentina was not positive because the allocation of the funds were
conditioned upon the attainment of strict deficit reduction goals that were reliant upon
"large dismissals of employees, limitation on wage increases, and a reduction in public
works." Id.
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IMF's conditions and attempting to deal unilaterally with the $2.5
billion Argentina owed to international creditors. 206 By failing to
comply with the IMF's policies, Illia eroded international confidence in
the Argentinean economy. This was reflected in the severe decline of
international loans to the country over the next three year period, and
thus, Illia suffered the same fate as his Argentinean predecessors. 207
In 1967, Colonel Juan Ongania ascended to power and agreed to
implement an IMF stabilization program, which mandated the same
fiscal deficit and inflation goals that had relegated Argentina to a
constant state of political and economic turmoil since 1958. 208
However, in 1969 the IMF proclaimed a successful stabilization effort
in Argentina based on an increase in its gross domestic product and
reduction in the inflation rate. 209 These economic indicators seemingly
validated the IMF's policies, but failed to resonate in the hearts of the
Argentinean people who had been forced to adapt and survive on real
wages that had fallen 11 % in 1968. 210
Starting in 1970, and continuing throughout the next three decades,
the citizens of Argentina galvanized together against the IMF and
fought for political changes as the IMF remained resolute in the
conviction that the "shock therapy" approach was the right path for
Argentina to attain progress and prosperity. 211 After a further decline in
real wages in 1978, only ten percent of the population had the economic
means to purchase the government's shopping basket of basic goods

206.
Argentina: Going It Alone, TIME (Apr. 30, 1965), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898668,00.html (last visited Oct. 23 ,
2013) (explaining how Illia had attacked the IMF during his campaign for president, calling
it an economic intruder and recommending that Argentina break relations with the Fund).
207. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 234. International loans to Argentina fell
drastically, from 361 million in 1962, to 99 million in 1963 and 6 million in 1964. See id.
The military overthrew Illia in June 1966. Id.
208. Id. at 235. Conditions in 1967 and 1968 including the devaluation of the peso,
limits on fiscal deficit (increased utility charges for public services, restraints on
government spending, and higher internal taxes), and wage controls (wage freezes until
1968). Id.
209. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 41(comparing Mexico and Argentina's positive
reaction to capital inflows when inflation dropped to nearly zero and GDP increased by 25%
in three years).
210. Conklin & Daphne Davidson, supra note 205, at 236.
211. See Kim Reisman, World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 349, 390 (1991 - 1992) (explaining that shock therapy
is a means used by the IMF and World Bank to establish a market economy in countries by
inflicting the attendant hardships for as short a time as possible in contrast to an
evolutionary or gradual approach).
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and services. 212 After struggling with massive inflation rates and a
costly war that ended in 1982, Argentina appealed to the IMF for aid. 213
The startling figures taken in the 1980's illuminate a blatant disregard
by the IMF to balance the human cost of economic stabilization with the
benefits of attaining arbitrary economic indicator targets.214 The
problems of inflation and economic stagnation in the 1980s culminated
in the hyperinflation that occurred in 1989. 215
In 1991, Argentina instituted a Convertibility Plan designed to
stabilize the economy through drastic measures, including fixing the
peso to the U.S. dollar. 216 The Convertibility Plan and structural
reforms led to stabilization, and the IMF believed that the six percent
average GDP growth through 1997 was a sign of the success of these
measures. 217 However, the appreciation of the currency placed exports
and domestic producers at a disadvantage because payments became
more difficult to make. Ultimately, the rise in prices led to a balance of
payment issue.
In 1995, the payment issue was coupled with
government public relations problems with the IMF, and eventually
resulted in the decline of the stock market. 218 Additionally, laws
212. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 245- 52 (explaining that in the years of
1976 to 1978, public sector employees had their wages decreased by 53%, so that the
government could comply with the Fund's fiscal deficit targets). The Fund's demand to
reduce government expenditures translated to massive cuts and layoffs of public sector
employees who were already "paid among the lowest in Argentina." Id. Although the
deficit declined, the citizens were confronted with the reality that the cost of gas, telephone,
water, rail fares, electricity, postal charges, and metro fare had increased an average of 405
percent. Id.
213. Id. at 239; I.MF. Loan to Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1983, at D2(explaining
that in early 1983, the IMF approved a $2 billion loan, including $1.5 billion S DR, to
improve the collapsing economy).
214. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 245- 52 (explaining that a study in 1985
estimated that one third of employed workers failed to earn sufficient wages so as to be able
to feed a family of four); see Milt Freudenheim, Henry Giniger, & Richard Levine, A
Heartfelt Cry From Alfonsin On Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1985, at 42 (explaining
the plight of President Raul Alfonsin in 1985). Alfonsin 's presidency followed eight years
of military rule. Id. During his presidency, inflation began eating away at the standard of
living to a point where Alfonsin had to balance the IMF's demands for austerity measures
with the demands by Argentinean wage-earners for pay increases. Id.
215. INT'L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN
ARGENTINA,
1991-2002
(July
2003),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/arg/070403 .pdf [hereinafter The Role of the IMF].
216. Id. (defining the Convertibility Plan). It was centered around a currency boardlike arrangement in which the peso was fixed at par with the dollar and autonomous money
creation by the central bank was severely constrained. Id. "[I]t also included a broader
agenda of market-oriented structural reforms to promote efficiency and productivity." Id.
217. Id.
218. Juan Carlos Linares, After the Argentine Crisis: Can the IMF Prevent Corruption
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influenced by the IMF conditions, along with changes to the social
219
security system, ultimately sparked massive "anti-IMF riots" in 1998.
Later, in mid-2001, the lack of access to capital markets caused an
increased capital flight that, in tum, resulted in Argentina's financial
collapse later that year. 220 Once again, as had happened repeatedly
before 1991, Argentina was unable to meet IMF conditions and the IMF
suspended disbursements. 221 The Convertibility Plan was widely
criticized for failing to account for Argentina's internal conditions
because linking the currency with the U.S. dollar forced Argentina to
"align its monetary policy with that of the United States, despite
cyclical differences between the two countries. " 222
The IMF' s negative involvement in Argentina culminated in
January 2002, when the government of Argentina defaulted on $141
billion in public sector debt; this embodied "the largest sovereign
default" of a state in history. 223 The catalyst behind Argentina's default
and economic collapse has been "attributed to the country's excessive
adherence to International Monetary Fund advice. " 224 Argentina's 2009
statement that it does not need the IMF' s financial help seems tenuous
at best, as earlier that same year Argentina demanded IMF loans
without conditions. 225 It has been stated that "the success story of the
in its Lending? A Model Approach, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 13, 19 (2005) (explaining
how Argentina was forced to renegotiate its IMF loan, leading to the stock market decline).
219. Id. at 20 (describing the situation in Argentina around the time prior to the antiIMF riots). The IMF's bailouts were seen as protecting the affluent at the expense of the
poor. Id. The austerity programs installed to pay for the IMF loans were said to be
absorbed by the poor instead of the wealthy. Id.
220. The Role of the IMF, supra note 215.
221. Id. (explaining how this led to the abandonment of the Convertibility Plan and, by
the end of 2002, the economy had contracted by twenty percent since 1998).
222. The Role of the IMF, supra note 215; see Linares, supra note 218, at 23
(explaining other factors that contributed to the economic collapse, including decline in
capital flows, institutional and political factors unique to Argentina, external shocks, failures
in the banking system, and systemic corruption that was inherent in Argentina's politics and
economy).
223. Linares, surpa note 218, at 18- 19 (explaining the steps taken by the IMF and
Argentina, starting in 1991 to its default in December 2001). Argentina's relationship with
the IMF from l 990's through 2000 was marked by a series of renegotiations to loan
agreements and requests for financial assistance. Id. Although Argentina never really
complied with any of the IMF conditions, the IMF was unwilling to abandon its work there.
Meanwhile, Argentinean citizens and businesses found themselves marred in
Id.
government tax increases and spending reductions. Id.
224. See Jo Marie Griesgraber & Oscar Ugarteche, The IMF Today and Tomorrow:
Some Civil Society Perspectives, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351 (2006).
225. Walter Brandimarte, Argentina Demands IMF Lend Without Conditions,
REUTERS, Apr. 24, 2009, available at
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Argentine stabilization program can be best told by international
creditors as ... they have been paid punctually and ... could hardly be
happier regarding the success of International Monetary Fund
recommendations. " 226
2. Sub-Saharan Africa
The BWis have been the cause of the most numerous set of
policies Sub-Saharan African countries have ever faced. 227 Either
directly, or as a consequence, the World Bank and IMF are responsible
for policies which make significant changes in African economies. 228
Even with the implementation of these policies, Sub-Saharan Africa is
still the poorest region of the world and the least likely to meet the
Millennium Development Goals 229 by the established date. 230

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN24454 l 5920090424; Sujata Rao & Carolyn Cohn,

Argentina Says Does Not Need Aid From IMF, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2009, 2:30 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58429020090905.
226. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 259- 60 (explaining how the Fund
consistently went against the poor and working class Argentineans). The Argentine
government, faced with many hardships, had poor bargaining power against the Fund. Id.
227. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 55 (2006)
(listing the IMF and World Bank conditionality's in Sub-Saharan Africa as of 1999 as:
Cameroon 92; Djibouti 134; Gambia 121; Ghana 80; Guinea 125; Madagascar 137; Mali
105; Mozambique 74; Rwanda 135; Senegal 165; Tanzania 150; Uganda 74; and Zambia
87).
228. REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE WORLD: AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 2004 20
(Katherine Murison ed., 33d ed. 2003) (explaining how the IMF and World Bank have
pushed pressured Sub- Saharan African countries to large scale economic reforms). In 1998,
thirty- five African countries began economic reform programs or borrowed from the IMF to
support economic reform programs. Id. A 1981 World Bank study proposed four economic
policy changes including: (1) the correction of overruled exchange rates; (2) the
improvement of price incentives for exports and agriculture; (3) the protection of industry in
a more uniform and less direct way; and (4) the reduction of direct governmental controls.
Id.; see GERARD ROLAND, PRIVATIZATION: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 44 (2008) (explaining
that most of these policies concentrated on the goals of privatizing and stabilizing the
economies). The hope was for economic growth and financial development results to
follow. Id. Many of the newly private companies, instead of contributing to the growth of
the economy, actually worsened the population's situation by laying workers off. Id. In
Zambia for example, two large mines were sold to a bidder who agreed not to dismiss any of
the workers. Id. However, after title was transferred, three thousand of the seven thousand
workers were dismissed, and subsequently, the new owner went out of business causing the
remaining four thousand workers to lose their jobs. Id.
229. The Millenium Development Goals: Eight Goals/or 215, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (laying out the
Millenium Development Goals, which include: ending poverty and hunger; universal
education; gender equality; child health; maternal health; combating HIV, AIDS and other
diseases; environmental sustainability; and global partnership).
230. SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL

Published by SURFACE, 2013

119

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

112

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

During the 1950s and 1960s, the World Bank concentrated on the
development of physical infrastructure. 231 Through the 1970s, the
Bank's lending shifted and concentrated more on social areas like
education, water access, poverty reduction, and income distribution. 232
However, as the 1980s approached, most economic leaders were
conservative and favored economic liberalization and keeping
governments at the edge of the economic markets. 233 In 1963, the IMF
started lending to Sub-Saharan Africa; however, the number of loans
granted to the area was relatively small until the 1970s. 234 The World
Bank, influenced by conservative economists, began taking this
approach as well in the policies it pushed Sub-Saharan African
countries to employ. 235 Lending during the 1980s became conditioned
on economic policy reforms, and by the end of the decade, there was
practically no difference between the World Bank and IMF
conditionality terms. 236 Countries who received aid in Sub-Saharan
Africa were at times undeserving, due to the political and economic
turmoil present within. 237
RELATIONS 31 (2009) (explaining that the average per capita income in Sub- Saharan Africa
is $2,500, and 30% of the working poor earn less than one dollar per day); see JEFFREY
SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET 31 (2008) for a discussion
on the history of Sub- Saharan Africa's poverty and lack of development in comparison with
the United States and United Kingdom; see also ROB BOWDEN' AFRICA SOUTH OF THE
SAHARA 10 (2008) (stating that the World Bank has said that twenty- two of the twenty- five
poorest countries in the world are in Sub- Saharan Africa, Burundi being the poorest of the
world, with an average annual income per person of $640).
231. PHILIP W. JONES, EDUCATION, POVERTY AND THE WORLD BANK 11 (2006).
232. John Williamson, The Impact of the Bretton Woods Institutions on the Prospects
for development, in SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 1990's 178, 179
(Pauline H. Baker et al eds., 1993). From his first speech to the Board of Governors
McNamara spoke of directing Bank lending toward improving the living conditions of
individual poor people, and proposed expanding education lending to emphasize advanced
technical training as well as fundamental literacy. Id.; see MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 107 (1996); RONALD G. RIDKER, THE WORLD BANK'S
ROLE IN HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA: EDUCATION,
TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 42 (1994) (explaining that these were the goals of
the World Bank's president at the time, Robert McNamara).
233. See Williamson, supra note 232.
234. Robert S. Browne, The IMF in Africa: A Case of Inappropriate Technology, in
THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ETHICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY; VOLUME 3 (Robert J. Myers ed., 1987).
235. See Williamson, supra note 232.
236. IDA'S PARTNERSHIP FOR POVERTY REDUCTION: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF
FISCAL YEARS 1994- 2000 77 (2002); Howard Stein, Structural Adjustment, in THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 599 (David A. Clark ed., 2006).
237. KENDALL W. STILES, NEGOTIATING DEBT: THE IMF LENDING PROCESS 69, 75
(1991) (describing the IMF's loan to Zaire). Zaire's Chief of State, Mobuto Sese Seko,
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Both the World Bank and the IMF still subject African countries to
dozens of conditions in order to receive loans. 238 The conditions are
mainly focused on lowering government expenses on social issues and
diverting them towards market liberalization in order to cover forgone
government revenues from lowering export barriers. 239 The results of
these conditions are lower salaries, impoverishment for Africans, and
cheaper raw materials for multinational companies. 240 Presently the
began talks with the IMF in 1976, and a forty- seven million dollar one- year stand- by loan
was approved. Id. The loan called for a forty- two percent devaluation to align Zaire with
the SOR; a twenty percent ceiling on wage increases; a cut of government expenditures
involving foreign exchange; a twenty- two percent limit on domestic credit expansion during
1976; and a renegotiation of external public debt. Id. Zaire became ineligible for further
assistance in 1977 because it failed to meet conditions of the loan and repay debts. Id. at 72,
76. Zaire provided the IMF with disjointed, uncoordinated, and confused financial
information that "tried the patience of the IMF to its limit." Id. It also became clear to
Zaire's creditors that Zaire had not intent to implement the IMF reforms. Id. In 1978, at the
urging of Zaire' s creditors, the IMF sent officials to replace local Zairian financial
leadership, and other stand- by arrangement of $155 million was given in 1979. Id. at 69,
76. Zaire's political aristocracy frustrated the efforts of the IMF team, and thus the loans
were cancelled by 1983. Id. at 70, 74. The willingness of the IMF to keep returning to
Zaire with loans was deemed "startling" in the context that Zaire's performance indicated its
unwillingness to meet the terms of its loans. Id. at 79, 83.
238. See SALIWE M. KAWEWE, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AFRICA, VOL. 5 43
(Olufemi Wusu ed., 2007) (stating that if governments fail to meet the measures imposed,
any loans that may have been promised to them are withheld or canceled); THE POLITICS AND
POLICIES OF Sus- SAHARAN AFRICA 73 (Robert A. Dibie ed., 2001) (stating that "the
conditions attached to World Bank and IMF structural adjustment program ... effectively
transferred sovereignty from the African State to Washington") [hereinafter THE POLITICS
AND POLICIES].
239. THE POLITICS AND POLICIES, supra note 238; see KAWEWE, supra note 238, at 44
(stating that the World Bank and IMF force governments to reduce spending on basic
human needs and necessities like the elimination of subsidies for food prices, and reduction
or social welfare and programs, including health and education); VINCENT B. KHAPOY A, THE
AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 182 (1998) (explaining how the IMF has required
governments from Sub- Saharan Africa to reduce budget deficits by making cuts on
expenditures on public programs).
240. See KAWEWE, supra note 238, at 44 (noting Zimbabwe as an example where the
elimination of price controls on manufactured goods, retrenchment of works, devaluation of
currency, and privatization of government industries resulted in a sharp shrinkage of income
opportunities for the urban middle class and the working class). The elimination of price
controls simultaneously marginalizing the poor further, especially women and children. Id.;
RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF WORLD BANK AND WTO 141 (2007) (stating that
during the 1980's when most African countries came under World Bank and IMF tutelage,
per-capita income decreased by twenty five percent in most of Sub- Saharan Africa). In
addition, the removal of food and agricultural subsidies caused prices to rise and created
increased food scarcity. Id. Since between one- fourth and one- third of the population of
Sub-Saharan Africa is malnourished, the vulnerability of African populations to the spread
of diseases and other health problems, has increased. Id. This, coupled with the closing of
numerous hospitals and the understaffing of the ones remaining, has only added to the
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global economic crisis affecting the industrialized nations is likely to
affect donors' commitments, and thus, efforts to reach the MDGs by the
2015 deadline will be slowed down. 241 Sub-Saharan African countries
have accumulated increasingly high debt allowances, whereby, interest
outlay payments to financial institutions exceed income from loans
which results in harmful net outflows of cash. 242
The IMF and World Bank structural reforms have proven to be
243
inefficient and detrimental to the people in Sub-Saharan Africa.
After adhering to the IMF's and World Bank's policies and mandated
structural adjustments, residents of Sub-Saharan African countries have
not experienced any long-term improvement in their living
conditions. 244 However, since the voting power in the IMF of all SubSaharan African countries together is only about a fourth of that
allocated to the United States alone, their voice is not likely to bring
about any major reform. 245

problems rampant within Sub-Saharan Africa. Id.
241. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATIONS AND PROSPECTS 2009 21 (2009)
(explaining how the decrease in demand for exports, lower commodity prices, and decline in
investments in the Sub- Saharan African region resulting from the crisis, will affect SubSaharan African countries' economic development).
242. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN HISTORY: VOLUME 1 338 (Kevin Shillington ed.,
2004).
243. See REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE WORLD: AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 2004 119
(Katherine Murison ed., 33d ed. 2003) (explaining the case of Burkina Faso which
highlights the inefficiencies of the policies) [hereinafter REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE
WORLD]. Since the 1970's there has been a history of fiscal deficit in Burkina Faso which
has been mainly attributable to the economy's low taxable capacity. Id. In 1993 the IMF
accorded an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility to Burkina Faso. Id. Under the terms
of the accord the primary objective was to reduce the fiscal deficit, which was at 4.6% of
GDP. Id. However, by 1994, instead of decreasing, the deficit had actually increased to
5.1% of GDP. Id. By 1999, the deficit was still four percent of GDP. See REGIONAL
SURVEYS OF THE WORLD, supra.
244. Andrew Conteh, Sub-Saharan Africa in the Post Cold War Era, in THE POLITICS
AND POLICIES OF Sus- SAHARAN AFRICA 73- 76 (Robert A. Dibie ed., 2001).
245. International Monetary Fund, Annual Report 2009 47, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
(showing that the aggregated voting power for all Sub- Saharan countries is 4.36 percent,
while the Unites States alone holds 16.77 percent); see Maurilo Portugal, Improving IMF
Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries, in IMF DECISIONMAKING, IN REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 75, 83 (Ariel
Buira ed., 2006) (explainifor Sub- Saharan Africa's voting power); see also MARCUS
POWER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT AND GEOGRAPHIES 84 (2003) (explaining that similarly,
in the World Bank, the G8 states hold ten times the voting power of all Sub- Saharan
countries together). The G8 states hold forty percent of the voting power in the World
Bank, while Sub-Saharan Africa holds just over four percent. Id.
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3. The Asian Crisis

The Asian financial crisis destroyed "the conventional wisdom that
East Asia's economies would prosper indefinitely."246 While few
scholars predicted it, 247 the crisis showed the flaws of IMF loan
conditionality and consequences of global financial liberalization. 248
The "[f]inancial liberalization from the 1980's had major ramifications
in the region as savings supplemented the already high domestic savings
rates in the region to further accelerate the rate of capital
accumulation. " 249
Although there are at least four competing explanations that
provide background for how the Asian financial crisis began, 250 it
officially started in July 1997 in Thailand, after the Thai government
began to float its currency, the Thai baht. 251 At that time, "the growth
246. Peter A. Coclanis & Tilak Doshi, Globalization in Southeast Asia, 570 ANNALS,
July 2000, at 49, 56-57 (explaining that few would have predicted the crisis because leading
up to 1995 because per capita growth in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand was
much greater in comparison to that of South Asia and Latin America); JEFFREY D. SACHS &
WING THYE Woo, UNDERSTANDING THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA 13 (Wing Thye Woo, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Klaus
Schwab, eds. YEAR) ("The World Bank and International Monetary Fund ... are now
divided on the causes of the crisis, and on what the policy advice should have been given.").
But see Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia 's Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 62, 64 (1994)
( explaining, before the Asian Crisis began, that the rapid Asian growth that occurred at the
beginning of the l 990's was not a model that the West should follow, and that future growth
would be limited).
247. JOMO K.S., GROWTH AFTER THE ASIAN CRISIS: WHAT REMAINS OF THE EAST
ASIAN
MODEL?
2
(March
2001 ),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsmdpbg24dl0.en.pdf.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1,
at 6 (arguing how decisions concerning necessary reforms in global institutional
arrangements must be made not by a self selected group such as the G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20,
or G-24, but should be made by all the countries of the world).
248. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 13.
249. MANUEL F. MONTES, THE CURRENCY CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 (2000) (listing
four competing explanations of the Asian financial crisis). The four explanations are: the
entry of low cost producers into the international export markets; macroeconomic weakness
in all economies; undisciplined banking; or the shear differences between all of the different
countries' economies. Id.; see Laurent L. Jacque, The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons from
Thailand, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 87 (1999) ("[T]he Asian crisis primarily originated
in the private sector. It is a crisis of flawed resource allocation abetted by misguided
government policies and unfortunately corrected by Western style policies often ill- adapted
to the idiosyncrasies of Asian capitalism.").
250. SACHS & Woo, supra note 246, at 13 (explaining the confusion among experts as
to how the financial crisis occurred even after analysts had been praising Asian economies
up until the unexpected collapse in July 1997).
251. MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIC
IMPLICATIONS 7 (1998); see Helen Hughes, Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency
POLICY
(Spring
1999)
available
at
Financial
'Crises',
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of bank and nonbank credit to the private sector exceeded... the already
rapid growth of real GDP ... , [and] exposure to the property sector
accounted for roughly twenty-five to forty percent of total bank loans in
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and more than that in
Hong Kong." 252 With an overextension and concentration of credit,
countries became vulnerable to shifts in cyclical and credit conditions.
By the end of 1997, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand,
and the Philippines' stock markets had lost more than sixty percent of
their value. 3 "[T]he Indonesian rupiah was down more than 80
percent against the dollar, and the currencies of Thailand, Malaysia, and
Philippines all fell by 30-50 percent; . . . [w ]ithin months of the baht
flotation, the stock markets of all four saw losses of sixty percent or
more in dollar terms. " 254 Most surprisingly affected by the crisis was
South Korea, because at the onset it was the most rapidly growing
country in the region and the eleventh biggest economy in the world, yet
after the crisis hit, South Korea lost its credibility as it became known
that its banks lacked "commercial orientation" and had made too many
risky loans. 255
At the center of some of the criticism before the crisis was the
IMF, whose inappropriate advice "led to overly tight macroeconomic
policies and badly designed and badly handled restructuring
programs. " 256 Besides persuading Thailand into devaluation, the IMF
http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/Spr99/polspr99- 1.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
(explaining that most East Asian banks did not adopt the proper accountability and
transparency measures necessary to police loaning practices, thus a high proportion of those
loans were non- performing).
252. Id. at 8- 9 (explaining that falling property prices and rising shares of
nonperforming bank loans were a consequence of the ASEAN-4 economies being
vulnerable to the shifts in credit and cyclical conditions). In an effort to minimize
borrowing costs, too much of those countries' borrowing consisted of short maturities
and/or foreign currency; an ultimately risky strategy as it contributed to currency
mismatches. Id.; see Overview, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN,
available at http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
(providing an overview of ASEAN).
253. Coclanis & Doshi, supra note 246, at 59 (describing these events as the "Asian
flu" or "bahtulism"); see Jomo K.S., supra note 247, at 12 (discussing how the Republic of
Korea's currency, the won, collapsed, and as a result, the Hong Kong dollar was directly
attacked).
254. Coclanis & Doshi, supra note 246, at 59; see Jomo K.S., supra note 247, at 12.
255. John W. Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: Banking,
Economic Integration, and Crisis Management in the New Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 939, 945-46 (1999) (explaining how South Korea's financial difficulties basically
forced it to accept an IMF bailout package in December 1997). At the time, South Korea's
twenty- one billion dollar IMF loan was the largest the IMF ever made. Id.
256. SACHS & Woo, supra note 246, at 14; see Hughes, supra note 251 (criticizing the
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was alleged to have pressured Indonesia to devalue the rupiah, which
also led to devaluation in the Philippines and South Korea, and the
needless "debasing" of the Taiwan dollar. 257 The World Bank was not
immune from criticism either, as just four years prior to the crisis it
argued that Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia were the preferred
models of economies for other developing countries to emulate. 258 Both
the IMF and World Bank encouraged Asian countries to adopt a
strategy known as "fast-track capitalism" which ended up putting
countries in high-yield, yet high-risk sectors; this ultimately led to the
crisis. 259
After the crisis broke, the IMF attempted to come to the countries'
rescue by instituting "programmes and conditionalities, as well as
policies favored by the international. .. financial communities and others
affected. " 260 Its three-point strategy was aimed toward financing,
macroeconomic policy, and structural reform within Indonesia, South
Korea, and Thailand. 261 The IMF's programs "urged bank closures,
IMF for funding countries that had balance of payment difficulties). This led to a moral
hazard where private lenders and developing country borrowers relied upon the IMF for
perpetual credit. Id. The author goes on to criticize the World Bank for giving loans to
countries "that had no intention of following prudent economic policies." Id.
257. Editorial, The IMF Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A22 (describing the
IMF's mishandling of Asia's economy). "The IMF tripped this crisis by urging the Thais to
devalue, then, promoted contagion by urging everyone else to do likewise." Id.
258. Jomo, supra note 247, at 1- 2 (explaining The East Asian Miracle study
conducted by the World Bank in 1993 that the World Bank sought to distance itself from).
The study concluded, in contrast to the majority of case- studies such as those in Latin
America and Africa, that structural adjustment programs were working in East Asia. Id.
259. Jomo, supra note 247, at 23- 24; see John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian
Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 70,
71 - 74 (1998) (detailing the IMF's bailout package broken down by country and dollar
amounts); PETER G. ZHANG, IMF AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 73-74, 78 (World
Scientific Publ'g Co. Pte. Lte.) (1998) (explaining, for example, how at the peak of the
crisis, the IMF loaned South Korea fifty- eight billion dollars on December 4, 1997). The
IMF's immediate response was to help Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand design programs of
structural economic reforms to win investors' confidence. Id. The loans did not curb the
financial crisis, because, for example, the South Korean won ended up falling to 1,745 wons
for every U.S. dollar on January 23, 1998. Id.
260. Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, INT'L MONETARY FUND
(June 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#III (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing the three components of the IMF's Asian crisis rescue plan).
Although the IMF initially put in thirty- five billion dollars of support for Indonesia, K01:ea,
and Thailand to be distributed equally, eventually, Indonesia got more money, in 1998 and
1999. Id. The macroeconomic policies affected were monetary and fiscal policies. Id.
Money was tightened to stop the collapse of each country's exchange rate and, especially in
Thailand, fiscal policy was tightened to diminish deficit increases. Id. Finally, structural
reforms were taken to address corporate and financial sector weaknesses. Id.
261. Jomo, supra note 247, at 23- 24.
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government spending cuts and higher interest rates in the wake of the
crisis."262 In the end, the IMF's aid failed as the programs it instituted
were contradictory in consequence and exacerbated the impact of the
crisis in countless aspects. 263
In a review of its handling of the Asian Crisis of 1997 to 1998, the
IMF recognized that it needed to improve the infrastructure of the
The IMF Managing Director,
international financial system. 264
realization by stating "the Fund
this
echoed
Strauss-Kahn,
Dominique
has advocated fiscal stimulus to restore global growth; . . . [t]here is
now a broad consensus on this. " 265 The lessons of the Asian Crisis have
not manifested themselves within the framework of the policy advice
that has been directed toward countries battling the current economic
262. Id.; see Editorial, Dousing the IMF Fires, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at Al8.
"Before you pour liquid on a raging fire ...make sure it doesn't smell like gasoline ... the
IMF doesn't look like much of a fireman." Id. In March 1997, IMF Managing Director
Michel Camdessus encouraged Thailand to devalue its currency, but as the Asian crisis
proves, this was a huge mistake. Id. Then, the IMF gave eighteen billion to Thailand,
forty- three billion to Indonesia, and fifty- seven billion to South Korea. Id. Those loans,
coupled with loans to Russia and Brazil, totaled $171 billion from the beginning of the
Asian Crisis through 1998 as the crisis continued. Id. In 1997, Camdessus predicted that
the crisis would not be prolonged. Editorial, supra note 257. His prediction looked foolish
for the IMF to have stood behind at the time. Id.; but see Letters to the Editor: A Gross
Distortion of IMF's Policies, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at A15 (discussing IMF External
Relations Department Director Shailendra Anjaria's contention that the IMF did not force
Thailand to devalue its currency).
263. The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at
http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (explaining
the six major areas where the IMF should be strengthened: (1) more effective surveillance
over countries' economic practices and policies; (2) financial sector reform; (3) ensuring
orderly and properly sequenced integration of international financial markets; (4) promoting
regional surveillance; (5) promoting good governance and fighting corruption; and (6) more
effective structures for orderly debt workouts).
264. Neil Watkins, The London G- 20 Summit: The Global New Deal We Need,
at
available
2009),
3,
(Mar.
3
at
NETWORK
USA
JUBILEE
http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Resources/G20/Briefing_note_G20 Lond
on_Summit.pdf (last visited on Oct. 22, 2013) (quoting Managing Director of the IMF,
Dominique Strauss- Kahn).
265. See id. at 4 (discussing the recent history of the IMF in its loans to Serbia, El
Salvador, Latvia, and Hungary). Serbia was told that anything less than a tight fiscal stance
would jeopardize the credibility of the program in the eyes of foreign investors and the
Serbian public. Id. A loan to El Salvador in January of 2009 advocated the attainment of
ec,momic growth through the administering of tax increases and diminishing gas and
transport subsidies. Id. In funding a December 2008 loan to Latvia, the lending was
contingent upon reduction in many government related expenditures as well as the
incorporation of a value added tax. Id. The implementing of stringent fiscal deficit and
inflation targets were also a critical component of the loan to Hungary in November 2008.
Watkins, supra note 264, at 4. The IMFs polices toward developing countries differ from its
policies toward developed countries. Id.
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crisis. 266 The nature of the conditions attached to the loans symbolizes
the unresponsiveness and systematic inability of the IMF to avoid the
historic cyclical pattern of providing loans to those without the
sufficient financial and economic systems set in place to provide for
timely repayment, the cost of which has been nothing less than a
country's sovereignty. 267
IV. OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE BWIS
A. Challenge of the Monterrey Consensus
In 2002, the BWis conjured a recipe of false hope through their
participation in and subsequent lack of commitment to the Monterrey
Consensus ("Consensus"). 268 Prior to the Consensus, the World Bank
was criticized because many of its low-interest loans went to corrupt
governments who were not held responsible when no accounting could
be given for the money. 269 The IMF was criticized for its expensive
rescue operations, and for giving too little attention to improving
financial structures in developing countries. 270
266. See PAUL BLUSTEfN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 382 (Pub.Affairs) (2003) (suggesting
that instead of attaching conditions, loans should only go to countries that pre-qualify by
adhering to certain banking standards); see also infra Part IV.
267. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 84 (proposing countercyclical lending to countries
in distress in order to stabilize the suffering economies); see id. (stating how lending at
higher rates in a cyclical manner will infringe upon the economic recovery of the nation).
The policies pushed by the international financial institutions are now seen as having
contributed to the lack in confidence in these institutions and the loan conditionalities they
imposed. See id. at 110.
268. Editorial, Forging the Monterrey Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, § 4 at
14 (explaining criticisms aimed at the World Bank and other international development
bodies because the aid doled out by those institutions to countries made no great progress in
those countries at eliminating poverty) [hereinafter Forging the Monterrey Consensus]; see
Susanne Soederberg, Recasting Neoliberal Dominance in the Global South? A Critique of
the Monterrey Consensus, ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POL., Vol. 30, No. 3, 325 (JulySept. 2005) (explaining how the World Bank found a seventy-three percent failure rate in
Africa); see also supra (explaining the Monterrey Consensus conference). The Monterrey
Consensus set a priority for combating corruption at all levels, reaffirmed at the Doha
Conference. See Draft Outcome Document on the Follow-up International Conference on

Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus,
Submitted by the President of the General Assembly in Accordance with General Assembly
Resolution 62/187: Doha Outcome Document on Reviewing the Implementation of the
Monterrey
Consensus,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Jul.
28,
2008),
available at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/draftoutcome/Draft:OutcomeDoc_ English.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 20 l 3)[hereinafter General Assembly Resolution 62/187].
269. Forging the Monterrey Consensus, supra note 268.
270. See General Assembly Resolution 55/2, Monterrey Consensus (Mar. 22, 2002),
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The Consensus sought to establish a common ground for
developed and developing countries to converge in an effort to stabilize
and grow the global economy in pursuit of the MDG's development
objectives. 271 The atmosphere leading into Monterrey was built upon
272
several factors: the 1997 economic crisis in South East Asia;
international financial institutions ("IFis") were not acting as neutral
and independent public authorities; the Consensus' precursor, the
Washington Consensus, 273 was "not solely political in nature, but had its
roots in the changing nature of the world economy;" 274 and "growing

reprinted in Financing/or Development: Building on Monterrey, UNITED NATIONS 9 (2002),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/Building%20on%20Monterrey.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Building on Monterrey]. As a result, the IMF attempted
reorganization in its fight against poverty with lowering demands for loan approval. Id.; see
M.L. NARASAIAH, MICROCREDIT AND RURAL POVERTY 103----04 (Discovery Publ'g House)
(2006) (explaining that structural- adjustment programs were replaced by PovertyReduction Strategy Papers).
271. The Consensus contains six thematic "chapters" for action, including one devoted
to external-debt-relief. See Building on Monterrey, supra note 270, at VII- X.
272. See id.; Akila Weerapana, Lecture 23: The IMF and Its Critics, Spring 2003 &
at
available
WELLESLEY,
2004,
http://www.wellesley.edu/Economics/weerapana/econ213/econ213pdf/lect213-23.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013). Following the East Asia crisis, the IMF imposed conditions on the
Indonesian government to get fiscal spending under control. Id. Rather than using financial
aid to put an end to widespread corruption, the Indonesian government was forced to
remove food and fuel subsidies, a blow to the poor in Jakarta. Id. The IMF was further
criticized for allowing devaluation to occur, stating this was the catalyst to the crisis. Id.
The IMF should be helping countries defend their currencies, rather than devaluing them.
Id. The IMF required high interest rates in exchange for bailouts. Weerapana, supra; see
Paul Blustein, World Bank Turns Up Criticism of the IMF, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 1998),
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43 528.html (last
visited on Oct. 21, 2013). Although the institutions usually work in tandem, the World
Bank lending for long-term and the IMF short-term relief, this rift marked a growing
separation between Europe and the United States of America. See General Assembly
Resolution 62/18, supra note 268.
273. Soederberg, supra note 268 (explaining the Washington Consensus as the neoliberalistic policy of the IFis, such as the IMF and World Bank, that believed political and
social problems should not be solved through state intervention and instead through marketbased mechanisms).
274. See Soederberg, supra note 268 (discussing three caveats leading to the
Monterrey consensus). The heavily skewed IMF voting power and United States
dominance within the World Bank's standby capital were examples of how IFis are not
natural and independent authorities. Id. The roots of the Washington consensus being in
the changing nature of the economy meant that policies were created as a reaction to the
crisis of overproduction and thus there was a growing dependence of corporations,
governments, and consumers on debt financing. Id. Finally, the policies of the Bush
administration led to overproduction because performance-based grants were intrinsically
tied to the efforts to maintain U.S. competitiveness and dominant position in the world
economy. Id. Thus, tax cuts and government spending, coupled with a fear of public
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protectionism, unilateralism, and fiscal overrun pursued by the Bush
administration" created a crisis of overproduction, which was not
simply a reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. 275
Preparation for the Consensus spanned four years of "patient
consensus-building work. " 276 By the end of the fourth preparatory
meeting for the Monterrey Conference, all participants endorsed the
Monterrey Consensus. 277 The Zedillo report, 278 prepared by a panel of
backlash by policymakers wary of criticizing the administration's budget, led to a rise in
debt levels. Id
275. Calls Heard for Increased Aid to Reduce Poverty at Monterrey Conference on
Development Financing, UNITED NATIONS, Mar. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.un.org/ffd/pressrel/2lc.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (explaining how
September 11 tore down the invisible wall dividing rich and poor worldwide) [hereinafter
Calls Heard for Aid]. The Monterrey Conference should serve to rebuild confidence lost in
the international economy and system as a result of 9/11/01 events. See id.; Group of 77
Plays Key Role in Monterrey Consensus on FFD, G77, available at
http://www.g77.org/news/monterrey.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Group of
77]. "Greater confidence should lead to higher investments and stronger recovery as well as
concrete measures in international trade and better prices for primary commodities. " Group
of 77, supra. Since then, re-development in the world's poorest societies as taken on a sense
of urgency because "although not a direct cause of terrorism, 'poverty breeds frustration and
resentment ... particularly in those countries in which poverty is coupled with a lack of
political rights and basic freedoms."' Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 276; see Lan Cao,
Cultural Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 363 (2007) (citing Colin Powell, No Country Left
Behind, FOREIGN PoL'Y Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 30); see also Soederberg, supra note 268
(discussing three caveats leading to the Monterrey consensus). The heavily skewed IMF
voting power and United States dominance within the World Bank's standby capital were
examples of how IFis are not natural and independent authorities. Calls Heard for Aid,
supra. The roots of the Washington consensus being in the changing nature of the economy
meant that policies were created as a reaction to the crisis of overproduction and thus there
was a growing dependence of corporations, governments, and consumers on debt financing.
Id. Finally, the policies of the Bush administration led to overproduction because
performance-based grants were intrinsically tied to the efforts to maintain U.S.
competitiveness and dominant position in the world economy. Id. Thus, tax cuts and
government spending, coupled with a fear of public backlash by policymakers wary of
criticizing the administration's budget, led to a rise in debt levels. Id.
276. Building on Monterrey, supra note 270, at vii. The Paris Club has since become
a highly- popular bilateral institution supplying multiple avenues of debt relief to many lowSee
Club
de
Paris,
available
at
income
developing
countries.
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Under most administrations, a
common thread has been the identification and focus on enhancing long- term development
goals. See JOHN R. ERIKSSON, TOWARD COUNTRY- LED DEVELOPMENT: A MULTI- PARTNER
EVALUATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 25 (2003). Nations were
encouraged to lead a strong commitment and ownership of national strategies. Id.
277. See Ernesto Zedillo, Report of the High- Level Panel on Financing for
Development, U.N., available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2013) [hereinafter "Zedillo Report"]. The MDGs can only be reached if developed
countries increased aid by $50 dollars per year. Id.
278. Barbara Crossette, No Headline, N.Y. TIMES, July l, 2001 at 6 (discussing the
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the world's leading financial and development experts, 279 was reviewed
by the preparatory committee and indicated that restructuring the
international financial architecture was a crucial issue in attaining the
MDGs. 280
External-debt relief, in addition to other goals and challenges of
financing for development, was not a novel idea to the heads of State
and Government at the international conference 281 in Monterrey,
Mexico. 282 External debt damaged countries by consuming resources
that could be used for public services and poverty eradication. 283 Thus,
the focal point of the development committee's meeting at Monterrey
was ensuring commitment to lifting more people from poverty and
allowing them to reap benefits associated with globalization and
economic development. 284 The challenging plan set forth by the BWis
recommendations put forth in the Zedillo report as setting an objective of free trade to take
place between industrial and developing countries, as it already had between industrial
countries). See Zedillo Report, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-l 000.pdf (last
visited Oct. 30, 2013) (describing the key issues in the Zedillo Report, which include
mobilizing domestic financial resources, foreign investment, trade, official development
assistant (ODA), external debt and the international financial architecture); see also World
Bank and IMF Roles Debated at Development Finance Summit, available at
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-16170 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) [ hereinafter
Roles Debated].
279. Roles Debated, supra note 278.
280. See Development Finance Summit a Fiasco: Say Campaigners, BRETTON Wooos
PROJECT (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art- 16172 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Development Finance Summit].
281. The summit marked the culmination of four years of "patient consensus-building
work." See Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation,
ALLB USINESS, available at http://www. al lbusiness.com/accounting/debt/883 63 9-1. html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013).
282. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at vii (explaining that the heads of
State and Government met March 18- 22, 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico to discuss and finalize
implementation of the Consensus).
283. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 25. "We must do our utmost to
ensure that people at the local level understand this process, are engaged, and have the
means to take advantage of its opportunities." Id. Criticism at the NGO Global forum
stated "Monterrey ... is an example of the negative impacts of globalization on people,
particularly the high social costs of production of the large-scale enterprises." Id. at 307.
Rather than focusing on privatization and neo- liberal tactics, which incur substantial microeconomic harms, the focus should be on developing world- wide economy based on human
rights and environmental protections. See id.
284. See Trevor Manuel, Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for
Development (Mar. 18, 2002), http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/cdcE.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2013); see also Inclusive Globalization, United Nations Development Program on
Poverty Reduction, available at http://www.undp.org/poverty/inclglob.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2013) [hereinafter Inclusive Globalization]. Chairman Manuel noted that although the
consensus for cooperation between developed and developing countries were strong, so was
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involved commandeering globalization to advance the goal of poverty
Chairman Trevor Manuel stated that "[r ]eform of
reduction. 285
international financial governance is critical to ensuring developing
countries benefit from globalization through participation. " 286
Challenges in achieving debt-relief changed institution objectives from
"achieving a permanent exit from debt rescheduling ... to removing the
debt overhang within a reasonable time and providing a base from
which to achieve debt sustainability." 287
Since halving poverty was the cornerstone of the MDGs, 288 the
primary focus in formulating the Consensus was to address the
commonly occurring "shortfalls in resources required to achieve the
internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in
the United Nations Millennium Declaration (the "Declaration")." 289 At
the conference, the "performance-driven aid" 290 initiative was heavily
supported through the two-tiered lending structure of the Highly
the risk of failing to implement the Consensus. Id. The BWis envision globalization as the
solution to poverty, and their neo- liberal practices as its antidote. See Joseph Yu, Has
Globalization
eased
global
poverty?,
CHOIKE.ORG,
Aug.
2005,
http://www.choike.org/nuevo_ eng/informes/3316.html.
The BWis claim ineffective
integration of low- income countries rather than globalization has caused the onslaught of
global poverty. See id. "Although globalization brought overall net benefits and was also
contributing to poverty reduction, its growth effects were unequally distributed, and so far it
had contributed little to greater gender equality. As a result, progress towards the
Millennium Development Goals differed considerably across regions and countries." Id.;
see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Accra, Ghana, Apr. 20- 24,
2008, Globalization, Development, and Poverty Reduction- Their Social and Gender
Dimensions, U.N. Doc. TD/L.405, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdl405_en.pdf.
285. Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for Development, supra
note 284;see also Inclusive Globalization, supra note 284; Poverty Reduction, UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.org/poverty/inclglob.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2013).
286. Id. See A. GESKE DIJKSTRA, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF 107
(2007).
287. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275.
288. Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for
UNITED
NATIONS
(2002),
available
at
Development,
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013)
[hereinafter International Conference on Financing and Development].
289. Sophie Smith & Anna Triponel, Development Goals and Indicators: Education

as a Lynchpin for Development: Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of
Education for All - Fast Track Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & PoL'Y 8, 8
(2005) ( "international development aid should follow and support clear evidence of
commitment to reform and improvement on the part of the recipient country").
290. See Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013); see also The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, THE WORLD
BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/XLE8KKLEXO (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
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Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (the "HIPC"). 291 The Consensus also
called for international financial institutions and bilateral agencies to
"scale-up."292 The main emphasis was "broadening and strengthening
the role of developing countries in international economic decisionmaking and norm setting. " 293
Crucial to this objective was a financial structure and system that
could be beneficial, purposeful, and feasible in facilitating the stated
21st century values. 29 The Consensus sought the formulation of a "new
partnership between developed and developing countries,"295 fueled by
the fundamental values expressed in the Declaration. 296 It promoted the
values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and
shared responsibility 97• as essential for survival in the 21st century
international arena.
"Sustainable debt financing is an important element for mobilizing
resources for public and private investment. " 298 The Consensus
promoted the idea of accountability, stating "[ d]ebtor and creditor
countries should be mutually responsibility for preventing and resolving
un-sustainable debt situations. " 2 9 The BWis' critical role, in addition
to facilitating lending venues, was to provide "technical assistance for
external debt management and debt tracking. " 300
Several opinions regarding the facilitation of worldwide debt

291. Id.
292. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 3.
293. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th
49, at 4, U.N. Doc. N55/49 (2000), available at
Sess., Supp. No.
Millennium
[hereinafter
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm
Declaration]. Development and poverty eradication "depends on good governance at the
international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems." Id.
"We are committed to an open, equitable, rule- based, predictable and non- discriminatory
multilateral trading and financial system." Id.
294. International Conference on Financing and Development, supra note 288.
295. Millennium Declaration, supra note 293. The declaratiO'll was a re- affirmation of
the original charter of the United Nations. See id. In addition to the original principles of
human dignity, equality, and equity, the Millennium Declaration sought to expand their
perspective to ascertain the needs of a developing global economy. See id.
296. See Millennium Declaration, supra note 293. Responsibility for managing
worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and
security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised
multilaterally. Id. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world,
the United Nations must play the central role. Id.
297. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 4.
298. Id. at 9.
299. Id. at 219.
300. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

132

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Failure to Achieve Integral Development

125

reduction were presented at the Consensus. 301 The developed nations
and developing countries held differing views on how debt should be
reduced. Norway's Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik informed
delegates that the Norwegian government planned to increase official
development assistance from .92% to 1% of GDP by 2005, advance
policy coherence, and forgive all debts to countries under the HIPC. 302
Most donor countries only provided 0.22% of GDP, with only five
countries reaching the 0.70% target. 303 Former U.S. President George
W. Bush proposed, "development resources should be distributed fifty
percent for grants and fifty percent for loans." 304 The approach to
cancellation of debts expressed by NGOs attending the conference was
heavily ignored. 305
Developing countries held strong views about how poverty
reduction should have been accomplished. 306 Small island nations
301. See id
302. See id. By the rate at which it was improving at the time of the conference, the
ODA would only reach 0.7% in 2032. See id The European Union was only contributing
0.27%, pledging to increase its contribution to 0.33% at the EU Barcelona Summit. See id.;
see Small Steps Towards More Development Aid: Financing for Development Conference
Finishes in Monterrey, OUTREACH 2002 (Mar. 25, 2002), available at
www.earthsummit2002.org/es/newsletter/Issue%2020.rtf.
303. See Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275. Proposed increase in development
assistance by the United States was projected to reach "a $5 Billion annual increase over
current levels." Id see BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 113; see also Stephen
Marks, U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights: The Human Right to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 156- 57 (2004) (discussing Bush's speech
at Monterrey). Bush said that developed nations had duties to share wealth and encourage
sources that produce wealth such as economic freedom, human rights, rule of law, and
political liberty. Id.
304. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 308. "[A] fair and transparent
process ofarbitration" should be used to cancel "external debt of countries of the south." Id
"All forms of conditionality should be eliminated, such as tied aid, and food aid, which
undermines the productive capacity, and food security of countries." Id
305. See World Economic Outlook: Database
WEO Groups and Aggregates
Information,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND
(Oct.
2009),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/groups.htm#oem
(listing
emerging and developing economies as well as advanced economies) (last visited Oct. 15,
2013).
306. Gaston Browne, Minister of Planning Implementation and Pub. Serv. Affairs of
Ant. & Barb., Statement at the International Conference on Finance for Development, (Mar.
22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/aabE.htm (explaining how
developing countries wanted to make sure the Consensus would catapult developed
countries into action instead of being just another "talk shop") (last visited Oct. 15, 2013);
see Eduardo Duhalde, President of the Arg., Statement at International Conference on
available
at
Financing
for
Development
(Mar.
21,
2002),
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/argentinaE.htm (stating: "the gap between many emerging
economies and developed countries has not been reduced[,] and [o]n the contrary, it seems
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pushed for the international community to expand the HIPC. 307 African
developing countries stressed that since most of their economies were
based on exporting, the deterioration of trade had a negative impact on
the balance of payments and thus, economic growth. 308 Donald
Kaberuka, Rwanda's Minister for Financing and Economic Planning,
stressed that aid alone would not eliminate poverty and that there should
be greater integration of poor countries into world-wide trade and
investment. 309
To achieve the development objectives, including the MDGs, the
U.N. members and the representatives from the BWis addressed six
areas of financing for development that ultimately would become
known as the Monterrey Consensus: (1) the mobilization of domestic
financial resources for development; 310 (2) the mobilization of
international resources for development through foreign direct
deeper day by day") (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
307. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2007, 11, 13 (2007)
(explaining that small island developing nations have special needs due to their particularly
difficult geographic constraints, such as a small tax base, lack of natural resources, lack of
access to ODA, substantially reduced foreign direct investment flows, and a lack of access
to capital markets; several of these needs were addressed through the Programme of Action
for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the 22nd special
session of the General Assembly).
308. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275 (discussing how creating sound
environments, frameworks for investment, structural and government reforms, and
transparency are all primary responsibilities of developing countries and aid should be
secondary).
309. Altai Efendiev, Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Statement to the International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey,
Mexico (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/azerbaijanE.htm.
Handling and managing the expected massive inflows of resources in a most
efficient way, transform potentially high growth into sustainable development is one
of the major challenges ... building up adequate institutional infrastructure,
enhancing institutional capacities, introducing good-governance practices, pursuing
radical structural and administrative reforms, implementing poverty reduction
strategy, SME and non-oil sector development are ... the areas where the
international assistance and expertise is most needed.
Id.
310. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 4. "In our common pursuit of
growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to ensure
the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private,
sustaining adequate levels of productive investment and increasing human capacity." Id.
"An enabling domestic environment is vital for mobilizing domestic resources, increasing
productivity, reducing capital flight, encouraging the private sector, and attracting and
making effective use of international investment and assistance." Id. "We recognize the
need to strengthen and develop the domestic financial sector, by encouraging the orderly
development of capital markets ... addressing development financing needs, including the
insurance sector and debt and equity markets." Id.
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investment and other private flows; 311 (3) international trade as an
engine for development; 312 (4) increasing international financial and
technical cooperation for development; 313 (5) external debt; 314 and (6)
addressing systemic issues, including enhancement of the coherence and
consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems
in support of development. 315 The ability of the BWis to contribute in
311. See BUILDfNG ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 5. "We will support new
public/private sector financing mechanisms, both debt and equity for developing countries
and countries with economies in transition." Id. at 6. See Abdel H. Bouab, Comment,
Financing for Development, the Monterrey Consensus: Achievements and Prospects,
26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2004). "Both domestic and international conditions are
necessary to facilitate direct investment flows to Least Developed Countries ('LDCs')." Id.;
see U.S.A. Gov't Submission, Review of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development Feb. 15, 2008 Review Session on Mobilizing International Resources for
Development: Foreign Direct Investment and Other Private Flows, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/chapter2/USA_submission.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2013)
(stating each country is primarily responsible for maintaining its own economic
environment and international institution support should be considered secondary).
Although the benefits of foreign direct investment include "increase in employment,
technological spill-overs, higher public revenue, and a positive impact on growth ... such
benefits may be off- set by negative long- term balance- of- payments effects." Id.; see
David Woodward, Foreign Direct Investment for Development?, G- 24,l,
http://www.g24.org/PolicyBriefs/pbno23.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
"A clear
distinction needs to be made between maximizing FDI flows and maximizing their
contribution to development" in order to make effective use of funds. Id. at 2.
312. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 6. Trade is the single most
important external source of development financing. See id. "We urge international
financial institutions, including regional development banks, to continue to support projects
that promote sub- regional and regional integration among developing countries and
countries with economies in transition ... we invite multilateral and bilateral financial and
development institutions to expand and coordinate their efforts." Id. at 7; see Bouab, supra
note 311, at 362.
313. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 8. "We recognize that a
substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are
to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those
contained in the Millennium Declaration." Id. "There is a need for the multilateral ...
development institutions to intensify efforts to . . . enhance the absorptive capacity and
financial management of the recipient countries ... [and] enhance recipient countries' input
into and ownership of the design, including procurement, of technical assistance programs."
Id.; see Bouab, supra note 311, at 363.
314. See BUILDfNG ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 9. "External debt relief can
play a key role in liberating resources that can then be directed towards activities consistent
with attaining sustainable growth and development." Id.
315. Id. at 10; see Bouab, supra note 311, at 365; UNITED NATIONS ECON. AND Soc.
COUNCIL, ECON. AND Soc. COMM'N FOR ASIA AND THE PAC., Date, Venue and Theme Topic
of
the
Commission,
available
at
for
the
Sixty-First
Session
http://www.unescap.org/60/E/El327e.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). Commentators have
suggested these six themes can actually be merged into four: (a) bringing about a substantial
increase in the volume and effectiveness of foreign resource flows (private, bilateral, and
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these areas, and particularly the sixth one which touches precisely on
economic governance, was crucial to their viability. 316
With public skepticism looming, 317 early criticisms regarding
Monterrey were that it did not call for independent external evaluations
of the performance of either the World Bank or the IMF, 318 and few
initiatives were substantially generated to achieve the MDGs. 319
Furthermore, insufficient attention was given to reforming the
international financial institutions regarding composition and decisionmaking process of the executive boards in dealing with debt relief. 320 In

multilateral) in support of development, with a clear focus on poverty eradication; (b)
setting up a fair, transparent, and ethical procedure and institutional framework for resolving
external debt problems; (c) improving global economic governance to make it more
participatory and accountable to a broader community of nations; and (d) creating an
international trading environment that is more supportive of growth, in general, and the
development of the poor, in particular. Id.; see Innamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescue,
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from International
Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT'LCOMP. L. REv. 219, 243-44 (2004).
316. See Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), THE MONTERREY
CONSENSUS SIX YEARS LATER AND FfNANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE
CARIBBEAN
9
(June
20,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sela.org/DB/ricsela/EDOCS/SRed/2008/06/T023600002872-0Monterrey_Consensus_six_years_later_and_financing_ for_ development_in_LAC. pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013 ). "A real reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions is necessary ...
[t]he boards of directors of these institutions must be restructured so as to increase the
number of seats for least developed countries." Id. at 23. Others have stated the UN, rather
than the BWis should take charge in restructuring worldwide finances. Id.; see Rbisso, UN
Only Legitimate Body to Reform Financial System, IFIWATCH.NET (Nov. 22, 2008),
available at http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/26509 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
317. See Development Finance Summit, supra note 280 (explaining the skepticism as
the product of the Monterrey Consensus being drafted in preparatory committees, and not
being subject to any further negotiations). Thus, the predetermined nature of the
Conference caused many civil society organizations to question their own, what was then,
upcoming participation in the Conference. Id.
318. Assessment of the FjD Outcome Paper and Proposed Next Steps, BRETTON
WOODS PROJECT (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art16171 [hereinafter Assessment of the FjD]; see Independent Evaluations Office, available at
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/ieohome.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter IEO]
(discussing the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office ("IEO")). The IEO was established in
2001 "to conduct independent and objective evaluations of Fund policies and activities." Id.
The IEO is fully independent of IMF management and operates at arm's length from the
Executive Directors. Id. The IEO's mission is to "[e]nhance the learning culture within the
Fund, [s]trengthen the Fund's external credibility, [p]romote greater understanding of the
work of the fund, and [s]upport institutional governance and oversight." Id.
319. Development Finance Summit, supra note 280 (explaining that civil society
groups organized Foro Global, ahead of the Conference, to challenge the Monterrey
Consensus). The Consensus was chastised for failing to propose any new ways to mobilize
finances toward achieving the MDGs. Id.
320. Assessment of the FJD, supra note 318.
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response to criticisms, IMF Managing Director, Horst Koehler,
proclaimed the underlying stigma of the new plan: "nothing will work
without good governance." 3 1 Under the HIPC, the IMF would
contribute rehabilitation and stimulus loans once the poor countries took
certain measures in evaluating and formulating their domestic
policies. 322 Priorities included: trade; a standard of 0.7% GNP for debt
assistance; debt relief; and institutional capacity. 323
With twenty-five years of failed structural adjustment programs for
poverty reduction and the inability to assist major countries out of
poverty crisis, 324 whether the IMF is truly in a position to command the
correct administration of such funds towards developing counties is at
issue. However, it is fair to recognize, given the traditional opposition
321. Horst Koehler, Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, Introductory Remarks at the
International Conference on Financing for Development (Mar. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/imfE.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (stating poor
countries should be ready to confront responsibility to their people before the international
community can step in to bail them out); Horst Kohler: Biographical Iriformation, INT'L
MONETARY FUND, available at, http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013). Horst Kohler served as Germany's Deputy Minister of Finance from
1990 to 1993. Horst Kohler: Biographical Iriformation, INT' L MONETARY FUND, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). During that
time, he led negotiations on behalf of the German government on the Maastricht treaty. Id.
He was President of the German Savings Bank Association from 1993 to 1998, and in
September 1998, he was appointed President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Id. From May 2000 to March 2004 Kohler served as the Managing Director
of the International Monetary Fund. Id.
322. Horst Kohler: Biographical Information, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); see Rick
Rowden, A World of Debt: Why "Debt Relief" has Failed to Liberate Poor Countries, AM.
PROSPECT,
July
1,
2001,
at
29,
available
at
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Reforming_System/World_of_Debt.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2013) (criticizing the HIPC initiative). Although the HIPC framework invites
NGOs and civic groups to consult with governments, there are not any clear guidelines as to
how a legitimate NGO can be identified. Id. Governments in some countries had the ability
to handpick who was allowed to participate in the poverty reduction process. Id. Legitimate
NGOs have called this process a joke. Id.
323. Rowden, supra note 322. Even the IMF doubted its capacity to provide assistance
to poor countries. Id. A draft resolution by the economic and financial committee, in a
follow- up meeting to the Monterrey Consensus held in 2005, urged for time tables to stage
increments for developed countries to achieve 0.7% GDP, reaching 0.5% by 2010. See Press
Release, United Nations, Second Comm. Approves Draft Resolution Underlying Need to
Improve Commitments of Monterrey Consensus, GA/EF/3141 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at
http://www. unis. unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/gaef3 l 4 l .html (last visited Oct. 21,
2013).
324. IMF Support for Low-Income Countries, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 30,
2013), available at,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter
IMF and Poor Countries] .
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of industrial countries to discuss international financial and monetary
matters in a UN setting, the Monterrey Conference, and the resulting
Consensus, constituted an unprecedented blueprint for action that would
bring the Bretton Woods agencies, historically dominated just by
Finance Ministries, into much closer touch with broader political
decision makers.
B. The Challenge of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

In response to criticism of their development approach and
structural-adjustment policies, the BWis ended an eleven-year
productivity drought with the formation of the HIPC. 325 With its
establishment in 1996 and doubling in 1999, the HIPC provides
comprehensive debt-relief 326
assistance to countries qualified to receive
aid from the International Development Association (the "IDA"). 327 To
eliminate poverty, the mission was to promote local government
spending on public services such as healthcare and education, and for
relief to include multi-lateral creditors, such as the IMF and World
Bank. 328 Unfortunately, commentators correctly predicted real debt
relief provided by the HIPC would be substantially lower than

325.
BARBARA P. THOMAS-SLAYTER, SOUTHERN EXPOSURE: INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2003) (discussing
how the HIPC doubled through the Enhanced HIPC Initiative). For the World Bank's
description of the HIPC and links to the HIPC At- A- Glance Guide and Status of
Implementation see (HIPC) The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, THE
WORLD BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/85B908KVEO (last visited Oct. 22,
2013).
326. LEONIE F. GUDER, THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEBT RELIEF BY INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE HIPC INITIATIVE 2 (2009)
(defining debt relief as "a restructuring of debt that contains an element of forgiveness or
reduction, thus relieving the overall debt burden of a country"). Although providing relief,
as opposed to extending loans, is a drastic tum from concessional lending structures of the
past, the HIPC conditions ultimately reveal similar development goals. Id. at 28- 29. In
addition to the World Bank and IMF, there are eighteen lenders affiliated with the HIPC.
See id. at 48. The debts relieved are "official debts" because they are owed by governments
or state- owned enterprises. Id. Half of the debt relief will be provided by bilateral funding
and the other cancelled by the BWis. Id. at 49.
327. THOMAS- SLAYTER, supra note 325, at 175 (discussing that qualification includes
an unsustainable debt burden, limited exports, low foreign currency reserves, and other
limited resources). Of the qualified countries, eighty percent are in Africa. Id.; see also Part
IV for regional case studies involving countries which qualify for the HIPC.
328. Sanjee Gupta et al., Bulletin of the World Health Organization, SCIELO PUBLIC
HEALTH, available at http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_ arttext&pid=S004296862002000200011 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (discussing fiscal policy issues related to
debt relief in twenty- three countries that reached their decision point under the HIPC
framework).
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anticipated. 329
The BWis began the HIPC initiative for the purpose of assisting
poor countries that were sustaining potentially unmanageable amounts
of debt. 330 The World Bank administers a trust fund, separate from its
own resources, financed and administered by external donors, allowing
for the leveraging of poverty-reduction programs by providing
expanding development collaboration, including technical assistance,
advisory services, debt relief, and co-financing. 331 In response to harsh
criticism of the qualifying criteria for the original HIPC, the IMF
initiated and advanced a version of the Initiative in 1999. 332
In 2004, the World Bank stated: "the enhanced HIPC initiative
provides an opportunity to strengthen the economic prospects and
poverty reduction efforts of its beneficiary countries." 333 Nevertheless,
329. Daniel Cohen, The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises 5 (OECD Dev.
Centre, Working Paper No. 166, 2000). Furthermore, the G-7 Leaders have expressed doubt
stating:
[N]ot all creditors have agreed to reduce their HIPC debts; the expected financing
needs for the initiative have not been met, and as a result of weaker growth and
export commodity prices, a number of countries could be at risk of not having
sustainable debt loads at the Completion Point.
G-7 Leaders at Kananaskis Summit, supra. The leaders encouraged the BWis to seek
assistance from both regional and multilateral development institutions. Id. Furthermore,
they requested the institutions seek additional assistance and availability from internal
resources. Id. The leaders of the G-8 committed to contribute $1 billion to the initiative.
Id.
330. See Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Debt Relief Under HIPC]; see also Eugenia McGill,
Poverty and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent Approach?, 27 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 380 (2004) ("The initiative was the result of a civil- society
campaign for meaningful external debt relief to free up scarce financial resources to address
HIV/AIDS and other social development needs.").
331. John R. Crook, United States Supports G- 7 Decisions to Reduce Debt Burden of
Poor Countries, Including Those Affected by December 2004 Tsunamis, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L.
500, 501 (2005); Bonnie D. Jenkins, et. al., International Institutions, 37 INT'L LAW. 609
(2003). The United States has repeatedly encouraged other bilateral creditors to follow it on
providing 100 percent loan forgiveness for MDB soft loans to the HIPCs. Id.
332. Robin Goldberg, Financing Developments and the Desperate Need for Debt
Relief, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 969, 969 (2001 ); Elizabeth Justice, The African Union:
Building A Dream to Facilitate Trade, Development, and Debt Relief, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 127, 130-31 (2003) (explaining that at its inception in 1996, only 5 countries
qualified for the HIPC).
333. Bouab, supra note 311, at 365. "When default becomes inescapable, the debts
that governments cannot pay are almost always owed in foreign currency ... an inability to
stay current on payments on external debt causes deep economic trauma." Barry Herman,
Doing the Right Thing: Dealing with Developing Country Sovereign Debt, 32 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 773, 775 (2007). During the time building up to the Monterrey Consensus,

Published by SURFACE, 2013

139

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

132

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

as of 2009, of the two trillion dollars owed by developing countries,
about $250 billion is owed by nations that were given "low income"
status. 334 Critics claim that although the program has good intentions,
the program is inadequate because it does not force debtor nations to
adequately reduce poverty or provide basic health care and education
for their citizens. 33 Irrespective of these shortcomings, budget cuts are
often incurred in these areas to meet stringent demands for receiving
debt relief. 336
Currently, thirty-eight states are recognized as HIPC qualified. 337
The initiative provides low-interest loans and debt relief to reduce
external debt payments and achieve levels sustainable for countries to
reach "completion point." 338 Factors for considering whether a country

fifty- six countries had "arrearages in their foreign debt payments or rescheduled their debtservicing obligations . .. accounting for one- fifth of world's population, over one billion
people, but less than six percent of world's gross product." Id. at 776. Middle- income
countries such as Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Iraq have also restructured debts
they could no longer service. See id. "While the IMF has usually assumed the role of
international arbiter of how much relief, new financing, and policy reform a country needs
to overcome its debt crisis, it has been widely accused of systematically underestimating the
amount of relief needed." Id. at 779. There may be systematic bias for countries following
IMF policy advice. See id.
334. David Ricksecker, What is the HIPC Initiative?, UNIV. OF IOWA CTR. FOR INT' L
at
available
2006),
21 ,
(Sept.
DEV.
AND
FIN.
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/faq_docs/HIPC.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2013)
(describing how without major debt reduction, poor income countries are trapped and stuck
making endless interest payments on debts). Since inception of the initiative, Guyana is the
only country that has successfully been removed from the list of heavily indebted poor
countries. See DIJKSTRA, supra note 286, at 107. The problem with achieving sustainability
through the HIPC is evident in its qualification methods: almost ten countries have not even
reached the decision point and eight more have not reached completion. See id.
335. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine:
The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 59 (2007).
336. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATIONS AND PROSPECTS 77 (2009),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2009files/wesp2009.pdf (last visited
Oct. 22, 2013). This would require the reduction in poverty to mirror the release of
government-subsidized programs. Id.
33 7. INT' L MONETARY FUND, F ACTSHEET- DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED
at
available
2013),
1,
(Oct.
INITIATIVE
(HIPC)
COUNTRIES
POOR
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). See
Dickerson, supra note 335, at 59 (explaining that qualification requires eligible nations to
have a current track record of satisfactory performance under a Poverty Reduction Strategy,
an IMF program, or an interim PRS in place). An agreed plan must also be in place to clear
any outstanding debts to foreign creditors. Id.
338. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 337 (describing the two-step process
which countries must follow for HIPC Initiative assistance). The completion point is the
second and final step where, upon completion, a country is allowed to receive its full debt
relief committed at decision point. Id.
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is heavily indebted include "a nation's total outstanding debt relative to
exports and GDP, as opposed to rations of debt service expenses to
Furthermore, qualification is conditional
government revenues." 3
upon the governments' abilities to attain a range of economic
management and performance targets as set and agreed upon with either
the World Bank or the IMF. 340
As the 'gatekeeper' for development assistance, the IMF requires
HIPC countries to prepare and submit Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (the "PRSPs") for approval, prior to receiving loans or debt
relief. 341 However, this type of loan-bargaining structure often ends up
one-sided, placing the IMF in a totalitarian position regarding budget
cuts in the debtor countries, 342 and thereby limiting availability of
339. See Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court,
24 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 499, 504 (2006). These standards "penalize countries with: (i) low
government tax revenues relative to exports or GDP; and/or (ii) high debt service relative to
total outstanding debt." Id. at 517.
340. See Ambrose, supra note 281, at 272 ("[Governments] with questionable
creditworthiness will only be considered eligible for grants, loans, or credits once the IMF
has signaled its approval of the government's economic program.").
341. See Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Fact Sheet, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Oct.
4, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp#H. PRSPs are prepared by member
countries (of the BWls) and updated every three years. Id. PRSPs include annual progress
reports, a description of macro and micro- economic policies and programs for promotion of
growth and reduction of poverty. Id. Countries also provide interim PRSPs through the
process of finalizing the fully-developed PRSPs. See id. See also Lisa Philipps & Miranda
Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic Laws, and the Politics of Budgets,
34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 817- 21 (2009) (explaining several accountability mechanisms,
including PRSPs, that country donors have used to help strengthen and manage public
finances and fiscal policy in aid- recipient countries). The PRSPs are meant to increase focus
on poverty reduction while providing stronger collaboration between the country and the
financing institutions. Id. More than sixty-six countries completed PRSPs between 2000
and March 2009. Id.
342. See Dickerson, supra note 335, at 56. "Some members of the financial
community . . . contend that IMF lending creates a moral- hazard problem . . . knowingly
lending to repressive regimes who illegally divert the loan process or use the funds in ways
that affirmatively harm the countries' citizens." Id. Contrary to the effects of its
implementation, the PRSPs were supposed to grant governments greater influence in
"tripartite" discussions for loan forgiveness and redevelopment. MARC DARROW, BETWEEN
LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 289 (2006). This allows for the IMF and World Bank
policy makers to take advantage of the developing countries' weakness, diverting
government attention regarding obligations from citizens to the institutions. Id.; see Fergus
MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights
and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4. JO on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 527, 532- 33 (2002); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and the IMF
Relationship- Quo Vadis, 35 INT'L LAW. 3549 (2001). However, it is been assessed most
developing countries may not have the institutional capacity to conduct the necessary public
consultations required for approval of a PRSP. Id.; see Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating

Published by SURFACE, 2013

141

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

134

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41:1

resources for public services. 343 While urging priority in repayment of
debts, the IMF urges low-income countries to adopt potentially
cataclysmic policies. 344
C. The Challenge of the G-20

The Group of Twenty, otherwise known as G-20, is of a group of
finance ministers and central bank governors from countries across the
world initially dedicated to discussing and coordinating policies related
to the stabilization and regulation of global financial markets, but which
has recently broadened its agenda to include more general global
345
Established as a response to the
economic governance issues.
financial crises of the late 1990s,346 the G-20 consists of selected both
advanced and so-called "systemically significant" emerging
economies. 347 The G-20 functions as an informal forum, allowing for
Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic
and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 214 (1998). There are several
operational issues regarding the inter- relational aspects of these structural policies and
individual human rights standards. See id.
343. See Goldberg, supra note 332, at 970 (furthering insight into why countries
participating in the HIPC run into problems even with their participation in the program).
HIPC debtor countries usually apportion their domestic investments toward infrastructure,
such as providing electrical power, paving roads, and telephone connections instead of
spending money toward health and education. See id. This form of neoliberal economic
ideology has proven detrimental to certain countries. See Anup Shah, Structural Adjustment
- A Major Cause of Poverty, GLOBAL ISSUES, (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/3 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). Minimizing the role
of the state, privatization, reduced protection of domestic industries, currency devaluation,
increased interest rates, elimination of subsidies, reduction and removal of regulations to
gain attraction from foreign investors are all parts if this ideology. See id. "Structural
adjustments have . . . contributed to 'the greatest peacetime transfer of wealth from the
periphery to the imperial center in history' ... without much media attention." Id.
344. See KUNIBERT RAFFER, DEBT MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: PROTECTION OF
THE POOR AND THE MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 101 (2010).
345. See Haque & Burdescue, supra note 315, at 241 (explaining how leaders came to
the Conference with the objective of establishing a framework for cooperation and
assistance with alleviating poverty). See also What is the G20?, G20, available at
http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
G- 20,
Summit
F20
the
Hosts
Petersburg
St.
346. See
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
347. Id. The finance ministers and central bank governors hail from the European
Union and the following nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Former
Canadian Finance Minister (later, Prime Minister) is credited with proposing the G- 20. See
John lbbitson & Tara Perkins, How Canada Made the G20 Happen, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
(June 18, 2010, 4:09 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-canada-madethe-g20-happen/article43227 67 /?page=all.
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discussion between the participating developed and developing
countries as to the promotion of global economic stability and
development. 348 The inaugural meeting of the G-20 took place in
Berlin, Germany on December 15-16, 1999. 349 Since then, the G-20 has
held annual meetings, engaging in a dialogue about key economic issues
and implementing various initiatives and reforms. 350
Creation of the G-20 was premised in part on remedying the
limited participation of key emerging developing economies in global
economic discussion and govemance. 351 Other forums discussing world
economic issues preceded the G-20, and these "showed the potential
benefits of a regular international consultative forum embracing the
emerging-market countries." 352 Building on these predecessors, the
handpicked G-20 enabled a regular dialogue with a constant set of
partners. 353 Reflecting the broad representation of the G-20, its member
countries represent around ninety percent of global national product,
eighty percent of world trade, and two-thirds of the world population. 354
However, critics of the Group of Twenty mention that it is essentially a
self-appointed, elite group, and point to its corresponding lack of
inclusiveness, accountability and, most importantly, political
legitimacy. 355
Because of the informal nature of the G-20, members can make
comments, recommendations, and measures to be adopted. 356 There are
348. See St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346.
349. Id.
350. Id. The meetings are annual, but they are preceded by workshops, reports, case
studies to provide ministers and governors with analysis and insight. Id. The 2011 G-20
summit meeting took place on November 3-4, 2011, in Cannes, France. Id.
351. See St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346.
352. Id. Before the G- 20 was created, there was a G- 22, G- 7, and even a G- 33. Id.
These groups of leaders made proposals to deal with world economic issues. Id. The G- 7
was established in 1976, comprised of major industrial economies including Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Id.
The G- 7 also allows for discussion of current economic issues, but the discussion is geared
toward the interests of the seven countries. Id. The G- 20, in contrast, reflects the diverse
interests of the industrial and emerging-market economies. St. Petersburg Hosts the F20
Summit, supra note 346.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. Participation in the G- 20 meetings is limited to the members. St. Petersburg
Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346. The limit is linked to ensuring the "effectiveness
and continuity of [the G- 20's] activity. Id. Although the meetings are not open to the
public, the public has access to discussions via a "communique" which the G- 20 publishes
after
each
meeting.
See
G- 20
Publications,
G- 20,
http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (providing record
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no formal votes or resolutions. 357 Instead, "[e]very G-20 member has
one "voice" with which it can take an active part in G-20 activity." 358
There is no permanent staff; the chair, selected from a different regional
group of countries each year, rotates on an annual basis.359 The chair is
part of a three-member management "Troika" of chairs. 360
Financial ministers and central bank governors are not the only
attendees at G-20 meeting. 361 Also present at the meetings are
important representatives of the BWis, namely the Managing Director
of the IMF, the President of the World Bank, and the chairs of the
International Monetary and Financing Committee and Development
Committee of the IMF and World Bank. 362 This participation attempts
to ensure that "the G-20 process is well integrated with the activities of
the BWis." 363
Reform of the BWis has, indeed, been on the agenda of more than
one G-20 meeting. 364 Acknowledging the "vital role the [BWis] should
play in promoting macroeconomic and financial stability, economic
growth, and poverty reduction," 365 the G-20 concentrated in great part
on governance reforms. 366 Recognizing the evolution of the global

of communiques).
357. Id. There are no voting shares attached to the voting member, and voting power
is not governed by the member's economic status. Id.
358. Id. "To this extent the influence a country can exert is shaped decisively by its
commitment." Id.
359. The 2011 Chair is France. The G20, UNIV. OF TORONTO, available at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html (last updated Sept. 28, 2011). Mexico will
chair the G20 in 2012. Id. Starting in 2011, G- 20 summits will be held annually. Id.
360. The 2011 Chair is France. G20 Information Centre, U. OF TORONTO,
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/ (last updated Sept. 10, 2013). Mexico will chair the G20 in
2012. G- 20 Information Centre: The G20, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html
(last updated July 22, 2010). Starting in 2011, G- 20 summits will be held annually. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. These participate on an ex-officio basis. Id.
363. Id. The G- 20 also collaborates with the Financial Stability Board and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision. The G20, supra note 359.
364. G20 Statement on Reforming Bretton Woods Institutions, Meeting of Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Xianghe (Oct. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005bwi.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) [hereinafter
Statement on Reforming BWis].
365. Id.
366. Id. The G- 20 also called for reinforcement of the cooperation between the BWis,
and discussed their separate responsibilities. Id. The G- 20 emphasized that the IMF should
focus on macroeconomic and financial stability, both nationally and internationally, on the
surveillance of the global economy, and on strengthening crisis prevention. Id. As to the
World Bank, the G-20 advised that it focus on development "sharpening its financial and
technical assistance roles for both least- developed countries and emerging markets."
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economy since the inception of the BWis, 367 the G-20's statement
emphasized the need to have the governance structure of the BWis, with
respect to both quotas and representation, reflect the changes in
economic weight. "368
The 2005 Statement also addressed ·management reforms. 369 The
Statement suggested that the BWis work to enhance their "institutional
effectiveness." advising that selection of senior management should be
premised on merit and allow for broad representation of all member
countries. 370 The G-20 also drew attention to lending practices,
advising the BWis to "continue improving their lending frameworks,"
and to take measures to meet their members' financial needs. 371
As has been indicated, the 2008 financial crisis gave the G-20
forum a new dimension and promoted the G-20 to call for continued
BWI reform. 372 By 2004, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin wanted
the G-20 to be not only a forum for finance ministers and central bank
governors, but also one for the leaders of the governments. 373 Martin's
goal came to fruition as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, when then president George W. Bush decided to convene a meeting of world
Statement on Reforming BWis, supra note 364. See also Communique, Meeting of Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Xianghe (Oct. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005communique.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
(reiterating support for reformation of the BWis and drawing attention to the importance of
improving the governance, management, and operational strategies of the BWis).
367. Specifically the growth in emerging markets and "deepened integration in
industrialized countries." G- 20, Statement on Reforming the Bretton Woods Institution
(2005), available at www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005bwi.pdf.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. The 2006 G- 20 meeting renewed discussion regarding the reform of the
BWis. Communique, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Nov. 19,
2006), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2006/2006communique.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013 ). At the meeting, members discussed the formula of a quota formula and how
to implement it. Id. The members also agreed to further consider issues relating to IMF
surveillance, the IMF's role in emerging market economies, and its role in low- income
countries, as well as collaboration between the BWis. Id. The members called for the
modernization and strengthening of IMF surveillance to "meet the needs of globalization."
Id. Suggesting a possible weakness in the area of surveillance, the G- 20 addressed the
strengthening of IMF surveillance as recently as 2011, noting G- 20 agreement on the need
to further strengthen the effectiveness and coherence of bilateral and multilateral IMF
surveillance. See Final Communique, Meeting of 020 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors
in
Wash.
D.C.
(Apr.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/201 l-finance-l 10415-en.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
372. See Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, 020, available at
http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
373. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372.
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leaders to deal with the crisis. 374 The Bush administration gathered the
world leaders by turning to the G-20 countries. 375 The result was the G20 Summit, which convened on November 15, 2008 and featured a
gathering of both finance ministers and political leaders. 376
Notwithstanding its lack of inclusiveness (and legitimacy), the
Washington, D.C. summit has been billed by some as the "Bretton
Woods 2" meeting for its emphasis on reform of the BWis. 377 After the
Summit, the G-20 issued a declaration setting forth reforms to be
implemented in response to the ongoing financial crisis. 378 The G-20
announced an action plan designed to respond to the crisis, noting five
categories of reform and characterizing the measures to be taken in each
category as either "immediate" or "medium term." 379 One of the
categories of reform was the reform of international financial
institutions. 380 Recognizing the plight of developing economies as to
financing, the G-20 expressed approval of the IMF's new short-term
liquidity facility and urged the "ongoing review of its instruments and
facilities to ensure flexibility." 381 As to the World Bank, the G-20
encouraged full-capacity use of its development agenda, approving the
introduction of new facilities by the World Bank in the area of
infrastructure and trade finance. 382 The G-20 expressed its intent to act
to "[ e]nsure that the [BWis] ... have sufficient resources to continue

374. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372.
375. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372.
376. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372. Since then,
the leaders of the G-20 nations have held summits semi-annually or annually. Id. Summits
were held in London and Pittsburg in 2009. Id. Summits were also held in Toronto and
Seoul in 2010. Id.
377. G20 Heads of State Meeting I 5th November 2008: Summary and Analysis of
Washington Meeting, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Nov. 17 2008), available at
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2008/1 l/art-562975/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
378. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov.
15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declarationl 115.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013).
379. Id.
380. Id. The IMF and World Bank were the focus of this category of reform. Id. The
other categories of reform were: strengthening transparency and accountability; enhancing
sound regulation; promoting integrity in financial markets; and reinforcing international
cooperation. Id. The proposed reforms were separated into five categories: ( 1) strengthening
transparency and accountability; (2) enhancing sound regulation; (3) promoting integrity in
financial markets; (4) reinforcing international cooperation; (5) reforming international
financial institutions. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy, supra note 378.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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playing their role in overcoming the crisis. " 383
The November declaration emphasized the state of developing and
emerging economies in urging BWI reform. 384 The G-20 tied BWI
reform to these countries, noting its commitment to the BWis' reform
"so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in
the world economy .... " 85 It called for International Financial
Institutions to review and adapt their lending instruments to meet their
members' needs, and also called for the consideration of ways to
"restore emerging and developing countries' access to credit and resume
private capital flows which are critical for sustainable growth and
development, including ongoing infrastructure investment." 386 The G20 once again addressed the issue of surveillance, noting that the IMF
should conduct "vigorous and even-handed surveillance reviews of all
countries ... " 387 Elaborating on another weakness in IMF operations,
the G-20 stated the BWI's role in providing macro-financial policy
advice would be strengthened if it gave greater attention to the financial
sectors of all countries and better integrated the reviews with the joint
IMF/World Bank financial sector assessment programs. " 388
IMF operations were once again a source of discussion during the
April 2009 G-20 Summit, which took in place in London. 389 In a
declaration issued after the Summit, G-20 leaders noted the continued
need to reinforce international financial institutions, "particularly the
IMF." 390 To that end, the G-20 pledged to make available $850 billion
in resources through the global financial institutions "to support growth
m emerging market and developing countries by helping to finance
383. Id.
384. See id.
385. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, supra
note 378. The G20 also noted that the FSF should expand to a broad membership of
emerging economies. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. The G- 20 also addressed crisis response, emphasizing the need for the IMF to
collaborate with the FSF and other bodies in an effort to "better identify vulnerabilities,
anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response."
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, supra note 378.
Part of the action plan was for the IMF, in conjunction with the expanded FSF and other
regulators and bodies, to develop recommendations to "mitigate pro-cyclicality, including
the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation, and
provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends." Id.
389. Communique, Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, Statement Issued by the
G20 Leaders (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html
[hereinafter Global Plan for Recovery and Reform] .
390. Id.
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counter-cyclical spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure, trade
finance, balance of payments support, debt rollover, and social
support."391 The G-20 agreed to increase the resources available to the
IMF through immediate financing of $250 billion from members, and
announced its support for a substantial increase in lending of at least
$100 billion by the multilateral development banks, specifically to low
income countries. 392 Many of these same topics were revisited and
reiterated at the November 2011 summit meeting in Cannes, France.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the promotion of neo-liberal policies by the BWis, over the
last decade or so developed countries have hypocritically instituted
various government actions and regulations.
For instance, on
September 8, 2008, the United States government bailed out and took
over the nation's largest mortgage buyer, The Federal National
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), along with the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), after the two mortgage
giants struggled with deep losses and investors had lost confidence in
them. 393 Amid an economic recession, and shortly after the fall of
391. Id. Counter-cyclical spending is a fiscal policy characterized by an increase in
government expenditures that is meant to jumpstart economic recovery. Martin Khor,
Reality Behind the Hype ofG20 Summit, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Apr. 6, 2009), available
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends/gtrends246.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
Programs that automatically expand fiscal policy during recessions, and contract it during
booms, are one form of countercyclical fiscal policy. David N. Weil, Fiscal Policy, THE
CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ECON.,
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FiscalPolicy.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
Additionally, bank recapitalization refers to the restructuring of a troubled bank with the
assistance of a deposit insurance fund. Business Definition for: Recapitalization, ALL Bus.,
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/recapitalization/4954442-1.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013) Debt rollover refers to the rolling over of existing debt into new debt
when the existing debt is about to mature. Rollover Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, available at
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rollover-risk.asp#axzz1Zls25wls (last visited Nov. 7,
2013). The IMF defines balance of payments as a:
statistical statement that systematically summarizes, for a specific time period, the
economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world. Transactions, for
the most part between residents and nonresidents, consist of those involving goods,
services, and income; those involving financial claims on, and liabilities to, the rest
of the world; and those (such as gifts) classified as transfers, which involve
offsetting entries to balance-in an accounting sense- one-sided transactions.
INT'L MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 6, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2103).
392. Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, supra note 389.
393. See Federal National Mortgage Association Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, available
at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/fannie_mae/index.html?inline=nyt-
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Lehman Brothers, 394 the American International Group (the "AIG") was
suffering from a liquidity crisis when its credit ratings were downgraded
in September 2008. 395 Fearing the catastrophic consequences of AIG
filing for bankruptcy, on September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve
Board announced that it would authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to lend up to $85 billion to AIG. 396
In 2008, the United States automotive industry was facing financial
downturn partially linked to a substantial increase in the prices of
automotive fuels. 97 General Motors and Chrysler were given large
government bailouts to support them through this crisis while Ford was
given an open credit line.3 8 However, due to poor management and
org (last visited Oct. 25, 2013); see Freddie Mac, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/freddie_mac/index.html?inline=nytorg (last visited Oct. 25 , 2013); see also Charles Duhigg, As Crisis Grew, a Few Options
Shrank
to
One,
N.Y.
TIM ES
(Sept.
7,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08takeover.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all
&oref=slogin (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) ("The downfall of Fannie and Freddie stems from
a series of miscalculations and deferred decisions, both by their executives and government
officials, according to company insiders, regulators, auditors and outside analysts.").
394. See John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial
Crisis,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
1,
2008),
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/12/0l/08120lfa_fact_cassidy?currentPage=all
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013); Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt,
MARKET WATCH (Sept 15, 2008), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehmanfolds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). Lehman Brothers,
a Wall Street investment bank, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2008. Id. The bankruptcy
was the largest in history, with a total of $613 billion in debt against $639 billion in assets,
effectively ending the company's 158-year existence. Id.
395. See William Greider, The AIG Bailout Scandal, THE NATION (Aug. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/153929/aig-bailout-scandal?page=full (last
visited Oct. 25, 2013); see also Jim Puzzanghera, AIG Bailout is 'Poisonous '; Taxpayers
Risk 'Severe Losses,' Panel Says, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2010), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/201 O/jun/11/business/la-fi-aig-bailout-20100611 (last visited Oct.
25, 2013) (referring to the bailout as a $182-billion bailout, and noting lack of clarity as to
whether taxpayers ever will be fully repaid).
396. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2013); Pam Selvarajah, The AIG Bailout and A/G's Prospects/or Repaying
Government Loans, 29 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 363, 364 (2010) (noting that the loan carried
a twenty-four month term).
397. See Gas Prices Put Detroit Big Three in Crisis Mode, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2008),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24896359/ns/business-autos/t/gas-prices-putdetroit-big-three-crisis-mode/#.TsBwSMPNltM (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
398. See David Shepardson, Rattner Applauds Auto Bailouts' 'Happy Ending', 1853
CHAIRMAN (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.1853chairman.com/2011/11/0l/rattnerapplauds-auto-bailouts%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98happy-ending%E2%80%99/ (noting that
the Treasury extended Chrysler a $12.5 billion bailout, $11.3 billion of which has been
recovered, and extended General Motors a $49.5 billion bailout, of which $23.2 billion has
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business practices, General Motors and Chrysler still filed for Chapter
11 Bankruptcy in 2009. 399 Having emerged from bankruptcy, the
United States federal government now holds nearly 61 % of the new
company. 400
The United States has not been the only developed country to
institute the type of hypocritical policies described above. Currently
facing an economic debt crisis, Europe has been urged to begin bailing
out its banks. 401 The recommendation to do so came directly from the
IMF's managing director, Christine Legarde. 402 In agreement with the
bailout, the first major European bank bailout of 2011 occurred when
the governments of both France and Belgium pledged to participate in a
rescue plan for their banking giant Dexia. 4 3 The plan is to place
Dexia's "toxic assets, including Greek and other peripheral euro zone
government bonds" into a government-supported "bad-bank."404 Bank
of France Governor and G20 member, Christian Noyer, has stated "[w]e
will loan Dexia as much as it needs."405
As developed countries begin to institute actions contradictory to
neo-liberal policies, maybe the BWis will begin to recognize the harm
of forcing neo-liberal policies on developing countries; however, it
should not be forgotten that, in the final analysis, the general policies of
these institutions are set by member states' s governments, not by the
secretariat bureaucracy. Newly-elected Managing Director Christine
been recovered). "At current trading prices, the Treasury would lose more than $13 billion
on its GM bailout." Id.
399. See
Automotive
Industry
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES,
available
at
http ://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/clcredit_crisis/auto_ industry/in
<lex.html (last updated May 25, 2011).
400. Id. The Canadian government, a health care trust for the United Auto Workers
Union, and bondholders own the balance. Id.
401. Heather Stewart, Jill Treanor & Dominic Rushe, IMF Chief Tells Europe: You
Must Bail Out the Banks Again, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, .2011), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /sep/22/imf-chief-europe-bail-out-banks (last visited
Oct 25, 2013).
402. Id. (discussing Lagarde's call for action).
403. Philip Blenkinsop & Robert-Jan Bartunek, Dexia Bailout Set as Wider Bank
Rescue
Mulled,
REUTERS
(Oct.
9,
2011),
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/09/us-dexia-idUSTRE7962XE20111009
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2013). Dexia used short-term funding to finance long-term lending, and had
difficulty obtaining credit as the European debt crisis worsened. Id.
404. John O'Donnell & Illona Wissenbach, EU Preparing Bank Rescues Amid Greece
Doubts, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/useurozone-idUSTRE79211720111004 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
405. Alexandria Sage, France's Noyer Says Will Ensure Dexia Liquidity, REUTERS
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/france-dexia-noyeridUSP6E7KCOIN20111005 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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Lagarde has shown promise with her actions in trying to move towards
a more balanced approach (to the degree that she can). After edging out
the Bank of Mexico's governor Agustin Carstens, 406 the former Finance
Minister of France took over the top post at the IMF in the midst of
global economic turmoil. Ms. Lagarde won the support of a several
economic powers including China, Russia, and the United States with
the promise to bring "reform" to the IMF. 407
The most prominent reform pledged by Ms. Lagarde was to
increase the presence of emerging economies at the IMF. Several
emerging markets leaders voiced concern over the election of yet
another European to head the IMF, something that has not changed
since its inception in 1944. 408 Ms. Lagarde was able to curtail
complaints through assurance that the interests of emerging markets
To show her
would be represented under her leadership. 409
commitment, Ms. Lagarde created a fourth deputy managing director
position and appointed Chinese economist Zhu Min to the position.
Cornell University Professor Eswar S. Prassar hailed the move as a
"grand bargain" in that Europeans were able to keep control of the top
job at the IMF while emerging markets were able to gain more of a
voice with the appointment. 410
Even with a promising new managing director, massive changes to
the BWis are still unlikely. The policies of the BWis flow from ideals,
positions and interests of developed countries. The core structure of the
BWis gives the voice of developed countries more weight than
developing countries because the BWis are fundamentally a corporation
406. Press Release No. 11/259, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Selects
Christine Lagarde as Managing Director (June 28, 2011) (on file with author), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/prl 1259.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
407. See US Backs Christine Lagarde as Next Head of IMF, THE TELEGRAPH (June 28,
2011 ),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/dominique-strausskahn/8603421 /US-backs-Christine-Lagarde-as-next-head-of-IMF .html (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
408. See Liz Alderman, France 's Lagarde Selected as I.MF. Managing Director,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.corn/2011 /06/29/business/global/29fund.html?pagewanted=all.
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2013).
409. See Liz Alderman & Keith Bradsher, Emerging Nations Warm to Lagarde for
I.MF.
Role,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011 /06/08/business/global/08fund.html?pagewanted=all
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
410. Binyamin Appelbaum, I.MF. 's New Chief Names American and Chinese
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2013),
available
at
Deputies,
http://www.nytimes.corn/2011 /07I 13/business/us-and-chinese-officials-named-to-imfposts.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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with developed countries controlling its Board of Directors as majority
shareholders. Naturally, the actions of the corporation are for the
benefit of its shareholders. Without a major redevelopment to the core
structure of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
developed countries will continue to favor neo-liberal policies as they
open the economies of these developing countries to the benefit of
developed countries, despite contradictory actions within their own
countries.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Iraq was hopeful when it imagined preparing itself as an
"investment cake" under the new Investment Law.
Following
1
investment environment reforms, Iraq opened the doors of its economy
to foreign investors. 2 However, as some foreign investors flowed in and
commenced "eating" the cake, they were disappointed to find it sugarfree, not sweet and sugary as most would prefer. 3 What then would be
1. See SAMI SHUBBER, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT IN IRAQ 5-6 (2009).
2. Iraq has made significant progress in the reconstruction of its economy, and
investors have shown considerable interest in the country, as evidenced by the influx of
Chinese investors in the past few years. In fact, recent statistics show that the number of
foreign investments doubled in 2010, as investors swarmed into the Middle Eastern country
to cash in on investment opportunities arising from Iraq's stabilitiy. More positive results
are being reported by western news agencies, as evidenced by Newsweek International's
(London) following assertion: "Civil war or not, Iraq has an economy, and- mother of all
surprises- it's doing remarkably well. Real estate is booming. Construction, retail and
wholesale trade sectors are healthy, too, report by Global Insight in London. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce reports 34,000 registered companies in Iraq, up from 8,000 three
years ago. Sales of second-hand cars, televisions and mobile phones have all risen sharply.
Estimates vary, but one from Global Insight puts GDP growth at 17 percent last year and
projects 13 percent for 2006. The World Bank has it lower: at 4 percent this year. But, given
all the attention paid to deteriorating security, the startling fact is that, Iraq is growing at
all." See generally WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, REBUILDING
IRAQ: ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSITION (2006).
3. Considering the investment needs in Iraq, investment opportunities are myriad
across sectors in the Iraqi economy. In this respect, the Iraqi Government has availed
investment opportunities across sectors including construction, industry, agriculture,
tourism, housing, communications, and health care. Leading investment companies still
have a tendency to invest in the energy sector, particularly as proven by the fact that Iraqi
reserves of oil stand at 115 billion barrels. On the basis of these figures, Iraq ranks 2- 3
worldwide with the largest proven amount of reserves. There are also indications that Iraq
has 45- 100 billion additional barrels in its western desert, which remain undiscovered.
Furthermore, Iraq's discovered oil reserves amount to 10% of the world's total reserves.
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the result?
Certainly, other investors would receive a "warning" notice that
the Iraqi "cake" was not only free of sugar, but also salty. The following
question would be raised here regarding the multi-white-powder cakes
in a warehouse: which of them has sugar?
The thesis of this article is that ten years of Iraqi and international
efforts 4 to encourage foreign investment have failed and that foreign
investment in Iraq remains limited to the extent of foreign investment
flows amounting to USD 1. 617 billion, as of 2011. 5
The path to investing in Iraq is still full of obstacles because
reforms have not been addressed. For example, a number of old laws do
not meet minimum international standards, yet they remain in force.
Moreover, national infrastructure is not up to acceptable standards, and
foreign investors must comply with administrative red tape. Despite
other recently emerging challenges, as described by this article's
analysis below, 6 some writers argue that there are sufficient existing
justifications for foreign investors to come to Iraq and initiate a
harvesting of dividends. 7
Iraq has natural gas ("NG") reserves as well. Available information indicates 112 trillion
cubic feet NG reserves in Iraq, thus placing Iraq at the tenth position worldwide in terms of
largest NG reserves. Potentially, additional NG reserves amount to 275- 300 trillion cubic
feet along with large amounts of other metals including phosphate, sulphur, and iron. See
Top Ten Reason to Invest in Iraq, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ NATIONAL INVESTMENT COMMISSION,
available at http://investpromo.gov.iq/why-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
4. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ 8 (2010). The Iraqi Government is
at the forefront in spearheading reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but support is being provided
by other investment partners such as the U.S. through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
which is also channeling funds toward improving reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Id.
5. UNCTAD, WORLDINVESTMENTREPORTUNITEDNATIONS 171 (2012).
6. See generally Clarence M. Dass, Adventure Capitalizing in Baghdad: An
Entrepreneurial Approach to Reconstructing Iraq, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 157
(2010); Ned Parker, The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World's Next Failed State, 91
FOREIGN AFF. 94 (2012); Antony Blinken, Is Iraq on Track? Democracy and Disorder in
Baghdad, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 152 (2012); Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, Economic
Reconstruction Amidst Conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq, 22 DEF. & PEACE
ECON. 627 (2011); CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, The Economic Reconstruction of Iraq (2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1550867 (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
7. David Grantham argues that the calculation of profits outweigh risks for foreign
investment companies in Iraq. See David Brent Grantham, Calculated Risk: The Advance of
IOCs and NOCs Into the Iraqi Investment Theater, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 315
(2010) [hereinafter Grantham, Calculated Risk]; See generally Judith Richards Hope &
Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq 's Commercial Law is a Necessity for
Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11
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These opinions rely on a drastic change in the country's political,
legal, and economic arenas, with new facts being formulated after the
Anglo-American troops toppled the then-ruling Baathist Regime.
Thereafter, the new Iraqi Government sought to rebuild the country's
war-tom economy by opening its doors to investors. Iraq has moved
from a central to an open-market economy. To enable this shift, a
number of laws were enacted; 8 Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is the
most notable of these new laws. The law provides for guarantees
together with prohibition of nationalization and confiscation, adoption
of stable legislation, and provision of international arbitration as
mechanisms of dispute settlement. A host of incentives and exemptions
have been provided for by this law, the most important of which is the
ten year tax free period for investments. 9
The reconstruction efforts are one reason why international
investors are storming into Iraq. It is estimated that Iraq's reconstruction
efforts are going to cost about USD 100 billion. 10 International
companies are coming into Iraq to acquire a share of the finances.
Another reason for such a notion is the amount of support Iraq is
receiving from international organizations and governments. Since
2003, Iraq has been a recipient of aid both in technical and legislative
know-how from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Political developments in the country are seen
as remarkable progress in that MENA-OECD deemed it necessary to
help hold competitive elections as part of the democratic transition.
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 875 (2004); Robert D. Tadlock, Occupation Law and Foreign
Investment in Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine has Become an Obstacle to Occupied
Populations, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 227 (2005). The title of David Grantham's previous article
was Caveat Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry into Iraq, which won
the Spring 2009 AIPN Student Writing Competition. See David Brent Grantham, Caveat
Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry Into Iraq, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L.
& Bus. 304 (2010).
8. One of these was the "Foreign Investment Order." This legislation, which was part
of the 100 orders issued by the former U.S. civilian administrator Paul Bremer when he was
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") during the first year of occupation, has
provided U.S. groups with a multitude of benefits: full repatriation of profits earned in Iraq
by foreign companies, sale of all Iraqi companies to foreign groups including banks,
privatization of the entire Iraqi public sector, total legal immunity for occupants and their
subcontractors in Iraq, and "national treatment" of foreign investments. See Order No. 39
Foreign Investment, THE IRAQ COALITION (Dec. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220_ CP AORD_ 39_Foreign_Investment_. pd
f (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
9. See SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 5.
10. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding
Blunders, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at Al.
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However, Iraq's political and economic environments are still seen as
challenges for its government, and will need to be dealt with in the
years ahead. At the international conference concerning developments
in Iraq, the representatives of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)
recognized the importance of reforms that are required to be supported
by the MENA-OECD: noting that refors should center on governance
and investment for development. Structural reforms such as promoting
sector development, attracting foreign investment, and good governance
were presented at this gathering. According to the representatives, all
these aspects affect a country's business environment. 11
The author argues that such a reform is a white point on a grey
board, but is still insufficient for the revival of the investment
environment. Unfortunately, the Iraqi investment environment has been
shaken to the roots by political rifts at the borders, where the volcano of
terrorism has erupted. The consequent corruption has taken its toll.
Furthermore, the weak investment-related legal system can be ascribed
to a lack of effective protection of intellectual property rights, the
indefinite role of national investment authorities, and the extreme
ineffectiveness (even lack) of an independent and efficient judiciary.
This article concludes that there are certain reforms that may
alleviate these obstacles and establish a sustainable investment-friendly
environment so that Iraq may move forward.
The rest of this article consists of five parts: the first part analyzes
the endemic obstacles in the country; the second part tests the efficiency
of the Iraqi legal system; the third part reveals that the country's
investment frameworks are inhibitory; the fourth part demonstrates that
legal determinants still exist in the investment environment; the fifth
part presents a roadmap for the reform of the investment environment in
Iraq.
II.

ANALYSIS OF INHERENT LIMITATIONS

Even though Iraq is a country rich in investment opportunities,
investors have expressed concerns over the feasibility of investing
money in Iraq and obtaining negative returns. The causes of investors'
fears include political conflicts, insecurity, corruption, and poor
infrastructure.

11. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4,
at 14, 34.
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A. Political Conflict and Security Collapse
On December 19, 2011, Iraqis woke to receive the news that Vice
President, Tareq al-Hashemi, had been arrested on charges of running a
terrorist group. 12 This story caused further damage to the deteriorating
political, legal, and security situation in the country, sending a bleak
message to potential investors. 13 Upon analysis, it was determined that
the worst part of the situation was that it reflected a negative political
environment. If the charges against the Iraqi Vice-President, who was
accused of harboring terrorists, were proven in the absence of any fierce
political competition, this would be a clear indication that terrorists held
a strong foothold in the Iraqi Government. However, if the charges were
proven false, the case would reflect the exclusion mechanism adopted
by politicians on one hand, and the lack of independence of
investigative authorities and the judiciary represented by the court that
sentenced Al-Hashemi to death on the other. 14 This led to massive
political and legal issues. The asylum sought by Al-Hashemi in
Kurdistan and his stay therein under the protection of the Kurdistan
forces despite the arrest warrant against him was followed by the
reluctance of the Kurdistan Police to enforce the Baghdad court arrest
orders; the role of the Kurdistan Police in denying the Federal Police
admittance into Iraqi Kurdistan to enforce the arrest warrant is also
significant. 15 Such developments resulted in a big question over the
administrative and legal powers of the Kurdistan region, leaving the
Iraqi Constitution in a dilemma regarding the regulation and
administrative organization of the state. 16 This scene is but a reflection
12. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REPORT No. 126, DEJA vu ALL OVER AGAIN?
IRAQ'S
ESCALATING
POLITICAL
CRISIS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Afiica/Iraq%20Syr
ia%20Lebanon/Iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2013).
13. See Blinken, supra note 6 at 155
14. On September 9, 2012, the Iraqi Central Criminal Court sentenced Vice President
Tareq al-Hashemi to death after he was convicted on charges of managing terrorist death
squads. See The Judicial Authority, TRANSLITERATED ARABIC TITLE [JUDGMENT TO DEATH
BY SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL] (2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.1677 I (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013); Michael A. Newton, The Death Penalty and the Iraqi Transition:
Observations on a Lost Opportunity (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
12-45,
2010),
available
at
Research
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191144## (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
15. See Iraq VP Tariq al-Hashemi Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2012),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19537301 (last visited Nov. 5,
2013).
16. Most of the political and administrative problems are due to the failing constitution
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of a failed state, where the absence of law and infesting corruption and
brutality are the rule. Political leaders use security forces and militias to
suppress enemies and intimidate the public with an inclination to settle
scores with opponents by means of timed bombs and silencer guns on
streets. 17 There are large-scale accusations against the government and
ruling parties of protecting and harboring criminals and corrupt
individuals on one hand and liquidating supervisory and judicial bodies
that hinder illegal activities on the other. 18 Clearly, the Iraqi
Government has proven itself unable to provide basic services such as
electricity, clean water, and appropriate healthcare to the public.
Unemployment among youths amounts to 30%; thus, they are easy prey
for terrorist groups. 19 Consequently, Iraq does not exhibit the stability
sought by foreign companies which has a negative impact on its efforts
to attract investors. 20
The post-2003 political conflicts in Iraq resulted in a fragile
security environment; 1 however, such fragility has existed in Iraq over
the last four decades owing to wars fought by Iraq and its consequent
political seclusion, as manifested by the investor repellent siege.
However, the governments in existence during those times endeavored
to enact pro-investment laws to attract investors into Iraq. This effort
failed because of the then unstable political and security situations, and
the presence of a pessimistic outlook. 22 This led to the failure of
in terms of the sought-after crystal clear administrative federal or decentralized
organization. The ambiguous constitutional provisions regarding the regulation of powers
between the central and province governments on one hand, and the overlap of powers on
the other, contributed to creating one of the most complex problems that resulted in the
conflict between the Central Government, Kurdistan Region and the Region-free
Governorates. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Notes in Defense of the Iraq Consitution, 33 U. PA.
J. INT'L L. 1277 (2012); Christina J. Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking
the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 181 (2009).
17. See Parker, supra note 6.
18. See Blinken, supra note 6, at 152-53.
19. See Parker, supra note 6, at 94
20. See Dass, supra note 6, at 157, 161-62.
21. See James P . Pfiffner, U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the
Army, 25 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SECURITY 76, 76-85 (2010). The dissolution of the Iraqi
army and security departments by the former Civil Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, and
his substitution with militias of the ruling parties contributed to the insecurity. This led to
large-scale corruption in granting military positions to persons who lacked basic police or
military training. The political rampage has been further compounded by sacking thousands
of civil servants who once were members of the banned Baath Party. For the same political
reasons (i.e., membership of the Baath Party), some opponents were banned from having a
say in the political process. Id.
22. See Dass, supra note 6, at 159-60.
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attracting in-bound investments and out-bound departure of local
capital. 23 By 2005, the political situation improved following the
adoption of the new constitution and the completion of the first free
elections, thus marking a better political situation and a future
democratic outlook. Another positive point was the significantly
improving security situation. 24
Contrary to expectations, the political and security situation in Iraq
only worsened, with serious setbacks taking place to initiate an
unending series of daily terrorist acts since mid-2006. As for investors,
deliberate assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and threats against
individuals and corporations alike have created an enormous obstacle to
in-bound investments. Political instability and insecurity are the main
reasons behind foreign companies and local capital leaving Iraq. 25
In 2009, under a political truce, the number of terrorist attacks
reduced owing to hunting down of armed militias under the "law
enforcement" operation. Following the formation of the national
partnership government, which involved parties from across the Iraqi
political spectrum, the investment environment improved slightly, with
numerous Turkish, Chinese, and Iranian companies engaging in
business activities of various natures, particularly in the housing
industry. 26
Despite the aforementioned progress, the Iraqi investment
environment remained incapable of attracting and retaining major
foreign companies. At the time, foreign investors were uncertain about
the long term stability of Iraq's investment climate. 27 Fleeing from
investments in Iraq is justifiable; the political congestion between
Baghdad and Irbil has generated problems that have reflected on the
operations of oil companies. 28 Relations between investment-hosting
and parent states have gained importance in Iraq's case, as the strained
Baghdad-Ankara29 political relations have had a toll on Turkish
23. See generally Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon & Kenneth M. Pollack, How
to Leave a Stable Iraq, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 40, 52-53 (2008).
24. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4,
at 14.
25. See Dass, supra note 6, at 161-62.
26. See WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, supra note 2, at 27,
44.
27. See Grantham, Calculated Risk, supra note 7, at 315, 319-20.
28. See REX J. ZEDALIS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN IRAQ:
CURRENT REALITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 317, 319 (2009).
29. Baghdad- Ankara relations are experiencing tension because of a number of
differences; recently, Turkey refused to extradite the fugitive Iraqi Vice-President Al-
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companies' Iraq-based operations. 30 The security of Turkish investors is
related to Iraq's inter-country political disputes.
Broadly speaking, the partial stability of given areas in an
investment region does not lead to astonishing results. Although the
southern and northern parts of Iraq enjoy reasonable security, the
creation of a healthy and attractive environment requires more stability
across Iraq. 31 Foreign direct investments are long-term by nature, and
hence, investors are interested in the political and security situation
across the whole of a country, rather than just parts of it. 32 Therefore,
insecurity is a hindrance to foreign private investment as it results in
higher security and protection costs for investments, and transport. A
number of opinions stress that such investment companies sometimes
use security or military companies to overcome the insecurity
dilemma. 33 Moreover, some sectors such as the oil sector will be a target
for foreign companies for two reasons: (1) the global strategic
importance of this sector, which promotes the protection of such
companies, and (2) the high returns that motivate a high-risk approach. 34
Hashemi in addition to accusations brought by Al-Maliki's government against Erdogan of
dealing with Kurdistan as an independent state last August, following the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Kirkuk without notifying the Federal Government,
which irked the latter. Earlier, Erdogan accused his Iraqi counterpart of power monopoly. In
response, Al-Makili accused Turkey of causing chaos in the region by meddling in the
internal affairs of neighboring countries, including Iraq and Syria. See Iraq Warns Turkey
over Kurdistan Pipeline Deal, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2012), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18163248 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
30. Hundreds of Iraqi demonstrators burnt the Turkish flag and threatened Turkish
interests in Iraq on the backdrop of Turkey's interference with Iraqi affairs and violation of
Iraqi sovereignty. Turkey, Iraq Condemn "Shameful Behavior" Against Flag in Basra
Protest, TODAYS ZAMAN (May 20, 2012), available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news280891-turkey-iraq-condemn-shameful-behavior-against-tlag-in-basra-protest.html
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2013).
31. Dass, supra note 6, at 157.
32. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 16 (2008).
33. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, Terrorism and the World Economy, 52 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1 (2008).
34. This can be seen in Colombia, where foreign companies were reluctant to enter the
Colombian market. Opposition groups used to blow up the pipelines of foreign oil
companies, but the latter managed to wipe out such opposition groups by offering huge
financial support to the Colombian Government with a view to securing their interests. The
same holds true for the companies that operated in Afghanistan before toppling, as they
concluded many agreements with the Government since 1996. These foreign companies
offered large amounts to the Taliban Government. When Unocal was told that Taliban is a
regressive terrorist movement, UNOCAL spokesman Mike Thatcher said, "We're an oil and
gas company. We go where the oil and gas is." This makes sense because large companies
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Iraq is going through difficult times, mainly because of sectarian
and racial divisions that have never been as deeply felt or expressed as
they are now. 35 The country's foreseeable future holds no indication of
the settlement of rampant disputes that have taken place between
warring parties since the last parliamentary elections. 36All political
efforts did not lead to any solution; the appointment of the two ministers
of defense and interior is far from settled, 37 the council of strategic
policies has never come to light, and the dispute between Baghdad and
Irbil about Kirkuk and other disputed regions remains intact. 38
Moreover, acting on the Oil and Gas Law is still of no interest to
politicians. Meanwhile, the Federal Government and Government of
Kurdistan are still at war regarding the endorsement of oil agreements
with several oil companies created without the federal government's
review or consent. The Constitution39 remains as it is despite its
ambiguities. No census has been executed. There are a large number of
political blocs, especially those represented in the House of
Representatives, on top of conflicts that affected the overall situation of
the State.
In a serious evaluation of political and sectarian conflicts,
grassroots uprising in Iraqi cities, particularly Ramadi and Salahuddin,

use specialist security companies for protection. This applies to the Iraqi economy, where
oil resources are outside city boundaries, thus making protection and capital retention easy.
See Wayne Madsen, Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013).
35. One of the reasons behind sectarian volatilization has been the Iraq-based U.S.
Forces; the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds deal with the U.S. forces differently. The first fought
U.S. Forces, while the second cooperated with them to establish the foundations of the
nascent state, but for U.S. Forces exiting Iraq afterwards. However, the Sunnis felt insecure
about U.S. Forces leaving the country. See Bart S. Fisher, Symposium: Markets in

Transition: Reconstruction and Development: Part One - Reconstruction: Prescriptions for
Iraq, Predictions for Russia and Performance for China: Investing in Iraq: Legal and
Political Aspects, l8TRANSNAT'LL. 71 (2005).
36. Strong suspicions exist between political blocs which stubbornly fight and
exchange accusations of power monopolies or attempted dictatorships. See IMTIAZ HUSSAIN,
AFGHNISTAN, IRAQ AND POST-CONFLICT GOVERNNANCE: DAMOCLIAN DEMOCRACY? 5 (David
Sciulli ed., Brill Academic Publishers, 2010).
37. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12; Parker, supra note 6.
38. SONER CAGAPTAY ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI KURDS 15 (Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 85, 2008), available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus85 v2. pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2013).
39. An undertaking given to the Sunni movements in return for their political
involvement. See Parker, supra note 6, at 108.
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started with a wave of raids and arrests based on terrorism charges
against the bodyguards of the Minister of Finance, Rafe al-Eissawi, a
40
member of the Iraqya political bloc and an iconic Sunni figure.
However, the uprising gave way to larger-scale demands, most
importantly the angry demand for the freedom of female detainees in
Iraqi prisons. Protestors accuse security forces of arresting women to
force their wanted husbands and sons to tum themselves in, 41 and call
for releasing those detainees already proven innocent by court orders,
but never set free as well as others who were arrested upon informant
reports while being denied the right to legal investigation. 2
Regarding protesters, it is important to mention that the way the
state is addressing the dilemma of terrorism is clearly politicized and
sectarian. This has caused protesters to call for abolishment of the AntiTerrorism Law owing to the notion that it is designed to target Sunni
Arabs. Moreover, protesters call for the Accountability and Justice Law,
which has replaced the De-Baathification Law, to be rescinded and for a
43
newly enacted amnesty law for all detainees to be put into force.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki' s response to protesters has
consisted of a mixture of warnings and approbation. He has expressed
his willingness to set up a fact-finding committee to investigate the
cases of detainees and penitentiaries while accusing some demonstrators
of making up a sectarian crisis and being involved in a clamor that will
end with a partitioned Iraq. 44
Considering the latest developments in Iraq, the door is wide open
for partitioning, with the ill omens of civil war looming ahead.
B. Spread of Corruption
Globally, the previously quoted indices indicate that corruption has
reached serious proportions and threatens the development and
investment programs just as it distorts the economic decision-making
process and drains the economy. 45 This reduces the quality and volume
40. Duraid Adnan, Arrest of a Sunni Minister 's Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2012) at A9.
41. Rami Ruhayem, Protests Engulf West Iraq as Anbar Rises Against Maliki, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20887739
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
42. See Parker, supra note 6, at 102-203.
43. Ruhayem, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. David Ng, The Impact of Corruption on Financial Markets, 32,10 MANAGERIAL
FIN. 822-36 (2006).
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of foreign and local investments. 46
Despite the fact that most countries in the world contain a certain
degree of corruption, corruption has never prevented foreign investors
from investing in these countries. However, the case is different with
the 169th country of 175 listed that was awarded 18 points by
Transparency International (TI) in 2012. 47 The worst part about this is
the suspicions regarding the reconstruction efforts undertaken after
2003 among supporters and donors. 48 Corruption is a serious problem,
especially in Iraq; Iraq is a country rich in natural resources where the
rule of law has been weakened by consecutive wars and dictatorships.
Therefore, Iraq is the victim of instability and punitive supervisory
procedures. Furthermore, since the discovery of oil to the present date,
Iraq has lost opportunities of economic recovery derived from large oil
revenues. Corruption, as witnessed currently, is starting to nurture
terrorism and deepen sectarian divisions. The failure of rehabilitating
state institutions hinders the development of investment and business
environments. 49
Since 2004, there has been a constant series of corruption charges
within the UN Oil-for-Food Program. 50 The scandal emerged after an
Iraqi newspaper published a list of 270 persons that included UN
officials, politicians, and company owners who made use of illegal oil
transactions as part of the program. Thereafter, the U.S. Congress
discovered that Saddam Hussein had accumulated a staggering amount
of USD 17.3 billion from such transactions, of which USD 13.6 billion
were with neighboring countries. 51
46. Id.
47. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, available at
http://transparency.org/cpi2012/%20results (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
48. M. CherifBassiouni, Postconjlcit Justice in Iraq, 33 HUM. RTs. 15 (2006).
49. See Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008); Ryan J. Liebl,
Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the American Soldiers Involved in
the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose Actions?, 28 HAMLINE L. REv.
91 (2005).
50. The Oil-for-Food Program was designed in 1996 at a cost of USD 60 billion to
enable Iraq to buy food, medicine, and other necessary supplies using oil revenues. Back
then, oil volumes had an impenetrable ceiling against the UN-imposed blockade on Iraq
after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The program came to an end because of the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. See Joy Gordon, When Unilateralism is
Invisible: A Different Perspective on the Oil-for-Food Scandal, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 59
(2007).
51. Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,
Report on the Management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, Volume II- Report on
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The UN received backlash for being the entity responsible for the
program. 52 This led the UN to set up a three-member independent
committee, presided over by Folker, for investigating the charges. The
investigations resulted in corruption charges against officials,
companies, 53 and organizations. 54 The program damaged the reputation
and credibility of the UN, and was described as the largest financial
scandal in history. 55 Astonishingly, Iraqi brokers accused of suspicious
dealings have emerged once again to contribute to the reconstruction
stage in Iraq. 56
With the arrival of U.S. Forces in Iraq, reconstruction finances
started to flow into the war-tom country. 57 What happened to such
finances? Washington provided a total of USD 60 billion to
reconstruction efforts and USD 146 billion in the Iraqi currency. 58
However, Iraqi citizens have not benefited considerably from these
funds. How then was the money spent? Recently, the Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity failed to satisfying the needs of the electricity despite ''the
true price of Iraq's power crisis is not just the $40bn it costs the Iraqi
economy annually, but also the growing frustration of the Iraqi populace
that suffers with only four-five hours of electricity each day." 59 Portable
Investigation (Sept. 7, 2005).
52. Id. at 3.
53. A key figure of the scandal was Benon Sevan, the former director of the program,
who pleaded not guilty to all bribery or complicity charges leveled against him. Kojo, the
son of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has been proven to have received payments from
Cotecna, another suspicious person. See id. at 71-72.
54. Investigations included French company Total, as well as international companies
from the Middle East and Russia, in addition to security companies. See id. at 29-30.
55. The wider scale of this scandal was all about the future of the UN, with the socalled Neo-conservatives in the United States adding fuel to the fire as an indication of the
UN' s incompetence. Senator Norm Coleman, head of the Congressional Investigation
Committee, called for Annan's resignation. See Nile Gardiner, The White House Should
Call on Kofi Annan to Resign, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/12/the-white-house-shou ld-call-on-kofiannan-to-resign (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
56. Gordon, supra note 50. The provisional Iraqi Government conducted routine
investigations in 2005 but never came up with a decision. Id.
57. David Caron, The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 123, 126 (2005).
58. See STUART w. BOWEN, A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
at
available
(2013),
9
vii,
RECONSTRUCTION,
IRAQI
FOR
http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
59. See Shamsek Asad, Hussain Qaragholi & John Sachs, Iraq 's Power Crisis and the
Need to Re-engage the Private Sector - Smartly, THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.mees.com/en/articles/3923-iraq-s-power-crisis-and-
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water supplies are cut off every other day. Conditions in the country are
as poor as those in the "pre-Saddam" era and are worsening because of
the terrorist attacks, which have claimed the lives of tens of thousands
since 2003. 60
Considering this situation, TI warned that reconstruction efforts
may well tum into the largest corruption scandal in history 61 and stated
that management of oil revenues must be more transparent and
accountable62 and a weak government, black market, and legacy of
dictatorship form a dangerous corruption-breeding combination. 63
George W. Bush faced strong pressure from opponents to unveil
profiteering war-related activities in Iraq. 64 Henry Waxman, who
presides over the Congressional Committee on Integrity and
Government Reform, said, "[t]he money squandered or gulped by
corruption as part of these contracts are infuriating and astonishing. We
the-need-to-re-engage-the-private-sector-smartly (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
60. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ,
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, (2010), available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/100317_IraqEconomicFactors.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2013).
6 I. See JEFFREY COONJOHN, CORRUPTION IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: AN IRAQI
CASE STUDY, (Kurdistan Center for Democracy in the Middle East, 2012), available at
http://www.kcdme.com/Corruption%20in%20PostContlict%20Environments%2002.02.2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
62. TI recommended key steps to be adopted urgently before a "plague of corruption"
amounts to inevitability and irreparability. International contractors operating in Iraq,
according to the TI, must abide by the Anti- Corruption Law. Donors and allied forces are
encouraged to adopt a stricter approach in dealing with the phenomena. TI indicated a
highly corrupt post-war Iraq. See id.
63. Bribery has been rampant since the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Some contractors
and government officials have conceded that corruption widely exists. The report lashed out
at the U.S. policy of awarding investment contracts in Iraq, depicting the same as secretive
and favoring certain large companies. TI agrees with some UN bodies, such as the UN
global consultative body which reported that the U.S. awarded an oil investment contract to
the Texas-based Halliburton run by Dick Cheney until Cheney was elected Vice President
of the U.S. last December. A BBC team tracked down the missing billions in a house
inhabited by Hazem Sha'alan, who was appointed minister of defense in the 2004 Iraqi
Government in Acton, West London. Sha'alan and accomplices drained about USD 1.2
billion from the ministry by purchasing old military equipment from Poland while claiming
it to be state-of-the-art and subsequently transferring the difference in money to personal
accounts. Radi Ar-Radi, the judge who presided over the Public Commission on Integrity,
said, "They failed to rebuild the ministry of defense, and hence the continuing violence and
blood baths. Iraqis and foreigners are still slaughtered, and those corrupt officials are to be
blamed for that. They are criminals." Sha'alan was sentenced to death, but fled the country
to avoid this sentence. See id.
64. See Jane Corbin, BBC Uncovers Lost Iraqi Billions, BBC NEWS (June 10, 2008),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7444083.stm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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may discover that it has been the widest profiteering process m
history. " 65
The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) identified two reasons for the lack of tangible
results from the reconstruction efforts in Iraq: (1) rampant corruption66
and (2) economic mismanagement. However, the 2008 federal report
revealed that the reconstruction policies adopted by Washington for Iraq
failed owing to bureaucratic division inside the Pentagon and a lack of
familiarity with the Iraqi society. 67
Today, corruption is present in the Iraqi Government at all levels.
Some ministries are obviously controlled by militias or organized crime
bosses. 68 The Iraqi Government is incapable of enforcing the bare
minimum of anti-corruption laws. 69 Furthermore, key Government
officials boldly refuse to engage in or initiate any corruption case
investigations. Consequently, the Commission of Integrity is not
70
empowered to be a true investigative authority.
Despite the powers of the comm1ss10n associated with
investigating corruption cases, it cannot fulfill its role because of fragile
security and violent criminals who are controlling various ministries. It
is impossible to investigate corruption cases without support from the
police and government. However, in Iraq, such support does not
currently exist. 71

65. Id.
66. An example cited by the report is USO 36 billion deal for military equipment,
weapons, and communication gear for the Iraqi forces, but no one knows about the fate of
this expenditure. The report also mentions that a U.S. company, DynCorp International,
submitted USO 18 million in invoices for unjustifiable costs. Furthermore, large amounts
have been mismanaged or squandered (e.g., a police training camp with a USD 43.8 million
swimming pool which was never used). See Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin,
The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Commercial Law is a Necessity for Foreign Direct
Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 875 (2004).
67. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, supra note 10.
68. Parker, supra note 6.
69. Id.
70. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report to Congress, SIGIR
at
available
2012),
30,
(July
OBSERVATIONS
http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2012/Section 1 -_July_2012.pdf#view=fit
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
71. CRISIS GROUP MIDDLE EAST REPORT No.113, FAILING OVERSIGHT: IRAQ'S
at
available
(2011 ),
GOVERNMENT
UNCHECKED
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009 20 l 4/documents/d-iq/dv/diq20111005 06_/d-iq20111005 06 en.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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Accordingly, the commission investigators cannot be relied upon
to detect criminal activities of persons protected by the influential, even
to the extent that they cannot be protected in the course of any such
investigation. Any comment about the ability of Iraqi institutions
established to combat corruption to enforce anti-corruption laws is
pointless. Another acknowledgment to be made here is that anticorruption and law enforcement efforts have not been well planned in
the consideration of rampant corruption, which has come to take various
forms and become a means of profitable trade through which security
and military positions are acquired in exchange for money. 72 Many
officials receive bribes for these purposes. Corruption has become a
human disaster, even a matter of life or death in Iraq, and has found its
way into child vaccines, portable water, and admittance of fatal
radioactive goods and foods into Iraq. 73 The pressing question here is:
where do huge amounts of corruption-generated money go? And what
reasons are behind the increasing rates of corruption?
Most of such corruption-generated money is used to finance and
strengthen the ruling parties to ensure their survival and purchase secret
accounts outside Iraqi borders. The rest of this money is used to finance
and nurture terrorism. Increasing corruption rates are due to illegal uses
of oil revenues, which have been on the rise because of increasing oil
prices. 74

C. Diminished Infrastructure Capacity
In today's world, infrastructure receives outstanding importance, as
it is the cornerstone of economic and social development. On one hand,
infrastructure assumes the role of being the link between economic
resources of a given country and production structures therein; on the
other hand, it links production locations and markets, thus boosting
72. Arming contracts and all security-related activities are corrupting-breeding arenas
owing to the inability of the independent supervisory bodies to audit them under the pretext
of national security. See Solomon Moore, Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
13,
2008),
available
at
Orders,
http://www. nyti mes.com/2008/04/ 13/world/middleeast/ l 3arms.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=O
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
73. See Anwar Al-Hamdani, STUDIO 9/AL-BAGHDADIYA TV (2012), available at
http://www.albaghdadia.com/programs/politics-prog/studio9.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013)
(in Arabic).
74. Patrick Cockburn, Iraq JO Years on: How Baghdad Became a City of Corruption,
THE
INDEPENDANT
(Mar.
4,
2013),
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-l O-years-on-how-baghdadbecame-a-city-of-corruption-8520038.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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economic activities and their horizons and variety in addition to
improving commercial activities and promoting easier establishment of
service and production ventures.
As far as investment is concerned, in developing an efficient
infrastructure, there is an urgent and inevitable need for attracting direct
foreign investments (DFls) while enhancing the competitive edge of the
country concerned. Accordingly, the deteriorated infrastructure in Iraq
sends a negative message to foreign investors, thus limiting investorflowing opportunities. This is the impact of the abovementioned
situation on economic growth and development.
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi economy suffers from out-of-date
infrastructure, which is largely due to the wars in which Iraq has been
involved75 Iraqi infrastructure has experienced little improvement since
2003, such as construction of building roads and airports. However, the
infrastructure, e.g., transportation and electricity utilities, are still
victimized by out-of-datedness and governmental negligence. 76 It is
worthy to mention that the low77 electricity production rate has affected
the performances of other sectors, particularly the industrial sector. 78
75. The Iraq- Iran war wreaked havoc in terms of infrastructure, followed by the First
and Second Gulf Wars, which wiped it out. Acts of rampage, destruction, and looting also
contributed to the current situation. Similarly, the electricity dilemma in Iraq started with a
lack of basic materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance. Technical support for a
grid station was also lacking due to the economic blockade imposed after the 1991 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. The dilemma persisted up to 2003, after which Iraq only encountered
slow-motion schemes in the form of specific investment targets for the electricity sector.
Poor planning and rampant administrative corruption across the departments in the Ministry
of Electricity account for this persistent predicament. See William Nordhaus, The Economic
Consequeces of a War with Iraq, YALE U. (Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/-nordhaus/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); Asad, Qaragholi,
& Sachs supra note 59.
76. Dahr Jamail, A Country in Shambles, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/0l/2012141151938534 8.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013).
77. An annual growth rate of 2.8% during the 1990s has been achieved in terms of
electricity production, marking a rate lower than the population growth rate. In return,
electricity consumption has increased by an annual rough rate of 8%, marking a clear divide
in the electricity production levels. Electricity station operation ratings have remained lower
than needed; as a result, 25% of the institutional capacity in Iraq was hit despite an increase
in electricity production over four years following 2003, with a total institutional capacity of
3550 megawatts in 2004, which increased to 5390 megawatts during 2005 only to regress to
4500 megawatts in 2006 owing to the increasing sabotage against electricity stations and
towers. The Ministry of Electricity produced only 6850 megawatts in 2013, which means a
daily operation capacity of 12 hours. See STATISTICS PRODUCTION ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
POWER IN IRAQ, SUPERVISORY ANALYSIS 2014(2014) (in Arabic).
78. The low-capacity infrastructure in Iraq, especially in terms of electricity
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Terrorist attacks pose a key danger to the shyly growing
infrastructure, especially when it comes to electricity transmission
towers and railways. 79 In fact, the lack of strategic thinking and
appropriate execution of reformative schemes for institutions concerned
with provision of the services needed for infrastructure rehabilitation
and development has resulted in a ramshackle and deteriorated the
national infrastructure. 80 Unfortunately, the excessively weak
infrastructure has contributed to foreign investors' reluctance to invest
in Iraq, as such infrastructure would increase operational and reach-out
costs for local and international markets alike. Eventually, this situation
discourages foreign investment in Iraq.
III.

DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This section highlights the nature of legal limitations that have
relatively precluded foreign investment flows and distorted the
investment environment. It further analyzes existing legal limitations,
which can be classified into three levels:

A. Inadequate Protection and Enforcement ofIntellectual Property
Rights
Laws regarding intellectual property rights in Iraq do not comply
with the provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in several respects. Copyright Law
No. 3 of 1971 is not completely harmonious in its use of terms such as
"author" and "original author" or in its references to the rights included
in a copyright and for holders of such rights. 81 For example, the
protection range set forth in the Copyright Law is narrow and only

production, will impact all other sectors, particularly the industrial sector, given the urgent
and inevitable need for projects to create electrically powered units. Given the abysmal
distribution capacity of this sector and the resulting longer blackout periods, individuals and
institutions, especially those in the private sector, have sought to come up with alternatives
from private generators to make up for the power shortage. Such generators are fuel
powered. This leads to increasing electricity costs and consequently higher direct costs in
the form of higher production costs for production projects. Therefore, one may say that less
efficient infrastructure is a major hindrance to investment. See Why Business is Still in the
Dumps, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), available at http://economist.com/node/16488938
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
79. Jamail, supra note 76.
80. Corbin, supra note 65.
81. See Bashar Malkawi, Iraqi Patent Law: In Search of Compliance with TRIPS, 37
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraqi Patent].
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provides for consolidated data without any reference to other articles, 82
while TRIPS provide for readable, selection-based, or content-orderbased works. 83 Similarly, Malkawi noted that Copyright Law No. 3 of
1971 does not address whether the exclusive right to adapt a work
includes the right to make a cinematographic adaptation of the work. 84
Further, the protection term under the aforesaid Iraqi Copyright
Law lags well behind TRIPS, 85 with the law providing for the first
public issue as the commencement date for protection. 86
The Trademark Law 87 violates the provisions of TRIPS in that it
allows for the filing of appeals and application of decisions of the
trademark registrar before the Minister of Industry and Minerals. 88
However, TRIPS provides for litigation before independent
administrative and/or judicial entities. 89
Moreover, despite the introduction of amendments to the Iraqi
Trademark Law, it still lacks in the use of state-of-the-art technology in
filing trademark registration applications, mainly because red tape
procedures are time- and money-consuming as well as less effective. 90
Regarding patents, pursuant to TRIPS, a patent must be a novel
innovation and applicable industry-wide. However, compared to Article
27 of TRIPS, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 does not explicitly set
forth patent-awarding requirements. Therefore, Iraqi legislators have
made up for this shortcoming through Article 2 of Patent Law No. 65 of
1970, which was produced to fulfill the aforementioned requirements. 91
In certain parts, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 goes further than

82. Bashar Hikmet Malkawi, Iraq's Accession to the WTO: Commitments and
Implications, 6 J. INT'L TRADE L. & PoL'Yl4, 19 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraq 's
Accession].
83. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property at Art. l 0.2,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (last visited Sept.
26, 2013) [hereinafter TRIPS].
84. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82.
85. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at arts. 20.4, 6.
86. See id. at art. 12 ("[S]uch a term shall be no less than 50 years from the end of the
calendar year of authorized publication, or, failing such authorized publication within 50
years from the making of the work, 50 years from the end of the calendar year of making.").
87. It is worth mentioning that compatibility exists between the Iraqi Law and TRIPs
in terms of the visual sensitivity requirement for trademarks. See Malkawi, Iraq's
Accession, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 24.3.
90. See Malkawi, Iraqi Patent, supra note 81.
91. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82.
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TRIPS in that it includes even biological patents for development of
methods of diagnosis and treatment, surgeries, and protection of flora
and fauna. Accordingly, Article 3 of the law should be amended to
accommodate exclusions provided for under Article 27 of TRIPS. 92
The provisions of the law regarding "fair compensation" are
ambiguous; an innovator may claim fair compensation from the relevant
employer in return for such an innovation as long as the same is covered
by the employment contract period, unless such a contract provides for
a specific compensation for an innovation. This provision may well
leave the door wide open for several predictions on accepting
compensation, setting a fair compensation mechanism in accordance
with the significance and importance of the innovation in question, and
the entity associated with setting the compensation value. 93
Once again, Patent Law No. 65 fails to refer disputes to judicial
entities. Article 33 of the law allows for appealing a registrar's decision
to void a patent before the competent minister, while TRIPS provides
for judicial referral to settle such disputes. 94 The protection period for an
industrial prototype is seven years as per the Iraqi Patent Law No. 65,
but 10 years as per TRIPS, in yet another violation of TRIPS. 95
Furthermore, the Iraqi Government's ability to enforce protection
of intellectual property rights and enforcement of relevant laws is
extremely weak. In addition, Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights
lack procedural measures for border-based customs management when
it comes to purchasing illegal copies of commodities and shipping them
across borders amounting to violations of property rights. 96 Moreover,
such laws are not enforced in the first place. For example, it is possible
to find hacked copies in public stores. The Iraqi laws on intellectual
property rights do not authorize competent authorities to self-act for
92. Id.
93. See Elizabeth Mirza Al-Dajani, Post Saddam Restructuring of Intellectual Property
Rights in Iraq Through a Case Study of Current Intellectual Property Practices in Lebanon,
Egypt, and Jordan, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 250 (2006).
94. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 32.
95. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19.
96. It is hoped that the new intellectual property bill will comply with Articles 51-60
of TRIPS regarding the competent court judgment requirement to finalize customs clearance
procedures of commodities suspected to be violating intellectual property rights. See 2013
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT- IRAQ, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204661.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). For this
purpose, a national committee has been established by the Council of Ministers of relevant
Iraqi ministries, syndicates, trade bodies, and the private sector to draft a new intellectual
property rights bill covering all related intellectual property rights. See id.
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confiscating materials that are proven to be violating property rights.
Furthermore, registry organizations in ministries and government bodies
concerned with the protection of intellectual property rights are still
using primitive tools that do not meet international standards. Finally,
the Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights are dispersed under several
laws managed by several bodies. Hence, there is an urgent need to
consolidate all intellectual property rights under one easily referred to
law. 97
B. Unclear Iraqi Laws for Ratification ofInternational Arbitration
Awards

Iraqis an active member of the Arab League ofNations, and in this
respect, 9 the country is often governed by stipulations from the 1985
Riyadh Convention, 99 which provides a common framework through
which member states enforce laws (including arbitration laws). 100
According to Articles 251-276 of the country's civil laws, any
arbitration proceedings taking place in the country are normally
considered to be a domestic issue (even though it may involve a foreign
party). 101 However, with recent changes in legislation, foreign nationals
or parties can decide to choose foreign arbitration. 102
Most states across the globe are common signatories to the New
97. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19.
98. According to Article 3 oflraq's 2005 Constitution, "Iraq is a country of multiple
nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League
and is committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world. Article 3, Doustour
Jaumbouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=l0027 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
99. The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation was signed on June 4, 1983,
in "Riyadh," by all the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice except Egypt and Islamic
Republic of Comoros. Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, LEAGUE OF ARAB
STATES (April 6, 1983), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
100. Id. at art. 37. "Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 28 and 30 of this
Agreement, adjudications of arbitrators shall be recognized and executed by any contracting
party in the manner stipulated in this part subject to the legal norms of the requested party,
and the competent judicial authority of the requested party may neither discuss the subject
of such arbitration nor refuse to execute the judgment, except in the following cases: (a) If
the law of the requested party does not permit the settlement of the subject of the dispute by
arbitration, (b) If the adjudication of the arbitrators is made in execution of a condition or
arbitration contract that is void or has not become final, (c) If the arbitrators are noncompetent under the contract or condition of arbitration or under the law on the basis of
which the adjudication was made." Id.
101. Saleh Majid, Arbitration in Iraq, 19 ARAB L.Q. 267 (2004).
102. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 139-140.
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York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitrary
Awards, but Iraq failed to be a signatory to the agreement and is
therefore excluded from the convention. 103
Requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitration decisions in Iraq are unclear because the Law on
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq (No. 30 of 1928) and the
Civil Procedural Law (No. 83 of 1969) do not regulate such decisions.
Accordingly, foreign arbitration decisions may not be enforceable in
Iraq, since this principle cannot be deduced from the provisions
neglecting the same. Furthermore, Law No. 30 of 1928 has provided
explicitly for the scope of enforcement in that it requires a decision or
judgment to be handed down by a court formed outside Iraq for it to be
enforceable in Iraq. 104
Iraqi commentators adopt two opinions regarding this negative
attitude: the first allows for enforcement, while the second denies such
enforcement. Advocates of the first opinion say that foreign arbitration
judgments can be enforced in Iraq despite the lack of a legal provision
to this end. The argument behind this is that the Arbitration Section of
Iraqi Civil Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 does not specify judgments
within the scope thereof. 105 Therefore, such scope cannot be restricted
without an explicit legal provision. Accordingly, it covers national and
foreign arbitration judgments, i.e., an absolute provision remains so
unless restricted by another. According to this opinion, irrespective of
whether foreign arbitration judgments are covered by international
conventions for enforcement of foreign arbitrator's judgments, 106 they
shall be enforced. Moreover, the acceptance of such enforcement in the
country has become a principle of private law that is common across the
103. Abdel Sattar al-Beriqdar, spokesman for Iraq's High Judicial Council, told RFE
that Iraq is keen to join the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitrary Awards. See generally Iraq Drafting International Arbitration
RADIO
FREE
EUR.
RADIO
LIBERTY
(2011),
available
at
Law,
http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_arbitration/2320391.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
Despite the fact that Iraqi officials have indicated that they are going to sign the New York
convention treaty, their failure to do so means that if a foreign national or company is to
obtain an arbitration award against an Iraqi company (or individual), it will have to enforce
the same through the courts. See PAULSSON ET AL., FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2011 ).
104. See Dr. Hamzeh Haddad, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan
and Iraq, Lecture Before the IBA Conference of Bahrain (Mar. 8, 1989), in ARAB INSTITUTE
OF ARBITRATION & ADR, available at http://www.aiadr.com/aiadr°/o20re/2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 4, 2013).
105. Id.
l 06. Maj id, supra note 101.
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world, as any judgment so handed down in the country is required to be
enforced. Hence, such enforcement is acceptable in Iraq as per Article
30 of the applicable Iraqi Civil Law, which provides the following:
"Any matter not covered by the previous articles regarding conflict of
laws shall be governed by the most common private international law
principles." However, the second opinion rejects the above argument,
as the advocates of the same are (rightly so) in favor of non-acceptance
of foreign arbitration judgments in Iraq unless the same are regulated by
international bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for
enforcement of the arbitrators' judgments in the contracting country if
Iraq is party thereto. 107
In addition, enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is one of
the most common principles of the private international law worldwide,
and hence, the potential enforcement thereof in Iraq pursuant to Article
30 of the Iraqi Civil Law may not be accepted in this respect because
the aforesaid Article is restricted to a subject of the private international
law or conflict of laws. It reads as follows: "Any matter not covered by
the previous Articles regarding conflict of laws shall be governed by the
most common private international law principles." 108 Considering the
fact that enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is not a case of
conflict of laws, the said Article is not applicable thereto. 109
Therefore, foreign arbitrator judgments including those handed
down to settle foreign investment contracts are not applicable in Iraq
unless provided for by international agreements. In any event, for the
purposes of enforcement of arbitration decisions by the concerned
executive authorities, the approval of such a decision by the competent
court after payment of fees pursuant to Article 272 (Fil) of Iraqi Civil
Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 is a requirement of the Iraqi laws. The
purpose of this procedure is to monitor the arbitrators' work through
approval or revocation judgments handed down by the competent court
on the ground that arbitrators are different from judges in terms of legal
experience. Another reason is to ensure that the arbitrators' decisions
are not illegal in either subject or form. 110

107. ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB
COUNTRIES 230 (3d ed. 2011).
108. Majid, supra note 101.
109. EL-AHDAB, supra note 107, at 230.
110. Haddad, supra note 104.
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C. Institutional Capabilities ofIraqi Judiciary
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi judiciary has adopted a number of steps to
wm foreign investors interested in Iraq. 111 However, there are many
111. In the aftermath of 2003, a new position was introduced in the Iraqi judiciary.
Additionally, some key reforms were introduced in the Iraqi judicial system; e.g., the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was restructured by Provisional Civil Coalition Authority
(PCCA) Order No. 35, whereby the SJC was assigned supervision of the Iraqi judicial
system independently from the Ministry of Justice. The said order was followed by the
PCCA-enacted Law No. 12 on May 8, 2004, which was designed to boost an independent
judiciary by providing for administrative and financial independence of the SJC from the
Ministry of Justice. See Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A
Retrospective and Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008). An independent
judiciary is enshrined and well-established in the Iraqi Constitution under Article 4 7, which
provides for establishing three federal powers in the State of Iraq, the independence of
which shall established by the Constitution: legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
Each of these powers shall conduct their work under the "separation of powers" principle.
See Bassiouni, supra note 48. Furthermore, the judicial power shall be independent, with
duties and functions conducted by courts of various degrees and types. See Christina J.
Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in
Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 181 (2009).
Courts shall hand down their judgments pursuant to the applicable laws. In addition to this
point, judges shall be independent and not subject by any power except that of the law in
the course of conducting their duties. No power may interfere with judicial affairs or
administration of justice. See Bassiouni, supra note 48.
Additionally, the Commercial Court has been created recently by virtue of the SJC
Statement No. 136, issued on 01/11/2010, which is the first specialist court in Iraq to be
assigned cases in which a party is a non-Iraqi. After the establishment of the economic
open-door policy in Iraq, it has become inevitable to create commercial courts to assure
investors of the presence of an impartial specialist court that allows for summary settlement
of disputes. Furthermore, a foreign investor may not only plead before such a court in the
course of legal proceedings marking disputes with private sector entities but also with
entities from the Iraqi Government. The only difference between a commercial court and a
court of first instance lies in the involvement of non-Iraqi litigants. However, in a
commercial case with Iraqi litigants, a court of first instance shall be the competent court.
See JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT (2010), available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/view.680/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (in Arabic); see also Jordan E.
Toone, Foreign Direct Investment in Iraq: Reassessing the Legal Framework, BYU I.L. &
MGMT. Rev., (Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2152037 (last visited
Oct. 29, 2013). The first judgment of the Commercial Court revoked the decision of the
Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MoIM), which was the defendant (the trademark
registering party) on the French Veolia Environment and condemned the defendant for
registering a trademark in the plaintiff's name pursuant to the legally applicable ways.
Veolia Environment, the plaintiff, filed an application with the relevant department of the
defendant to register its trademark, Veolia Environment, in several types of commodities
and goods following the defendant's refusal to register the same on no legal grounds
because the trademark was a two-word phrase, while the other trademark was a one-word
phrase in upper case letters and placed inside a square frame. The trademark to which the
subject matter of the case is related is not framed and is written in lower case letters.
Therefore, no similarity exists between both trademarks, and thus, the case was dismissible.
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challenges ahead, which are obstacles to creating a national world-class
judiciary.
The challenge encountered by the Iraqi judiciary is the unmet dire
needs of judicial institutions in terms of resources, training, and
Lack of experience in foreign investment disputes,
facilities.
international arbitration, training for judges, and court officers or
employees are the major concerns. 112 Foreign investors' trust the Iraqi
judicial system has been compromised by political interferences with
judicial work, 113 mainly in the form of personal safety threats against
114
judges, thus undermining the efficacy of judicial institutions.
Furthermore, outdated legislations and delayed legal reforms undermine
the integrity of the judiciary and Iraq's. abidance to international
obligations under international law. 115 Clearly, this leads to delayed
judgments. As a result of the enforcement of the De-Baathification
Law, many judges have been relieved of office on the grounds of being
members of the Baath Party. 116 As a result, only 750 judges remain to
Moreover, the court reviewed the original copy of the trademark layout and decided to
appoint three judicial exports to look into the matter. They confirmed non-similarity
between both trademarks and the subsequent cheating and deceiving of the public into
buying trademarked commodities bearing misleading trademarks that are not identical.
There is a clear verbal difference in the pronunciations of the trademarks, and hence, the
experts grounded the report, which is valid for a judgment pursuant to Article 140 (1) of
Evidence Law. The Court handed down its judgment based on Articles 5 and 10 of the
Trademark and Commercial Logos Law No. 21 of 1957. See Commercial Court, Judicial B
No. 315 I commercial court I 118 (2011) (in Arabic).
112. Court administrations still feature many administrative technique problems on a
large scale, all of which are obsolete. Such techniques include keeping case records, not
integrating records, and primitive and weak exchanges of information. These methods are
causing a lot of concern owing to the resulting potential disclosure of case details. See
U.N.E.P., IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT 18, 25 (2006), available at
http://www. unep .org/disastersandconflicts/portals/ 15 5/disastersandconflicts/docs/iraq/I CA_i
raq_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013); QED GROUP, LLC, IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL
CAPACITY BUILDING (ICB) ASSESSMENT, USAIDIIRAQ 2, 52 (May 2010), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADW087.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
113. AB.A., JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR IRAQ 35 (2006).
114. Id. at 29. Terrorist attacks against judges may well cast shadows on the country's
judicial institutions because investigations and trials are usually followed by threats and
violence against judges concerned, thus compromising their abilities to fairly and
impartially look into cases. See id. Most judges lack knowledge of personal security details
or sufficient training therein. Id. Other areas of lacking include provisions of a judicial safe
house, safe workplace, and firearms ·license. Id. A total of 58 judges and 70 judicial
officers were killed between 2003 and 2012. See Martyrs of Judges, Iraqja.iq (May 30,
2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/shheedq.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (in Arabic).
115. AB.A., supra note 112, at 19.
116. Jeffrey J. Coonjohn & Zuhair al-Maliki, Chaos in the Courts Can Iraq's

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

178

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Cakes Without Sugar

171

serve nation-wide judicial needs. Despite the fact that the appointment
of judges is a top priority for the SJC, it has been slow and accompanied
by a lack of experience among new judges in handling specific issues
such as foreign investment disputes. 117
IV.

PILLARS OF THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL CRACKS

Although Iraq has taken significant steps to create an attractive and
competitive investment environment together with the enactment of
Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 and establishment of the National
Investment Commission, which has given way to rising hopes of strong
Iraq-bound foreign investment flows, the following limitations account
partly for foreign investors' reluctance to flow into Iraq.
A. Imbalance in Investment Commissions
The facilitating procedures of foreign investors' dealings with
government commissions in the investment hosting country would
normally mark a positive economic and commercial activity
encouraging attitude. 1 8 Therefore, the Iraqi Investment Law No. 13 of
2006 provides for establishing investment commissions 119 that shall be
responsible for developing and planning national investment policies,
facilitating investment law enforcement by enacting regulations and
directives, and monitoring the execution of strategic investment
projects. 120
However, the Iraqi National Investment Commission (NIC) was
born politically dependent. Political rifts and corruption cast shadows

Embattled Chief Justice Fend-off Presidential Strategists, JJCOONJOHN.COM (Feb 26. 2013),
available at http://jjcoonjohn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Chaos-in-the-Courts-.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013); Pfiffner, supra note 21. The Chief Justice was removed from
service on the grounds of being a member of the Baath Party. Coonjohn, supra; Pfiffner,
supra note 21. Jeffrey Coonjohn, a Senior Policy Advisor working in the Middle East,
North Africa, and Central Asia commented, "Valentine's Day was none too sweet for Iraq's
Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud this year. Coonjohn, supra note 115; Pfiffner, supra
note 21. The 79-year-old jurist awoke to find himself ignominiously ousted from his post as
a result of having once been Saddam Hussein's personal legal advisor." Coonjohn, supra;
Pfiffner, supra note 21.
117. A.B.A., supra note 113, at 18.
118. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 48.
119. See The Investment Law Oct. 2006 Article 4, TRADE, available at
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
Investment Law].
120. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 49.
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largely on the commission performance of the local NIC. 121 Political
quotas played a key role in choosing NIC officers and employees, thus
leading to incompetent individuals being entrusted with the
responsibility of management of investment commissions. 122
Furthermore, the private sector, represented by high-profile
businessmen or key investors, is not represented in the NIC board. 123
Much to Iraq's detriment, the non-professional administration of some
investment commissions has led to politically-motivated decisions
granting or denying investment licenses; 124 investment commissions
have not been far from the government bodies causing corruption, of
which the Commission of Integrity (Col) has detected several cases of
blackmailing foreign investors into bribing employees for completing or
approving investments and disburse payments.
The NIC has not fulfilled its role, nor has it worked smoothly, as it
failed to reconstruct a foreign investment friendly environment.
Moreover, the NIC never had an investment advancement plan and even
lacked a comprehensive vision to plan for foreign investment
attraction. 125 All of this led to incorrect investment choices in terms of
121. Consequences of political rifts in the Iraqi Government include lack of
coordination concerning obtainment of approvals for key projects that end up rejected owing
to the non-obtainment of necessary approvals because of political rifts in decision-making
circles. See Hussein Tamimi, Iraq Needs to Rehabilitate and Expand Infrastructure
Investment through the Gate, NENO's PLACE (Jan. 17, 2013), available at
http://nenosplace.forumotion.com/t973-iraq-needs-to-rehabilitate-and-expandinfratstructure-investment-through-the-gate (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
122. See Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priorities in Iraq, USAIDTIJARA
at
A-79
(2012),
available
at
https://tijarairaq .com/?pname=resources_ tech&doctype=2 l &t_t=Technical_Reports (last visited Oct.
27, 2013) [hereinafter USAID]. In general, NIC employees show a very modest level of
expertise and competence, especially in terms of mastering foreign languages,
administrative systems, and e-control. Iraq Investment Climate Statement Bureau of
Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, IRAQPROJECT.COM, available at
http://iraqproject.com/investment-in-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
123. See Investment Law, supra note 119.
124. The most critical point here is that investment commissions have lost their
institutional professionalism regarding the vision behind establishment and performance.
They are the victims of political pressures that have affected their performance. For such
reasons, investment commissions have lost their credibility and necessary political support
to interact effectively with investors and national institutions (as put forward by the Council
of Representatives). See Rahim al-Uqailee, Corruption in Iraq Hampered Investment, 117
JUDICIARY 12 (2012) (in Arabic).
125. The NIC does not have a clear-cut integrated plan for current or future investment
opportunities. Qusay al-Abadi, a member of the Parliamentary Economy and Investment
Committee, called to cancel the national investment for failing to ensure the success of the
investment process in the country. See Ahmed Hussein, Ebadi Suggests Canceling Iraqi
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serving Iraqi development priorities. 126 In addition, the NIC could have
played a greater role in supporting Iraqi legislators and the government
via identification of key obstacles to foreign investment inflow, with a
view to adopting appropriate solutions considering direct contact of the
NIC with investors, which enables the NIC to spot obstacles to smooth
inflows of foreign investments into Iraq. 127
Iraq's foreign investment promotion policy has never been
commensurate with the country's investment needs. Shortcomings in
terms of promotion have been a key characteristic of the NIC; the NIC
has never established a promotion unit through which it may raise
awareness of the parties concerned through media campaigns,
conferences, or websites, thus creating a "foggy" perspective in the
already investor-reluctant investment environment. 128
Furthermore, despite the participation of the NIC in international
and national affairs, the organization needs more effective and active
participation to attract individuals and corporations to Iraq by displaying
available investment opportunities, distributing promotional booklets
and holding direct meetings with key investors or companies to provide
first-hand knowledge of investment projects in the country. 129
In addition, the NIC Marketing Department lacks strategic means
for targeting and building relationships with clients. Most NIC
employees do not master communication and foreign-language skills.
The mechanisms adopted to follow planning and project-licensing

National Investment Commission, IRAQI NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/ebadi-suggests-canceling-iraqi-nationalinvestment-commission/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013); John Lee, Sadrist MP calls for
Abolition of NIC, IRAQ Bus. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.iraqbusinessnews.com/?s=Failure+of+iraq+National+lnvestment+ Commission&x=42&y=l6
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013); Qusay al-Abadi, Call to Cancel the Investment Commissions,
ALL
IRAQ
NEWS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.alliraqnews.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=:2012-1 Ol l-16-3 7-4 l &catid=4 l :201 l-04-08-l 7-27-2 l&ltemid=86 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
126. NIC suggestions, proposed by local investment commissions, should be studied,
prioritized, and then listed as part of the wider national investment plan. See SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 16, 18.
127. The NIC argues that it has never been enabled to serve as an independent,
empowered member to adopt an investment attraction and sustainment strategy, but suffers
from governmental and political pressures. See id. at 20.
128. The NIC lacks sufficient and accurate information about the investment
environment in Iraq, particularly about the legal framework to establish investments, seize
available investment opportunities, and provide statistics and studies. See id. at 38.
129. See Mohammed al-Musawi, Weaknesses in the Performance of Investment
Commissions, 18 AL-QADISIYA L. SCI. 350 (2013) (in Arabic).
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processes such as design, purchase, production, distribution, marketing,
post-transaction services, search, and development are still paperbased.130 Furthermore, the NIC Department of Statistics has only
limited and far from accurate statistics, which lack any classification or
analyses. This leads to difficult investment decision-making in the light
of uncertainties owing to a lack of a reliable database. 131
The performance of the NIC has always been distorted by conflicts
and interference with ministries. Despite entrusting the NIC with the
responsibility of planning and executing investment projects, the
investment and development departments in other government bodies
that are entrusted with establishing ministry specific investments are
still in charge of such planning and execution. This led to a lack of a
comprehensive investment vision. 132 Therefore, the long-awaited
objective of reconstructing the national economy has never
materialized. This was further worsened by the presence of weak
political will in standardizing the existing institutional framework of
action, the controversial applicable laws, which are too ambiguous to
settle such duplication of roles. 133
The NIC-provincial investment commission relationship is all
about interference in terms of power and capacities despite the
supervisory powers given to the NIC and the requirements that such
provincial bodies act in line with the National Investment Plan. 134
However, there is an objection to the non-regulation of potential
conflicts between the NIC and provincial or territorial counterparts. A
clear manifestation of this conflict materialized in cooperation cessation
and contract termination threats delivered by the Iraqi Government to
Shell and Exxon Mobil, should the latter sign contracts with the
Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. 135 As explained by the Central
Government, the reason behind such disputes is that the Kurdistan
Board of Investment is not authorized to issue oil exploration
130. See Zainab Abbas, National Investment Commission Under the Hammer, 18 ALQADISIY AL. SCI. 350 (2011) (in Arabic).
131. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
4, at 38.
132. USAID, supra note 122, at 27.
133. Id. at 38, 47.
134. al-Musawi, supra note 129.
135. The Exxon Mobil-Kurd oil deal spat spotlights Iraq's juggling act between
politics and investments. See Alice Fordham & Dan Morse, Exxon Mobil Dispute Deepens
Arab-Kurd Spit in Iraq, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 l 2-04-05/world/35453128_ 1_ kurdistan-regionalgovemment-kurdish-region-exxon-mobil (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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licenses. 136 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil continually requests that
Kurdistan notify the ministry of all oil agreements signed by the latter
with international companies. 137 In tum, the Ministry of Natural Wealth
and Resources in Kurdistan argues that the Iraqi Constitution gives Iraqi
provinces the right to enter into contracts with oil companies. 138 It
appears that such disputes will persist because of the lack of legislation
for regulating Iraqi oil wealth. 1 9 The Iraqi legislature is blamed for not
referring to the legal personality of the govemorate non-provincial
investment authorities so that it can enjoy the same personality as the
National Investment Authority in Baghdad. This lack of legal
personality would limit their powers regarding issuance of investment
licenses for investors considering such authorities' financial
dependence. 140
For these reasons, some Iraqi writers and officials have called for a
"Supreme Investment Council" along the lines of the Supreme Energy
Council, which was formed in neighboring Arab countries. This council
is supposed to consist of the NIC, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Planning, and representatives from departments of investment in other
ministries and bodies under the management of the Ministerial
Cabinet. 141
The objective of setting up the Supreme Investment Council is to
settle existing disputes between the NI C and ministries and standardize
investment plans and efforts. 142 This can be realized by setting up the

136. The Iraqi Government declared the illegality of production-sharing agreements
between foreign companies and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Rex J. Zedalis, Iraqi
Oil Revenues from its Sale: A Review of How Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected
and the Past ad May Shape the Future, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (2007). For instance,
Hussain al-Shahristani, Deputy Prime Minister of Energy Affairs, said, "Iraq was 'weighing
measures' that it may take against Exxon after the company signed what the central
government considers to be illegal contracts with the Kurds." Id.
137. See Johnny West, Iraq's Last Widow: Diffusing the Risks of a Petro-State (Ctr.
For Global Dev., Working Paper No. 266, 2011); Abbas, supra note 130.
138. ZEDALIS, supra note 28, at 31.
139. Iraqi Oil Minister Mr. Ghadban stated, "I am not optimistic that the energy law
will be adopted in the coming months, and I would be happy if it is adopted by the end of
the year." He also stated that, "The more the law is delayed, the more we will have problems
such as the one with Exxon Mobil." See Kadim Ajrash & Nayla Razzouk, Iraq's Oil Law
May Be Pushed Till End of 2012, Ghadhban Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-02/iraq-s-energy-law-may-be-delayed-for-restof-year-ghadhban-says.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
140. al-Musawi, supra note 129.
141. al-Abadi, supra note 125.
142. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
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proposed Supreme Investment Council, which will have the upper hand
in decisions taken by ministries and the NIC, thus leading to the
commitment of conflicting parties to the enforcement of the same.
Considering its high-level political management, the Supreme
Investment Council may well overcome the obstacle of political rifts.
However, this study argues against the establishment of the Supreme
Investment Council, thus adding another obstacle to the already
obstacle-ridden institutional framework. The viability of a national
investment commission under the role assigned to the Supreme
Investment Council is questionable. If the solution is to introduce an
administrative council, reform should be introduced a fortiori to the
NIC. Accordingly, the key critique thrown at the suggestion lies in the
violation of principles on which Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is
based.

B. Bureaucracy in Land Allocation for Investment Projects
In the pre-1991 war era, Iraq had an outstanding position in the
Middle East thanks to its distinguishable abilities in public sector
management, which used to have a segment of well-trained and highly
qualified civil servants. 143 While good institutional capabilities still exist
across several fields, the long years of war and international isolation
resulted in the following issues: (1) diminished investments in key
domains of public sector management which diminished the
administrative capabilities of civil service; (2) very large numbers of
public sector employees stemming from a lack of job opportunities
elsewhere (the Iraqi Government has become one of the largest pools of
employees worldwide); (3) limited e-governance and automation; (4)
lower credit standards, higher corruption rates, and a weaker public
144
All these
sector; and (5) inefficient economic governance in general.
factors combine to yield a weaker and less efficient government,
particularly when it comes to the ability to provide key services and
1 5
assume responsibility for organizational responsibilities.
The main shortcoming to be spotted here is the strictly central
administration that rules by unquestionable orders and the

4, at 37.
143. Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6.
144. USAID, supra note 122, at 52.
145. See, e.g., ABBAS ALNASRAWI, THE ECONOMY OF IRAQ: OIL, WARS,
DESTRUCTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS,1950-2010 168-169(2010); SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 102.
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accompa
anying red tape that takes the form of a series of orders and
46
bodes.
This type of administration has fallen afoul of requirements
for investments because the latter requires simple, out-of-the-box, and
swift mechanisms to come to fruition. 47
Along with the complicated political transition, the administration
related challenges prevented the enforcement of necessary structural
changes to re-engineer the government and its mechanisms. Red tape,
lack of administrative efficiency, and blackmailing investors are key
obstacles to investments, as seen by Sarni al-Aa'raj, head of the NIC. 148
The One-Stop-Shop Authority (OSSA) is the only entity an
investor would visit if willing to be in Iraq. The OSSA facilitates the
investment process by equipping investors with the investment permit
without interference by the bureaucratic red tape. 149
However, the one-stop-shop policy has not eliminated the red tape;
even by bringing investment and land allocation licensing processes to a
more complicated level there is still the requirement to obtain approvals
from a large number of ministries and bodies. 15 For example,
considering Iraq's position as the world's second largest country with
oil reserves, the exploration operations for which are still underway,
approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Oil to establish an
investment on a given part of land. Difficulties can be easily imagined if

°

146. See Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6.
147. Id.
148. See Abdul Malik Mahmoud, Investment in Iraq: Reality or Illusion?, 83 ALRRAUD
MAG. 8 (2012). Abdullah al-Ismaili, head of Development Affairs at the Omani Gulf Energy
Company, said that the investment process has several obstacles and red tape to the extent of
scaling down ambitions of foreign investors, particularly in terms of obtaining licenses for
investments and importing materials to be used for such investments. See al-Musawi, supra
note 129. In tum, Taymour al-Byali, the representative of a U.S. construction company,
said that the current situation in Iraq requires many measures, most of which are
complicated. See Mahmoud, supra. Furthermore, the Vice President of the Parliamentary
Committee on Provinces, Mansour at-Tamimi, told Free Iraq Radio that the investment
problem in Iraq is very complex owing to myriad obstacles, highlighting that the way
investors are dealt with is too poor for them to maintain their investments in Iraq.
Accordingly, the investment environment has become repellent rather than attractive. AtTamimi also revealed that the one-stop-shop has failed in terms of investment facilitation.
Selling or leasing lands for purposes of investment is very complicated because of red tape
and conflicts between investment authorities and institutional owners of such lands. See
Abbas, supra note 130.
149. See JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT
(2006), available at http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2013 ).
150. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
4, at 35-36.
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the reply obtained from the Ministry of Oil is "oil or other sources of
energy soil tests are not finalized." 151
The NIC is also required to obtain approvals from the Ministry of
Water Resources, 152 Ministry of Electricity, 153 Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Interior, 154 Ministry of Finance, 155 Ministry of Construction
and Housing, 156 Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Tourism and
Antiquities, 157 and Customs and Free Zones Authority before any
investment license can be issued.
Considering the inherent red tape and delays, obtaining approvals
from the aforementioned departments inevitably leads to significantly
delayed efforts by the NIC, especially because of the political disputes
between the NIC and the political "references" of such ministries and
bodies.

C. Financial Markets
Any outdated legislation that regulates companies operating in the
Iraqi financial market must be amended to catch up with the new Iraqi
economic trend toward a market economy and to keep up with the

151. Abbas al-Yasiri, Corruption in the Form of Bureaucracy: The Investment Projects
as a Case Study, 79 J. KUFA U. 352 (2013) (Iraq).
152. Iraq is an agricultural country wherein the rivers Euphrates and Tigris flow in
addition to many creeks and water bodies that irrigate vast agro lands. Therefore, the NIC
must obtain the approval of the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture
to ensure that there is no conflict between an investment and public or private rights on the
site proposed for such investment. See Abbas, supra note 130.
153. Iraq has an electricity grid that encompasses almost every part of the country.
Considering the severe power shortage, the Government has prioritized projects of the
Ministry of Electricity. For its part, the NIC is committed to non-conflict with grid lines or
the projects of the Ministry of Electricity. See Mahmoud, supra note 148.
154. Since 2003, Iraq has faced a wave of terrorism and instability causing change in
heavy security forces across Iraqi cities. Therefore, it is the NIC's duty to avoid issuing an
investment license unless approvals of security institutions are obtained first. See alMusawi, supra note 129.
155. The Ministry of Finance is the body entrusted with allocating government-owned
lands. Id. Therefore, it holds the power to allot a piece of land to the NIC. See id.
156. The Ministry of Housing exerts enormous efforts to build housing communities in
a large number of governorates and on vast sites under a long-term plan to build five million
housing units. Id. Accordingly, the Ministry of Housing must be contacted to ensure nonconflict with NIC projects. See id.
157. Iraq has been home to the civilizations of Babylon, Assyria, Sumer, and Akkad in
addition to the Islamic civilization. Mahmoud, supra note 148. Because of this, monuments
are almost ubiquitous, and excavation efforts for artifacts of these prior civilizations are
underway in many sites. This has caused the NIC's commitment to not introducing
investment projects that may be harmful to archeological sites. See id.
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legislation regulating international financial markets. 158 A lack of legal
protection takes away the confidence of Iraqi and foreign investors and
capital owners and holds them back from operating effectively in such a
market. Furthermore, this market suffers from weak monitoring tools
and measures, which secures minimum disclosure and transparency for
those concerned-a fact that has given rise to companies operating in
the Iraqi market with limited finances, with the exception of banks that
are required by the Central Bank to hold a minimum capital of 250
billion Iraqi Dinars, compared to 15 billion Iraqi Dinars for money
transfer companies, 150 million Iraqi Dinars for exchange companies,
1-2 billion Iraqi Dinars for small- and medium-sized loan companies,
and 150 million Iraqi Dinars for financial investment companies. 159 In
addition, some companies have weak or limited databases, much to the
detriment of investors in terms of taking safe and quick consultative
decisions. 160 Other weaknesses include lack of flexibility in the
prevailing interest rate structure, especially with banks and insurance
companies that offer mid- and long-term loans for real estate
purposes. 161
V.

DEMONSTRATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: IRAQ
RANKING IN INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE
INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Many international bodies and organizations provide investors and
decision makers with digital information that helps them make
investment decisions. This help takes the form of a number of indices
that clarifies the efficiency of an investment environment. 162 Statistical
studies have proven that there is a close relationship between a
country's rank on such indices and how much investment it attracts. 163
To boost the stance of this study and show how faulty governmental
reforms have proven to be obstacles to foreign investment in Iraq, the

158. See Doing Business in Iraq: A Legal Guide, CEKTIR & BASARI L. FIRM (2011 ).
159. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Joshua D. Goodman, The Global Economic
Crisis
&
Iraq's
Future,
THE
JEWISH
PoL'Y
CENTER,
available
at
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/966/global-economic-crisis-iraq-future/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2013).
160. Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A Retrospective and
Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008).
161. THE WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ: FINANCIAL SECTOR REVIEW 11(2012).
162. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where
Should We Be Going?, 23 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (2008).
163. UNCTAD, supra note 5.
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following points examine Iraq's performance in the investment climate
on the basis of international indices.
A. Index of Economic Freedom
Economic freedom is one of the most important investmentattracting factors because it constitutes the best means for reaching an
advanced level of growth and economic welfare. Economic freedom is
measured using a number of variables that seek to figure out how open
an economy is and how much the state interferes with its economy. 164
Iraq has continued to miss a position on the 2013 index because of
a lack of reliable data on economic liberalism within the country. Iraq
has been categorized among the countries with zero economic
liberalism, and a 4.9-point classification on the index during 19972001. In 2002, this classification went up to 5, which is the highest
ceiling for a total lack of economic liberalism, thus marking an
on
unmistaken situation of zero economic liberalism, a tighter
1 5
economic activities, and expansion of state or government control.
To have the pre-2003 Iraq so classified among states with zero
economic liberalism is a result that sounds pretty logical because of the
economic policies and measures adopted by the country's pre-2003
governments. This period was an era of heavy state interference with its
economy. However, in post-2003 Iraq, there has been an economic
reformist approach with a view to larger economic liberalism. However,
the steps adopted by Iraq have never been sufficiently convincing to
merrit any enhancement considered in its classification.

grip

B. Ease ofDoing Business Index
The Ease of Doing Business Index, created and updated annually
by the World Bank Group (WBG) and International Finance
Corporation (IFC), is a compound index consisting of ten subcomponents that make up the base for a business-doing environment.
This index measures how a country's laws and governmental
procedures affect its economic situation while focusing on the small164. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: About the Index, HERITAGE FOUND. &
WALL ST. J. (2013), available at http://www.heritage.org/index/about (last visited Oct. 30,
2013). The Heritage Foundation introduced this index in 1995 in conjunction with the Wall
Street Journal. Other bodies concerned with measuring economic freedom include the Fraser
Institute of Canada and the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC).
165. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: Iraq, HERITAGE FOUND. & WALL ST. J.
(2013), available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/countries/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

188

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Cakes Without Sugar

181

and medium-scale enterprise sector with a view toward developing
benchmarks for measuring and comparing business environment
conditions in developed and developing countries. 166
In 2013, Iraq ranked 165 out of 185 countries on the Ease of Doing
Business Index, pushing it two ranks behind its placement in 2012. Iraq
debuted on this Index in 2005, when it ranked 114 out of 155 countries,
before moving behind to 145 out of 17 5 in 2006 and 146 in 2007 and
2008, with a persistent backward trend to 152 in 2009 and 166 in 2010
and 2011. These classifications explain the difficulties encountered by
the Iraqi investment, which is additional proof of the futility of the post2003 reforms. 167
C. Country Risk Rating

The country-based risk assessment indices include a number of
indications for investment- hosting countries that affect the flow-in of
foreign investments. These include political, economic, and financial
risks. Iraq has always been ranked low on all these indices, which is
further proof of the obstacles to investing in Iraq. The unanimous
categorization of Iraq by all these indices indicates the height of the
risks facing investments in Iraq. Country-based risk assessment indices
are issued by several specialist bodies, and the following are some of
them:
1. International Country Risk Guide

The BRS International Country Risk Guide is a monthly guide first
issued in 1980 that measures investment-related risks. 168 This guide
covers 140 countries, including Iraq, which remained among the highrisk countries untill 2012. From 2004 to 2007, Iraq was among the very
high-risk countries but moved forward to the moderate risk category in
2008, only to move back to the high-risk category from 2009 to 2012. 169
166. Ease of Doing Business and Distance to Frontier, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L
FIN.
CORP.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIA WB/Doing%20Business/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB 14-Chapters/DB 14-Ease-of-doing-business-and-distance-to-frontier. pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
167. Doing Business 2013: Economy Profile: Iraq, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L FIN.
CORP.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.trade.gov/iraq/build/groups/pub lic/@tg_iqtf/documents/webcontent/tg_iqtf_ 003
994.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
168. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, PRS GROUP (2013), available at
http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
Iraq, PRS GROUP (2012), available at
169. Political Risk Rating:
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2. Euromoney Country Risk
This index is semiannually issued by the magazine Euromoney to
measure a country's ability to meet its foreign obligations, such as debt
service, paying for imports when due, and freedom to transfer
investment returns and capital. This index has nine sub-indices with
various weights. The greater the percentage of an index, the lower the
risk that a country would not meet its obligations. 170
In total, 185 countries are covered by this index. According to the
2012 results, Iraq belongs to the high-risk category of states. In 20042011, Iraq has been swinging between the very high-risk to high-risk
categories. 171
3. Institutional Investor Index
The Investment Corporation index has been issued semiannually
since 1998 and covers 173 countries. 172 Iraq was categorized among the
high-risk countries during 2010-2012. From 2004 to 2009, Iraq was a
very high-risk country, except for 2008 when it was a high-risk
country. 173
4. Dun & Bradstreet Index
This index measures country specific international commercial
exchange-related risks, paying attention to assessing country specific
risks that are not related to a country's ability to meet the obligations of
not only debt repayment, investment capital and returns, and payment
for imports to exporters, but also missed exportation and investment
opportunities. The index in question depends on four categories of
variables that cover political risks, macro-economic risks, external, and
commercial risks. 174 Covering 132 countries, the index has classified

http://www.prsgroup.com/FreeSampleRequest.aspx?fs=/prsgroup shoppingcart/freedata.asp
x@@ctry_id=44 (last visited Oct. l, 2013).
170. World Risk Average, EUROMONEY COUNTRY RISK (2013), available at
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
171. Iraq's
wiki,
EUROMONEY
COUNTRY
RISK
(2014),
available
at
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Wiki/Iraq (last visited Mar.15, 2013).
172. Global
Rankings,
INSTITUTIONAL
INV.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/4 l 43/Global-Rankings.html (last visited Sep.
14, 2013).
173. Id.
174. Country Risk Subscriber Zones, DUN & BRADSTREET INDEX (2013), available at
http://www.dnbcountryrisk.com/?page=fctryriskl (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
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Iraq among the highest risk group from 2004 to 2012. 175

5. Co/ace Index
This index measures the risks related to a country's failure to repay
its debts and highlights how corporate financial obligations are affected
by the performance of the local economy, local political conditions, and
economic relations with the outer world. Countries are classified into
two key groups: (1) Investment Class Countries A, which branches out
into four classes (Al-A4) and (2) Speculation Class Countries (B, C,
and D). According to this 164-state index, Iraq belongs to Group 2, with
a low class of D, i.e., Iraq is categorized as a high-risk country. 176 Two
of the negative results that emerges from a Co face index of 2014 are
"Ethnic and religious rivalries complicating the establishment of the
rule of law and fuelling the risk of civil war; Insecurity and institutional
weaknesses delaying reconstruction and investment". 177
D. Transparency Index
The Transparency Index was started in 1993 by Transparency
International, which defines "corruption" as "abuse of public office for
private gain." This index measures the transparency level by
determining corruption levels among public servants and politicians. 1 8
Iraq was introduced to Tl's reports in 2003. Iraq ranked 113
internationally and 16 in the Arab world, with a 2.2-point 179 index,
dropping down to 2.1 in 2004 to rank 129 internationally and 17 in the
Arab world. In 2005, the index went up to 2.2, leading Iraq to rank 137
internationally and 17 in the Arab world. Iraq dropped in 2006 and 2007
to international ranks of 160 and 178, respectively, and 17 and 16,
respectively, in the Arab world, with a 1.9-point index in 2006 and 1.4
in 2007. In 2008, the status oflraq worsened to hit 1.3, ranking 178, but
went back up in 2009, 2010, and 2011 as ranking 176, 175, and 169,
175. Country Risk:
Iraq, DUN & BRADSTREET (2013), available at
https://www.dbai.dnb.com/int/en/dbai_frame.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
176. Economic
Studies:
Iraq,
COFACE
(2013),
available
at
http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
177. Economic Studies: Major Macroeconomic Indicators: Iraq, COFACE (2013),
available at http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014).
178. Who We Are: Our history, 1993 In the beginning, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2013),
available at http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
179. Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2012), available at
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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respectively, with 1.5, 1.8, and 18 points in 2012. 180
The quoted indices simply add to a distrustful investment
environment and the growing reluctance of investors to investing in Iraq
owing to lack of transparent transactions.

E. Governance Indicator
Governance Indices are issued by the World Bank Group following
the collection of respective elements from various sources. These
indices monitor governance and institutions entrusted with power in a
given country. Such monitoring includes the mechanisms of electing,
supervising, and replacing a country's government, a government's
ability to develop and enforce sound and efficient policies, and respect
from citizens and the state for institutions that govern a country's
economic and social relations. 181 The Percentile Index is adopted here to
figure out where Iraq stands among the rest of the world.
1. Regulatory Quality Index
This index develops perceptions of a government's ability to
develop and enforce sound policies and regulations that help encourage
private sector growth. 182 Iraq's ranks on this index have been 7.4/2003,
3.4/2004, 5.4 /2005, 6.9/2006, 7.3/2007, 13.1/2008, 16.7/2009, 15.8
/2010, and 12.8/2011. This is but an indication of the deteriorating and
inefficient regulatory frameworks to bring investments into Iraq. 183
2. Government Effectiveness Index
This index develops perceptions on the efficiency of public
services and civil service and the degree of independence of the latter
from political pressures. It also analyzes the sound mechanisms used for
government policy development and enforcement, as well as the
credibility of the government in terms of realizing these policies. 184 Iraq

180. Id.
181. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, WORLD BANK GRP.,
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#home (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
182. Regulatory Quality, WORLD BANK GRP., available at
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/rq. pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
183. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq Index, WORLD BANK GRP. (2012),
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (last visited Sept.
16, 2013) [hereinafter Iraq Index].
at
available
GRP.,
BANK
WORLD
Effectiveness,
184. Government
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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has secured low ratings in this respect: 1.5\2003, 2.0\2004, 1.0\2005,
0.5\2006, 2.9\2007, 8.7\ 2008, 9.1 \2009 & 2010, 10.4\ 2011. 185
These ratings indicate the inefficiency of the Iraqi Government's
administrative performance. This is no surprise considering the
conditions of the Baath Government till its toppling by the Coalition
Forces in 2003. Despite the little improvements made since 2007, the
ratings remain below the investors' expectations.
3. Index ofPolitical Stability and Absence of Violence
This index measures the perceptions of potential instability, such
as potential government instability or toppling by unconstitutional
means, and violent cases with political and terroristic motives. 186
Iraq had very low ratings from 2003 to 2011: 0.5/2003, 0.0/2004,
0.5/2005, 0.0/2006, 0.5/2007, 1.4/2008, 2.4/2009, 1.9/2010, 3.8/2011. 187
These ratings reveal the country's unstable political situation and higher
waves of violence and terrorism. Therefore, efforts must be exerted to
alleviate political rifts and enshrine national interests for a better
political reality, which is currently experiencing moderate improvement.
4. Rule of Law Index
This index evaluates the confidence of the parties working with the
state in terms of the latter's commitment to sound legal practices as per
the rule of law principle, especially as it relates to contract enforcement,
property rights, police, and courts, while ensuring such parties have
necessary protection against arbitrary orders or decisions in individual
cases. 188 Iraq ranked low on this index between 2003 to 2011: 2.9/2003,
0.5/2004 & 2005, 1.0/2006 to 2008, 1.4/2009, 1.9/2010, and
2.3/2011. 189 These figures prove the lack of state prestige and omission
on the part of public authorities to enforce applicable laws with equality
and observation of realities in Iraq. Therefore, foreign investors may be
dubious about the efficiency and enforceability of legal rules and
regulations in the countries they intend to invest.
In a nutshell, and as suggested by these indices, the investment
185. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
186. Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, WORLD BANK GRP.,
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2013).
187. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
188. Rule of Law, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, available at
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
189. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
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environment in Iraq has consistently secured low rating despite
moderate improvement in some of these rankings during different
periods. However, improvements have not been made to the extent that
enables the recovery of Iraqi investment environment. In contrast, Iraq
still lacks a sound, healthy, and competitive environment, which would
attract foreign investors. Therefore, a clear investment promotion
strategy coupled with boosting the recent approaches adopted over the
years that have shown the best index ratings for Iraq must be adopted.
VI.

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHOULD
BE ADOPTED
There is no "silver bullet" for foreign investor aversion to Iraq.
Nevertheless, there are certain reforms that may well alleviate foreign
investors' concerns and establish a sustainable investment friendly
environment.
The general reform framework is all about introducing
constitutional amendments, combating terror under a rule-of-law
approach adopted by a strong and transparent (both centrally and
locally) government, and introducing incentive and guarantee-based
pro-foreign investment legislation.
A. Address Inherent Determinants

By showing that the Iraqi Government's strategy did not
effectively address these challenges, this subsection highlights the
importance of creating a safe environment for foreign investors and
dealing with the risks encountered by these investors Iraq by addressing
the country's security and political challenges, need for institutional
reform by governance, and modernization of investment environment
laws.
1. Constitutional Revision
Constitutional revision of power distribution between the central
government and Kurdistan Province on one hand and the central
government and other non-provincial governorates on the other 190 is the
190. The Iraqi Constitution adopted a federal system for dealing with the Kurdistan
Province. Sabah Al-Bawi, Influences of Ambiguity of Constitutional Provisions on the
Administrative System of Iraq, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1165, 1165 (2012). This system applies
decentralized administration when it comes to the central government non-provincial
govemorate relationship. Id. Constitutional provisions are so unclear that several disputes
erupted across various fields, casting shadows on foreign investment companies. Id.
Furthermore, foreign investments that entered into oil contracts with the Kurdistan Province
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starting point for constitutional reform. Despite the current
decentralized administration of govemorates, the current administrative
structures adopt an unsteady approach toward Kurdistan, but a strong
approach toward other govemorates. Federalism and decentralized
administration have not been enforced effectively in the modem sense
of the concept, while public govemorate-based directories are nothing
short of "seconded" circuits of various centralized ministries. 191
A reformist paper about the decentralization policy must address
the administrative and structural organization at the province level, in
the Kurdistan Province, in non-provincial govemorates, roles and
responsibilities at each level, mobilization and allocation of resources,
institutional development, and capacity building. A reformist paper
must be based on a comprehensive survey of all existing laws and
practices that could be developed through consultative measures
adopted in conjunction with the concerned parties.
The conflict of federal, provincial, and govemorate laws that are
not clearly regulated by the Constitution is a major obstacle to foreign
investments in Iraq. Therefore, amending Article 115 of the Iraqi
Constitution 192 is a key issue because the Article prioritizes the Province
Law in reference to the distribution of powers in the event of a dispute
with the federal government. In contrast, other specific Articles refer to
the federal law as the dominating law when applied to cases of dispute
between provincial or govemorate laws. Surely, this trend is compatible
with sound legal logic.
The other suggestion is amending Article 122.5 of the Iraqi
Constitution, which allows Provincial Councils to disobey the laws of
the central legislature. Paragraph 2 of this Article gives govemorates
large administrative and financial powers, but relevant laws do not
identify such large powers. Accordingly, the provision results in a
dispute between the central government, which is annoyed by the
concept of powers, and the govemorates, which demand an expanding
have been penalized by the Iraqi Federal Government, which deems any contract it does not
control as invalid. See id.
191. See Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the Framework
of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the
Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV . 707 (2010).
192. See Article 115, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005, which reads: "All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the
federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not
organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government
and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and
governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute."
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interpretation. 193
Such disputes and conflicts have been a stumbling block to
establishing a healthy foreign investment environment, even leading
foreign investors to lose confidence in Iraqi laws. Penalties have been
imposed on foreign companies owing to their agreements with
Kurdistan without the consent of the federal government. These
penalties have caused a hostile atmosphere between provincial councils
and Kurdistan on one hand and the central ministries on the other.
Establishing a successful system for the distribution of wealth in
Iraq requires a clear interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi
Constitution 194 up to enactment of the Oil & Gas Law. As a consequent
step, the central government is required to develop and enforce
transparency and accountability systems that ensure a better exploitation
of resources out of decentralization; otherwise, state-driven anti-redtape efforts will grow more costly, with more chances for wider-scale
corruption. The central government can play a key role in formulating
public policies to attract investors, controlling the public, evaluating
institutions that are in direct contact with investors, and supervising the
decentralized opportunities available for investment.
Promoting a pro-foreign-investment culture in local, closed
communities is an essential effort that must involve better legal
awareness of foreign properties. The federal government can contribute
to the benefits of foreign investments. Furthermore, the social role of
the government and civil society organizations may be evident in
managing the means of contact with foreign investors and local
communities to break the psychological barriers that form a part of the
legacy of the colonization era further awakened by the 2003 occupation
oflraq.

2. Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Efforts
Boosting security stability is a key cornerstone to building an
investment attracting environment. As far as decade long terrorism
stricken Iraq is concerned, efforts of combating terrorism require the
following:
193. Al-Bawi, supra note 190, at 1167.
194. The Government of the Kurdistan Province insists on the "existing field" phrase
in Article 112, which provides for the control of oil and gas matters by the oil-producing
provincial and governorate governments. This means that newly discovered fields will be
controlled directly by the relevant province and/or governorate. The Central Government, in
turn, insists on Article 111 of the Constitution, which reads, "Oil and gas are owned by all
the people oflraq in all the regions and govemorates." See id. at 1168.
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a. Combating Terrorism Financing
The government should consider adopting new legislation on
confiscation of assets, money-laundering, and combating terrorism
financing with a view to allowing more room for law enforcement that
hinders financing terrorism and organized crime.
b. Fighting Terrorism According to the Rule ofLaw
Iraq's anti-terrorism efforts should move ahead while focusing on
the rule of law by litigating imprisoned terrorists using the applicable
Iraqi laws. The government should ensure joint responsibility of all
bodies concerned with enforcing applicable laws while moving ahead
with the capacity building of key government bodies and officials to
combat terror and international organized crime per existing laws.
Furthermore, the government is required to work with the international
community to update the laws and tools used to stand against fastgrowing criminal and terrorist networks.
It is essential to exert tremendous effort to enforce court orders and
judgments and step up cooperation between the judiciary and Judgment
Enforcement Office of the Ministries of Justice and Interior. The
unending prison breaks by terrorism condemned inmates must be
stopped. Government officials should honor final judgments through
improved administrative and criminal mechanisms.
c. Cooperating Widely in Counter-Terrorism Efforts
The government should expand its cooperative efforts across its
federal, provincial, and local system of government to combat terrorism,
whether Iraq-based or otherwise. Careful exchanges of information
between several government bodies, along with ensuring joint but
carefully distributed roles and procedures between local anti-terrorism
departments and all federal security agencies is the best means of
combating major threats.
3. Combating Corruption Flu
Several agencies such as the Commission of Integrity, 195 the
195. A key anti-corruption body was established by Decree No. 55 of 2004, which was
issued by the Interim Coalition Authority. About CO!, COMM'N OF INTEGRITY, available at
http://www.nazaha.iq/en_news2.asp?page_namper=e2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). A key
distinctive feature of this body is its independence from governmental and parliamentary
supervision. Id. The body was established to enforce the country's anti-corruption laws,
public service standards, and conduct social awareness campaigns that add to stronger
demands for transparent and accountable, clean leadership. Id.
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Inspector General, 196 and the Board of Supreme Audit 197 assume the
burden of combating corruption in Iraq. The growing corruption rates in
Iraq are due to the double-control, balance, and law enforcement
standards, with actions of the judiciary and parliamentary powers also
being in a similar position. All the abovementioned bodies have been
pressured to achieve certain results and have hence caused damage to
the overall anti-corruption system. There are key procedures that should
be established by the government for effectively combating corruption.

a. Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions
Effective leadership for any agency or organization is determined
by the employment authority. In Iraq, integrity bodies still need to boost
the appointment of Commission of Integrity employees and public
inspectors by the House of Representatives, as provided for in relevant
law, by moving away from the political quota-based trend. Filling future
vacancies by means of the random choice of public inspectors by
supervising bodies (such as the best employees of the Board of Supreme
Audit) would be a means of ensuring fair appointments. The same
applies to the Central Bank of Iraq and Office for Reporting Money
Laundering. Moreover, procedures and measures requmng
determination of beneficiary owners to prevent and disclose transfers of
criminal revenues should be legislatively endorsed. 198 Furthermore,
there is an urgent need to activate and build the capacities of the Office
for Reporting Money Laundering of the Central Bank of Iraq and
develop new systems to settle conflicts of interest between the integrity
officers.
b. Improving Accountability
Better accountability practices require the adoption of a group of
measures, such as annual submission of financial statements to the
Board of Supreme Audit and House of Representatives, regulating
196. This office was established by Decree No. 57 of 2004. MINISTRY OF OIL,
available at http://www.oil.gov.iq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). It is charged with
conducting reviews and audits of and investigations into ministerial works to check for any
abuses of power and violations of laws governing public service. Id.
197. The oldest controlling institution as it dates back to 1927 as per Law No. 17.
Board's Law, Bo. OF SUP. AUDIT (2013), available at http://www.d-raqabam.iq/pages_en/about_law_e.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Formerly the Public Audit
Office, it aims at conducting financial auditing to check corruption, fraud, and misuse of
public funds for the purposes of disbursement and use. Id.
197 United Nations Convention against Corruptoin art. 52, Oct. 31, 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/58/422.
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disclosures of income and ensuring submission to the Commission of
Integrity, including capacity building to use such disclosures to expose
corruption, and developing integrity, accountability, and control
capacities of parliament members and governorate board members,
particularly in major fields such as oil and gas, public finance, public
expenditure constraints, corruption, and law enforcement. Similarly, the
containment of political influence to weaken the control and influence
of government employees is required. Financing political parties and
disclosure of sources thereof should be regulated. The enforcement of
effective anti-corruption measures at supreme levels (including
imprisonment sentences commensurate with relevant crimes),
prevention of criminal revenues from falling into the hands of corrupt
persons, and development and enforcement of long-term capacitybuilding programs for combating the corrupt practices of government
officials at all levels of civil service are required. In addition,
government capacity should be enhanced to combat corruption and
nepotism through the promotion of a professional civil service that
adopts transparent policies of human resources management, including
the existing efficiency-based systems and clarifying the role of the
applicable Code of Conduct. Iraq needs sustained assistance to establish
an anti-money-laundering system in order to detect, investigate, freeze,
confiscate, and return lost assets and to immediately boost initial legal
cooperation with neighboring countries and countries further from its
borders. Other steps include combating money laundering by enacting
appropriate legislation, supporting strong capacity building efforts for
the Office for Reporting Money Laundering, and establishing a
monetary intelligence unit with the Central Bank of Iraq under strong
and independent leadership. These steps should be followed by a list of
public officials to be monitored and developed in this respect. Finally,
control, monitoring, and supervisory bodies need a better level of intercoordination, especially between the Board of Supreme Audit and
Commission of Integrity.

c. Complying With International Commitments
Despite approving the United Nations Convention against
Corruption by virtue of Law No. 35 of 2007, Iraqi legislators are
required to adopt all necessary measures to ensure effective
enforcement of the said Convention and observe the provisions thereof
in all laws enacted thereby. To achieve this goal, it is time to approve
Article 12 of the Convention, which regulates mechanisms of control,
supervision, and accountability adopted by the State in cooperation with
Published by SURFACE, 2013
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the private sector. Furthermore, working on harmonizing internal codes
of conduct for public servants and internationally and regionally
approved rules is a must. Other measures Iraq needs to undertake
include international cooperation to combat money laundering crimes
and coordinate efforts for the same, approval of the principle of
exchangeable international judicial assistance and international
cooperation in criminal and civil fields, and confiscation of corruptiongenerated revenues and returning the same to the country of origin.
Finally, electronic means for detecting and following up on corruption
and cross-border corruption-generated revenues must be implemented.
4. Rehabilitation ofInfrastructure
The Iraqi Government should take up achieving good economic
growth ratings as a key priority, an endeavor that requires a
comprehensive and advanced program to develop and enhance the
existing infrastructure. The major challenge to this program is the
electricity sector because securing current and future electricity needs
by the most cost-efficient means is inevitable to push forward the
country's economic growth and reduce production costs.
To upgrade the infrastructure in Iraq, the government should
establish a supreme council for the reconstruction of infrastructure with
the mission of planning, overseeing, and coordinating efforts of the
concerned ministries in accordance with an explicit future vision. The
proposed council needs specialist management in the field of
infrastructure and economy. Further, the Iraqi infrastructure database
should have complete and continuously up-to-date data. In addition,
there must be a specialist bank concerned primarily with financing
various infrastructure projects for low interest rate loans while seeking
to manage such loans in a manner that secures necessary liquidity for
infrastructure service projects without compromising the development
of such services on the grounds of lack of necessary liquidity.
Meanwhile, there must be deliberate and constant endeavors to
encourage infrastructure-based investments in accordance with modem
finance schemes such as concession and management contracts, which
secure private sector involvement by realizing double digit return
ratings in return for provision of quality services and maintenance for
such projects. Unequivocally, this requires a competitive approach,
private sector involvement, fewer restrictions to these markets, and
regulation of the same as per market economy rules.
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B. Reform of the Legal Framework
The purpose of this subsection is to seek the relevant benefits and
offer them in the form of a "guiding manual" for the Iraqi Government
for use in order to handle its investment-environment problems, mainly
by amending and modernizing investment environment laws.
1. Activation ofProtection ofIntellectual Property
At the center of the reform efforts is the establishment of effective
institutions to deter violations against intellectual property rights, which
should begin in conjunction with the launch of a public awareness
campaign to respect these rights. In a related development, unifying the
rules of property rights scattered in several laws under a single law is
also necessary. Likewise, legal wording contained in the legislation of
property rights should be clear and not allow for more than one
interpretation. Additionally, the country's intellectual property laws
should be identical to the provisions of the TRIPS agreement. These
reforms as well as their role in the protection of intellectual property
will lead to the acceleration oflraq's accession to the WTO.
2. Enforcement ofInternational Arbitration Awards
The Iraqi Investment Law allows for national arbitration as per
Iraqi laws or international arbitration through referral to any
internationally recognized arbitration body, as provided for under
Article 27/4. 199 However, this Article is inconsistent with provisions of
the Law on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq No. 30 of 1928
because it does not include any provision for enforcing foreign
arbitration judgments in Iraq. Furthermore, Article 1 of the aforesaid
law requires that for a foreign judgment to be enforced in Iraq, it needs
to be issued by a foreign competent court formed outside Iraq. 200
As long as there is no law allowing for the enforcement of foreign
judgments, Article 27/4 of the Iraqi Investment Law is futile. This is
further complicated by the fact that Iraq is not a party to international
conventions on arbitration. Consequently, as a procedural guarantee for
settlement of investment disputes, efficient arbitration is up to standard

199. National
Investment Law [NIL]
art.
27 (2007),
available at
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf. "If one of the parties to a dispute is subject
to the provisions of this law, they may, at the time of signing the agreement, agree on a
mechanism to resolve disputes including arbitration pursuant to the Iraqi law or any other
internationally recognized entity." Id.
200. Haddad, supra note 104.
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in Iraqi legislation. Therefore, this paper proposes amendment of Law
No. 30 on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq of 1928 in order to
provide for enforcement of arbitration judgments as per the terms and
conditions required thereof.
The above analysis clarifies that the enforcement mechanism of
foreign arbitration decisions has terminated all efforts exerted to
identify or develop effective settlement mechanisms for foreign
investment disputes in Iraq. Therefore, signing the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York
1958, has become inevitable because arbitration clauses in foreign
contracts require enforcement of arbitration awards. This shall become a
reality only by joining the said Convention, entering into bilateral
international agreements, or enactment of a new Iraqi arbitration law.
3. Promote Judiciary Independence and Capabilities
Iraqi courts are key players in investment dispute settlements.
Accordingly, it is imperative for the courts to have the power to deal
with foreign investment contracts. This shall be a key milestone to back
up upgrading capacities and establishing judicial independence and
security.
a. Boosting Judicial Independence
In seeking an independent judiciary, there is a dire need to provide
a sufficient number of judges and judicial courts to boost the course of
civil and commercial proceedings. Through judicial education and
capacity building, the SJC will be able to maintain high professional
standards for new judges. The much sought after independent judicial
system can be shielded from political influence by enforcing laws that
provide immunity to the judiciary. In addition, a relevant suggestion is
making more information and statistics regarding cases available to the
general public in order to spread awareness on legal culture and judicial
transparency.
b. Upgrading Judicial Capacities
Judicial newcomers' capacities must be built alongside efforts to
educate current judges through systemic training, continuous learning,
and updating relevant curricula. The Judicial Development Institute
assumes a key role in such continuous learning efforts. Long-term
activities can be technologically updated along with state-of-the-art
means of reviewing and presenting cases. Advanced training for the
judiciary in commercial and civil laws, as well as effective use of the
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commercial structure of cases and handing down judgments are among
areas of desired development. Additionally, commercial and civil legal
proceedings must be upgraded to promote a scientific and technical
court environment. Systemic reviews and continuous improvements in
enforcement of judgments (especially foreign arbitration judgments)
and court orders will contribute to better judicial capacities.

c. Enhancing Judicial Security
Judicial reforms in Iraq require short-term consideration of the
joint responsibility of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and the
Ministry of Interior (MoI) for judicial security. This objective is
attainable via a judicial security place clarifying the Mol's or SJC's
responsibility for judicial security. This plan shall cover details of
personal security, court security, and safe and secure houses for judges.

C. Reorganization of the Investment Framework
This measure aims to determine rehabilitation mechanisms of the
investment framework-an objective achievable by discussing available
solutions and recommending rectification of defects in the overall
investment process.

1. Activating the Role ofInvestment Commissions
The key suggestion for a reformist plan starts with the initiation of
a comprehensive scheme concerning the Law of Civil Service and
Public Administration. This scheme should enhance the links between
civil service and administrative reforms, enhance public finance
management, and build provincial capacities to provide non-central
services.
Reforms of the Law of Civil Service should adopt the key values
of modem management, namely efficiency-based appointments;
performance assessments and evaluations; successful planning; role
determination; delineation of responsibilities and relationships between
civil servants, ministers, and other elected officials; and codification of
ethical values and standards for the benefit of the society. In addition,
there is a need to establish secondary legislation to strengthen the civil
service compliance framework and links between civil service and
administrative reforms.
In a nutshell, Iraq needs to establish integrated e-govemance to
wipe out forms of financial and administrative corruption and provide
services (absent red tape) to investors through state-of-the-art e-portals
across public institutions.
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This study suggests entrusting the Ministry of Finance with
obtaining approvals from the ministries and government bodies in the
course of any potential investments. This is because the Ministry of
Finance owns all public lands that are not allotted to other ministries or
bodies. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is supposedly responsible for the
determination of all land available for investments, contacting other
ministries to ensure that these are free of current or proposed activities
by such ministries, and establishing the viability of introducing
investments thereto. This suggestion ensures full knowledge and
determination of the lots available for investment and thus enhances
investment planning and promotion. Another benefit is minimizing the
red tape associated with obtaining a host of ministerial approvals.
2. Removal ofBureaucratic Obstacles
For addressing institutional obstacles, it is hereby suggested to
introduce a "Liaison Department" to serve as a linking point between
the NIC and other ministries and bodies concerned, for better
understanding and coordination. The suggested structure of such
Liaison Department is based on assigning the management thereof to
the NIC, with deputy ministers accounting for other members.
Ministries that are directly concerned, such as the Ministries of Finance,
Planning, Housing and Construction, and Industry, should be introduced
as members of the suggested Department along with other members
belonging to the ministries and bodies as needed in a manner
commensurate with their roles in support investment projects.
3. Developing the Iraqi Financial Market
There are a number of key recommendations to enhance the Iraqi
financial market, the most significant among which is increasing
cooperation opportunities between Iraqi financial market components in
terms of their respective services and amending the existing financial
and banking legislations that regulate and control operations of nonbanking economic institutions to ensure compatibility with marketdriven economy requirements, develop performance among such
institutions, use e-systems to run their work, and ensure sufficient legal
guarantees to win investors' trust. Relevantly, an extensive durable
database must be created for public entities in the Iraqi financial market
to enable decision makers to make objective decisions regarding entities
working therein. Another key step is providing a non-banking financial
entity friendly investment climate by encouraging the creation of
market-making compames, investment guarantors, and finance
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companies, including small and medium loan companies. Further, banks
and companies must be encouraged to issue bonds allowed under
Companies Law No. 21 of 1997, as doing so is a key tool to increasing
capital and developing investment awareness of good revenues.
Working on developing clear mechanisms and directives to transform
the central Iraqi economy to a market-driven economy adds up to taking
the aforementioned steps. These actions would help dispel the
ambiguities, difficulties, and gaps posed by such transformation during
the transitional period.
VII.
CONCLUSION
In today's critical stage of Iraq's modem history, efforts to attract
foreign investors are underway. Foreign investors have always been
reluctant to break into this harsh investment environment given its
particularities, such as the military force driven transformation from a
dictatorship to a democracy and the transformation from a socialist to a
liberal system of government. This has resulted in Iraq's inability to
apply democratic ways of government and its fragile relationship with
liberalism, which hinders its financial and economic openness with the
rest of the world widely. Further, the current socialist laws of commerce
and economy are still in force alongside new liberal laws, thus leading
to a conflict between laws meant to regulate the same aspects of an
action.
Analytically speaking, this article has revealed the seriousness of
the risks of investing in Iraq to foreign investors. In addition, this article
spots the key obstacles in the Iraqi investment environment and
provides suggestions for Iraqi legislators and government for the
development and enhancement the investment environment. This
conclusion requires further legislation tantamount to the International
Investment Law in addition to ratification of relevant international
conventions and consideration of the conclusion of more bilateral
investment agreements; these measures would send positive messages
about the seriousness of the incentives and legal guarantees for foreign
investments in Iraq. Equally important is an appropriate consideration
of the challenges being faced by the concerned investment authorities
and public service bodies, as these may affect the efforts to enhance
Iraq's worldwide rank in foreign investment. To a large extent, codes of
shielding investment authorities against political influences should be
adopted. Meanwhile, initiatives developed by investment authorities to
attract foreign investors must be provided with political support.
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INTRODUCTION
Take out a pencil and a piece of paper. Now write down the
number five and put fourteen zeros after it. Now, going from right to
left, place a comma after every three zeros. Finally, put a dollar sign in
front of the number. Now, look at the number.
$500,000,000,000,000.
Five Hundred Trillion Dollars. To the majority of the public, that
amount of money is the equivalent of "a million bajillion" dollars. It is
more than thirty-three times the 2011 Gross Domestic Product of the
United States 1 and, if stacked in $100 dollar bills, would be taller than
(and consume) the Empire State Building. 2 However, five hundred
trillion dollars is the amount of money that was left in the hands of
greedy investment bankers looking to make a quick buck. How? Since
its institution, the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") has been
left unregulated. As a result, a few greedy individuals manipulated the
rate for their own financial advantage at the expense of every individual
who has ever taken out a loan. And how much money does LIBOR
affect? Five Hundred Trillion Dollars.
LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate that reflects the cost of
borrowing for banks and has been used to set an estimated $500 trillion
worth of financial instruments. 3 A number of banks have been accused
I.

at
available
BANK,
WORLD
THE
US$),
(current
GDP
1. See
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
2. See generally US Debt Ceiling Visualized in $100 Bills, DEMONOCRACY INFO,
available at http://demonocracy.info/infographics/usa/us_debt/us_debt.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2013).
3. See Heidi N. Moore, LIBOR for Mortals: An Easy Explainer, MARKETPLACE (July
3, 2012, 3:40 PM), available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/easy-street/libormortals-easy-explainer (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
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of attempting to manipulate LIBOR from 2005 through 2009. 4 The
manipulation stemmed from two sources: ( 1) derivative traders,
colluding with counterparts at other banks in attempting to manipulate
LIBOR submissions to boost individual trading profits; and (2)
executive level focused 'decisions' or collaborations to falsely lower
LIBOR submissions in order to give an artificial impression of sounder
financial strength. 5
Out of the potential twenty banks believed to be involved, to date,
only UBS and Barclays have admitted rate manipulation and false
reporting. 6 Subsequently, Barclays negotiated a $450 million settlement
which was divided amongst the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Financial Services
Authority. 7 To date, the U.K. and the U.S. criminal investigations have
been led by the Serious Fraud Office and the Department of Justice,
respectively. 8
While much of the focus thus far has been on the actions taken by
governments and regulators, this Note will focus on the institution and
history ofLIBOR, the manipulation ofLIBOR from 2005 through 2009,
and the evidence supporting collusion between banks to manipulate
LIBOR. Furthermore, this Note will examine a regulation proposal and
recommendations to the LIBOR system by Martin Wheatley, a top U.K.
regulator, and how his proposal fails to address the culture of the
banking system. Finally, this Note will propose the creation of a
"whistle blowing" incentive system to be instituted along with a
4. See James O'Toole, Explaining the Libor Interest Rate Mess, CNNMONEY (July 10,
2012, 12:07 PM), available at http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /03/investing/libor-interestrate-faq/index.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
5. See Halah Touryalai, Regulators Instructed Barclays to Lower Libor: Del Missier
Testifies,
FORBES
(July
16,
2012,
1:42
PM),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/07I 16/regulators-instructed-barclays-tolower-libor-del-missier-testifies/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see also James O'Toole,
Winners and Losers in Libor Mess, CNNMONEY (July 12, 2012, 5:10 AM), available at
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /12/investing/libor-consumers/index.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2013).
6. See UBS Fined $1.5B over Libor Manipulation, FoxBUSINESS (Dec. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/ l 2/l 9/ubs-fined- l 5b-over-libormanipulation/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
7. See Barclays Will Pay $450Mfor Manipulation Interest Rates, USA TODAY (July
available
at
27,
2012)
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/story/2012-06-27 /barclayspenalty/55854212/1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
8. See id.; see also Jill Treanor, Serious Fraud Office to Investigate Libor
Manipulation,
GUARDIAN
(London)
(July
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co. uk/business/20 l 2/jul/06/serious-fraud-office-libor-investigation
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013 ).
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regulatory overhaul of the LIBOR system.
Part II of this Note will provide background information on
LIBOR, specifically how LIBOR is calculated and how it affects any
person who takes out a loan. Part III of this Note will present an
overview of the LIBOR manipulation through investigation into
Barclays Bank, specifically through violations found by regulatory
authorities and the settlement between Barclays and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Part IV of this Note will
display evidence suggesting that LIBOR submitting banks colluded to
manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis. Part V of
this Note will discuss Martin Wheatley's proposed reforms to the
LIBOR system and the reaction it received from the public. Part VI of
this Note will discuss the problems within Wheatley's regulation
scheme, specifically its failure to account for the banking culture among
LIBOR submitting banks.
Finally, Part VII of this Note will
recommend reform for LIBOR and the institution of "whistle blowing"
incentives for LIBOR submitting banks.
II.
LIBOR
This section provides background information on LIBOR. Part A
defines LIBOR and how it is calculated, while Part B discusses what
information is taken from LIBOR and how it affects any common
person that takes out a loan.
A. What is LJBOR?

LIBOR is an interest rate set in London through submissions of
lending rates by eighteen major banks. 9 The submission by each bank is
a calculation of how much interest each bank would have to pay to
borrow from one of the other banks. 10 The British Bankers' Association
("BBA"), with assistance from the Foreign Exchange and Money
Markets Committee, selects the specific banks that will submit rates for
the calculation of LIBOR based on the bank's market volume,

9. Moore, supra note 3. The complete list of all 18 banks that contributed to fixing
LIBOR are as follows: (I) Bank of America, (2) Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd, (3)
Barclays Bank PLC, (4) BNP Paribas, (5) Citibank NA, (6) Credit Agricole CIB, (7) Credit
Suisse, (8) Deutsche Bank AG, (9) HSBC, (10) JP Morgan Chase, (11) Lloyds Banking
Group, (12) Rabobank, (13) Royal Bank of Canada, (14) Societe Generale, (15) Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation, ( 16) The Norinchukin Bank, ( 17) The Royal Bank of Scotland
Group, and (18) UBS AG. US Dollar Panel, BBALIBOR (May 2012), available at
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
10. Moore, supra note 3.
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reputation, and assumed knowledge of the currency concerned. 11 The
selection of banks occur each year, but rarely result in any change. 12
Many well-known banks such as Bank of America, Barclays, JPMorgan
Chase, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC are among the banks selected by the
BBA. 13
The use of LIBOR can be traced back to the late 1960's, when the
rate that banks used to borrow money was set and governed by a "small
Minos A.
group of like-minded bankers" based in London. 14
Zombanakis, a former banker at Manufacturers Hanover, recalls the first
LIB OR loan, an $80 million loan extended by a group of banks to Iran.
He explained, "we had to fix a rate, so I called up all the banks and
asked them to send to me by 11 a.m. their cost of money. We got the
rates, I made an average of them all and I named it the London
interbank offered rate." 1 For the next fifteen years, the banks set the
rate at which banks could lend to each other roughly as Zombanakis
described. 16 Although this may be shocking in today's financial world,
there was a trust amongst bankers that they would truthfully submit
their rates without looking out for their own interests. 17
In 1986, the banks asked the BBA to bring a measure of uniformity
into the market and to devise a benchmark to act as a reference for new
financial instruments, such as Forward Rate Agreements, that were
actively trading in the market. 18 Rather than negotiating the underlying
rate or forming rates by taking averages of ad-hoc panels, banks could
now use a standard rate. 19 This facilitated the operation of markets and
made benchmarking more transparent and objective. 20

11. LIBOR, Information About the London InterBank Offered Rate, GLOBAL-RATES,
available at http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/libor-information.aspx (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter LIBOR, global-rates].
12. Id.
13. Moore, supra note 3.
14. Id.; Landon Thomas, Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y.
TIMES (July 5, 2012), available at http://nytimes.com/2012/07/06/business/global/thegentlemens-club-that-sets-libor-is-called-into-question.html?pagewatned=all&_r=O
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
15. Thomas, Jr., supra note 14.
16. Moore, supra note 3; Thomas, Jr., supra note 14.
17. Moore, supra note 3.
18. Historical
Libor
Rates,
BBALIBOR,
available
at
http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspective (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
[hereinafter BBALIBOR]; Timeline: How the Libor scandal unfolded, TELEGRAPH (London)
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/liborscandal/9754981/Timeline-How-the-Libor-scandal-unfolded.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
19. BBALIBOR, supra note 18.
20. Id.
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At first, LIBOR was a benchmark for only a few currencies, which
included the American dollar, the British pound sterling, and the
Japanese yen. 21 Over the years, LIBOR expanded to include sixteen
currencies, but is presently a benchmark for only ten currencies. 22 To
date, regulators estimate that LIBOR supports more than $500 trillion
worth of financial instruments, ranging from simple mortgages to risky
derivative transactions, worldwide. 23
Currently, LIBOR is calculated in a similar way that Zombanakis
described. Each bank that is selected by the BBA answers the specific
question "at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market
size just prior to 11 a.m. ?"24 The bank then looks at its own financials,
looks at how much interest it would have to pay to borrow from another
bank, and submits a rate. 25 The BBA compiles all of the submissions
from the banks and presents the information to Thomson Reuters, a
global provider of business information. 26 Once Thomson Reuters
collects all of the rates from the panel banks, the highest and lowest
Then,
twenty-five percent of the submissions are eliminated. 27
Thompson Reuters takes an average of the remaining rates to produce
the official LIBOR rate. 28 As this process suggests, LIBOR must rely
on accurate and truthful submissions from each of the banks or LIBOR
will be skewed in one direction and the system will fail.
So why does it matter ifLIBOR is skewed in one direction? Well,
LIBOR is the primary way to measure the health of the banking system
worldwide. 29 Many banks will rely on this rate to determine the risk
involved with lending and "whether the other banks they do business

21. LIBOR, global-rates, supra note 11.
22. Id. The ten currencies are as follows: (1) American dollar, (2) Australian dollar, (3)
British pound sterling, (4) Canadian dollar, (5) Danish krone, (6) European euro, (7)
Japanese yen, (8) New Zealand dollar, (9) Swedish krona, and (10) Swiss franc. Id.
23. See Yuval Rosenberg, Libor-gate Explained: Why Barclays' Scandal Matters,
at
available
2012),
6,
(July
TIMES
FISCAL
http://www.thefiscatimes.com/Articles/2012/07 /06/Libor-gate-Explained-Why-BarclaysScandel-Matters.aspx#page 1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
24. BBALIBOR, supra note 18; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23 .
25. Moore, supra note 3; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23.
26. Moore, supra note 3.
27. Id.; see also Matthew Jensen, The Uses of LIBOR and the Victims of its
at
available
2012),
23,
(Aug.
AMERICAN
Primer,
A
Manipulation:
http://www.american.com/archive/2012/august/the-uses-of-libor-and-the-victims-of-itsmanipulation-a-primer (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
28. Moore, supra note 3.
29. Id.
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with are good for the money." 30 In simple terms, if LIBOR is high, it
means that banks do not believe the other banks are in good financial
health and are less likely to pay back loans that they will receive. 31 If
LIBOR is low, it makes the banking system look healthy and
creditworthy. 32 However, this correlation between LIBOR and financial
health may incentivize banks to submit lower rates. If a bank continues
to submit higher rates than its peers, which will be publicly available, it
may tip off the market that the bank is more risky or desperate for cash.
Once the market or investors obtain this information, they may invest
with other banks and cause banks submitting higher rates to lose
business. Therefore, if the majority of panel banks consistently
submitted low LIBOR rates, the remaining banks may underestimate
their true lending rate to refrain from reporting higher rates.
B. Who is Affected by LIBOR?

To many people, LIBOR may seem like financial jargon thrown
around by bankers at a cocktail party. However, LIBOR affects
virtually every common person who obtains a loan. 33 In the U.S., banks
have used LIBOR to set the borrowing rate for student loans,
adjustable-rate mortgages, and car loans. 34 In the U.K., many of the
same products rely on LIB OR. 35
For example, if a person has an adjustable-rate mortgage, it will
usually be tied to LIB OR. 36 With an adjustable-rate mortgage, a
borrower will lock in an interest rate, typically a low one, for a fixed
period. 37 Once that period ends, usually in three, five, or twelve
months, the mortgage rate resets to the current interest rate of the
index. 38 If LIBOR is lower when the mortgage rate resets, a borrower's
monthly payment will be lower; however, if LIBOR is higher, a

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27.
34. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27.
35. See BBALIBOR, supra note 18.
36. Donna Fuscaldo, Libor: What It Means/or US Consumer Loans, BANKRATE (Aug.
3, 2013), available at http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/libor-what-it-means-for-usconsumer-loans.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Kirsten Grind, What Libor Means
for
You,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
3,
2012),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000087239639044354550457756512072803 7852.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
37. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
38. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
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borrower's premium will rise. 39
The process is very similar for a person with student loans tied to
LIBOR. It is common for students to take out loans with a rate that is
LIBOR plus 2% or LIBOR plus 7%. 40 If a student signs a loan when
LIBOR is high, the loan repayment will be more expensive than if
LIBOR is low. In both cases, the loan rate rests on the foundation that
banks will submit honest and accurate LIBOR rates and will not
consider their own interests when making submissions.
Although inaccurate or dishonest submissions will affect LIBOR,
the change of LIB OR impacts an individual's finances differently. If an
individual has the financial security to handle increases in mortgage or
student loan premiums, an inyrease in LIBO R may not have a
substantial effect on the individual. However, for people who are
simply making mortgage or student loan payments and do not have the
financial wherewithal to deal with an increase in LIBOR, the effects
could be devastating. Therefore, a bank that is manipulating LIBOR,
either higher or lower, to stay aligned with the market or to affect
derivative positions, will drastically effect individuals who rely on
banks for trustworthy and well-founded financial instruments.
BARCLAYS BANK LIB OR MANIPULATION
This section provides an overview of the LIBOR manipulation
scandal presented through the recent investigations into Barclays Bank.
Part A describes Barclays's attempts to manipulate LIBOR. Part B
describes the violations found by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") under the Commodities Exchange Act and
provides a discussion of the settlement between Barclays and CFTC.
III.

A. Evidence of Manipulation
In the midst of the 2007 financial crisis, the credit markets began to
freeze up as banks began to suffer losses on their American subprime
mortgages. 41 As a result, banks were reluctant to lend to one another,
which led to shortages of the funding system worldwide. 42 As described
earlier, when banks are reluctant to lend to one another, a bank's
LIBOR submission will be higher and it will look less credit worthy to

39. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
40. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
41. The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Rotten Heart of Finance].
42. Id.
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the market.
At the time of the financial cns1s, Barclays claimed it was
submitting "honest rates" and other banks were submitting suppressed
rates, this caused investors to question the financial health of Barclays. 43
However, the CFTC responded by instituting its own investigation into
Barclays and uncovered emails between Barclays' traders and traders in
other banks asking each other to artificially manipulate LIBOR. 44 Upon
the release of this information, Barclays admitted to manipulating its
LIBOR submissions so they were more aligned with the rates of rival
banks. 45 Barclays instructed its LIBOR submitters to submit numbers
that were high enough to be in the "top four" and thus discarded from
the calculation, but not so high as to draw attention to the bank.46 In its
defense, Barclays claimed that it informed the regulators and the Bank
of England that banks were submitting lower rates than they could
actually lend at, and Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of
England, authorized Barclays' suppressed submissions. 47
As the investigations continued, the CFTC found additional
evidence of Barclays manipulating LIBOR to not only keep its
submission in line with other panel banks, but also to benefit its
derivative positions in swaps and futures that were tied to LIBOR. 48
From January 2005 through May 2009, at least 173 requests for altered
LIBOR submissions were made to Barclays' submitters. 49 Depending
on the trader's derivative position, the requests asked for a higher or
lower LIBOR submission. 50 To put the manipulation in perspective, if
Barclays traders were able to affect the rate in their favor by only one
43 . Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Libor's Dirty Laundry, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07 /opinion/libors-dirty-laundry.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
46. Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 41; see also Nocera, supra note 45.
47. Barclays Reveals Bank of England Libor Phone Call Details, BBC NEWS (July 3,
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18695181 (last visited Oct. 13,
2013) [hereinafter Barclays Phone Call Details].
48. Id.
49. Lindsay Fortado & Silla Brush, Barclays Fined by UK., US. for Falsifying Libor
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
27,
2012),
available
at
Rates,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-27 /barclays-said-to-be-nearing-liborsettlement-with-fsa-cftc (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Dan Jones, 'Done . . .for You
Big Boy': The Barclays LIBOR Messages, INVESTMENTWEEK (June 27, 2012), available at
http://www.investmentweek.co. uk/investment-week/news/2187554/-done-for-boy-barclayslibor-messages (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
50. See Simone Foxman, How Barclays Made Money on LIBOR Manipulation, Bus.
INSIDER (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-barclays-mademoney-on-libor-manipulation-2012-7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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basis point, or .01 %, it would likely make the traders more than $2
million. 51 This amount of money created large incentives for traders to
manipulate the rate with untruthful and inaccurate submissions.
Additionally, many of these requests were personal favors between
traders; replies from LIBOR submitters included phrases such as "for
52
you, anything" and "done ... for you big boy." In another instance, a
trader thanked a Barclays LIBOR submitter by saying, "Dude. I owe
you big time! Come over one day after work and I'm opening a bottle of
54
Bollinger [champagne ]53 "
In essence, traders were helping each other make money at the cost
of ordinary borrowers of loans benchmarked on LIBOR. They asked
each other for favors, so it seemed personal. In the financial industry,
traders cut deals with each other all the time, 55 as maintaining
relationships with other banks is sometimes just as important as making
money. However, when traders negotiate with financial instruments
such as LIBOR submissions, an official benchmark and a prime
indicator for market health, they can drastically affect the lending
market and investors that rely on honest rates.

B. Barclays Violations of the Commodities Exchange Act
After the CFTC completed its investigation, the CFTC sanctioned
Barclays for three major violations. This section will explain each
violation and will conclude by discussing the Barclays settlement and
how it spawned additional investigations into other rival banks for
manipulating LIBOR.

C. Sanctions against Barclays
First, the CFTC alleged that Barclays made false, misleading, or
Section 9(a)(2) of the
knowingly inaccurate reports of LIBOR.
Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA") makes it unlawful for any person
"knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through
the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or
other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly
inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions
that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate

51. Id.
52. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49.
at
available
BOLLINGER,
CHAMPAGNE
53. See
bollinger.com/en_UK/welcome (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
54. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49.
55. Moore, supra note 3.
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commerce. " 56 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays, through the
transmission of an electronic spreadsheet to Thompson Reuters,
knowingly delivered American dollar, Japanese yen, and British pound
sterling LIBOR submissions through the mail or interstate commerce
that contained market information concerning costs of borrowing,
liquidity conditions, and stress in the money markets. 57 Additionally,
Barclays's submissions were false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate
because they were not based on costs of borrowing unsecured funds in
the pertinent markets, but rather were based on impermissible factors
such as: (1) the management directive to lower Barclays' submitted
rates to manage market and media perceptions of Barclays; and (2) the
derivatives positions of swaps traders. 58
Second, CFTC alleged that Barclays attempted to manipulate
LIBOR. Under section 9(a)(2) of the CEA, it is unlawful for "any
person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the
price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity." 59
Two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: ( 1) an
intent to affect the market price; and (2) an overt act in furtherance of
that intent. 60 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays traders specifical1li
intended to affect the price at which the daily rights would be fixed. 1
The fixings, accomplished by calling Barclays submitters and asking for
higher or lower submissions, were done in order to benefit the
derivative positions or to benefit the derivatives trading positions of
traders at other banks, with whom they actively coordinated. 62
Third, the CFTC alleged that the Barclays traders aided and abetted
traders at other banks to manipulate LIBOR. The CFTC alleged that the
Barclays swap traders and the traders at the other panel banks discussed
LIB OR submissions that would benefit each banks' respective
derivative trading positions. 63 The traders at other panel banks asked
56. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
57. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, As Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In the
Matter of: Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., (CFTC 2012) No.
12-25,
at
26,
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/en
fbarclaysorder062712.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter CFTC Order].
58. Id.
59. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
60. CFTC Order, supra note 57, at 26.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28.
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the Barclays swap traders to instruct the Barclays LIBOR submitters to
submit a certain rate, or submit a rate in a direction higher or lower, that
would benefit the derivatives' positions of the traders at other panel
banks. 64

D. Barclays Settlement and the Spawn of Global Investigations into
other Panel Banks
Almost immediately after the CFTC published its allegations,
Barclays paid over $450 million to three regulators in the U.S. and the
U.K., and its chairman, Marcus Agius, resigned. 65 Additionally,
Barclays Chief Executive Officer, Bob Diamond, and Chief Operating
Officer, Jerry Del Misser, stepped away from their positions without
taking 2012 bonuses. 66 However, after the CFTC report was published,
the evidence that Barclays' traders aided and abetted traders at other
banks to manipulate LIBOR spawned criminal investigations into other
banks' executives and the individuals that contributed to submitting
false interest rate data for setting the benchmark. 67 As noted by Gary
Gensler, the chairman of the CFTC, the Barclays LIBOR settlement
initiated global investigation into rate-rigging at more than a dozen big
banks that contributed to setting LIBOR during the period of
manipulation. 68
Additionally, the CFTC report initiated private lawsuits and class
actions against the panel banks that made submissions to set LIBOR.
Collusion among banks to fix LIBOR, either higher or lower, can have
an enormous effect on a number of sectors, so there is a vast pool of
potential victims who can seek compensation. 69 As stated by Steve
Berman, managing partner for Hagens Berman, "[ w ]hile the settlement
with the CFTC does punish Barclays and other banks, it does little to
address the losses of perhaps thousands of investors who were

64. Id.
65. Moore, supra note 3; see also Sara Schaefer Munoz & Max Colchester, Top
Officials at Barclays Resign Over Rate Scandal, WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304299704577503974000425002.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
66. Munoz & Colchester, supra note 65.
67. Peter J. Henning, What the Barclays Settlement Means for Other Banks,
DEALBOOK (July 3, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/whatsnext-after-the-barclays-settlement/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
68. Ben Protess, Libor Case Energies a Wall Street Watchdog, DEALBOOK (Aug. 12,
2012, 8:57 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/libor-case-energizesgensler-and-the-c-f-t-c/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
69. Id.
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financially harmed by the conspiracy." 70 Therefore, investigations into
other panel banks and private lawsuits will continue into the foreseeable
future.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF MANIPULATION AMONG LIBOR
SUBMITTING BANKS

This section discusses the evidence suggesting that panel banks
colluded to manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial
cns1s.
As stated earlier, the Barclays settlement initiated an
overwhelming number of private lawsuits and class actions. Many of
these actions will rely on the following allegations to build their cases.
Part A will discuss evidence supporting that panel banks artificially
suppressed LIBOR. Part B will describe the discrepancy between
LIBOR and Eurodollar deposit rates. Part C will provide evidence that
LIBOR quotes "bunched" around the fourth lowest quote.

A. Evidence Supporting that Panel Banks Artificially Suppressed
LIBOR
As previously discussed, LIBOR is a calculation of how much
interest each bank would have to pay to borrow from another bank or a
bank's borrowing costs. However, LIBOR is not the only method of
calculating a bank's borrowing costs. Certain statistics, such as the
probability of default, calculate the degree of likelihood that the
borrower of a loan or debt will not be able to make the necessary
scheduled repayments. 71 These calculations are estimated on a daily
basis by analyzing each banks equity and bond prices, accounting
information, and general economic conditions (i.e. interest rates,
unemployment rates, and inflation rates). 72 These factors are essentially
the same factors used when determining LIBOR submissions.
Therefore, one would assume that the two statistics, LIBOR and
probability of default, which account for the same economic factors and
measure a bank's lending rate, would have a positive coefficient.
However, during the financial crisis, these rates were in opposition. As

70. Press Release, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Hagens Berman Files Class
Action Against Barclays Bank, Others Over Euribor Rate Fixing (July 6, 2012), available at
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/hagens-berman-files-class-action-againstbarclays-bank-others-over-euribor-rate-fixing-161635455 .html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014 ).
71. Default
Probability,
INVESTOPEDIA,
(2013),
available
at
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/defaultprobability.asp#axzz2B 118WVXm (last visited
on Oct. 8, 2013).
72. See generally Jens Hilscher et al., Measuring the Risk: A Modern Approach, 90
RMA J. 60 (2008).
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seen from the figures below, which list all panel banks that submitted
LIBOR rates in 2007 and 2008, the correlation coefficients were
negative.
To put these coefficients in perspective, if one variable is
increasing and the other is also increasing then the correlation is
"positive."73 However, if the variables diverge in opposite directions,
then the correlation "negative." 74 Finding a negative coefficient
between a bank's daily LIBOR quotes and the daily probabilities of
default suggests that as the probability of default increases, the LIBOR
quotes decreases. However, that would violate fundamental finance
theory because both LIBOR and probability of default are based on the
same economic factors. If both rates are based on the same economic
factors, then both statistics should move in the same direction and
display a positive coefficient. However, as displayed by the graphs
below, the probability of default and LIBOR quotes throughout the
financial crisis display a negative coefficient. This was true for every
LIBOR submitting bank, except HSBC, in both 2007 and 2008.
Additionally, the same negative coefficient resurfaces regardless of
whether the data is spread over a one-month, a three-month, or a
twelve-month term. This disregards any possibility of coincidence
between the two statistics. Therefore, this would suggest that banks are
suppressing LIBOR quotes to avoid revealing the higher rates that
reflect the true (higher) probabilities of default.
FIGURE 1
Graph 1: Correlation Coefficients Between Each Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and Probability
of Default (PD), One-Month Term

(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.)

73. A. K. SHARMA, TEXT BOOK OF CORRELATIO NS AND REGRESSION 5 (2005).
74. Id.
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FIGURE 2
Graph 2: Correlation Coefficients BetweenEach Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and P1·obability
of Default (PD), Three-Mouth Term
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(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of KamakuraRisk Information Services.)

FIGURE 3
Graph 4: Correlation CoefficientsBetweenEach Bank's Daih· LIBOR Bid and Pa·obabilitv
of Default (PD). Twelve-Month Term
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(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.)

B. Evidence Supporting a Discrepancy Between LIBOR and
Eurodollar Deposit Rates
The Eurodollar deposit rates are analogous to LIBOR because they
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1
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reflect the rates at which banks in the London Eurodollar money market
lend American dollars to one another, just as LIBOR is intended to
reflect rates at which panel banks in the London interbank market lend
American dollars to one another. 75 Economic and statistical analysis
strongly supports the Federal Reserve Eurodollar Deposit rate as an
accurate benchmark for measuring the validity of LIBOR as reported by
the panel banks. 76 Furthermore, because LIBOR and Eurodollar
Deposit Rates measure the lending cost to banks of Eurodollar deposits,
consider important market and financial fundamentals (i.e. monetary
policy, market risk, and interest rates), and incorporate risk factors,
absent manipulation, the spread between the rates should always be zero
or close to zero. 77 However, that was not the case.
As seen in Figures 4 and 5, from January 5, 2000, to about August
7, 2007, the spread remained positive and very close to zero. However,
from August 8, 2007, through May 17, 2010, which is the time period of
alleged manipulation, the spread became negative and reached levels of
negative 35 basis points. Additionally, during the two-week period
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the spread reached levels
as high as 153 basis points. Therefore, this evidence demonstrates that
the panel banks were suppressing their LIBOR quotes and colluding to
suppress LIBOR.
FIGURE 4
Figure 3: BBA LIBOR Federal Reserve Eurodollar Spread in

75. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1 68, In Re Libor-Based
Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) MDR No. 2262,
available at http://www.hausfeldllp.com/content_documents/9/Stamped-LIBOR-OTCPlaintiffs-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id.
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FIGURE 5

Bank Name

Average Spread between
September 16, 2008 and
September 30, 2008

Average Spread between
August 8, 2007 and
May 17,2010

1.Bank ofTokyo-Mitsb.

-120 basis points

-25 basis points

2. Bank of America

-144 basispoints

-30 basis points

3. Barclays

-87 basis points

-25 basis points

4. Citi

-142 basis points

-32 basis points

cs

-122 basis points

-27 basis points

6. Deutsche Bank

-129 basis points

-31 basis points

7. HBOS

-110 basis points

-29 basis points

8. HSBC

-141 basis points

-32 basis points

9. JP MorganChase

-153 basis points

-35 basis points

10. Lloyds

-146 basis points

-30 basis points

11. NorinBank

-126 basis points

-25 basis points

12. Rabo Bank

-143 basis points

-32 basis points

13. Royal Bank of Canada

-140 basis points

-28 basis points

14. Royal Bank of Scotland

-140 basis points

-26 basis points

15. UBS

-141 basispoints

-29 basis points

16. West

-138 basis points

-35 basis points

5.

C. L/BOR Quotes "Bunched" Around the Fourth Lowest Quote
Supports Manipulation
Because of the way LIBOR is calculated, by discarding the four
highest and lowest reported rates and averaging the remainder, if a
number of banks sought to act in concert to depress LIBOR, evidence
would display a strong concentration around the fourth-lowest rate. 78
During the time period when LIBOR was allegedly suppressed,
evidence demonstrates that the banks, specifically Citigroup, Bank of
78. Id. at 55.
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America, and JP Morgan Chase, submitted rates that displayed
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth lowest quote. 79 This can be
seen from Figure 6 below. After compiling all the banks LIBOR
submissions, quotes tend to "bunch" around the fourth-lowest spread.
However, when comparing this data against I-year CDS spreads, which
is also an indicator of a bank's financial health, the CDS spreads do not
"bunch" around the fourth-lowest rate and are more evenly distributed.
It is well established that "if banks were truthfully quoting their costs,
we would expect these distributions to be similar," 80 which is not the
case here. Following the same reasoning described with LIBOR and
probabilities of default stated earlier, if two statistics are based on the
same economic factors, their results should be similar. If not, the results
would disprove basic economic theory. Therefore, the LIBOR rates
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth-lowest rate, while CDS
spreads are evenly distributed, suggest manipulation between
submitting banks.
FIGURE 6
1 Year CDS Spreads

1 Year Libor Quotes
Zi

·f

5
0
5
1
1.5
2
Differencefrom the Fourth Lowest pread

V.

1

5

0

5

1

1.5

2

Difference from
the Fourth
Lowest Quote

REFORM OF LIBOR: THE WHEATLEY REVIEW

Martin Wheatley, a top U.K. regulator for the Financial Service
79. Id.
80. Connan Andrew Snider & Thomas Y oule, Does the Libor Reflect Banks'
Borrowing Costs?, Soc. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Apr. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.econ.umn.edu/-youleOOI/libor_4_01_10.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
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Authority ("FSA"), conducted an investigation of possible reforms to
the LIBOR calculation method in order to prevent another manipulation
scandal. Part A of this section will begin by presenting Wheatley' s
findings, and then Part B will introduce his recommendations for
reform. Finally, Part C will share immediate reactions to Wheatley's
report. If Wheatley's proposal is adopted, it will be included in the
financial services reform bill. 81 This bill is before parliament and is
scheduled to receive royal assent next year. 82

A. Initial Findings From the Wheatley Report
Wheatley's preliminary recommendation is to reform the current
LIBOR system rather than implement a full replacement benchmark
rate. 83 In order to replace the benchmark entirely, one must prove that:
(1) LIBOR is beyond repair; (2) LIBOR is subject to a better alternative
that existed in this moment in time; and, critically, (3) an immediate and
smooth transition to that alternative could be made. 84 Wheatley
concluded that none of these conditions were met and found that a
reform would be a more realistic solution than a full overhaul. 85 Due to
the overwhelming number of financial instruments benchmarked on the
current LIBOR system, a move to replace LIBOR would "pose an
unacceptably high risk of significant financial instability" and cause
large-scale litigation between parties holding contracts that reference
LIBOR. 86 Additionally, throughout the current manipulation scandal,
"there has been no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR by market
participants. " 87 This signals that the market has not lost complete
confidence in the current benchmark rate and that a wholesale
replacement of LIBOR would be an overreaction to the current
situation.
81. See Brooke Masters, Libor to be Regulated 'Without Delay', FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2012, 4:31 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6d20d018-1865-l le2-80e900144feabdc0.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
82. Id.
83. Martin Wheatley, Managing Director, Pushing the Reset Button on LIBOR, FSA
available
at
(Sept.
28,
2012),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml (last visited
Oct. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Martin Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of Libor: Final Report 7, GOV.UK
available
at
(2012),
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1917 62/whea
tley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Wheately,
Final Report].
87. Id.
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B. Wheatley 's Recommendations for LIB OR Reform
After Wheatley decided to maintain the current LIBOR system, he
proposed three major changes to regain trust in the benchmark rate and
prevent another large-scale manipulation. 88
First, Wheatley suggested that the British Bankers' Association
("BBA") hand over the authority to regulate LIBOR to the FSA. 89 The
current manipulation scandal, occurring over a lengthy period of time,
provides evidence that the BBA failed to properly oversee the LIBORsetting process and should take no further role in the administration and
governance of LIBOR. 90 Once authority is transferred, the FSA should
institute an independent committee headed by the FSA' s approved
persons. 91 The committee's obligation would include: surveillance and
scrutiny of submissions; publication of a statistical digest of rate
submissions; and periodic reviews addressing the issue of whether
LIBOR continues to meet market needs effectively and credibly. 92
Second, Wheatley suggested that the FSA' s independent
committee institute a clear, consistent, and effective regulatory regime
that underpins all activity. 93 This would include the authority to write
and implement rules in relation to the LIBOR process, supervise the
conduct of the firms and individuals involved in the process ... and "take
regulatory action for misconduct." 94 The independent committee would
require increased transparency from banks by mandating LIBOR
submissions be explicitly supported by transactional data that properly
identifies the bank's current lending rate. 95 Additionally, if banks
continue to manipulate LIBOR, the FSA' s independent committee
would be able to impose public censure or financial penalty. 96
Third, Wheatley suggested that the government should amend
current legislation to allow the FSA to "prosecute manipulation or
attempted manipulation. " 97 This would enable the FSA to use criminal
powers for the worst cases of attempted manipulation. 98 Currently, the
FSA only has statutory powers to investigate various offenses under the
88. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 12.
93. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
94. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 16.
95 . Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
98. Id.
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Financial Services Market Act 2000 and insider dealing under the
Criminal Justice Act 1993. 99 Therefore, the FSA is not in a position to
investigate and prosecute LIBOR manipulation. 100 Although Wheatley
noted that introducing criminal sanctions for LIBOR submissions might
create overlap with existing fraud offenses, create financial uncertainty,
and unintentionally criminalize unrelated activities, the civil sanctions
may not be sufficient to deter the large financial benefits that might be
obtained from manipulating LIBOR. 101

C. Immediate Reaction to the Wheatley Review
In his review, Wheatley stated, "in relation to the question of
whether administering LIBOR should become a regulated activity, most
of the responses addressing this issue were in favor of regulation." 102
Following the report, banking trade bodies, politicians, lawyers, and
buy-side representatives confirmed his opinion and were in favor of
regulation. 1 3 Andrew Tyrie, who is leading the government-mandated
probe into banking standards in the U.K., stated that "[t]he Wheatley
Review is a welcome initial step ... it has rightly stripped the BBA of
responsibility for LIBOR . . . brings LIBOR within the scope of
regulatory oversight and criminal law . . . and ensure[ s] that LIBOR
can't be rigged again." 104 Additionally, Simon Lewis, Chief Executive
of the Global Financial Markets Association, said, "the Wheatley
Review is timely and outlines clear recommendations for change ...
[GFMA] believes that all systemically important financial benchmarks
should be subject to regulatory oversight." Furthermore, the BBA
released a statement saying, "the BBA has strongly stated the need for
greater regulatory oversight of LIBOR and tougher sanctions for those
who try to manipulate it." 105

99. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Wheatley Review: Reactionfrom the City, FIN. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), available
at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-09-28/martin-wheatley-libor-report-city-oflondon-reaction (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Reaction From City].
104. Id.
105. Press Release, British Bankers' Association, BBA Statement on Conclusions of
Wheatley
Review
into
LIBOR
(Sept.
28,
2012),
available
at
http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-statement-on-conclusions-of-wheatley-reviewinto-libor (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
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PROBLEMS WITH WHEATLEY'S REGULATION
SCHEME
This section discusses why Wheatley' s proposed regulation
scheme fails to account for the current financial structures among banks.
Wheatley's proposed scheme is another increased transparency and
regulation scheme that is instituted only after the damage occurred.
Evidence will show that Wheatley' s regulation scheme fails to address
the collusion problem between the banks. Without addressing these
problems, banks will continue to act in their best interest regardless of
the sanctions or regulatory systems imposed.
VI.

A. Failure to Address Vague Definitions
After the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a trend in favor of
increased financial regulation. 106 However, to this day, four years after
the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, many of these
regulation schemes still have not been implemented. Additionally, in
the view of many scholars, many of the recent financial regulation
schemes have been far from successful. 107 The prominent explanation
for this delay is that in many of these regulations the wording and
definitions are too vague and, if left alone, would lead to expansive
regulation. 108 To solve this problem, regulating bodies continue to work
together to interpret the legislations' intent which has only pushed back
the date which regulation will take effect.
Wheatley's proposal runs into many of the same problems. For
example, Wheatley proposes that "the new regulated activities should
be defined in such a way as to cover the production of the submissions,
the calculation of the benchmark, ... systems and controls regarding ...

106. Letter from KPMG, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY PRACTICE LETTER (2010),
available at http://kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/regulatorypractice-letters/Documents/rpl-1013-otc-derivatives.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013); Mike
Colodny, Federal Reserve Board: Testimony of J. Nellie Liang, Director of Financial
Stability Policy and Research, on the Financial Oversight Council, given on April 14, 2011 ,
at
available
2011),
1,
(June
LAWYERS.COM
http://govemment.lawyers.com/blogs/archives/ 13638-Federal-Reserve-Board-Testimony-ofJ.-Nellie-Liang,-Director-of-Financial-Stability-Policy-and-Research,-on-the-FinancialOversight-Council,-given-on-April-14,-2011.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (providing
evidence through the Dodd-Frank Act, EMIR, and Volcker Rule that the response of the
2008 financial crisis was increased financial regulation).
107. See Mercatus Scholars on the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, MERCATUS
CENTER, available at http://mercatus.org/features/mercatus-scholars-comment-dodd-frankfinancial-reform-bill (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
108. Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End
Too Big to Fail? , 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 1, 27 (2012).

Published by SURFACE, 2013

227

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal

221

the processes for identifying and querying suspicious submissions." 109
However, Wheatley fails to give any guidance on how to actually define
these tasks. He does not include any factors that should be considered
when producing submissions or calculating the benchmark; rather, he
states that calculations should be "market led" to adapt to current
market conditions. 110
Furthermore, to increase transparency, Wheatley suggests that
LIBOR submissions should be explicitly and transparently supported by
transactional data. 111 Unlike his definition requirement discussed
above, Wheatley gives "LIBOR submissions guidelines" which set out
the specific transactional data that contributing firms should use to
determine their assessment of their interbank lending. 112 However, to
provide flexibility for submitters when transactional data is unavailable,
Wheatley asks submitters to "use their experience of the inter-bank
deposit market and its relationships with other markets," and allows
adjustment based on "interpolation or extrapolation from available
data." 113 In other words, if the bank is actually carrying out unsecured
inter-bank deposit transactions then it should use that transactional data
to support its submissions. If not, which commonly occurs, banks are
still able to use their judgment based on "experience," "relationships,"
and "research" of market data. 114 In essence, Wheatley trusts traders
with discretionary power to make honest and accurate submissions
when trading data is unavailable to support submissions. These are the
same factors that created the opportunity for manipulation in the first
place.
Therefore, Wheatley fails to give specific intentions for definitions
within the regulation scheme, which will lead to overregulation and
delay implementation. Further, where Wheatley attempts to provide
definitions, opportunities for continued manipulation remain blatantly

109. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 13 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 27.
112. Id.at28.
113. Matt Levine, It's the Beginning of the End for Danish Kroner Libor,
DEALBREAKER (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://dealbreaker.com/2012/09/its-thebeginning-of-the-end-for-danish-kronerliborl?utmsource=feedburner&utmmedium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dealbreaker+
dealbreaker+%28Dealbreaker°/o29&utm_ content=Google+Reader (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
114. See id.; see also Richard E. Farley, The Future of L/BOR- The Final Reportfrom
Paul
Hastings
LLP
1,2
(2012),
available
at
the
Wheatley
Review,
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2260.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2013).
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evident.
B. Failure to Address Banking Culture
As stated earlier, evidence suggesting banks were colluding to
manipulate LIBOR spawned Wheatley's investigation. Collusion is an
agreement amongst competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on
interfirm communication or transfers. 115 The suppression of interfirm
rivalry leads to firms earning monopoly profits. 116 Here, evidence
suggested that banks, which usually compete within the industry,
colluded with each other to suppress rivalry and enhance profits. 117
Wheatley's solution to this problem is to "increase transparency" and
"impose criminal sanctions." 118
However, Wheatley overlooks the fact that a culture was created
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. Only
increasing transparency and instituting criminal sanctions fails to
properly address this problem. One should consider the following.
First, although other benchmark rates exist that could substitute
LIBOR, in the wake of the biggest manipulation scandal to date, there
was no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR. 119 This suggests that
these colluding banks experience no threat of substitutes to other
benchmark rates and will still control the vast amount of financial
instruments within the market through LIBOR. In essence, they have a
monopoly among investors within the LIBOR market.
Second, as stated earlier, Wheatley's submission platform leaves
opportunity for LIBOR submitters to make submissions based on their
own judgment from "experience," "relationships," and "research" of
market data. This is the same situation for LIBOR submitters when
they were completely unregulated before the Wheatley report.
Therefore, as long as potential profits outweigh the potential sanction or
fines, Wheatley's suggestions will not change the colluding nature
around LIBOR because major threats to the benchmark rate are absent
and opportunities for manipulation are still available.
Now, what would be the immediate response to such an argument?
Make sure Wheatley' s sanctions or criminal penalties are high enough
to deter banks from colluding to manipulate LIBOR. However, if

115. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELLS AND BIDDING RINGS VIII (2012).
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 5.
See Foxman, supra note 50.
Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18.
See id. at 7.
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opportunities arise, which they will, where LIBOR rates are based on
trader's "experience," "relationships," and "research" of market data,
then it will be very difficult for regulatory bodies to impose criminal
sanctions without a bank admitting its wrongdoing like Barclays.
However, the current regulatory structure and the profitable business
relationship between banks makes such a situation very unlikely.
First, the regulatory structure makes an admission of manipulation
unlikely. The ability of the bank to maximize personal benefit is based
on the ability to predict what the other side will do in response to either
abiding by the regulations or manipulating LIBOR. 120 Given that in
almost all cases the regulatory body has less funds, personnel,
resources, and expertise than its bank counterparts, there is little to be
gained in the long run by cooperating, and much to be gained by
maximizing its own benefit. 121 Therefore, if the regulatory body does
not have the means to properly overlook every submission of banks,
submissions may continue to be manipulated to maximize personal
gam.
Second, the relationship between banks makes an admission of
manipulation unlikely. The banks involved in submitting LIBOR rates
are amongst the biggest and most respected banks in the world. 122 In
addition, LIBOR submitting banks participate in a vast amount of
financial transactions with each other. If one bank was to report
manipulation of another bank, it may jeopardize a working business
relationship. Sacrificing a business relationship, especially a profitable
one, would likely outweigh the choice to come forward to comply with
Wheatley' s regulation scheme.
Therefore, Wheatley's proposed criminal sanctions will not affect
the banking culture and incentives to collude in the long run.
VII.

PROPOSAL FOR LIBOR REFORM

This section provides insight on a possible solution to
shortcomings within the LIBOR system and Wheatley's proposal. Part
A will characterize the present regulator-regulatee system that is
currently in place and explain why only regulation will not be sufficient.
Afterwards, Part B will explain a possible solution to alter the
120. DAVID RUBENS Assoc., THE REGULATORY SYSTEM WHY IS IT FAILING? 1, 7
(2012),
available
at
http://www.davidrubensassociates.com/PDFS/DRA_The%20Regulatoty°/o20System%20%20Why%20Is%20It%20Failing_Aug2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
121. Id.
122. Top IO Investment Banks, BANKS AROUND THE WORLD, available at
http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/top-investment-banks (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
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regulatory structure.
A. LIBOR Regulation and Modern Day Game Theory
As explained earlier, Wheatley proposed a regulatory structure that
would place all LIBOR submitting banks under the governance of the
FSA. However, the supervisory role of the regulatory bodies, with
threat of punitive action, only creates a modem day game theory and
makes collusion among banks the optimal solution.
Game theory attempts to look at the relationships between
123
participants in a particular model and predict their optimal decisions.
The most well-known example is the prisoner's dilemma. 124 For
example, imagine that two prisoners are offered the opportunity to
either deny a charge or give evidence against the other one. 125 If both
Prisoner A and Prisoner B stay silent, they each receive one month
imprisonment. 126 If they both provide evidence against the other, they
each receive three months imprisonment. 127 However, if one prisoner
rats on the other, who in tum stays silent, then the prisoner who gives
the evidence goes free, and the prisoner who was betrayed receives one
year imprisonment. 128
It is well recognized that the optimal strategy in the above situation
is to give evidence against the other person. 129 Although both sides
would attain a lower sentence if they stayed silent, the prisoners have no
130
control over each other's actions and will give up each other.
However, the optimal strategy changes if the prisoners can adjust their
strategy based on previous experience. This is a more practical view for
comparison with the financial regulatory structure. In such a situation,
commonly identified as 'tit for tat,' the optimal strategy would be to
repeat what the other party did on the first occasion. If the first choice
was to cooperate, then continue to cooperate. If the first choice was to

at
available
lNVESTOPEDIA,
Theory,
123. Game
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gametheory.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
at
available
LEARNER,
ANNENBERG
Dilemma,
Prisoner's
124. See
http://www.learner.org/courses/mathilluminated/units/9/textbook/04.php (last visited Sept.
20, 2013); DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 120, at 6.
125. ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
130. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
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betray, then continue to betray. 131
Here, strong evidence supports the conclusion that LIBOR
submitting banks have been "cooperating" for an extended period of
time. As seen in the 'tit for tat' theory, it is mutually beneficial for all
parties involved to continue to "cooperate." However, unlike the
prisoners in the example who seek less jail time, "mutually beneficial"
for LIBOR submitting banks equals extraordinary financial gains.
Additionally, the incentive to "cooperate" only increases if one includes
the fact that most regulators are less funded and resource intensive than
the majority of LIBOR submitting banks. If regulators cannot provide
funds for proper supervision or banks realize they are more likely to get
away with manipulation than face punitive damages, then banks will
only continue to "cooperate." Therefore, a regulatory structure must be
instituted that creates a situation that makes LIBOR submitting banks
"betray" each other rather than "cooperate."
B. Creation of a "Whistle Blowing" Incentive System

As stated above, if banks are not deterred from cooperating then
financial regulations will be ineffective. However, a "whistle blowing"
incentive system incorporated within Wheatley's proposed regulatory
scheme could tum the LIBOR submitting banks against each other.
A similar program was instituted within the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act, which rewards 10 to 30 percent of monetary
sanctions for whistleblowers who report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") original information leading to securities law
enforcement actions that recover more than $1 million. 132 As a result,
the SEC reported that the "whistle blowing" program received 3,001
formal written whistleblower "tips" seeking consideration for an award
in 2012 (excluding tips that reported alleged violations that were
received from persons who were ineligible to receive a bounty). 133
Here, if a similar "whistle blower" program was instituted, the
131. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
132. Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act's Robust Whist/eh/owing Incentives,
FORBES
(Apr.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011 /04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robustwhistleblowing-incentives/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
133. Scott J. Wenner, United States: SEC Report Confirms Substantial Dodd-Frank
Whistle-Blowing Activity, lllustrating Need for Employers To Be Proactive - And Careful,
MONDAQ
(Nov.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/208852/Whistleblowing/SEC+Report+Confirms+Su
bstantial+DoddFrank+WhistleBlowing+Activity+Illustrating+Need+For+Employers+To+B
e+Proactive+And+Careful (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
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dynamic between the regulator and a LIBOR submitting bank would be
altered. Banks would no longer be subjected to possible punitive
damages from the regulators, but they also could be subjected to
"whistle blowing" claims made by other banks or players in the
industry. Additionally, if "whistle blowing" incentives are comparable
to the gains made by manipulating LIBOR, banks would be more likely
to "blow the whistle." LIBOR submitting banks would be able to make
similar short term profits by tipping regulators of misconduct, but would
do so without apprehension of their own misconduct. Such a program
would incentivize LIBOR submitting banks to betray each other and
"blow the whistle" rather than "cooperate."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The LIBOR manipulation scandal is considered one of the biggest
scandals the financial world has seen to date. While in 1960, when
LIBOR was instituted, an unregulated system to set the world's largest
benchmark for lending may have been acceptable, it is clear that
structural changes are needed. The evidence presented in this Note
points not only to a couple greedy individuals looking to make a quick
buck (or million), but an industry wide manipulation, that included
some of the most powerful corporations within the financial industry.
Additionally, as this Note has illustrated, the manipulation did not just
affect the financial markets, but had devastating effects to almost every
person that went to the bank and took out a loan.
Wheatley's proposal is a much-needed step. LIBOR needs to be
heavily regulated to prevent a scandal like this from ever happening
again. However, Wheatley' s proposal does not fix the problem and
contains multiple shortcomings. First, a banking culture was created
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. If this
culture is not altered, banks will just look to other ways to make money
to compensate for any sanction a regulatory body will impose.
Additionally, most, if not all, of these banks engage in a vast amount of
financial transactions together and reporting partner banks' attempted
manipulation may jeopardize these relationships. Second, Wheatley
leaves room for submitters to use their own "experience" and
"relationships" to set LIBOR. In effect, Wheatley gives LIBOR
submitters large discretion for setting the rate, which is exactly what
created the opportunity for manipulation.
To solve these problems, this Note has discussed an incentive
program to change the structure between financial regulators and the
LIBOR submitting banks. If a system is implemented that makes it
more or equally profitable to "blow the whistle" than collude, future
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manipulation will be prevented.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is sending a lot of semen abroad - but not sailors.
Currently, the U.S. is the number one exporter of human sperm. 2 The
French may be the expert in romance, and Latin Americans may flaunt
their machismo, but it is American sperm that foreigners want. 3 While
the rest of the world may not respect our goods and services - the
French bomb McDonald's4 - one author has commented that "it's nice
to know this country can still produce in one area where it counts. And
in great quantities." 5
Sperm donation has ballooned into a multi-billion dollar global
industry.
Internationally, countries have been moving towards
regulation of sperm donation over the last twenty years. 6 Such
regulations include banning anonymous donation, regulating the
number of children fathered by a given donor, placing eligibility
requirements on donors, and creating registry systems for children to
obtain information about their biological fathers. 7 However, "growing
pressures" on the U.S. to impose regulations on sperm donation have
been to no avail. 8 And, with scant regulations in place, numerous legal
complications have surfaced.

2. Buck Wolf, Sending Sperm Abroad, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Sex/story?id=93277 &page= 1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
3. Id.
4. John-Thor Dahlburg, To Many French, Ugly American is McDonald's, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2000), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/apr/22/news/mn-22176 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2013).
5. Wolf, supra note 2.
6. Mark Ballantyne, My Daddy's Name is Donor: Evaluating Sperm Donation
Anonymity and Regulation, 25 RICH. J.L. PUB. INT. 569, 571 (2012).
7. Id.
8. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, MY DADDY'S NAME
IS DONOR 53 (2010).
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This note purports to critically examine the legal issues that have
surfaced as a result of such a lassiez-faire U.S. approach to artificial
insemination. Further, this note engages in an analysis of domestic
legislation relating to artificial insemination, comparing the U.S. 's
approach with other countries that have elected to place restrictions or
bans on donor anonymity.
Section II of this note offers a brief overview of the history of
artificial insemination by donor ("AID"), and the modem industry.
Section III analyzes several international approaches that have been
undertaken in addressing AID. Section IV sets out various legal issues
due to the inadequacy of the American legal system in the artificial
insemination industry. And finally, this note concludes with Section V,
where I propose possible remedies to curtail the potential liabilities that
accompany non-regulated AID.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR
It is difficult to grasp the depth and breadth of the current market
for artificial insemination without providing a brief historical overview
and an analysis of the current industry in the U.S.

A. What is Artificial Insemination by Donor?

Artificial insemination, also known as "assisted reproduction," is
defined as a "method of causing pregnancy other than sexual
intercourse."9 Assisted reproduction has been primarily used to "assist
individuals who are unable to conceive children," whether due to actual
infertility of either partner, or the "social structure in which [an
individual or couple] self-[identifies ]." 10
Artificial insemination has been used for over two centuries as an
alternative method to sexual intercourse as a means of achieving
conception. 11 There are several types of artificial insemination, and
each carries with it different rates of success: intrauterine insemination
(fertilization); 12 intra-fallopian insemination; 13 and m vitro
9. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (2002) (the term includes "intrauterine
insemination").
10. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation is
Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 379, 381 {2009) (quoting Judith F. Daar,
Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKLEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008)).
11. Jennifer M. Vagle, Putting the "Product" in Reproduction: The Viability of a
Products Liability Action for Genetically Defective Sperm, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1175, 1201
(2011 ).
12. Intrauterine insemination (fertilization) is fertilization by injection of sperm into
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fertilization. 14
There are "two broad categories" of artificial insemination,
distinguished by who provides the sperm: ( 1) artificial insemination by
husband, in which the recipient-mother's husband is the individual
providing the sperm; and (2) AID, where the sperm is provided by a
male other than the recipient-mother's husband. 15 With AID, the
identity of the donor "may or may not be known to the recipients(s)." 16
B. The History
The concept of artificial insemination has existed since about 200
A.D. 17 Jewish commentary written between 400 A.D. and 1200 A.D.
reveals an interest in the possibilities of artificial insemination. 18 One
commentator during this period posed the question of "who would be
the legitimate father of a child born by accidental fertilization of an egg
from indirect contact, such as from bath water." 19
The first occurrence of human artificial insemination was in the
late 1700s, and there is a dispute over where it occurred. 20 One account
credits England, while the other credits a French doctor. 21 The first
performance of artificial insemination in the U.S. was in 1884, at
Jefferson Medical College in Pennsylvania. 22
the uterus. Ninety percent of couples usually conceive within the first six cycles or
treatments, making an average success rate of fifteen percent for each treatment. Artificial
Insemination Tips: Success Rates of Artificial Insemination, LIFETIPS (2012), available at
http://infertility.lifetips.com/cat/6420 I /artificial-insemination/index.html (last visited Oct.
10, 2013).
13. Intra-fallopian insemination is fertilization by the injection of sperm directly into
the fallopian tubes. The average success rate is thirty percent. Id.
14. In vitro fertilization is fertilization of an egg by sperm in a test tube or petri dish.
The success rate for achieving pregnancy is an average of thirty percent, but once pregnant,
the success rate for live birth is eighty-three percent. Id.;
Vagle, supra note 11, at 1201; see Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor:
Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 860-61
(2007).
15. Swink & Reich, supra note 14, at 860-61.
16. Id.
17. Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single
Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173,
176 (1996) (Artificial insemination was used on animals first, "possibly as early as the
fourteenth century.").
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 176-77.
21. Id.atl77.
22. Denise S. Kaiser, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving
Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 794 (1988).
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AID was initially a response to male infertility and, given
associated "unresolved moral and legal questions," the early use of
artificial insemination was considered an intensely private matter:
"[ s]ecrecy thus benefited the physician, the woman receiving the sperm,
any child born as a result of the procedure (who were called 'artificial
bastards' by some critics), and the husband whose infertility needed to
be masked from public view." 23 Later, artificial insemination received
attention as a means of preventing the transmission of genetic
diseases. 24 However, doctors continued to select donors for mother
recipients. 25
With the advent of cryopreservation technologies, 26 the U.S. sperm
banking industry grew rapidly, 27 and the procedure has been welcomed
by those wishing to conceive. 28 In 1969 an estimated ten sperm banks
were in operation. 29 Now there are nearly 700 sperm banks in the U.S. 30
The fertility industry in the U.S., which amassed to $979 million in
1988, is projected to be worth $4.3 billion in 2013. 31 In sum, artificial
insemination has transformed from what was initially considered a
primarily doctor-dominated process, to a consumer-driven industry.

23 . Vagle, supra note 11, at 1202; see also Kaiser, supra note 22, at 794 (explaining
that AID was initially regarded as a "sensational procedure" and labeled by early
practitioners as "immoral and equivalent to adultery"); Harlow, supra note 17, at 177
(recognizing that physicians who women consulted were often adamantly opposed to AID
because they believed that "such a proposition came from the devil").
24. Vagle, supra note 11, at 1202.
25. Id.
26. "Cryopreservation: The process of cooling and storing cells, tissues, or organs at
very low temperatures to maintain their viability." Definition of Cryopreservation,
MEDICINENET.COM,
available
at
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7252 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
27. Vagle, supra note 11, at 1202.
28. "Today, it is estimated that between ten and twenty percent of married couples in
the United States cannot conceive. The procedure is naturally welcomed by these couples
as perhaps their only means of parenting a child other than by adoption. This procedure has
also been welcomed by those single women who are either unable to conceive naturally or
chose AID as an alternative means of conception." Kaiser, supra note 22, at 795. AID has
also been welcomed by lesbian couples. Newton-Small, supra note 1, at 51 (explaining that,
"[m]ost international sperm business has been for heterosexual couples with fertility
challenges, but that is changing as more cultures accept lesbians as single parents-two
groups that compose by some estimates up to 60% of the U.S. market").
29. Vagle, supra note 11, at 1202.
30. Sperm: America's most renewable resource? CBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505269 _ 162-57409735/sperm-americas-most-renewableresource/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
31. Id.
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III. A MOVE TOW ARDS INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
Given the significance of the artificial insemination industry over
the last twenty years, a move has been made internationally towards
regulation.
A. Sweden: The Forerunner
Sweden was one of the earliest states to regulate AID. Swedish
society is considered by scholars, not solely in a material or a political
context, but with philosophical or even moral significance, as
epitomizing the good life. 32 In that context, Sweden can be seen as the
forerunner of a new social order. 33 A model of "social ethics," and a
"nation above suspicion," Sweden's ideological underpinnings are
consensus and transparency. 34 And, Swedish legislation of AID is no
exception to this notion of transparency.
Prior to 1985, AID was performed worldwide without any legal
restrictions. 35 Thus, the provider of the semen was anonymous not only
to the recipient couple, but also to the donor offspring. 36 However, a
case in Sweden highlighted the need for legislative enactment to protect
a child of AID. 37 There, the social father of a child conceived through
AID sought, and won, release from fatherhood in a lawsuit, referring to
the fact that he was sterile. 38 And, because the semen provider was
unknown, the child thereby became "fatherless. " 39
The debates accompanying the introduction of the legislation were
passionate. 40 However, legislation finally came as a result of a fouryear investigation by a government-appointed committee charged with
reviewing AID, and advising whether legislation or regulation was
necessary. 41 The Committee in favor of legislation maintained that the
rights of children had to be protected, and that was best achieved by

32. KRISTINA 0RFALI, The Rise and Fall of the Sweedish Model, A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE: RIDDLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES 417 (Antoine Prost & Gerard
Vincent, eds., 1991).
33. Id. at 418.
34. Id.
35. A. Laios, K. Daniels, et al., Recruitment and Motivation of Semen Providers in
Sweden, 18 HUM. REPROD. 212, 212 (2003).
36. Id.
37. K. Daniels, A. Laios, et al., Semen Providers and Their Three Families, 26 J. OF
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 15, 15 (2005).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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permitting access to the identity of the donor. 42 In contrast, those
against such regulation argued that it would lead to the end of donor
insemination in Sweden, as no one would elect to donate. 43
Notwithstanding such concerns, in 1985 Sweden introduced
groundbreaking legislation that required all semen providers to furnish
identifying information about themselves. 44 Becoming the first country
in the world to regulate the practice of AID, Sweden enacted the
Swedish Law of Artificial Insemination ("SLAI"). 45 SLAI gave
"'sufficiently mature' donor offspring the right to 'obtain identifying
information concerning their donor[s,] ... in other word[s,] ... donor[s]
could be identified. "'46 Further, the legislation imposed requirements
upon physicians, requiring them to keep records identifying donor
information for at least seventy years. 47
While there was a temporary decline in donor availability, the
decline reversed itself despite predictions that the law would deter
sperm donation. 48 In fact, one study, which presented data covering the
pre- and post-legislation period, revealed that there had been an increase
in the number of semen providers recruited. 49 The subjects of the study
were the current semen providers at two Swedish Fertility Clinics:
Karolinska, located in Stockholm; and Umea, located in the northern
part of Sweden. 50 The study, conducted by anonymous questionnaires,
was aimed at getting answers from semen providers in Sweden
regarding factors associated with their requirement and motivation. 51
The response rate was 100%. 52
While there were demographic differences between the two clinic
populations, 53 the corresponding data showed that providers were in
total agreement that their desire to assist infertile couples was their sole,
42. Daniels, supra note 37, at 15.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Chia R. Rosas, A Necessary Compromise: Recognizing the Rights of a Donated
Generation to Tame the Wild Wild West of California's Sperm Banking Industry, 37 Sw. U.
L. REV. 393, 406-07 (2008).
45. Id. at 406-07.
46. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Daniels, supra note 37, at 15-16; see also Rosas, supra note 44, at 407.
50. Daniels, supra note 37, at 16.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. There was a difference in how the two groups of sperm donors first became aware
of AID, which may reflect the different ways in which the clinics approach recruitment. Id.
at 16-19.
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or main motivating factor, in becoming a provider. 54 The study
highlighted the fact that semen providers have a drive to help infertile
couples regardless of the possibility of future contact by genetic
offspring. 55 In sum, semen providers can be recruited within a system
that provides for their potential future identification to offspring.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989)
On November 20, 1989, the United Nations ("UN") adopted,
without a vote, the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"). 56
The CRC is a "legally binding international instrument" that sets forth
basic human rights for children (people under 18 years old). 57 The
human rights recognized in this treaty had never previously been
protected in an international treaty. They include the child's right to
identity and the right to know his or her parents. 58 It is, for the
aforementioned reasons that the terms of the CRC are worth exploring.
The travaux preparatoires59 provide a useful reference point in
interpreting the final draft. 60 Dr. Jamie Sergio Cerda was the
Argentinean sponsor of the article, and the original wording proposed
by Argentina is as follows:
The child has the inalienable right to retain his true and genuine
personal, legal and family identity.
In the event that a child has been fraudulently deprived of some or
all of the elements of his identity, the State must give him special
protection and assistance with a view to re-establishing his true and
genuine identity as soon as possible. In particular, this obligation of the
State includes restoring the child to his blood relations to be brought
up. 61
The travaux preparatoires illustrate that at least from Argentina's
perspective, the right to a "true and genuine" identity - a legal identity is a specific right worthy of international recognition.
54. Daniels, supra note 37, at 20.
55. Id.
56. George A. Stewart, Interpreting the Child 's Right to Identity in the UN.
Convention to the Rights of the Child, 26 FAM. L. Q. 221, 221 (1992).
57. Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF (May 25, 2012), available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (last visited April 4, 2013).
58. Stewart, supra note 56, at 221.
59. "Preparatory works."
60. Stewart, supra note 56, at 222.
61. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child,
U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39 (Mar. 13, 1986) (emphasis added); see also id. at 222-23.
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The final text of the CRC strongly suggests that the members
agreed that the right to identity necessitated protection in the
international arena. 62 For instance, Article 8 provides:
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family
relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements
of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance
and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her
identity. 63
Further, in Article 7, the UN recognized the significance of a
child's "right to acquire a nationality" and, "as far as possible, the right
to know and be cared for by his or her parents." 64 Transcripts of the
debates at the time make it "clear that the term 'parents' in this clause
includes biological parents in the first instance, and that the Convention
therefore militates against the practice of anonymous gamete
donation. " 65
However, the final version of the CRC, described by Dr. Cerda as a
"negotiated compromise," 66 is riddled with elusiveness and ambiguity.
For instance, a major problem arises from the use of the term "identity,"
in Article 8. 67 Significantly, the term is not defined in Article 8, nor is
"identity" defined elsewhere in the CRC. 68 In place of a definition are
elements of identity
nationality, name, and family relations as
recognized by law. 69 In addition, the original draft proposed by
Argentina provided for an enforcement provision. 70 However, there is
62. Stewart, supra note 56, at 223.
63. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
64. Id. art. 7; see Rosas, supra note 44, at 408 (maintaining that the "CRC
'recognize[s] the significance of children knowing who they are and where they have come
from"') ( citation omitted).
65. David J. Velleman, Persons in Prospect, Part II: Gift of Life, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
221, 225 n. 12 (2008).
66. According to Dr. Jamie Sergio Cerda, the "negotiated compromise" was in part
determined by significant hesitations and fears expressed by many of the working group
members. Jamie Sergio Cerda, The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New
Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 115, 116 (1990).
67. Id.; see also Stewart, supra note 56, at 224.
68. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63; see also Stewart, supra note
56, at 224.
69. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63; see also Cerda, supra note
66, at 116; Stewart, supra note 56, at 224.
70. "In the event that a child has been fraudulently deprived of some or all of the
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no longer an explicit obligation for a state to reunite a child with his or
her blood relations. 71 Further, while Article 7 of the Convention
stipulates the right to know one's parents, this right is hedged with the
qualification, "as far as possible." 72
As suggested by Dr. Cerda, the nature of the new rights created by
the convention will "depend on the development of the legal systems of
the countries concerned."73 Further, developments in the area of genetic
engineering "should be covered by an element in Article 8 relating to
the duty of states to preserve the identity of the child. " 74 Though,
despite its shortcomings, the treaty may have given rise to the
elimination of donor anonymity around the world. 75
C. Canada
Canada similarly has undertaken regulations of the AID industry.
Canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories. 76 The roles
and responsibilities for Canadian heath care are shared between the
national and provincial-territorial governments. 77 According to the
Canada Health· Act (1985), the federal government is responsible for
both administering the national principles or standards of the health care
system, 78 and providing funding to help pay for health care services
through cash and tax transfers to the provinces-territories. 79 The
provincial-territorial governments are responsible for the "management,

elements of his identity, the State must give him special protection and assistance with a
view to re-establishing his true and genuine identity as soon as possible." Report of the
Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/39 (Mar. 13, 1986) ( emphasis added).
71. Stewart, supra note 56, at 225.
72. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63.
73. Cerda, supra note 66, at 117.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Rosas, supra note 44, at 408. To date, the U.S. and Somalia are the only countries
that have not ratified the CRC. Status of Treaties: Convention on the Rights of the Child,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Sept.
11,
2012),
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV11 &chapter=4&1ang=en (last visited Oct. 9, 2013 ).
76. Jean Hassee, Canada: The Long Road to Regulation, in THIRD PARTY ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACROSS CULTURES: SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 55 (Eric
Blyth & Ruth Landau eds., 2004); see Provinces and Territories, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
(Dec. 5, 2011 ), available at http://www.canada.gc.ca/othergov-autregouv/prov-eng.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
77. Hassee, supra note 76.
78. Id. at 55.
79. Id.
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[organization], and delivery of health services for their residents." 80
In Canada, semen - unless donated to a spouse or sexual partner is regulated like a drug. 81 As such, because it is a drug, semen must
pass through a "battery of checks" under the Food and Drugs Act and
"Processing and Distribution for Assisted Conception Regulations,"
which includes a six-month "quarantine period" during which the sperm
is frozen. 82 Though Canada initially had a "hands off' approach with
regulation of sperm, the recent and groundbreaking case of Pratten v.
British Columbia - "the first of its kind in North America" - put British
Columbia "on par with the U.K. and several other European Nations, as
well as the state of Victoria, in Australia, in banning anonymous gamete
donation. " 83
The May 2011 decision banned anonymous sperm donation,
holding that anonymity is harmful to the child and is "not in the best
interest of donor offspring. " 84 In her opinion, Madam Justice Adair
highlighted both physical and mental health problems that arise as a
result of donor anonymity. 85 Preliminarily, the Court found that "donor
offspring fear that their health can be comprised, and may be seriously
compromised, by the lack of information about their donor ... [E]ven
with the availability of genetic testing, a good old-fashioned family
history is more predictive, and genetic testing is best interpreted in the
context of a family history. " 86 The Court concluded that the lack of
information about the donor further comprises a child's health because
of their inability to "have conditions that are inherited or genetic,
diagnosed or treated. " 87 The Court also recognized that donor offspring
"commonly, and legitimately[,] fear inadvertent consanguinity." 88
Moreover, the Court noted that like adoptees, donor offspring
80. Hassee, supra note 76, at 55.
81 . Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, 2006,
SOR/96-254 (Can.); see also Age, sex, location . . .sperm count? Free sperm donors online,
PROUD
PARENTING
(Apr.
4,
2012),
availqble
at
http://www.proudparenting.com/node/16831 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (explaining that
semen is regulated as a drug in Canada, unless it is donated to a spouse or sexual partner).
82. Age, sex, location . . .sperm count? Free sperm donors online, supra note 81.
83. Alison Motluk, Canadian court bans anonymous sperm and egg donation, NATURE
(May
27,
2011 ),
available
at
http://www.nature.com/news/201 l/l 10527/full/news.2011.329.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
84. Pratten v. British Columbia, 2011 BSCS 656, 215 (Can. B.C. ).
85. Id. 111.
86. ld.i!lll(a).
87. Id. 11 l(b).
88. Id. 11 l(f).
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experience a "sense of loss and incompleteness."89 Thus, the Court
recognized that, for psychological reasons, children have a need for
identifying information to "complete their personal identities and to
alleviate the stress, anxiety and frustration caused by not knowing.
Donor offspring demonstrate a strong commitment to searching for
information about the other half of their genetic make-up." 90 Moreover,
when they are unable to obtain such information, donor offspring
"experience sadness, frustration and anxiety ... [t]hey feel the effects
both for themselves and, when they become parents, for their own
children. " 91 Similarly, the Court noted that the secrecy, which often
shrouds the process of conception, can have "devastating effects on
donor offspring when the truth is revealed. " 92
The Court allowed the province fifteen months to generate a new
adoption law that would recognize the rights of those conceived via
donors and to bring it in accordance with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 93 However, the province appealed the decision and the
plaintiff maintains that the case will likely go before the Supreme Court
of Canada. 94 If the ruling is upheld by the Supreme Court, the entire
country would have to comply, and would join other jurisdictions that
have banned anonymity for sperm donors. 95
D. The United States: The "Best" Interests of the Child?
1.

The "Best Interests" Principle

The broadly stated general principle of the "best interests of the
child" is all too often misapplied in the U.S. Though the best interests
of children are usually a consideration in cases concerning parental
89. Pratten, 2011 BSCS, 1ll(i).
90. Id., 11 l(d).
91. Id., 11 l(e).
92. Id., tll(g).
93. Id.,, 332, 335(b).
94. Olivia Pratten Case: Sperm Donor Information Should be Shielded, B. C. Argues,
HUFF POST (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/02/14/oliviapratten-case-sperm-donor-information_n_1277512.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
The Court of Appeals for British Columbia overturned the lower
95.
court's decision, ruling that there is no constitutional right to know the identity of one's
parents. James Keller, Olivia Pratten, Sperm Donor Case Won't be Heard by Supreme
at
available
2013),
30,
(May
PRESS
CANADIAN
THE
Court,
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/05/30/ol ivia-pratten-sperm-case-supremecourt_n_3359567 .html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). Failing to provide any reasoning,
the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear the case. Id. Nonetheless, it is still
significant that a trial court found donor anonymity unconstitutional, and further supports
the notion that the move towards abolishing AID anonymity is on the horizon.
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rights, they are not the primary consideration. 96
If one looks to the infamous case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. which is often referred to as establishing the right to privacy in the
marital relationship - what happened to the "best interests of the child,"
Victoria? 97 The facts were, in brief, as follows: Carole D. and Gerald
D. were married, during which time Carole became involved in an
adulterous affair with Michael H; Carole became impregnated with a
young girl, Victoria, who turned out to be Michael's child; Gerald D.
held Victoria out to be his daughter, but Michael H. and Victoria,
through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael. 98
There, the United States Supreme Court found that Michael failed
to adduce modem or historical precedent recognizing the power of a
natural father to assert parental rights. 99 As such, the Court rejected
petitioner's argument, finding that Michael had no constitutionally
protected liberty interest sufficient to maintain his father-daughter
relationship with Victoria. 100
When an individual denies the importance of biological ties irrespective of what brilliant judge, scholar, etc., uttered that denial how can that individual be said to read world literature with any
comprehension? The following has been offered in regards to this
dilemma:
How do they make any sense of Telemachus, who goes in search
of a father he cannot remember? What do they think is the dramatic
engine of the Oedipus story? When the adoptive grandson of Pharaoh
says, 'I have been a stranger in a strange land,' what do they think he
means? How can they even understand the colloquy between Darth
Vader and Luke Skywalker? [With], the revelation 'I am your father.' 101
As the aforementioned stories illustrate, persons unacquainted with
their origins have been perceived throughout history as tragically
disadvantaged. 102 There must be some reason why persons, living at
different places and times, under dramatically different conditions, have
96. In Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the "best interests" of the
child are deemed to be a "primary consideration" for all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 63.
97. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
l 00. Id.
101. Velleman, supra note 65, at 256.
102. Id.
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converged on the same opinion: a relationship with one's biological
parents is essential to a child. 103 It is in the child's best interests.
However, the arguments for secrecy in the AID context rarely
104
The notion that information
invoke the "best interests" of the child.
about one's origin should be withheld from children because it is in
their best interests is a "stark form of welfarism," which could be used
to "justify many forms of state manipulation deemed to be of benefit to
citizens." 105 In actuality, "would anyone choose to live his or her entire
life on the basis that he or she had been deliberately deceived about
their genetic origin?" 106
One proposed rationale for secrecy has been the parents' interest in
Parents may feel threatened by the
having a "normal family."
possibility that their child's biological father could appear and disrupt
their family. 107 Alternatively, parents may not want people to know that
they resorted to AID. 108 Though, in these justifications, the child is
109
Meaning, the
really being used as a means to his or her parents' end.
interests of the parents in achieving this seemingly "normal family," are
paramount to any needs of the child. However, using one person as a
means to another's end can never be right, "unless the person has
consented to be so used. [And] as the AID children grow towards
adulthood . . . they are more and more being made an object of
contempt." 110

2. Anonymity Regulation
Regulation of sperm donation in the U.S. remains relatively nonexistent.

a.

The Food and Drug Administration

The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") currently provides the
only federal means to regulate AID. The FDA regulation falls under 21
CFR § 1271, which proposes to create a "unified registration and listing
103. Velleman, supra note 65 at 256.
104. See Michael Freeman, The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the
Reproduction Revolution, 4 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 274 (1996).
105. Families and Children: From We/farism to Rights, in CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN,
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LA w IN BRIT AIN 317 (Clarendon Press, 1994 ).
106. Id.
107. Hollace S. W. Sawonson, Donor Anonymity in Artificial Insemination: Is It Still
Necessary? 27 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 151, 180 (1993).
108. Id.
109. Mary Warnock, The Good of the Child, 1 BIOETHICS 141, 151 (1987).
110. Id.
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system for establishments that manufacture human cells . . . and to
establish donor-eligibility, current good tissue practice, and other
procedures to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of
communicable diseases .... " 111 Accordingly, under § 1271, FDA
regulation of sperm banks is divided into three pertinent areas: ( 1)
Establishment; (2) Registration and Product Listing, Donor Eligibility;
and (3) Current Good Tissue Practice ("CGTP"). 112
Sperm banks and clinics must register with the FDA and update
registration annually. 113 They must register with the FDA using Form
FDA 3356, which asks for very basic information, such as the center's
physical mailing address and the establishment's function (i.e. type of
tissue(s) it maintains). 114
Under the FDA's Donor Eligibility rules, both anonymous and
non-anonymous donors must undergo a physical examination and
medical history interview, which includes assessments of their physical
and "relevant social behavior." 115 The physical examination requires
that sperm donors be tested for communicable diseases, but there is no
federal requirement that sperm banks screen for genetic diseases. 116 As
for the latter test ("relevant social behavior"), according to the FDA
there are twenty-nine "risk factors," which include men who have had
sex with other men in the preceding five years, persons who have
injected drugs for non-medical reasons in the preceding five years, and
persons who have engaged in sex in exchange for money or drugs. 117
The FDA's CGTP requirements include periodic inspections of
fertility institutions to evaluate compliance with the Donor Eligibility
111. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.l(a)(2007).
112. See generally id.; Pi, supra note 10, at 382-83.
113. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.21(a) (2007).
114. Id.; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FORM FDA 3356, ESTABLISHMENT
REGISTRATION AND LISTING FOR HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUEBASKED
PRODUCTS,
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM082428.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2013 ).
115. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.2l(a)(2007).
116. Jacqueline Mroz, In Sperm Banks, A Roll of the Genetic Dice, N.Y. TIMES (May
14, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/health/in-sperm-banks-amatrix-of-untested-genetic-diseases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O (last visited Sept. 30,
2013).
117. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ESTABLISHMENT
REGISTRATION AND LISTING FOR HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUEBASKED
PRODUCTS,
IV.E
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
Guidance/tissue/ucm073964.htm#DONORSCREENINGI 2171. 75 (last visited Sept. 30,
2013).
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Rule and record-keeping standards. However, this type of mandatory
record-keeping does not require sperm banks to "track donors' health,
disclose information to donor-conceived children, or even place limits
on the number of births resulting from one donor." 118
b. State Regulation

Individual states regulate aspects of the AID process by licensing
sperm banks, controlling the process, and determining parental
legitimacy. Additionally, twenty-four states have created regulatory
legislation addressing the operations of sperm banks, though varying in
terms of how much they ultimately choose to regulate. For example,
some states set forth explicit requirements for AID, such as requiring it
119
Others
be performed under the supervision of a licensed physician.
120
In addition, most states
set forth specific testing requirements.
regulate the parent-child relationship by establishing who are the
biological and legal parents of a child conceived through AID. 121
(1) The Uniform Parentage Act

The Uniform Law Commission ("ULC") provides states with
"non-partisan, well conceived, and well drafted legislation" that brings
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law. 122 The ULC
is comprised of practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative
staff, and law professors, who have been appointed by state
governments, and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, to research, draft, and promote enactment of uniform
123
state laws in areas where "uniformity is desirable and practical."
Accordingly, the ULC revised the Uniform Parentage Act ("UP A") in
2000, and amended it in 2002. 124 The UPA is considered the most
118. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80; Anetta Pietrzak, Note, The Price of Sperm: An Economic
Analysis of the Current Regulations Surrounding the Gamete Donation Industry, 14 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 121, 125 (2012).
119. Pi, supra note 10, at 384.
120. Id.
121. Beth G., U.S. Sperm Donation Laws by State, KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY,
available at http://knowndonorregistry.com/component/content/article/166-legal/pri vatedonation-laws/114-us-sperm-donation-laws-by-state (last visited Sept. 25, 2013); Pi, supra
note 10, at 384.
About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2012), available at
122.
http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Sept. 25,
2013).
123. Id.
Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2012), available at
124.
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%Act (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
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important Uniform Act addressing children's rights, 125 and has been
accepted in nine states, 126 with numerous others enacting significant
portions of the model act. 127
Section 702 of the UP A states that "a donor is not a parent of a
child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." 128 Moreover,
commentary to Section 702 clarifies that if a child is conceived as a
result of AID, then the donor is not a parent of the resulting child. 129
Further, the donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be
sued for child support for the resultant offspring. 130 In sum, "donors are
eliminated from the parental equation." 131 Therefore, as a ·matter of law,
the sperm donor has "no paternal rights or responsibilities," 132 nor does
the child have any recourse for seeking parental support - or love.
Thus, the UP A is inherently different from the CRC in that the
UPA explicitly states its refusal to recognize a child's right to know and
be cared for by a parent. 133 Although the U.S. has not given a reason for
why it has not elected to ratify the CRC, one possibility is the
"hesitance of conservative organizations that believe ratification would
have implications for issues like abortion, education, and discipline," or,
alternatively, the notion that the CRC is "anti-family." 134
c.

Individual Sperm Banks

To a certain extent, sperm banks are self-regulating, and may
voluntarily choose to implement rules and regulations upon
125. Swink & Reich, supra note 14; at 871.
126. The Uniform Parentage Act has been enacted in Alabama, Delaware, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Legislative
Fact Sheet-Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2012), available at
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Sept.
25, 2013).
127. Although Alaska, Arizona, New York, North Carolina, and Tennessee have not
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, AID is mentioned in their statutes - either directly or
indirectly - stating that a child conceived through artificial insemination and born to a
married couple is the natural and legitimate child of both parents. ALASKA STAT. §
25.20.045 (LexisNexis 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501(8) (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW. § 73(1) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 49A-1 (LexisNexis 2013); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-3-306 (LexisNexis 2013); see also Pietrzak, supra note 118, at 127; Swink &
Reich, supra note 14, at 871.
128. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 702 (2002).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Swink & Reich, supra note 14, at 871.
133. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 702 (2002), with Rosas, supra note 44, at 408.
134. Pi, supra note 10, at 394.
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themselves. 135
For example, Cryogenic Laboratories is a bank
committed to tracking, monitoring, and evaluating each donor specimen
in order to acquire, among other things, knowledge of donor fecundity
and geographical distribution of donor progeny. 136 Also, the NW
Cryobank bank has a webpage aimed at providing the public with notice
of any important updates to donor health history information. 137 There,
a donor number is listed along with any health updates, such as notices
that a donor has since been treated for testicular cancer, or that a child
has experienced growth and developmental problems. 138 In contrast,
some sperm banks avoid regulating any aspect of sperm donation. 139
d. Private Organizations

Professional organizations attempt to govern important aspects of
the sperm donation process by publishing standards and guidelines.
However, they are non-binding, and merely suggestive. 14 For instance,
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) sets advisory
Regarding anonymity, the ASRM supports the
guidelines. 141
prerogative of sperm donors to remain anonymous. 142 The ASRM also
recommends that institutions, clinics, and sperm banks maintain
sufficient records to allow a limit to be set for the number of
pregnancies for which a given donor is responsible. 143 According to
ASRM October 2012 recommendations, in a population of 800,000, a
limitation of a single donor to no more than twenty-five children would
avoid any "significant increased risk of inadvertent consanguineous
conception." 144 Further, with regard to the records of each donor, the

°

135. Pi, supra note 10, at 386.
About our Donors, CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, available at
136.
http://www.cryolab.com/aboutDonors.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
137.
Donor
Health
Updates,
NW
CRYOBANK,
available
at
https://www.nwcryobank.com/donor-health-updates/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
138. Id.; see Ballantyne, supra note 6, at 580.
139. Free Genes Included With Your Purchase, NW ASSOCIATION FOR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH (2007), available at www .nwabr.org/education/pdfs/Cases/Genes_ Included.doc
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) [hereinafter "Free Genes"]; See Mroz, supra note 116; Ballantyne,
supra note 6, at 581.
140. Pi, supra note 10, at 387.
141. Ballantyne, supra note 6, at 580.
142. Id.
143. Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Committee Opinion,
ASRM
(Oct.
16,
2012),
available
at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guid
(last
elines/Guidelines_and_ Minimum_Standards/2008 _Guidelines_for_gamete( 1).pdf
visited Oct. 1, 2013).
144. Id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/1

252

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2013]

Who's Your Daddy?

247

ASRM opines that a subsequent follow-up evaluation of the donor
should be undertaken so as to avoid any adverse outcomes including
inheritable diseases identified pre-conceptually or postnatally. 145
Similarly, the American Fertility Society (AFS) and the American
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) issue non-binding guidelines that
emphasize the importance of genetic testing. 146 For example, the AFS
recommends that donor records of genetic history be made available on
an anonymous basis at the request of the recipient and the resulting
child(ren). 147 Moreover, the AFS recommends ten pregnancies per
donor, or even less than that if the pregnancies are a part of a smaller
geographic subgroup of the general population. The AA TB sets out
similar recommendations. 148
e.

Courts

American courts have similarly failed to address the regulation of
AID. Although no court has directly faced the issue of anonymity, the
case of In re K.MH., decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 2007,
indirectly upheld donor anonymity. 149 There, the Court upheld a Kansas
statute, which provided the following:
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated
in law as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived,
unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman. 150
In response to the Equal Protection challenge, the court found that
the statute served two legitimate governmental objectives: (1)
"encouraging men who are able and willing to donate sperm ... by
protecting the men from later unwanted claims for support from
mothers or the children;" 151 and (2) protecting "women recipients as
well, [by] preventing the potential claims of donors to parental rights
and responsibilities." 152
Further, in its Due Process analysis, the Court recognized "the
continued evolution in regulation of artificial insemination in this and

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Recommendations/or Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 143.
Pietrzak, supra note 118, at 128-29.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128-29.
See generally In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
Id. at 1029.
Id.at 1039.
Id.
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other countries." 153 In particular, the Court noted that Britain and the
Netherlands now ban anonymous sperm donations, which "formally
recognize[ s] the understandable desires of at least some children
conceived through artificial insemination to know the males from whom
they have received half of their genes." 154 However, the Court held that
"in weighing the interests of all involved" as well as the policies that are
furthered, the legislation was constitutional. 155 It is worth mentioning
that the best interests of the child were only appropriately discussed in
Judge Hill's dissenting opinion. 156
In sum, the phrase, in the child's "best interests" is really a nullity
with respect to AID cases.
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS
The fertility industry is booming. 157 Today, women in the U.S.
shop for "sperm donors in online catalogs in much the same way as they
might shop for a date through a matchmaking service . . . a piece of
furniture[,] or potential car." 158 And, the evolution of the Internet has
159
Potential mothers can
only made "sperm shopping all the easier."
simply log onto sperm banks' websites and plug in a picture of her
husband, or Brad Pitt, and facial-recognition software will look for, and
160
Moreover, customers can
locate, the closest possible donor match."
compare donors' heights and weights, ethnicity, physical traits,
educational and professional accomplishments, view baby pictures, and
listen to an audiotape of the donor expounding the meaning of life and
why sperm donation appealed to him.161
153. In re K.MH., 169 P.3d at 1041.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1042.
156. "I raise my hand and ask a different question. Who speaks for the children in
these proceedings? As applied by the majority in this case, this generative statute of frauds
slices away half of their heritage. A man who was once considered a 'putative father' in the
initial child in need of care proceeding is now branded a mere ' semen donor.' The majority
offers the children sympathy. But is this in their best interest? The trial court never got to
the point of deciding the best interests of the children because it was convinced that such a
consideration was barred by the operation of [the statute] to a known donor ... only the
voices of the mother and 'semen donor' are heard." Id. at I 051 (Hill , J. , dissenting)
(emphasis added).
157. Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 5.
158. Id. at 16.
159. See generally Swink & Reich, supra note 14, at 858 (arguing that the Internet has
increased the availability of, and the market for, donor sperm to a larger audience "than ever
imagined").
160. Newton-Small, supra note 1, at 51 .
161. Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 16.
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It is not only women in the U.S. who can access these catalogues,
though. Financial analysts call sperm a "growth sector" in the
American economy - and it is actually one of the few in which the U.S.
is running a significant trade surplus. 162 The U.S. currently exports
sperm to at least 60 countries, including Venezuela, Kenya, and
Thailand. 163 As of late 2005, ABC News reported that the top four
sperm banks in the U.S. controlled 65% of the global market. 164 And
the second largest U.S. facility - Fairfax Cyrobank - says 10% of its
sales are exports, and the third largest - Xytex Cryo International - does
more than a third of its business abroad. 165
The reason is that in the U.S., anonymity is still permitted. As
previously established, in contrast to U.S. donors, other countries do not
permit their donors to remain anonymous. Consequently, the U.S. now
views itself as a "destination[] for couples [and single mothers] who
wish to circumvent stricter laws." 166 Accordingly, several countries,
including Canada and Sweden, are some of U.S. sperm banks' biggest
customers. 167 Indeed, Canada imports 90% of its sperm. 168
However, with no regulations defined in the U.S. - the number one
exporter of sperm 169 - we find ourselves in the "Wild West" phase of
global sperm sales, 170 confronted with a plethora of legal issues.

A. Parental Ties
"My Daddy's Name is Donor" was the first study to conduct an indepth investigation into the psychological effect of being a donor child.
The 2010 study, which surveyed a sample of 485 donor children
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years old, yields startling

162. "There's talk that America can't make anything anymore ... Asia now controls
vast sectors of the international high-tech business. Our foreign-trade deficit has ballooned
to a record annual rate of $425 billions. But whatever economic problems America may
have, we can at least raise our fists and tell the world with pride that we are the No. I
exporter of sperm." Wolf, supra note 2.
163. Newton-Small, supra note 1, at 50.
164. Id. This number has presumably gone up considering the overall increase in the
market, and the varying restrictions placed by countries.
165. Id.
166. Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 5.
167. Alex Dickinson, The Daily Exclusive: The Seed of a Trend, DAILY, (May 29,
2012), available at http://www. thedaily .com/page/2012/05/29/052912-news-sperm-bankexports-1-3/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
168. Newton-Small, supra note 1, at 50.
169. Wolf, supra note 2.
170. Newton-Small, supra note 1, at 51.
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results. 171 First, the study reveals that young adults conceived through
sperm donation experience profound struggles with their origins and
identities. 172 For instance, a majority of donor-conceived adults - a full
173
Similarly,
65% - agree that their sperm donor is half of who they are.
people
other
hear
they
when
hurts
it
that
agree
offspring
53% of donor
174
talk about their genealogical background.
Second, the study suggests that AID itself is psychologically
detrimental to donor children. 175 For example, the study reveals that
donor offspring are twice as likely as those raised by biological parents
to have problems with the law. 176 Moreover, the study reveals that
donor offspring are 1.5 times more likely than those raised by biological
parents to report mental health problems; and twice as likely to report
substance abuse problems. 177 This point is further elaborated by Katrina
Clark, a child conceived through AID:
[E]motionally, many ofus are not keeping up. We didn't ask to be
born into this situation, with its limitations and confusion. It's
hypocritical of parents and medical professionals to assume that
biological roots won't matter to the "products" of the cryobanks'
service, when the longing for a biological relationship is what brings
customers to the banks in the first place. We offspring are recognizing
the right that was stripped from us at birth - the right to know who both
our parents are. 178
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the study suggests that
donor children disfavor anonymous donation. 179 In fact, nearly twothirds of grown donor offspring support the right of offspring to have
non-identifying information about their biological father, to know his
identity, to have the opportunity to form some kind of relationship with
him, to know about the possible existence of half-siblings conceived
with the same donor, and to have the opportunity to form a relationship
with those potential half-siblings. 180 Moreover, donor offspring whose
Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 19.
Id. at 7.
/d.at7,21,109.
Id. at 7, 28.
Id. at 37-38.
Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 9, 115.
Id.
Katrina Clark, My Father was an Anonymous Sperm Donor, WASH. POST (Dec.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
available
2006),
17,
dyn/content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006l2l501820.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
179. Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 11-12.
180. Id.
171 .
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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parents kept their origins a secret (so that the donor found out the truth
in an accidental or unplanned way) were 51 % more likely to report
depression or other mental health issues, 36% more likely to struggle
with substance abuse, and 29% more likely to have had problems with
the law. 181
B. Health
The failure of the FDA to require that sperm donors be screened
for genetic diseases has produced abysmal and permanent
consequences.
For instance, sperm donor "F827" "aced" all the tests: he was
healthy; he said his parents and grandparents were healthy; and, under a
microscope, his chromosomes looked "perfect." 182 Accordingly, he
turned out to be quite prolific, and his deposits to a Michigan sperm
bank in the 1990s produced eleven children. However, his "deposits"
also carried with them an extremely rare disease. 183
Severe Congenital Neutropenia ("SCN") is a disease that normally
affects one in five million individuals. 184 As such, when Dr. Laurence
Boxer, the director of pediatric hematology and oncology at the
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, was presented with five cases
within four families in Michigan, "there was clearly something
amiss." 185 SCN is an "extremely serious blood disease," and it can be
fatal for children under three years of age. 186 Additionally, patients who
contract this disease are highly vulnerable to infections and prone to
leukemia. 187 Moreover, all persons infected with this disease need
expensive daily shots to augment their immune system. 188
Dr. Boxer soon determined that all four families had used donor
sperm, and the same donor at that: F827. However, the anonymity of
the donor was protected by his legal arrangement with the sperm bank.

181. Marquartdt, supra note 8 at 12, 112. Although they fared better than those whose
parents tried to keep it a secret, those children who say their parents were always open about
their origins, still exhibit an elevated risk of negative outcomes. Id. at 12-13.
182. Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
6,
2006),
available
at
Hazard,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/health/06opin.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Oct.
1, 2013).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Grady, supra note 182.
188. See id.
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As such, the bank was unable to release the donor's name, nor did they
have any way to contact him. 189 Despite it being seemingly obvious
that F827 was the carrier of SCN, an "ethics panel ruled that his
190
remaining specimens could not be tested without his permission."
Accordingly, Dr. Boxer and his colleagues proceeded with advanced
genetic testing without using the donor's specimens, and concluded that
191
the donor carried a mutation of the gene involved in causing SCN.
Similarly, after being unable to conceive a second child, Sharine
and Brian Kretchmar of Yukon, Oklahoma also elected the path of
AID. 192 However, after their baby boy, Jaxon, failed to have a bowel
movement in the first day or so after birth, doctors knew something was
wrong. 193 Jaxon immediately underwent surgery, and the doctors
194
It was later
returned with terrible news: Jaxon had cystic fibrosis.
discovered that not only did Mrs. Kretchmar carry the gene for cystic
fibrosis (a fact previously unknown to her), so, too, did the Kretchmars'
donor. 195
The Kretchmars' lives have been irrevocably changed as a result of
their son's illness. Cystic fibrosis is a progressive disorder that causes
196
thick, sticky mucus to build up in the lungs and digestive track.
Accordingly, everyday Jaxon must take more than twenty pills, needs
several nebulizer treatments, and must regularly don a special vest that
197
The life
shakes his torso to help loosen the congestion in his body.
years.
thirty-seven
expectancy of someone with cystic fibrosis is about
Sadly, these situations are not unique: a donor in California passed
on a hereditary kidney disease; a donor in the Netherlands who fathered
eighteen children was later found to have a serious neurological disease
198
and ten
that his offspring have a fifty-fifty chance of inheriting;
children inherited a deadly heart defect known as hypertrophic
In fact, in households everywhere, children
cardiomyopathy. 199
conceived with donated sperm are suffering from serious genetic

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Grady, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.
Mroz, supra note 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mroz, supra note 116.
Grady, supra note 182.
Mroz, supra note 116.
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conditions inherited from men they have never met. 200 Though
hundreds of cases have been documented, it is likely that there are
"thousands more." 201
C. Accidental Incest
Given the failure to regulate the gamete industry, sperm banks in
the U.S. are primarily self-regulating entities.
Although some
individual banks have elected to limit the number of donations or births
per donor, this decision is left to individual sperm banks. 202 Typically, a
single sperm donation is divided up into multiple donations and sold to
numerous recipients. 203
Moreover, apart from voluntary guidelines issued by professional
organizations, sperm banks are not required to report the number of live
births per donor. 204 Rather, sperm banks are· solely required to report
"pregnancy success rates achieved by such program through each
assisted reproductive technology." 205 This means that even if a bank
were to impose a regulation that limited the number of donations per
donor, the donor could go elsewhere. 206 As such, a sperm donor can be
the biological parent of several children, and the possibility of
accidental incest between donor siblings becomes a genuine concern. If
that donor is considered a "prime candidate,"207 the likelihood becomes
even stronger. And, in the U.S., beyond any voluntary resources (i.e.
Donor Sibling registry), donor children have "absolutely no way of
knowing how many of them actually share the same biological
parent. " 208
The chances of accidental consanguinity have become increasingly
unsettling. Cynthia Daily and her partner used a sperm donor to
conceive a baby eight years ago, with hopes that their son would
eventually get to know some of his half siblings "an extended family

200. Mroz, supra note 116.
201. Id.
202. Pi, supra note 10, at 389.
203. Grady, supra note 182.
204. Pi, supra note 10, at 389; see Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The
Case For Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J. L. & HEALTH I, 15-16 (2008).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-l (a)(l) (2011).
206. Dennison, supra note 204, at 15 ( explaining that "there is no requirement that
banks engage in "cross-clinic information sharing").
207. "Almost every clinic reports having a most-requested donor, whose gametes are
so popular with prospective parents that the clinic (and the donor) has trouble keeping up
with the demand." Id.
208. Id. at 16.
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of sorts." 209 So, Ms. Daily searched a Web-based registry created to
help connect children fathered by the same donor. 210 And, as the years
went on, Ms. Daily watched the number of children in her son's group
grow. 211 Today, there are 150 children in this group, all conceived from
the same donor, and more on the way. 212
As such, it is obvious why parents of some of those children now
fear that their sons and daughters could one day unknowingly meet up
with their half siblings and commit incest. Accordingly, parents have
taken measures to hopefully avoid this type of incident: "My daughter
knows her donor's number for this very reason ... she's been in school
with numerous kids who were born through donors. She's had crushes
on boys who are donor children. It's become part of [her] sex
education." 213 However, the aforementioned case of engaging in "sex
ed" with one's daughter is not the "norm."
In actuality, most mothers who get their sperm elsewhere quite
often do not tell their child that their biological father is anyone other
than the parent raising them. 214 Further, even the child's pediatrician
may not be told the truth, as parents "simply, and grossly inaccurately,
report their own family and medical histories as the child's. " 215 As
such, the question is not what will happen if persons engage in
accidental consanguinity, but rather, what will happen when they do.
Should these donor children really be the ones to blame?
V. CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD
In light of these problems, it is clear that the U.S. should follow the
lead of Sweden and other nations (including Britain, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland), and end the practice of anonymous AID.
Primarily, the concern as to whether this regulation would lead to
decreased donations is without merit. Though, even if it were to
decrease, the real issue is whether the children's right to know trumps
the donor's right to privacy. And, if the U.S. were operating on a
system of "best interests" of the child, then the answer would
undoubtedly be yes - the interest of the child trumps the interest of the
209. Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. ( emphasis added).
214. Marquartdt, supra note 8, at 16.
215. Id.
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donor - always. Studies show that AID causes direct psychological
harm to donor children, even more so when those donors are
anonymous. Consequently, something needs to be done to help curb
those detrimental effects.
In terms of helping those born before the law is changed, a national
registry system should be enacted. At minimum, this registry system
should provide current AID children unrestricted access to medical
information and help them find their biological kin, when mutually
agreeable. Moreover, if donor children request medical information
about their biological father where good cause is shown (i.e. when it is
medically necessary), this information should be made immediately
accessible, and efforts to ascertain it should be undertaken by the
government.
Moving forward, the U.S. should enact a national health registry
system of record keeping to which all banks and "donees" can access.
Doctors of donor children should be required to provide any adverse
medical updates of these patients to the system. Further, parents and
sperm recipients should be required to update this health registry
system. Although one could argue that this may place a "high burden"
on parents, it is necessary to curtail the spread of genetic diseases. So,
too, should sperm banks be required to keep detailed records of AID
donors, and provide any other updates that may have slipped through
the cracks. Also, this registry should be designed to alleviate any fears
of an accidental incestuous relationship, and minimize psychological
harm experienced by donor-conceived children.
To further reduce the possibility of consanguinity, limits should be
placed on the number of children that can be conceived through one
donor. More specifically, as suggested by ASRM, in a population of
800,000, a limitation of a single donor to no more than twenty-five
children would avoid any significant risk of inadvertent consanguineous
conception. 216 However, if the population were much smaller, the
number of children would necessarily need to be proportionally
decreased.
Accordingly, sperm banks should maintain sufficient
records to allow a limit to be set for the number of pregnancies for
which a given donor is responsible, and update them in a system to
which all banks can gain access. By keeping such records, this would

216. Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Committee Opinion,
ASRM
(Oct.
16,
2012),
available
at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guid
elines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/2008_Guidelines_for_gamete(l).pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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eliminate the possibility for the proliferation of one donor's sperm in
several banks.
In sum, this seemingly impenetrable veil of secrecy and anonymity
in the practice of AID must be eradicated.
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